Date: April 30, 2024 Tue

Time: 2:42 am

Results for extremist groups

224 results found

Author: Great Britain. Department for Communities and Local Government Title: Preventing Support for Violent Extremism Through Community Interventions: A Review of the Evidence Summary: This research provides a rapid evidence assessment of the evidence base around preventing violent extremism through community interventions. It focuses on the most relevant evidence in order to identify which interventions present support for violent extremism; how they may best be implemented, and with which groups they are best developed. Details: London: Department for Communities and Local Government, 2010. 81p. Source: Internet Resource Year: 2010 Country: United Kingdom URL: Shelf Number: 118097 Keywords: Extremist Groups Religiously Motivated Violence Violence Prevention

Author: Bartlett, Jamie Title: The Edge of Violence: A Radical Approach to Extremism Summary: The path into terrorism in the name of Islam is often described as a process of radicalization. But to be radical is not necessarily to be violent. Violent radicals are clearly enemies of liberal democracies, but non-violent radicals might sometimes be powerful allies. This report is a summary of two years research examining the difference between violent and non-violent radicals in Europe and Canada. It represents a step toward a more nuanced understanding of behavior across radicalized individuals, the appeal of the al-Qaeda narrative, and the role of governments and communities in responding. Details: London: Demos, 2010. 70p. Source: Online Resource Year: 2010 Country: United Kingdom URL: Shelf Number: 118329 Keywords: Extremist Groups Radical Groups Terrorism

Author: Borchgrave, Arnaud de Title: Conflict, Community, and Criminality in Southeast Asia and Australia: Assessments from the Field Summary: These essays on Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, Singapore, Cambodia, Burma, and Australian have a common thread: terrorism, like politics, is local. Yes, there is a superficial frame, which is shared by local terrorists, but the vicissitudes of violence vary according to local events. Except for training provided a decade earlier to some aspiring terrorists, al Qaeda is notably absent from the various accounts in the present collection. Indeed, the weak links to al Qaeda central, trumpeted in the West more than in Southeast Asia, obscure the local dynamics, showing an upsurge in the threat earlier in this decade and a general decline as time goes on. While the ideology is similar, local social conditions change, and law enforcement agencies learn to deal with their foes. As the essays show, the situation is improving in Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Australia. The situation is deteriorating in Thailand because violent Islamists wrapped themselves with separatist grievances, while the situation in the Philippines is so embedded in local politics that it is difficult to even analyze it in terms of terrorism. Details: Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2009. 87p. Source: A Report of the CSIS Transnational Threats Project Year: 2009 Country: International URL: Shelf Number: 116190 Keywords: Extremist Groups Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Jacobson, Michael Title: Terrorist Dropouts: Learning from Those Who Have Left Summary: There is a growing recognition that capturing or killing every terrorist is not a realistic strategy and that we need to spend more time exploring the radicalization process - what motivates people to become extremists in the first place. Despite this, little study has been undertaken of the "flip side" - those who decide to leave terrorist and extremist organizations. This report is based on approximately twenty-five interviews with those who have left terrorist and extremist organizations. An analysis of the interviews reveals that individual dropout cases clearly show that no single overarching reason explains why individuals leave terrorist or extremist groups, just as no single reason leads to their radicalization in the first instance. Nonetheless, several patterns emerge that should give policymakers cause for optimism. First, it is clear that many of those who have left terrorist and extremist organizations have done so without being harmed or even threatened. And second, these organizations are often hid hard when leadership defections take place. Details: Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2010. 34p. Source: Internet Resource; Policy Focus #101 Year: 2010 Country: International URL: Shelf Number: 117701 Keywords: Extremist Groups Extremists Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Bartlett, Jamie Title: From Suspects to Citizens: Preventing Violent Extremism in a Big Society Summary: The U.K. Coalition Government has the opportunity to initiate a new era of counter terrorism policy. It has started well by signalling its commitment to ‘restore the rights of individuals in the face of encroaching state power’, including the introduction of a ‘Freedom Bill’, and a review of counter-terrorism legislation. This paper considers one aspect of that review, ‘home-grown’ terrorism, and the future of one specific type of response, prevention. It argues for an approach to prevention work that is consistent with the Coalition’s goal of creating a Big Society of active citizens and protecting civil liberties. That there has been no successful terrorist plot in the UK since 7/7 owes much to the skills of our policing and security services, as well as a sustained effort from Muslim communities to fight terrorism. But the threat of al-Qaeda inspired terrorism remains, as does a sense of alienation and frustration among many British Muslims. Preventing terrorism before it takes place is a vital part of the counter-terrorism effort, particularly given the home-grown threat we face. This is known as ‘Prevent’, which is the second ‘P’ in the UK’s CONTEST II strategy (Pursue, Prevent, Protect and Prepare). However, the five years since 7/7 have demonstrated how complicated prevention work is. Stopping a problem before it arises always poses ethical and practical questions; in counter-terrorism, it involves sensitive issues of theology, integration, and identity. And because the paths that people take into terrorism are varied, complicated, and unpredictable, it is difficult to know where and when ‘prevention’ should take place. A number of recent reports have been critical of the UK’s current prevention efforts, culminating in the House of Commons Select Committee Report into Preventing Violent Extremism, released in March 2010. It is widely believed that Prevent has alienated Muslim communities, increased intercommunity tensions, and threatens to undo a number of good initiatives that contribute to community cohesion because of the link to counter terrorism. It is also extremely difficult to assess its effectiveness as the relationship between these programmes and countering terrorism is weak. Thus,in a time of tightening public sector budgets, the question of value for money is impossible to determine.Some of these criticisms have been based on misconceptions about what prevention is about but it is difficult to know how to overcome them. Some form of terrorism prevention work must remain. This paper sets out a new vision for how it could be reformed under a new government. It proposes replacing the current broad approach to prevention, which targets all Muslims, with a more precise focus on individuals that have the intent to commit criminal acts. Broader plans for cohesion are important, but should not be pursued directly or through the prism of security. Instead, Big Society initiatives can indirectly create a more cohesive society and address some of the root causes of terrorism. But a Big Society will mean disagreement, dissent, and extremism. Deciding the limits of free expression will be a defining question. Rather than vague notions of tackling extremism, we propose a liberal republican solution. This means that intolerance must be allowed a platform, but the onus falls on us to demolish it in argument. It also means intervening when certain types of extremism stop others leading a life of their own choosing. The recommendations contains a number of recommendations to enable the coalition government to create a cohesive society and address some of the causes of terrorism. Details: London: Demos, 2010. 35p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 3, 2010 at: http://www.demos.co.uk/files/From_Suspects_to_Citizens_-_web.pdf?1279732377 Year: 2010 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.demos.co.uk/files/From_Suspects_to_Citizens_-_web.pdf?1279732377 Shelf Number: 119743 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Extremist Groups Muslims Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Bartlett, Jamie Title: The Power of Unreason: Conspiracy Theories, Extremism and Counter-Terrorism Summary: Conspiracy theories have become a mainstream cultural phenomenon. This paper considers the role they play in extremist groups and counterterrorism work. It presents the first ever analysis of conspiracy theories in the ideology and propaganda of fifty extremist groups: religious, far-right and left, eco, anarchic and cult-based. It is argued that conspiracy theories are a ‘radicalising multiplier', which feed back into the ideologies, internal dynamics and psychological processes of extremist groups in three ways. Firstly, they create demonologies of ‘the enemy’ that the group defines itself against. Secondly, they delegitimise voices of dissent and moderation. And thirdly, they encourage a group or individuals to turn to violence, because it acts as rhetorical devices to portray violence as necessary to ‘awaken’ the people from their acquiescent slumber. More broadly, conspiracy theories drive a wedge of distrust between governments and particular communities which can hinder community-level efforts to fight violent extremism. It is, however, difficult for government to tackle conspiracies. The paper calls for government institutions to be more open, investment to enable young people to think critically and recognise propaganda, and for civil society to play a proactive role. Details: London: Demos, 2010. 53p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 14, 2010 at: http://www.demos.co.uk/files/Conspiracy_theories_paper.pdf?1282913891 Year: 2010 Country: International URL: http://www.demos.co.uk/files/Conspiracy_theories_paper.pdf?1282913891 Shelf Number: 119795 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Extremist Groups Terrorism Violence

Author: Bjelopera, Jerome P. Title: American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat Summary: Between May 2009 and August 2010, arrests were made for 19 “homegrown,” jihadist-inspired terrorist plots by American citizens or legal permanent residents of the United States. Two of these resulted in attacks—U.S. Army Major Nidal Hasan’s alleged assault at Fort Hood in Texas and Abdulhakim Muhammed’s shooting at the U.S. Army-Navy Career Center in Little Rock, Arkansas — and produced 14 deaths. By comparison, in more than seven years from the September 11, 2001, terrorist strikes (9/11) through May 2009, there were 21 such plots. Two resulted in attacks, and no more than six plots occurred in a single year (2006). The apparent spike in such activity after May 2009 suggests that at least some Americans—even if a tiny minority — continue to be susceptible to ideologies supporting a violent form of jihad. This report describes homegrown violent jihadists and the plots and attacks that have occurred since 9/11. “Homegrown” and “domestic” are terms that describe terrorist activity or plots perpetrated within the United States or abroad by American citizens, legal permanent residents, or visitors radicalized largely within the United States. The term “jihadist” describes radicalized individuals using Islam as an ideological and/or religious justification for their belief in the establishment of a global caliphate, or jurisdiction governed by a Muslim civil and religious leader known as a caliph. The term “violent jihadist” characterizes jihadists who have made the jump to illegally supporting, plotting, or directly engaging in violent terrorist activity. The report also discusses the radicalization process and the forces driving violent extremist activity. It analyzes post-9/11 domestic jihadist terrorism, describes law enforcement and intelligence efforts to combat terrorism and the challenges associated with those efforts. It also outlines actions underway to build trust and partnership between community groups and government agencies and the tensions that may occur between law enforcement and engagement activities. One appendix provides details about each of the post-9/11 homegrown jihadist terrorist plots and attacks. A second appendix describes engagement and partnership activities by federal agencies with Muslim-American communities. Finally, the report offers policy considerations for Congress. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Services, 2010. 124p. Source: Internet Resource: CRS Report for Congress: Acceessed October 25, 2010 at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41416.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41416.pdf Shelf Number: 120066 Keywords: Extremist Groups Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Neumann, Peter R. Title: Prisons and Terrorism: Radicalisation and De-radicalisation in 15 Countries Summary: This report offers a wide-ranging analysis of the role prisons can play in radicalising people – and in reforming them. In doing so, it examines the policies and approaches of 15 countries, identifying trade-offs and dilemmas but also principles and best practices that can help governments and policymakers spot new ideas and avoid costly and counterproductive mistakes. Prisons matter. They have played an enormous role in the narratives of every radical and militant movement in the modern period. They are ‘places of vulnerability’ in which radicalisation takes place. Yet they have also served as incubators for peaceful change and transformation. Much of the current discourse about prisons and radicalisation is negative. But prisons are not just a threat – they can play a positive role in tackling problems of radicalisation and terrorism in society as a whole. Many of the examples in this report demonstrate how prisons can become net contributors to the fight against terrorism. Details: London: International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, 2010. 64p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 1, 2010 at: http://www.icsr.info/publications/papers/1277699166PrisonsandTerrorismRadicalisationandDeradicalisationin15Countries.pdf Year: 2010 Country: International URL: http://www.icsr.info/publications/papers/1277699166PrisonsandTerrorismRadicalisationandDeradicalisationin15Countries.pdf Shelf Number: 120329 Keywords: Extremist Groups Prisons Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Rabasa, Angel Title: Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists Summary: Considerable effort has been devoted to understanding the process of violent Islamist radicalization, but far less research has explored the equally important process of deradicalization, or how individuals or groups abandon extremist groups and ideologies. Proactive measures to prevent vulnerable individuals from radicalizing and to rehabilitate those who have already embraced extremism have been implemented, to varying degrees, in several Middle Eastern, Southeast Asian, and European countries. A key question is whether the objective of these programs should be disengagement (a change in behavior) or deradicalization (a change in beliefs) of militants. Furthermore, a unique challenge posed by militant Islamist groups is that their ideology is rooted in a major world religion. An examination of deradicalization and counter-radicalization programs in the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Europe assessed the strengths and weaknesses of each program, finding that the best-designed programs leverage local cultural patterns to achieve their objectives. Such programs cannot simply be transplanted from one country to another. They need to develop organically in a specific country and culture. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2010. 214p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 20, 2010 at: http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG1053.pdf Year: 2010 Country: International URL: http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG1053.pdf Shelf Number: 120548 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Extremist Groups Terrorism

Author: Poot, C.J. de Title: Jihadi Terrorism in the Netherlands: A Description Based on Closed Criminal Investigations Summary: What is the nature of jihadist terrorism in the Netherlands at the outset of the 21st century when we base our analysis on information the police gathered about this phenomenon? That is the core question of this research. In order to increase the understanding of jihadist terrorism, the knowledge collected by the police during criminal investigations into jihadist activities has been analysed systematically. When we refer to jihadist activities, we mean activities which are aimed at making a contribution to the armed fight against the West and against other perceived enemies of Islam. For the purpose of this research, we analysed a total of twelve (large-scale) criminal investigations that were conducted in the Netherlands in the period between July 2001 and July 2005. In doing so, we have sketched the portrait of an era. The most recent criminal investigation we analysed was conducted in the spring of 2005. We cannot make any projection about the manner in which the phenomenon of jihadism has changed since then under the influence of national or international developments. We have based this research on police files. This entails considerable restrictions. Firstly, not all jihadist activities come to the knowledge of the police and the police do not initiate criminal investigations into all jihadist activities which come to their knowledge. Secondly, we only selected a part of the cases which have been investigated during the research period. This selection may have influenced our perception. Thirdly, we have based this research on the information gathered by investigation teams which had the aim of reconstructing terrorist crimes and submitting these to the court substantiated by evidence. This focus of the investigation teams, their investigation hypotheses and the related selection and interpretation of information has also influenced our perception. The findings presented below must be seen in this light. For the purpose of obtaining an objective analysis of the available investigation material, but also because different criminal investigations into jihadist activities are often interrelated, we considered the selected investigation material in its entirety, and chose to rely less on the structures of the separate criminal investigations. The raw empirical material was subsequently restructured, so that groups of cooperating persons and joint activities could be examined together. In analysing this material, we focused on three dimensions of this phenomenon: (1) jihadist cooperations; (2) the activities performed in these cooperations and (3) the jihadist actors. Details: The Hague: Boom Juridische uitgevers, 2011. 176p. Source: Internet Resource: Onderzoek en beleid, 291: Accessed April 12, 2011 at: http://english.wodc.nl/onderzoeksdatabase/1381a-jihadist-terrorism-in-the-netherlands-a-description-based-on-closed-criminal-investigations.aspx?cp=45&cs=6796 Year: 2011 Country: Netherlands URL: http://english.wodc.nl/onderzoeksdatabase/1381a-jihadist-terrorism-in-the-netherlands-a-description-based-on-closed-criminal-investigations.aspx?cp=45&cs=6796 Shelf Number: 121318 Keywords: Criminal Investigation Extremist Groups Islam Terrorism (Netherlands) Terrorists

Author: Title: Indonesian Jihadism: Small Groups, Big Plans Summary: Violent extremism in Indonesia increasingly is taking the form of small groups acting independently of large jihadi organisations but sometimes encouraged by them. This is in part a response to effective law enforcement that has resulted in widespread arrests and structural weakening of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), Jama’ah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT) and other organisations accused of links to terrorism. But it is also the result of ideological shifts that favour “individual” over “organisational” jihad and low-cost, smallscale targeted killings over mass casualty attacks that inadvertently kill Muslims. The suicide bombing inside a police station mosque on 15 April 2011 and a spate of letter bombs delivered in Jakarta in mid-March are emblematic of the shift. The government needs urgently to develop prevention strategies to reduce the likelihood that more such groups will emerge. Unlike the small group proponents, advocates of “organisational” jihad believe that nothing can be accomplished without a large organisation and a strong leader, but if the ultimate goal is an Islamic state, then it is imperative to build public support. Rather than engage in violence, groups like JI and JAT are focused for the moment on building up a mass base, by finding issues that resonate with their target audience. Increasingly this means a greater focus on local rather than foreign “enemies”, with officials who are seen as oppressors, particularly the police; Christians; and members of the Ahmadiyah sect topping the list. It also means a greater willingness than in the past to join coalitions with non-jihadi groups. The two strands of jihadism are complementary. The larger organisations can fund the religious outreach that attracts potential recruits for the small groups. They can also provide the translators and distributors for material downloaded from extremist websites in Arabic or English that buttress the small group approach. They can maintain plausible deniability for acts of violence while trying to rebuild their ranks, while at the same time providing the cover under which small groups emerge. The report looks at detailed case studies of small violent groups that have emerged in Indonesia in 2009 and 2010 in Medan and Lampung, on Sumatra, and in Bandung and Klaten, on Java. All involved at least one former prisoner; three of the four had links to JAT but operated independently of JAT control. Three of the four also involved mosque-based study groups that evolved into hit squads, and all were committed to the idea of ightiyalat, secret assassinations. In none of them was poverty a significant driver of radicalisation. Information about these groups is only available because their members were caught. This raises the question of how many similar small groups operating under police radar exist across Indonesia that will only come to light when one of their murderous attempts succeeds. Prevention strategies that go beyond law enforcement are critical, and the new National Anti-Terrorism Agency (Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme, BNPT) has an important role to play in designing and testing them. All such strategies, however, must be based on wellgrounded research and informed by serious study of what has and has not worked elsewhere. Details: Jakarta/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2011. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: Asia Report No. 204: Accessed April 20, 2011 at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-east-asia/indonesia/204%20Indonesian%20Jihadism%20%20Small%20Groups%20Big%20Plans.ashx Year: 2011 Country: Indonesia URL: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-east-asia/indonesia/204%20Indonesian%20Jihadism%20%20Small%20Groups%20Big%20Plans.ashx Shelf Number: 121409 Keywords: Extremist Groups Terrorism (Indonesia) Violence

Author: Fink, Naureen Chowdhury Title: Transforming Terrorists: Examining International Efforts to Address Violent Extremism Summary: Efforts to promote “deradicalization,” or to rehabilitate detainees charged with terrorism-related offenses, have taken multiple forms in a wide range of countries, often as part of broader counter-radicalization strategies that seek to prevent the adoption of violent extremist ideologies or behaviors in the first place. This paper draws on recent insights from case studies of deradicalization initiatives in eight Muslim-majority countries and a variety of approaches adopted by countries in Europe and Asia. The paper makes recommendations concerning what role the United Nations might play in furthering such initiatives by states and facilitating broader international efforts to combat terrorism and violent extremism. Details: New York: International Peace Institute, 2011. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 4, 2011 at: http://www.ipacademy.org/publication/policy-papers/detail/316-transforming-terrorists-examining-international-efforts-to-address-violent-extremism.html Year: 2011 Country: International URL: http://www.ipacademy.org/publication/policy-papers/detail/316-transforming-terrorists-examining-international-efforts-to-address-violent-extremism.html Shelf Number: 121610 Keywords: Extremist Groups Terrorism Terrorists Violent Extremism

Author: European Police Office - EUROPOL Title: TE-SAT 2011: EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report Summary: Terrorism continues to pose a high threat to the security of the EU and its citizens and has become more diverse in its methods and impact. That is the conclusion of Europol's annual review of terrorism, presented today in the European Parliament by the agency's Director, Rob Wainwright. Europol's EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT) records a total of 249 terrorist attacks in the EU in 2010, in which seven people died and scores of others were injured. Most of these were related to violent separatist, nationalist, or anarchist activities. Three attacks were attributed to Islamist terrorist groups, of which two were aimed at causing mass casualties. In addition an attempted attack, claimed by Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in November 2010 had the capacity to cause serious damage and possible loss of life for a large number of EU citizens. A package containing explosive devices was sent by airfreight from Yemen to the US and was intercepted in the UK. Another one was intercepted in Dubai. In overall terms the number of attacks in the EU represents a decrease on the figure for 2009, due largely to a significant decrease in the number of attacks attributed to ETA. Details: The Hague: EUROPOL, 2011. 43p. Source: Internet Resource: accessed May 17, 2011 at:https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/main-reports/te-sat-2011-eu-terrorism-situation-and-trend-reportt Year: 2011 Country: Europe URL: https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/main-reports/te-sat-2011-eu-terrorism-situation-and-trend-report Shelf Number: 121731 Keywords: Extremist Groups Extremists Terrorism (Europe)

Author: Ungerer, Cari Title: Jihadists in Jail: Radicalisation and the Indonesian Prison Experience Summary: The issue of terrorist motivations and pathways towards violent extremism has been the subject of numerous studies in recent years. Much of that work, however, has focused on open source literature. Less attention has been given to understanding the individuals themselves and their personal experiences within terrorist organisations. To help address this gap, ASPI and the Centre of Excellence for National Security, a constituent research unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) in Singapore, undertook a joint research project to conduct personal interviews with members of the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) terrorist organisation who are serving or have served prison sentences in Indonesia. This project is the first detailed study of both the former leadership group and the foot soldiers of the JI organisation in prison. Interviews were conducted across four Indonesian prisons and detention centres with more than thirty convicted terrorists. Details: Barton, ACT, Australia: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2011. 20p. Source: Internet Resource: Special Report Issue 40: Accessed May 19, 2011 at: http://www.apo.org.au/sites/default/files/Jihadists_in_jail.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Indonesia URL: http://www.apo.org.au/sites/default/files/Jihadists_in_jail.pdf Shelf Number: 121754 Keywords: Extremist Groups Terrorism Terrorists (Indonesia)

Author: Belli, Roberta Title: Where Political Extremists and Greedy Criminals Meet: A Comparative Study of Financial Crimes and Criminal Networks in the United States Summary: Financial crime poses a serious threat to the integrity and security of legitimate businesses and institutions, and to the safety and prosperity of private citizens and communities. Experts argue that the profile of financial offenders is extremely diversified and includes individuals who may be motivated by greed or ideology. Islamic extremists increasingly resort to typical white-­‐collar crimes, like credit card and financial fraud, to raise funds for their missions. In the United States, the far-­‐right movement professes its anti-­‐government ideology by promoting and using a variety of anti-­‐tax strategies. There is evidence that ideologically motivated individuals who engage in financial crimes benefit from interactions with profit-­‐driven offenders and legitimate actors that provide resources for crime in the form of knowledge, skills, and suitable co-­‐offenders. This dissertation sheds light on the nexus between political extremism and profit-­‐driven crime by conducting a systematic study of financial crime cases involving Islamic extremists, domestic far-­‐rightists, and their non-­‐extremist accomplices prosecuted by federal courts in 2004. Attribute and relational data were extracted from the U.S. Extremist Crime Database (ECDB), which is the first open-­‐source relational database that provides information on all extremist crimes, violent and non-­‐violent, ideological and routine crimes, since 1990. A descriptive analysis was conducted comparing schemes, crimes, and techniques used by far-­‐rightists, Islamic extremists, and non-­‐extremists, before moving into an in-­‐depth social network analysis of their relational ties in co-­‐offending, business, and family networks. The descriptive findings revealed considerable differences in the modus operandi followed by far-­‐rightists and Islamic extremists as well as the prosecutorial strategies used against them. The subsequent exploratory and statistical network analyses, however, revealed interesting similarities, suggesting that financial schemes by political extremists occurred within similarly decentralized, self-­‐organizing structures that facilitated exchanges between individuals acting within close-­‐knit subsets regardless of their ideological affiliation. Meaningful interactions emerged between far-­‐rightists and non-­‐extremists involved in business ventures and within a tax avoidance scheme, indicating that the crime-­‐extremism nexus was more prevalent within far-­‐right settings compared to Islamic extremist ones. The findings were discussed in light of their implications for criminological theories, criminal justice and crime prevention policies, and methodological advances. Details: Dissertation, City University of New York, 2011. 464p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 28, 2011 at: http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/234524.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/234524.pdf Shelf Number: 121874 Keywords: Extremist Groups Financial Crimes Fraud Organized Crime Tax-Evasion Terrorism Terrorists White Collar Crime White Collar Offenses

Author: Fishman, Shira Title: Community-Level Indicators of Radicalization: A Data and Methods Task Force Summary: Recently, a number of United States citizens have been charged with seeking oversees training for terrorist plots, sending money to fund terrorism or plotting to launch terrorist attacks within the United States. These actions underscore the need to prevent violent radicalization well before the immediate threat of an attack. This is an emerging research area, and far too little is known about what drives individuals to engage in violent radical behavior. In addition, the vast majority of past research has focused on case studies constructed after an attack or attempted attack, large-scale attitudinal surveys, or interviews with former terrorists. As with all research, these methods have limitations including lack of external validity (limiting ones’ ability to generalize from one individual to other cases), the reliance on finding and convincing individuals to grant interviews, and the ability of large-scale attitudinal surveys to capture extremist beliefs. Thus, the current project was launched to explore alternative research approaches that could be used to improve understanding of the processes surrounding violent radicalization. In particular, we sought to examine whether empirical research, using archival or institutional data at the community level, could provide new insights into factors that might leave individuals vulnerable to radicalization. Scholars from around the world with expertise in radicalization, communities in the United States and innovative methods from related fields, agreed to serve on a Task Force focused on these issues. The group was brought together for a day and a half to explore the potential relationship between community characteristics and susceptibility to radicalization. The Task Force began with the theoretical premise that some communities might possess certain characteristics that make the likelihood and/or rates of radicalization higher in those communities. Marginalized communities (including Diaspora groups), those that experience relative deprivation (of resources, both financial and otherwise), and communities that have experienced significant social disruption emerged as priority areas for future research. To conduct empirical research, three categories of dependent variables were identified by Task Force members as potential proxies for violent radicalization. The categories are: • The amount of terrorism – this variable could include the number of incidents, the number of casualties or an estimate of the damage caused by an attack. • The number of other severe (both violent and financial) ideologically motivated crimes – extremist crimes may well serve as a gateway to other ideologically motivated violence, thus, a community with other ideological crimes may well be a proxy for radicalization. • The number of attempted terrorist attacks –there is a need to consider not just successful attacks but attempts as well. Using thwarted and successful attacks is most likely a better indicator, both theoretically and statistically, of concentrations of radicalization. To test theories of radicalization, Task Force members suggested specific conditions under which radicalization may be more likely to emerge: • Marginalized communities – measuring the extent to which a subgroup, including Diaspora communities, feels included in or excluded from a larger community. o Economic measures – to assess the extent of economic distress felt by a community, including variables such as unemployment rates, median household income, income inequality, and data on participation in government assistance programs. o Social capital – the extent to which members of a community feel connected or trusting of neighbors and government, with lower levels of social capital being indicative of marginalization. Variables included here are family structure (divorce rates, single parent families), the number (or density) of social service organizations, civic organizations or arts/sports organizations, and voter turnout rates. o Political inclusion/exclusion – the extent to which members of a community feel included in local politics and political institutions. These variables include participation rates in local elections, active involvement in campaigns and the extent to which a members of a subgroup are elected or appointed to local offices. o Social support – the greater the amount of services available, the less vulnerable a community may be to radicalization. Measures of support include Head Start programs, number of children enrolled in CHIP or Medicaid, and, for Diaspora communities, number of organizations or individuals receiving money from state Offices of Refugee Resettlement. o Demographics of Diaspora community – the social structure of an immigrant community is vital to a community’s success. Such factors that may impact the prevalence of radicalization include the age at which immigrants arrive in the United States, the number of foreign language speakers or students in ESL classes and the extent to which the community establishes its own institutions such as banks and local media. • Ideology – the variables discussed previously were assumed to affect radicalization across ideologies. However, there should be some indicators that are ideology-specific . Extremist organizations are ideologically motivated and may serve as a gateway toward extremist violence. The link between such organizations and terrorism could be tested by tracking the organizations’ legal activities, the number of extremist organizations or the extent to which an organization attracts members of a community. In all, participants of the Task Force concluded that pursuing research using community-level archival or institutional data to study radicalization was a challenging but necessary task. Issues such as the marginalization or deprivation of certain communities, especially Diaspora communities, are increasingly important to study. To date, violent radicalization is still a fairly rare problem within the United States, thus, it may be possible that the community level is too broad to adequately give guidance on when, where or how individuals radicalize. However, if such research does prove successful then it may have a major impact on the way in which law enforcement deals with terrorism. Details: College Park, MD: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), 2010. 126p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 10, 2011 at: http://www.start.umd.edu/start/publications/START_HFD_CommRadReport.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://www.start.umd.edu/start/publications/START_HFD_CommRadReport.pdf Shelf Number: 122354 Keywords: Extremist Groups Terrorism Terrorists

Author: U.S. White House Title: Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States Summary: This strategy outlines how the Federal Government will support and help empower American communities and their local partners in their grassroots efforts to prevent violent extremism. This strategy commits the Federal Government to improving support to communities, including sharing more information about the threat of radicalization; strengthening cooperation with local law enforcement, who work with these communities every day; and helping communities to better understand and protect themselves against violent extremist propaganda, especially online. Most of all, this strategy reafirms the fundamental American principles that guide our efforts, As we approach the 10th anniversary of the September 11 attacks, we remember that al-Qa’ida tried to spark a conflict between faiths and divide us as Americans. But they failed. As this strategy makes clear, we will not waver in defense of our country or our communities. We will defeat a1-Qa’ida and its affiliates. We will uphold the civil rights and civil liberties of every American. And we will go forward together, as Americans, knowing that our rich diversity of backgrounds and faiths makes us stronger and is a key to our national security. Details: Washington, DC: The White House, 2011. 12p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 15, 2011 at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/empowering_local_partners.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/empowering_local_partners.pdf Shelf Number: 122386 Keywords: Extremist Groups Terrorism Terrorists (U.S.)

Author: Ali, Wajahat Title: Fear, Inc.: The Roots of the Islamophobia Network in America Summary: On July 22, a man planted a bomb in an Oslo government building that killed eight people. A few hours after the explosion, he shot and killed 68 people, mostly teenagers, at a Labor Party youth camp on Norway’s Utoya Island. By midday, pundits were speculating as to who had perpetrated the greatest massacre in Norwegian history since World War II. Numerous mainstream media outlets, including The New York Times, The Washington Post, and The Atlantic, speculated about an Al Qaeda connection and a “jihadist” motivation behind the attacks. But by the next morning it was clear that the attacker was a 32-year-old, white, blond-haired and blue-eyed Norwegian named Anders Breivik. He was not a Muslim, but rather a self-described Christian conservative. According to his attorney, Breivik claimed responsibility for his self-described “gruesome but necessary” actions. On July 26, Breivik told the court that violence was “necessary” to save Europe from Marxism and “Muslimization.” In his 1,500-page manifesto, which meticulously details his attack methods and aims to inspire others to extremist violence, Breivik vows “brutal and breathtaking operations which will result in casualties” to fight the alleged “ongoing Islamic Colonization of Europe.” Breivik’s manifesto contains numerous footnotes and in-text citations to American bloggers and pundits, quoting them as experts on Islam’s “war against the West.” This small group of anti-Muslim organizations and individuals in our nation is obscure to most Americans but wields great influence in shaping the national and international political debate. Their names are heralded within communities that are actively organizing against Islam and targeting Muslims in the United States. Breivik, for example, cited Robert Spencer, one of the anti-Muslim misinformation scholars we profile in this report, and his blog, Jihad Watch, 162 times in his manifesto. Spencer’s website, which “tracks the attempts of radical Islam to subvert Western culture,” boasts another member of this Islamophobia network in America, David Horowitz, on his Freedom Center website. Pamela Geller, Spencer’s frequent collaborator, and her blog, Atlas Shrugs, was mentioned 12 times. Geller and Spencer co-founded the organization Stop Islamization of America, a group whose actions and rhetoric the Anti-Defamation League concluded “promotes a conspiratorial anti-Muslim agenda under the guise of fighting radical Islam. The group seeks to rouse public fears by consistently vilifying the Islamic faith and asserting the existence of an Islamic conspiracy to destroy “American values.” Based on Breivik’s sheer number of citations and references to the writings of these individuals, it is clear that he read and relied on the hateful, anti-Muslim ideology of a number of men and women detailed in this report—a select handful of scholars and activists who work together to create and promote misinformation about Muslims. While these bloggers and pundits were not responsible for Breivik’s deadly attacks, their writings on Islam and multiculturalism appear to have helped create a world view, held by this lone Norwegian gunman, that sees Islam as at war with the West and the West needing to be defended. According to former CIA officer and terrorism consultant Marc Sageman, just as religious extremism “is the infrastructure from which Al Qaeda emerged,” the writings of these anti-Muslim misinformation experts are “the infrastructure from which Breivik emerged.” Sageman adds that their rhetoric “is not cost-free.” These pundits and bloggers, however, are not the only members of the Islamophobia infrastructure. Breivik’s manifesto also cites think tanks, such as the Center for Security Policy, the Middle East Forum, and the Investigative Project on Terrorism — three other organizations we profile in this report. Together, this core group of deeply intertwined individuals and organizations manufacture and exaggerate threats of “creeping Sharia,” Islamic domination of the West, and purported obligatory calls to violence against all non-Muslims by the Koran. This network of hate is not a new presence in the United States. Indeed, its ability to organize, coordinate, and disseminate its ideology through grassroots organizations increased dramatically over the past 10 years. Furthermore, its ability to influence politicians’ talking points and wedge issues for the upcoming 2012 elections has mainstreamed what was once considered fringe, extremist rhetoric. Details: Washington, DC: Center for American Progress, 2011. 70p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 6, 2011 at: http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/08/pdf/islamophobia.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/08/pdf/islamophobia.pdf Shelf Number: 122652 Keywords: Extremist Groups Hate Crime (U.S.) Islamophobia

Author: Bouhana, Noemie Title: Al Qa'ida-Influenced Radicalisation: A Rapid Evidence Assessment Guided by Situational Action Theory: Scientific Report Summary: This paper presents findings from research into the causes of Al Qa'ida-influenced radicalisation. It looks to understand vulnerability and resilience to Al Qa‘ida influenced violent extremism; and distinguishes between indicators and causal factors of criminal and violent behaviour. It also explores what transferable knowledge can be applied from youth gangs, new religious movements and violent radical activism. Details: London: Home Office, 2011. 113p. Source: Internet Resource: Occasional Paper 97: Accessed November 9, 2011 at: http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/science-research-statistics/research-statistics/counter-terrorism-statistics/occ97?view=Binary Year: 2011 Country: International URL: http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/science-research-statistics/research-statistics/counter-terrorism-statistics/occ97?view=Binary Shelf Number: 123274 Keywords: Extremist Groups Radical Groups Terrorism Violence

Author: Munton, Tony Title: Understanding Vulnerability and Resilience in Individuals to the Influence of Al Qa’ida Violent Extremism Summary: In the absence of a mature empirical evidence base it explores what transferrable knowledge can be taken from the more developed literature on other types of violent activity e.g. other terrorist activity, gangs, cults, etc. This report presents the findings of a Rapid Evidence Assessment (REA) of open source empirical studies that seek to answer two key questions: • What factors, social, psychological and physical, make a person more vulnerable to participation in Al Qa’ida (AQ)-influenced violent extremism? • What factors enable vulnerable individuals to resist the influence of AQ-influenced violent extremism? This report also presents the findings from a second targeted REA on other relevant types of violent activity, including: • other (non-AQ-influenced) types of terrorist activity; • animal rights activism; • cults; • gangs; • right-wing extremism; and • youth crime. The report discusses learning from these other areas and how far lessons learned can be applied to the study of AQ-influenced violent extremism. Both REAs involved systematic searches of relevant electronic databases and hand searches of academic journals and websites. Additional relevant literature was identified by topic experts, peer reviewers, specific websites, and through backward and forward citation chasing. Studies were included if they were based on empirical research, were relevant to the REAs’ questions and were assessed to be of high scientific quality. The empirical evidence base on what factors make an individual more vulnerable to AQ-influenced violent extremism is weak. Even less is known about why certain individuals resort to violence, when other individuals from the same community, with similar experiences, do not become involved in violent activity. The following conclusions are based on the limited empirical evidence base identified by the two REAs. Details: London: Home Office, 2011. 90p. Source: Internet Resource: Occasional Paper 98: Accessed November 9, 2011 at: Year: 2011 Country: International URL: Shelf Number: 123275 Keywords: Extremist Groups Gang Violence Radical Groups Terrorism Violence Violent Crime

Author: Disley, Emma Title: Individual Disengagement from Al Qa'ida-Influenced Terrorist Groups. A Rapid Evidence Assessment to Inform Policy and Practice in Preventing Terrorism Summary: This paper looks at why and how individuals stop being violent and whether there are intervention practices to learn from. It also explores transferable knowledge from the literature on street gangs, religious cults, right-wing groups and organised crime groups. Details: London: Home Office, 2011. 137p. Source: Internet Resource: Occasional Paper No. 99: Accessed November 9, 2011 at: http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/science-research-statistics/research-statistics/counter-terrorism-statistics/occ99?view=Binary Year: 2011 Country: International URL: http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/science-research-statistics/research-statistics/counter-terrorism-statistics/occ99?view=Binary Shelf Number: 123276 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Desistance Extremist Groups Gangs Organized Crime Radical Groups Terrorism Violence

Author: Title: Indonesia: From Vigilantism to Terrorism in Cirebon Summary: Involvement in violent campaigns against vice and religious deviance has become one pathway to terrorism in Indonesia. "Indonesia: From Vigilantism to Terrorism in Cirebon," the latest briefing from the International Crisis Group, examines the radicalisation of a group from Cirebon, West Java that was behind the 2011 suicide bombings of a mosque and a church. It argues that ideological and tactical lines within the radical community are blurring, making it harder to distinguish “terrorists” from hardline activists and religious vigilantes. “The Cirebon men moved from using sticks and stones in the name of upholding morality and curbing ‘deviance’ to using bombs and guns, and this may become the common pattern”, says Sidney Jones, Crisis Group Senior Adviser. Poorly educated and underemployed, the Cirebon men represent a generational shift from the jihadists trained abroad or those who fought a decade ago in two major communal conflicts in Ambon and Poso. They were radicalised through attending public lectures by radical clerics; most had taken part as well in attacks on stores selling liquor and anti-Ahmadiyah activities. They had been members of Jemaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT), an extremist organisation founded by well-known cleric Abu Bakar Ba’asyir in 2008, but then left to form their even more militant group. The two suicide bombers, Mohamed Syarif, who blew himself up at a Cirebon mosque on 15 April 2011, and Ahmed Yosefa Hayat, who died in an attack on a church in Solo, Central Java on 25 September, taught themselves bomb-making from the Internet and worked on their own. The others preferred targeted assassinations to suicide attacks and learned bomb-making from friends in a Solo-based group of vigilantes-turned-bombers. The briefing notes that the merging of vigilantes and jihadists has been facilitated by the proliferation of Islamist civil society organisations and the popularity of public taklim (religious lectures), as forums for spreading radical views. The government needs a strategy, consistent with democratic values, to counter clerics who use no violence themselves but preach that it is permissible to shed the blood of infidels (kafir) or tyrants (thaghut), frequently meaning Indonesian officials and, especially, the police. The problem is that there is no agreement within the country’s political elite on the nature of the threat. If the radicalisation of groups like the Cirebon men is to be halted, the government needs to build a national consensus on what constitutes extremism; directly confront hate speech; and promote zero tolerance of religiously-inspired crimes, however minor, including in the course of anti-vice campaigns. “Expressions of shock and horror every time there is an incident of religiously-motivated violence as in Cirebon or Solo are not a substitute for prevention”, says Jim Della-Giacoma, Crisis Group’s South East Asia Project Director. Details: Brussels, Belgium: International Crisis Group, 2012. 16p. Source: Update Briefing, Asia Briefing No. 132: Internet Resource: Accessed on January 28, 2012 at http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-east-asia/indonesia/B132%20Indonesia%20-%20From%20Vigilantism%20to%20Terrorism%20in%20Cirebon.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Indonesia URL: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-east-asia/indonesia/B132%20Indonesia%20-%20From%20Vigilantism%20to%20Terrorism%20in%20Cirebon.pdf Shelf Number: 123846 Keywords: Extremist Groups Jihadism Male Offenders Suicide Bombings Terrorism (Indonesia) Vigilantism

Author: Muka, Ondrej Title: Kriminalita motivovaná nenávistí ve světle právních a faktických opatření v ČR -- Combating Hate Crime in the Czech republic Summary: Even the Czech society begins to face new problems on the threshold of the 21st century – a hate crime. In connection to the international relations liberalization after the year 1989, free movement of material possessions, ideas, services and people, the Czech society is put on new influences brought along such processes. The fallen yoke of the communist dictatorship released a “democratic” powerhouse of new or out-of-way and pent-up ideas not always leading to a model of the community tolerant solidarity. The liberal capitalism and globalization processes connected to an access to new technologies opened up a way to spreading not only new views and movements but also a detachment of the entire social groups inclining to certain models of behaviour, thinking and feeling. Such new relief is necessary to be observed and analysed in a thorough manner in order not to have the forms arisen directed to suppression of fundamental human rights and freedoms. One of such phenomena is also the hate crime. We speak about the hate crime in relation to growing number of racist, ethnic, religious or otherwise intolerantly motivated crimes. This is one of a number of chapters accompanying the aforementioned processes. A number of measures were adopted and implemented in the Czech Republic within fighting such crimes and tend to be a part of superior problems, the so-called “extremism”. The crimes motivated by racist intolerance or hate, crimes motivated by ethnic intolerance or hate, crimes motivated by religious intolerance or hate and crimes motivated by other type of intolerance or hate are those belonging among crimes with an extremist implication. It specifically concerns the following merits of cases under The Criminal Code: violation of copyright, violation of rights relating to copyright and rights to database (Section 152), assault of a public officer (Section 155 and Section 156), perjury (Section 174), violence against a group of persons and individual (Section 196 and Section 197(a)), defamation of nation, race and belief (Section 198), incitement and promotion of hatred against a group of persons or limitation of their rights and freedoms (Section 198(a)), dissemination of false news (Section 199), rioting (Section 202), murder (Section 219), aggravated battery (Section 221 and Section 222), robbery (Section 234), extortion (Section 235), infringement of the freedom of worship (Section 236), forcible entry into dwelling (Section 238), harm done to a thing of another person (Section 257) and support and promotion of movements directing to suppression of rights and freedoms of a human being (Section 260, Section 261 and Section 261(a)). Details: Prague, Czech Helsinki Committee, 2008. 70p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 10, 2012 at: http://www.helcom.cz/download/sborniky/CHV_HateCrime.pdf Year: 2008 Country: Czech Republic URL: http://www.helcom.cz/download/sborniky/CHV_HateCrime.pdf Shelf Number: 124920 Keywords: Bias Crimes Discrimination Extremist Groups Hate Crimes (Czech Republic)

Author: Fekete, Liz Title: Pedlars of hate: the violent impact of the European far Right Summary: his report brings together over one hundred cases from the beginning of 2010 until April 2012. Many aspects of far-right violence are discussed – from online death threats to arson and murder. While some of the cases suggest that small underground groups are stockpiling weapons and preparing for ‘race war’, with the organisations and individuals attempting to articulate how serious the situation is, now at serious risk themselves from the far Right, it would be wrong to see the situation in terms of one single and coherent far-right movement taking root across Europe. On the contrary, each far-right movement builds on its country’s particular extremist tradition. Details: London: The Institute for Race Relations, 2012. 48p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 20, 2012 at http://www.irr.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/PedlarsofHate.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Europe URL: http://www.irr.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/PedlarsofHate.pdf Shelf Number: 125384 Keywords: Extremist Groups Hate Crimes Radical Groups Violent Extremism

Author: Romaniuk, Peter Title: From Input to Impact: Evaluating Terrorism Prevention Programs Summary: In the years following 9/11, threat assessments necessarily focused on the dangers posed by al-Qaida, its affiliates, and those inspired by its ideology. There are signs, however, that the threat today is more complex and diffuse, comprising extremists from all parts of the ideological spectrum who may act in small “self-starter” groups or, in some cases, as “lone wolves.” The paths to extremism are more varied than ever before, and as our understanding of contemporary patterns of radicalization has advanced, terrorism prevention initiatives have become more prevalent in the counterterrorism repertoire at the national and multilateral levels. As many states have elaborated terrorism prevention strategies in recent years, they have begun to confront similar challenges. Among these is the challenge of program evaluation. Is the turn toward prevention an effective response to the diverse extremist threats that states face today? How can the effectiveness of prevention policies be measured? What approaches have states advanced in evaluating the impact of terrorism prevention initiatives? In responding to this challenge, can lessons be gleaned from efforts to evaluate programs in related policy domains? This policy report provides an initial discussion of these questions. It draws on the discussions during a meeting entitled “Colloquium on Measuring Effectiveness in Counterterrorism Programming” and held in Ottawa on 9–10 February 2012, as well as discussions with experts, government officials, and an initial desktop literature review. Details: New York: Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation, 2012. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 7, 2012 at http://www.globalct.org/images/content/pdf/reports/CGCC_EvaluatingTerrorismPrevention.pdf Year: 2012 Country: International URL: http://www.globalct.org/images/content/pdf/reports/CGCC_EvaluatingTerrorismPrevention.pdf Shelf Number: 126571 Keywords: Crime Prevention Crime Prevention Programs Evaluative Studies Extremist Groups Lone Wolves Terrorism Terrorism Violent Extremism

Author: Spalek, Basia Title: Preventing Religio-Political Extremism Amongst Muslim Youth: a study exploring police-community partnership Summary:  Counter-terrorism policing in the UK is undergoing a steep learning curve due to the introduction of overt community policing models. As a result, efforts need to be made to examine the extent to which policing efforts are community focussed and/or community-targeted.  Accountability towards communities is increasingly a feature or indeed a challenge for policing: community focused, problem-oriented policing requires police to be responsive to citizens‟ demands, and as such, counter-terrorism police officers working with and within communities must also be accountable to them.  Accountability is not only about being accessible and visible to communities, it is also about police officers being open about the fact they are counter-terrorism officers.  A key aspect of this accountability is information-sharing, and currently police officers are grappling with what information to release to communities regarding terrorism and counter-terrorism related issues, how to go about sharing this and to whom this should be made available. They are attempting to change the secretive culture of traditional counter-terrorism policing to see how this can be made more visible and open.  Overt counter-terrorism policing models can be used to gain valuable information from communities that may have, traditionally, been obtained through covert policing strategies. This highlights the real value of an open approach by police and highlights the importance of considering the balance and links between overt and covert approaches. Police-community partnership  Our study highlights the importance of relationship building between police officers and community members. It is important to stress that this study suggests that relationship-building in a counter-terrorism context presents particular challenges, and therefore requires added sensitivity.  Information-sharing is seen as a key way of building trust.  In areas deemed at „high risk‟ of violent extremism – by the authorities or communities - it is likely that both overt and covert policing is taking place. This creates a tension and challenge for community members who may be engaging with overt police officers whilst also believing that they are the subject of covert observation and other operations.  Given the sensitivities around counter-terrorism, it may be that police officers working overtly should be specially selected for their skills in engaging with communities. Additionally, police officers may need to consider that counter-terrorism is distinct from other areas of policing due to the historical legacy and wider socio-political context.  Community members can play a crucial role in helping to risk-assess those individuals who have come to the attention of the police or other agencies for a perceived vulnerability to violent extremism, for there may be aspects to individuals‟ lives that only community members can witness, understand and evaluate.  It is crucial that partnership is pursued as a goal in relation to intelligence/information sharing between communities and police and other agencies. There may be a danger that statutory agencies enter into relationships and agreements with community members that may prioritise the risk and other needs of those agencies rather than the risks and the needs of community members themselves.  The need to acknowledge and address the risks to communities as well as state agencies highlights the fundamental connection between state and community securities.  This study found multiple layers to risk. One key issue relates to the identification of risk: who decides whether a set of vulnerabilities constitutes risk of violent extremism and how this is managed. In a situation where risk is being assessed by different agencies, it is important to consider whose voice carries most weight and whether there is a danger that community voices are marginalised. Details: Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham, Religion & Society, 2011. 38p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 3, 2012 at: http://www.religionandsociety.org.uk/uploads/docs/2011_04/1302685819_preventing-religio-political-extremism-spalek-april2011.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.religionandsociety.org.uk/uploads/docs/2011_04/1302685819_preventing-religio-political-extremism-spalek-april2011.pdf Shelf Number: 127111 Keywords: Counter-terrorism (U.K.) Extremist Groups Hate Crimes Muslims Police-Community Relations Problem-Oriented Policing Religious Extremism

Author: Bipartisan Policy Center Title: Countering Online Radicalization in America Summary: While being a force for good, the Internet has also come to play an important—and, in many ways, unique—role in radicalizing homegrown and domestic terrorists. Supporters of Al Qaeda, Sovereign Citizens, white supremacists and neo-Nazis, environmental and animal liberationists, and other violent extremist groups all have embraced the Internet with great enthusiasm and vigor. They are using it as a platform to spread their ideas, connect with each other, make new recruits, and incite illegal and violent actions. We believe that this trend will continue and that future terrorist attacks against the United States and its interests will involve individuals who have been radicalized—at least in part—on the Internet. As a result, countering online radicalization should continue to be a major priority for the government and its Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) efforts. The purpose of this report is to equip policy makers with a better understanding of how the Internet facilitates radicalization, in particular within the United States; an appreciation of the dilemmas and trade-offs that are involved in countering online radicalization within the United States; and ideas and best practices for making the emerging approach and strategy richer and more effective. Details: Washington, DC: Bipartisan Policy Center, 2012. 56p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 7, 2012 at: http://bipartisanpolicy.org/library/report/countering-online-radicalization-america Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://bipartisanpolicy.org/library/report/countering-online-radicalization-america Shelf Number: 127136 Keywords: Domestic Terrorism Extremist Groups Internet Radical Groups (U.S.) Terrorist Groups

Author: Vidino, Lorenzo Title: Countering Radicalization in Europe Summary: Since the mid-2000s, European countries have developed counter-radicalisation strategies, seeking to de-radicalize committed militants and preventing the radicalization of vulnerable populations. What do these strategies entail? Where do they differ, and what do they have in common? How successful have they been? Based on extensive fieldwork in Britain, the Netherlands, Denmark and Norway, ICSR's latest report - Countering Radicalization in Europe - describes the genesis, main characteristics, aims, underlying philosophies and challenges experienced by counter-radicalization policies in Europe. Details: London: International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR), King's College London, 2012. 84p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 25, 2013 at: http://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/ICSR-Report-Countering-Radicalization-in-Europe.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Europe URL: http://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/ICSR-Report-Countering-Radicalization-in-Europe.pdf Shelf Number: 127400 Keywords: Counter-Radicalization Programs Extremist Groups Radical Groups

Author: Bjelopera, Jerome P. Title: American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat Summary: This report describes homegrown violent jihadists and the plots and attacks that have occurred since 9/11. For this report, “homegrown” describes terrorist activity or plots perpetrated within the United States or abroad by American citizens, legal permanent residents, or visitors radicalized largely within the United States. The term “jihadist” describes radicalized individuals using Islam as an ideological and/or religious justification for their belief in the establishment of a global caliphate, or jurisdiction governed by a Muslim civil and religious leader known as a caliph. The term “violent jihadist” characterizes jihadists who have made the jump to illegally supporting, plotting, or directly engaging in violent terrorist activity. The report also discusses the radicalization process and the forces driving violent extremist activity. It analyzes post-9/11 domestic jihadist terrorism and describes law enforcement and intelligence efforts to combat terrorism and the challenges associated with those efforts. Appendix A provides details about each of the post-9/11 homegrown jihadist terrorist plots and attacks. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2013. 141p. Source: Internet Resource: R41416: Accessed February 22, 2013 at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41416.pdf Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41416.pdf Shelf Number: 127702 Keywords: Extremist Groups Homegrown Terrorists Homeland Security Jihadist Terrorism Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism (U.S.) Terrorists Violent Extremism

Author: Goodwin, Matthew Title: The Roots of Extremism: The English Defence League and the Counter-Jihad Challenge Summary: While right-wing extremism and populist extremist parties have been the subject of growing attention in Europe and North America, the emergence of ‘counter- Jihad’ groups has been relatively neglected. Campaigning amid fiscal austerity and ongoing public concerns over immigration, these groups are more confrontational, chaotic and unpredictable than established populist extremist political parties, yet not enough is known about who supports them – and why. Widely held assumptions about their supporters – which often stress economic austerity, political protest and Islamophobia as the key drivers – are challenged by new survey data on public attitudes towards the ideas of one leading counter- Jihad group, the English Defence League. The data indicate that supporters of such groups are not necessarily young, uneducated, economically insecure or politically apathetic. They are not simply anti-Muslim or overtly racist, but xenophobic and profoundly hostile towards immigration. They are more likely than others in society to expect inter-communal conflict and to believe that violence is justifiable. And their beliefs about the threatening nature of Islam have wider public support. Few mainstream voices in Europe are actively challenging counter-Jihad narratives, or the surrounding reservoir of anti-Muslim prejudice among the general public, but this is an essential part of any successful counter-strategy. Details: London: Chatham House, 2013. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: Briefing Paper: Accessed March 12, 2013 at: http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Europe/0313bp_goodwin.pdf Year: 2013 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Europe/0313bp_goodwin.pdf Shelf Number: 127923 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism English Defence League Extremism (U.K.) Extremist Groups Muslims Radical Groups

Author: Schwartz, Matthew Title: Criminal Justice and Rule of Law Capacity Building to Counter Terrorism in Fragile Institutional Contexts: Lessons From Development Cooperation Summary: This policy brief argues that aligning counterterrorism capacity-building agendas within a framework informed by the development cooperation experience could greatly enhance the effectiveness and sustainability of criminal justice and rule of law capacity assistance in general and in preventing terrorism specifically. After providing definitions of capacity and capacity building, this brief outlines the five basic principles of the OECD’s Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness as they relate to capacity development. The discussion then turns to how criminal justice and rule of law capacity building can contribute to countering terrorism and to mitigating conditions conducive to violent extremism by enhancing the capacity of weak state institutions to deliver equitable security and justice to all. It concludes by offering guidance based on best practices and lessons learned from past and ongoing capacity-building efforts in accordance with key themes presented over the course of the brief. Details: Washington, DC: Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation, 2012. 11p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Brief: Accessed April 4, 2013 at: www.globalct.org Year: 2012 Country: International URL: Shelf Number: 128208 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Extremist Groups Rule of Law Terrorism Violent Extremism

Author: Fink, Naureen Chowdhury Title: The Roles of Women in Terrorism, Conflict, and Violent Extremism Lessons for the United Nations and International Actors Summary: This policy brief explores the conceptual and operational challenges in integrating a gender dimension into counterterrorism policy and programming and offers a set of recommendations for the United Nations and other actors to consider when developing effective and sustainable counterterrorism efforts. Details: Goshen, IN: Center on Global Counterterrorism Coooperation, 2013. 18p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Brief: Accessed April 18, 2013 at: http://www.globalct.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/NCF_RB_LS_policybrief_1320.pdf Year: 2013 Country: International URL: http://www.globalct.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/NCF_RB_LS_policybrief_1320.pdf Shelf Number: 128409 Keywords: Extremist Groups Female Terrorists Radical Groups Violent Extremism

Author: Painter, Anthony Title: Democratic Stress, the Populist Signal and Extremist Threat: A call for a new mainstream statecraft and contact democracy Summary: The rise of populism seen across Europe and the US is exposing old and hidden fault-lines in democratic systems. Mainstream parties seem powerless to respond to basic popular anxieties. Many appear blind to the reality that elite political projects have run their course. Democracy is under considerable stress – and fissures are opening up out of which new forms of populism and extremism have emerged. And yet populists are routinely dismissed as ‘protest’ parties, ‘clowns’ and ‘flashes in the pan’. In fact, real demand exists for Europe’s populists – of different kinds – and they must be seen as serious challenger movements that the established parties ignore at their peril. Today, Policy Network launches a significant new report entitled “Democratic stress, the populist signal and extremist threat”. The report is based on a substantial European research project which has over the past 8 months investigated campaigns, policies and political approaches targeted at populism and extremism at the national, local and neighbourhood levels. Working with a wide range of politicians, experts, campaigners, academics and public officials, it has considered how parties – of the left and right – have responded to their different manifestations in countries across Europe. The final report identifies where mainstream politics has failed to date and sets out a strategic evaluation of how the antagonistic and corrosive aspects of populist impulses and identity politics can be resisted and defeated. The conclusion sets forward an approach blending 'statecraft' and 'contact democracy', with case-study examples. Details: London: Policy Network/ Barrow Cadbury Trust, 2013. 56p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 22, 2013 at: http://www.policy-network.net/ Year: 2013 Country: International URL: http://www.policy-network.net/ Shelf Number: 128430 Keywords: Extremist Groups Radical Groups Violent Extremism

Author: Botha, Anneli Title: Assessing the Vulnerability of Kenyan Youths to Radicalisation and Extremism Summary: Following the intervention of the Kenya Defence Forces in Somalia in October 2011 in reaction to the increase in kidnappings on the Kenyan coast, the threat of terrorism in Kenya increased considerably. Initially the perception was that the threat originated from Somalia and that Somali nationals or Somali-Kenyans consequently committed attacks in Kenya. As arrests were made, Kenya was confronted with the reality that Kenyan nationals were responsible for the majority of these attacks. This sparked introspection and the need to understand where this threat originated. This paper aims to provide an overview of the threat of terrorism in Kenya; to consider the drivers of radicalisation, especially among the youth; and to propose counter-strategies that policymakers and security officials might adopt to prevent and counter radicalisation. Details: Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, 2013. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: ISS Paper 245: Accessed May 3, 2013 at: Year: 2013 Country: Kenya URL: Shelf Number: 128615 Keywords: Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Youthful Offenders (Kenya)

Author: Asian Centre for Human Rights Title: India’s Child Soldiers: Government defends officially designated terror groups’ record on the recruitment of child soldiers before the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child Summary: This report is the first comprehensive report on the recruitment and involvement of children in India’s burgeoning internal armed conflicts which currently afflicts 197 out of 640 districts. It has been prepared for submission as a shadow report to the Periodic Report of the Government of India on the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict. India had submitted its Periodic Report in 2011 and the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child is scheduled to consider it during its 66th pre-sessional working group to be held in Geneva from 7-11 October 2013. Apart from the field research, this report has been prepared based on the “Technical Seminar on Preparation of the Shadow Report to the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict” organised by Asian Centre for Human Rights on 23-24 March 2013 in New Delhi. The participants included mainly activists from the conflict affected areas and their names are being kept confidential as disclosure may put them at risk of reprisals from the armed opposition groups (AOGs) which have been recruiting children. This report also includes India’s periodic report, proceedings before the National Commission for Protection of Child Rights (NCPCR) on recruitment of children as boy orderlies under the Madhya Pradesh Police Regulation, India’s surrender and rehabilitation policies on the AOGs, and finally, Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict for awareness raising in India. Details: New Delhi: Asian Centre for Human Rights, 2013. 74p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 30, 2013 at: http://www.achrweb.org/reports/india/JJ-IndiasChildSoldiers2013.pdf Year: 2013 Country: India URL: http://www.achrweb.org/reports/india/JJ-IndiasChildSoldiers2013.pdf Shelf Number: 128857 Keywords: Child Protection Child Soldiers (India) Extremist Groups Terrorism

Author: Kundnani, Arun Title: Blind Spot? Security Narratives and Far-Right Violence in Europe Summary: This paper discusses the challenges of countering far‐Right political violence in the wake of the terrorist attack carried out by Anders Behring Breivik in Norway in July 2011. With brief case studies of Britain, the Netherlands, Denmark and Belgium, it argues that classic neo‐Nazi groups are being supplemented by new ‘counter‐jihadist’ far‐Right movements, which use various modes of political action, including participation in elections, street‐based activism and terrorist violence. Building on recent interest among scholars and practitioners in the role of narratives and performativity in counter‐terrorism, this paper argues that official security discourses tend to hinder efforts to counter far‐Right violence and can unwittingly provide opportunities for counter‐jihadists to advance their own narratives. When leaders and officials of Western European governments narrate issues of multiculturalism and radical Islamism in ways that overlap with counter‐jihadist ideology, it suggests a need for reflection on the unintended side‐effects of their security discourse. The paper concludes with a discussion of how governments can rework their security narratives to oppose far‐Right violence. Details: The Hague: The International Centre for Counter‐Terrorism (ICCT), 2012. 39p. Source: Internet Resource: ICCT Research Paper, June 2012: Accessed June 28, 2013 at: http://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-Kundnani-Blind-Spot-June-2012.pdf Year: 2012 Country: International URL: http://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-Kundnani-Blind-Spot-June-2012.pdf Shelf Number: 129196 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Extremist Groups Political Vioelnce Terrorism

Author: Helfstein, Scott Title: Edges of Radicalization: Ideas, Individuals and Networks in Violent Extremism Summary: This paper examines radicalization as a social phenomenon through the behavior of individuals and networks. Violent extremists, individuals pursuing political change through violence, remain committed to striking the U.S. homeland and its interests abroad. It is important to understand how radical ideas spread to counter or contain this immediate and persistent threat. This study argues that the spread of violent extremism cannot be fully understood as an ideological or social phenomenon, but must be viewed as a process that integrates the two forces in a coevolutionary manner. The same forces that make an ideology appealing to some aggrieved group of people are not necessarily the same factors that promote its transfer through social networks of self-interested human beings. This means that there is value in differentiating why radical ideologies resonate among individuals, and how individuals come to adopt and advocate those ideas. This report helps contextualize the current terrorist threat, the role of technology in radicalization, and next steps in decoding radicalization. Details: West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 2012. 71p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 8, 2013 at: http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/edges-of-radicalization-ideas-individuals-and-networks-in-violent-extremism Year: 2012 Country: International URL: http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/edges-of-radicalization-ideas-individuals-and-networks-in-violent-extremism Shelf Number: 129585 Keywords: Extremist Groups Radical Groups Terrorists Violent Extremism

Author: Perliger, Arie Title: Challengers from the Sidelines: Understanding America’s Violent Far-Right Summary: In the last few years, and especially since 2007, there has been a dramatic rise in the number of attacks and violent plots originating from individuals and groups who self-identify with the far-right of American politics. These incidents cause many to wonder whether these are isolated attacks, an increasing trend, part of increasing societal violence, or attributable to some other condition. To date, however, there has been limited systematic documentation and analysis of incidents of American domestic violence. This study provides a conceptual foundation for understanding different far-right groups and then presents the empirical analysis of violent incidents to identify those perpetrating attacks and their associated trends. Through a comprehensive look at the data, this study addresses three core questions: (1) What are the main current characteristics of the violence produced by the far right? (2) What type of far-right groups are more prone than others to engage in violence? How are characteristics of particular far-right groups correlated with their tendency to engage in violence? (3) What are the social and political factors associated with the level of far-right violence? Are there political or social conditions that foster or discourage violence? It is important to note that this study concentrates on those individuals and groups who have actually perpetuated violence and is not a comprehensive analysis of the political causes with which some far-right extremists identify. While the ability to hold and appropriately articulate diverse political views is an American strength, extremists committing acts of violence in the name of those causes undermine the freedoms that they purport to espouse. Details: West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 2013. 147p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 8, 2013 at: http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/challengers-from-the-sidelines-understanding-americas-violent-far-right Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/challengers-from-the-sidelines-understanding-americas-violent-far-right Shelf Number: 129588 Keywords: Domestic Terrorism Extremist Groups Homeland Security Radical Groups Terrorism (U.S.) Terrorist Groups Violent Extremism

Author: Southern Poverty Law Center Title: Terror From the Right: Plots, Conspiracies and Racist Rampages Since Oklahoma City Summary: At 9:02 a.m. on April 19, 1995, a 7,000-pound truck bomb, constructed of ammonium nitrate fertilizer and nitromethane racing fuel and packed into 13 plastic barrels, ripped through the heart of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. The explosion wrecked much of downtown Oklahoma City and killed 168 people, including 19 children in a day-care center. Another 500 were injured. Although many Americans initially suspected an attack by Middle Eastern radicals, it quickly became clear that the mass murder had actually been carried out by domestic, right-wing terrorists. The slaughter engineered by Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols, men steeped in the conspiracy theories and white-hot fury of the American radical right, marked the opening shot in a new kind of domestic political extremism — a revolutionary ideology whose practitioners do not hesitate to carry out attacks directed at entirely innocent victims, people selected essentially at random to make a political point. After Oklahoma, it was no longer sufficient for many American right-wing terrorists to strike at a target of political significance — instead, they reached for higher and higher body counts, reasoning that they had to eclipse McVeigh’s attack to win attention. What follows is a detailed listing of major terrorist plots and racist rampages that have emerged from the American radical right in the years since Oklahoma City. These have included plans to bomb government buildings, banks, refineries, utilities, clinics, synagogues, mosques, memorials and bridges; to assassinate police officers, judges, politicians, civil rights figures and others; to rob banks, armored cars and other criminals; and to amass illegal machine guns, missiles, explosives and biological and chemical weapons. Each of these plots aimed to make changes in America through the use of political violence. Most contemplated the deaths of large numbers of people — in one case, as many as 30,000, or 10 times the number murdered on Sept. 11, 2001. Details: Montgomery AL: Southern Poverty Law Center, 2012. 27p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 8, 2013 at: http://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/downloads/publication/terror_from_the_right_2012_web_0.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/downloads/publication/terror_from_the_right_2012_web_0.pdf Shelf Number: 129598 Keywords: Domestic Terrorism (U.S.) Extremist Groups Homeland Security Radical Groups Terrorists

Author: Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation Title: Countering Violent Extremism and Promoting Community Engagement in West Africa and the Sahel: An Action Agenda Summary: On 18–19 April 2013, the governments of Burkina Faso and Denmark hosted a workshop in Ouagadougou on the subject of countering violent extremism in West Africa and the Sahel. The workshop was hosted under the auspices of the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) and its Sahel Region Capacity Building Working Group, which focuses on community engagement as one of its five workstreams. Convened by the Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation (CGCC), the workshop brought together 141 participants from 27 countries, four regional and international organizations, and 28 civil society organizations, providing a forum for discussions that highlighted the drivers of violent extremism in the region and explored practical ways of addressing their impact on regional stability, security, and development. As the workshop participants noted, violent extremism in West Africa and the Sahel is fueled by a combination of complex circumstances, including societal conflicts, intercommunal tensions, an underdeveloped sense of citizenship and national loyalty and identity, organized crime, illiteracy, and other challenges related to weak governance, inadequate justice systems, and insufficient service delivery. Violent extremists are exploiting these circumstances and creating what members of the UN Security Council have called an “arc of instability” spanning the Sahara and Sahel. In May 2013, the UN Security Council issued a statement on terrorism in the Sahel that recognized that “terrorism will not be defeated by military force or security forces, law enforcement measures, and intelligence operations alone” and underlined “the need to address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism, including, but not limited to, strengthening efforts for the successful prevention and peaceful resolution of prolonged conflicts, and also promoting the rule of law, the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, good governance, tolerance and inclusiveness.” That statement highlights the need for concerted action from states, civil society, and international partners to work together to build trust with local communities and help them to counter violent extremism. There is no agreed definition of countering violent extremism (CVE) programming although it has been described as efforts to “prevent non-radicalized populations from becoming radicalized. The objective is to create individual and communal resilience against cognitive and/or violent radicalization through a variety of non-coercive means.” CVE programming can also focus on the need to reduce support for or active participation in violent extremist actions through noncoercive means. Therefore, the range of CVE and terrorism prevention programming and the practitioners involved is quite broad. Numerous actors, including bilateral donors, regional and international bodies, states in the region, and civil society organizations, are pursuing a wide range of activities that contribute to countering violent extremism in West Africa and the Sahel. In many cases, CVE measures build on existing initiatives and policies to address violence and insecurity and promote good governance and development. By addressing conditions conducive to the spread of violent extremism, these measures can be understood as relevant to countering violent extremism without the need to explicitly label them as CVE measures. In the co-chair’s summary at the workshop’s conclusion, Danish Ambassador to Burkina Faso Bo Jensen highlighted four recurring themes that capture the range of CVE and CVE-relevant programming. 1. Empower local community, government, and traditional leaders to work on conflict prevention and resolution in a region that has been plagued by several prolonged conflicts. 2. Strengthen law enforcement, criminal justice, and security sector actors through training and technical assistance focusing on community engagement, the rule of law, and human rights. 3. Actively engage and support civil society at the regional and international level. 4. Identify and prevent violent extremism by addressing its structural and ideological drivers.5 Building on those four themes and other inputs collected from participants during the meeting, this Action Agenda outlines a range of proposed activities to enhance existing CVE-relevant efforts. Details: Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation, 2013. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 10, 2013 at: http://www.thegctf.org/documents/10299/44331/Action+Agenda+ENG.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Africa URL: http://www.thegctf.org/documents/10299/44331/Action+Agenda+ENG.pdf Shelf Number: 129607 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Violent Extremism (Africa)

Author: Hunt, Alice E. Title: Beyond Bullets: Strategies for Countering Violent Extremism Summary: To guide future American efforts to counter violent Islamist extremism, the Center for a New American Security launched a strategy development process modeled after President Eisenhower’s Project Solarium. CNAS asked five experts to recast the effort in sustainable terms and in a manner consistent with American values. The result was a series of essays that recommended new counterterrorism tools and strategies for the Obama administration. Kristin Lord, John Nagl, and Seth Rosen present a comprehensive strategy to combat violent Islamist extremism. David Kilcullen recommends a “balanced • response” that disaggregates disparate Islamist groups and recalibrates the civilian and military tools of U.S. power. Larry Diamond focuses on democratization in • the Arab world as a means to staunch the supply of violent extremists and the grievances that inspire them. Camille Pecastaing suggests that the U.S. government dismantle the “war on terror,” relegate counterterrorism to the jurisdiction of technical government agencies, and educate the American public about the true nature of the threat. Harvey Sapolsky proposes a reduction of U.S. • military deployments in order to undercut extremist propaganda and conserve limited resources. Finally, Daniel Benjamin presents a counter• terrorism strategy that would recommit the United States to international legal standards and to expand civilian tools of government, while continuing to track down al Qaeda. CNAS researchers James Miller and Alice Hunt then convened the authors, along with leading experts and stakeholders from the U.S. government, to debate the merits and challenges of each approach. From these discussions, CNAS researchers crafted a draft strategy and presented it to the authors and outside experts at a second conference. The feedback from that session, along with a series of expert reviews, resulted in the final documents presented in this volume. Details: Washington, EC: Center for a New American Security, 2009. 127p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 19, 2013 at: http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/LordNaglRosen_Beyond%20Bullets%20Edited%20Volume_June09_0.pdf Year: 2009 Country: International URL: http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/LordNaglRosen_Beyond%20Bullets%20Edited%20Volume_June09_0.pdf Shelf Number: 129647 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Extremist Groups Islamist Terrorism Radical Groups Violent Extremism (International)

Author: Title: Policing Urban Violence in Pakistan Summary: Endemic violence in Pakistan's urban centres signifies the challenges confronting the federal and provincial governments in restoring law and order and consolidating the state's writ. The starkest example is Karachi, which experienced its deadliest year on record in 2013, with 2,700 casualties, mostly in targeted attacks, and possibly 40 per cent of businesses fleeing the city to avoid growing extortion rackets. However, all provincial capitals as well as the national capital suffer from similar problems and threats. A national rethink of overly militarised policy against crime and militancy is required. Islamabad and the four provincial governments need to develop a coherent policy framework, rooted in providing good governance and strengthening civilian law enforcement, to tackle criminality and the jihadi threat. Until then, criminal gangs and jihadi networks will continue to wreak havoc in the country's big cities and put its stability and still fragile democratic transition at risk. Some of the worst assaults on religious and sectarian minorities in 2013 occurred in Quetta and Peshawar, including the 10 January suicide and car bomb attack that killed over 100, mostly Shias, in Quetta; the 16 February terror attack that killed more than 80, again mostly Shias, in Quetta's Hazara town; and the 22 September bombing of a Peshawar church that killed more than 80 people, mostly Christians. The provincial capitals of Peshawar, Quetta, Karachi and Lahore are bases of operations and financing for a range of extremist groups and criminal gangs that exploit poor governance and failing public infrastructure to establish recruitment and patronage networks. As urban populations grow, the competition over resources, including land and water, has become increasingly violent. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK)'s capital, Peshawar, and Balochistan's capital, Quetta, are hostage to broader regional security trends. The conflict in Afghanistan and cross-border ties between Pakistan and Afghan militants have undermined stability in KPK and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Military-dictated counter-insurgency policies, swinging between indiscriminate force and appeasement deals with tribal militants have failed to restore the peace, and instead further empowered violent extremists. Police in Peshawar, which has borne the brunt of militant violence and where violence is at an all-time high, lack political support and resources and appear increasingly incapable of meeting the challenge. Indeed, while militants and criminals frequently target that city, the force is powerless to act when they then seek haven in bordering FATA agencies, because its jurisdiction, according to the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) 1901, does not extend to these areas. Balochistan's location, bordering on southern Afghanistan, the Afghan Taliban's homeland, and longstanding Pakistani policies of backing Afghan Islamist proxies are partly responsible for the growth of militancy and extremism that now threatens Quetta. Aided by a countrywide network, Sunni extremists have killed hundreds of Shias there, while their criminal allies have helped to fill jihadi coffers, and their own, through kidnappings for ransom. Civilian law enforcement agencies cannot counter this rising tide of sectarian violence and criminality, since they are marginalised by the military and its paramilitary arms. Continuing to dictate and implement security policy, the military remains focused on brutally suppressing a province-wide Baloch insurgency, fuelled by the denial of political and economic autonomy. The end result is more Baloch alienation and more jihadi attacks undermining peace in the provincial capital. In Karachi, Pakistan's largest city, which generates around 70 per cent of national GDP, much of the violence is driven by the state's failure to meet the demands of a fast growing population and to enforce the law. Over the past decade, the competition over resources and turf has become increasingly violent. Criminals and militant groups attempt to lure youth by providing scarce services, work and a purpose in life. Demographic changes fuel ethno-political tensions and rivalries, accentuated by the main political parties: the mostly Sindhi Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) representing mohajirs and the predominately Pashtun Awami National Party (ANP) forging links with criminal gangs. Details: Brussels, Belgium: International Crisis Group, 2014. 55p. Source: Internet Resource: Asia Report N�255: Accessed January 27, 2014 at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/pakistan/255-policing-urban-violence-in-pakistan Year: 2014 Country: Pakistan URL: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/pakistan/255-policing-urban-violence-in-pakistan Shelf Number: 131805 Keywords: Extremist Groups Gangs Hate Crimes Urban Areas Violence Violent Crime

Author: Howard, Russell D. Title: The Nexus of Extremism and Trafficking: Scourge of the World or So Much Hype? Summary: In a globalized and increasingly interconnected world, the transfer of information, expertise, and relationships are becoming more complex and more commonplace. The interconnectedness of criminal organizations that span not only countries but across regions of the globe is troubling. However, more troubling is the possibility of the linking of transnational criminal organizations with insurgent and terrorist organizations as addressed in this work by Brigadier General (retired) Russ Howard and Ms. Colleen Traughber. The radical ideologies propagating politically motivated violence now have the opportunity to leverage and participate in traditionally criminal enterprises. This melding of form and function provides criminals with new networks and violent extremists with new funding sources and potential smuggling opportunities. General Howard and Ms. Traughber delve into the nexus between violent extremist elements and transnational criminal elements by first clarifying whether a real problem exists, and if so, what is the appropriate role for Special Operations Forces (SOF) in confronting it. The authors bring rigor to the subject matter by dissecting the issue of intention and opportunities of criminal organization and violent extremists. The question is confounded by the authors who note the wide variance in the motivations and opportunities of both different criminal organizations and extremist organizations. What the authors do make clear is that the trafficking of humans, weapons, drugs, and contraband (HWDC) is a natural way for the criminals and extremists to cooperate. To bring the issue into focus, the authors systematically examine case studies dealing with the nexus between specific organizations and HWDC trafficking opportunities. Human trafficking in Europe and the former Soviet Union; weapons trafficking in the Far East, Asia, and South America for money; the narcotics trade by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia; Hezbollah and Kurdistan Workers' Party, as well as contraband smuggling of cigarettes, are all used to examine the extremist/criminal nexus. The connections become clear as the authors discuss each of the HWDC issues within the nexus; what is also clear is that often the nexus is a simple marriage of convenience. General Howard and Ms. Traughber transition from the vignettes to how this nexus will impact SOF and interagency partners. Most importantly, the authors recognized a need for SOF to expand their mission set, and authorities to more appropriately address criminality in support of extremist groups. The authors identify issues for SOF including the traditional delineation between law enforcement activities and military activities. The findings, therefore, make a case that as SOF move into the future and are required to confront the nexus between extremists and criminals, a new definition and some deep thought need to be given to expanding SOF roles and authorities. Details: MacDill AFB, FL: Joint Special Operations University, 2013. 98p. Source: Internet Resource: JSOU Report 13-6: Accessed March 12, 2014 at: https://jsou.socom.mil/JSOU%20Publications/13-6_Howard_Nexus_FINAL.pdf Year: 2013 Country: International URL: https://jsou.socom.mil/JSOU%20Publications/13-6_Howard_Nexus_FINAL.pdf Shelf Number: 131881 Keywords: Cigarette Smuggling Extremist Groups Human Trafficking Smuggling Terrorism Weapons Smuggling

Author: Christmann, Kris Title: Preventing Religious Radicalisation and Violent Extremism: A Systematic Review of the Research Evidence Summary: The purpose of this systematic review is to examine the scholarly literature on the process(es) of radicalisation, particularly among young people, and the availability of interventions to prevent extremism. The review was undertaken to inform the national evaluation of the Youth Justice Board for England and Wales' (YJB) preventing violent extremism programmes within the youth justice system, and as such, represents one of the research outputs from that study. The full evaluation report, Process Evaluation of Preventing Violent Extremism Programmes for Young People, is to be published by the YJB alongside this review. The review found that the evidence base for effective preventing violent extremism interventions is very limited. Despite a prolific output of research, few studies contained empirical data or systematic data analysis. Furthermore, although a growing body of literature investigating the radicalisation process is emerging, the weight of that literature is focused upon terrorism rather than radicalisation. As such, the evidence is concerned with that smaller cohort of individuals who, once radicalised, go on to commit acts of violence in the pursuit of political or religious aims and objectives. This introduces a systematic bias in the literature, away from the radicalisation process that preceeds terrorism, including radicalisation that does not lead to violence. Despite these limitations, the systematic review found that Islamic radicalisation and terrorism emanate from a very heterogeneous population that varies markedly in terms of education, family background, socio-economic status and income. Several studies have identified potential risk factors for radicalisation, and, among these, political grievances (notably reaction to Western foreign policy) have a prominent role. The review found only two evaluated UK programmes that explicitly aimed to address Islamic radicalisation in the UK. These were outreach and engagement projects running in London: the Muslim Contact Unit (MCU) and the 'Street' Project. In addition, the review drew heavily upon the Department for Communities and Local Government's (DCLG) rapid evidence assessment, Preventing Support for Violent Extremism through Community Interventions: A Review of the Evidence (Pratchett et al, 2010). This advocated the adoption of capacity building and empowering young people, and interventions that "challenge ideology that focus on theology and use education/training". The Netherlands-based Slotervaart Project was identified as an exemplar of the outreach/community-based approach recommended by the DCLG review. The review also considered a number of de-radicalisation programmes operating in several Islamic countries and programmes tackling right-wing radicalisation. These programmes provide some potential learning points for future UK programmes, chiefly around the need for those engaging with radicalised individuals to carry authority and legitimacy, and to be equipped with profound ideological knowledge. Details: London: Youth Justice Board for England and Wales, 2012. 77p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 17, 2014 at: http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/publications/research-and-analysis/yjb/preventing-violent-extremism-systematic-review.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/publications/research-and-analysis/yjb/preventing-violent-extremism-systematic-review.pdf Shelf Number: 131942 Keywords: Extremism Extremist Groups Interventions Muslims Radical Groups Radicalization Religion Violent Extremism

Author: Bjelopera, Jerome P. Title: Countering Violent Extremism in the United States Summary: In August 2011, the Obama Administration announced its counter-radicalization strategy. It is devised to address the forces that influence some people living in the United States to acquire and hold radical or extremist beliefs that may eventually compel them to commit terrorism. This is the first such strategy for the federal government, which calls this effort "combating violent extremism" (CVE). Since the Al Qaeda attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S. government has prosecuted hundreds of individuals on terrorism charges. Unlike the necessarily secretive law enforcement and intelligence efforts driving these investigations, the CVE strategy includes sizeable government activity within the open marketplace of ideas, where private citizens are free to weigh competing ideologies and engage in constitutionally protected speech and expression. Some of the key challenges in the implementation of the CVE strategy likely spring from the interplay between the marketplace of ideas and the secretive realm encompassing law enforcement investigations and terrorist plotting. The strategy addresses the radicalization of all types of potential terrorists in the United States but focuses on those inspired by Al Qaeda. To further elaborate this strategy, in December 2011 the Administration released its "Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States" (SIP). The SIP is a large-scale planning document with three major objectives and numerous future activities and efforts. The SIP's three objectives involve (1) enhancing federal community engagement efforts related to CVE, (2) developing greater government and law enforcement expertise for preventing violent extremism, and (3) countering violent extremist propaganda. Details: Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2014. 33p. Source: Internet Resource: R42553: Accessed March 17, 2014 at: https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R42553.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R42553.pdf Shelf Number: 131948 Keywords: Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Violent Extremism

Author: Vidino, Lorenzo Title: Jihadist Radicalization in Switzerland Summary: Even though over the last twenty years some of its citizens have been killed or kidnapped by various jihadist groups abroad, internally Switzerland has not witnessed jihadist activities on a significant scale. Unlike most Western European countries, in fact, no successful terrorist attack of jihadist inspiration has ever been perpetrated on its territory and there is no publicly available information indicating that concrete plans for an attack in Switzerland were ever made. Less than a dozen individuals have been tried for terrorism-related crimes, all of them involving non-violent activities of material support and propaganda. The number of Swiss residents who have traveled abroad to join jihadist groups is also estimated to be lower than in most other European countries. Yet Swiss authorities are not complacent and argue that "Switzerland is not an island." Counterterrorism officials have consistently claimed that there is ample evidence suggesting that some of the same radicalization trends that have long characterized other Western European countries also exist in Switzerland, albeit on a smaller scale. This report seeks to assess the size and dynamics of jihadist radicalization in the country. Its main findings are as follows: - While it is impossible to provide anything even close to an exact number, it can be argued that radicalization of jihadist inspiration involves a negligible cross-section of the Swiss Muslim community. There are probably only a couple of dozens of individuals in Switzerland who are actively involved in jihadist activities. Similarly, it can be argued that the number of those fully embracing jihadist ideology is somewhere in the hundreds, and of those with varying degrees sympathizing with it is somewhere in the lower thousands. - Basing the analysis on the admittedly limited number of Swiss-based individuals who are known to have embraced jihadist ideology, it is evident that jihadist enthusiasts, as elsewhere in Europe, do not have a common profile. In the 1990s and early 2000s most of them were first generation immigrants who had arrived in Switzerland already radicalized. An example is the case of Moez Garsallaoui and Malika el Aroud, the Fribourg-based administrators of prominent jihadist forums who had contacts with the upper echelons of al Qaeda, or members of various cells providing support to North African-based al Qaeda affiliates. Following a pattern common throughout Europe, over the last few years an increasing number of jihadist sympathizers have had homegrown characteristics: born (or at least raised) in Switzerland, they radicalized independently in the country and operated largely outside of the framework of established groups. Occasionally some Swiss-based radicalized individuals manage to link up with al Qaeda-affiliated groups outside of Europe and train or fight with them. - Militants are not born in a vacuum. Rather, radicalization takes place "at the intersection of an enabling environment and a personal trajectory." This report identifies militant Salafism as the ideological milieu from which jihadists, in Switzerland as elsewhere, can come from. An automatic identification of Salafism with terrorism is a gross analytical mistake. Moreover, even among those who interact with the most radical fringes of the Salafist movement, only a marginal fraction will make the leap into violent radicalism. But militant Salafism is the larger sea in which the fish swim. - The report analyzes various factors that, often operating concurrently, contribute to radicalization: 1. The internet: the report finds evidence of a small, loose-knit community of Swiss-based jihad enthusiasts who interact among themselves and with likeminded individuals abroad on jihadist forums and online social networks. 2. Mosques: the overwhelming majority of Swiss mosques reject extremism, but small groups of jihad enthusiasts congregate at the margins of some of Switzerland's most conservative mosques or in private prayer rooms. 3. Gateway organizations: there are a handful of organizations in Switzerland which do not advocate violence themselves, but spread ideas that may lead others to do so. 4. Links abroad: Swiss militants regularly interact with like-minded individuals from countries where the Salafist scene is more developed. It is common for Swiss residents to travel abroad to participate in seminars and for foreign speakers to come to Switzerland. This interaction is particularly strong with the Salafist scenes in Germany and in the Balkans. - Patterns of linkage are very difficult to assess, but there are indications pointing to the presence of "gatekeepers" operating on Swiss territory that channel aspiring jihadists in the direction of established groups operating in Africa, the Middle East or South Asia. - As in any other European country, radicalization of jihadist inspiration seems to affect only a statistically marginal segment of the Swiss Muslim population. But radicalization in Switzerland appears to be a limited phenomenon also when compared to other European countries. Four factors can explain this difference: 1. Lack of an "infecting cluster": Switzerland never hosted an openly jihadist mosque or high profile jihadists, elements that in other countries have been crucial in spreading jihadist ideology. 2. Good degree of social, economic and cultural integration of most Muslims living in Switzerland, rendering them more resilient to extremist narratives. 3. Demographic characteristics of the Swiss Muslim population: some 80% to 90% of Swiss Muslims trace their origins to the Balkans or Turkey, where the vast majority of Muslims traditionally espouses forms of Islam that are tolerant and apolitical. 4. Switzerland's foreign policy, whose largely neutral stance does not provide a source of grievances. - While these concurrently operating factors can potentially explain the low levels of jihadist radicalization in Switzerland, none of them is a guarantee. Each, in fact, presents weaknesses and exceptions. Many of the dynamics present throughout Europe are visible also in Switzerland, albeit on a much smaller scale. There are loosely knit milieus in Switzerland, both in the virtual and physical world, that sympathize with jihadist ideology. And occasionally individuals who belong to these milieus do make the leap from words to action. Details: Zurich: Center for Security Studies (CSS) ETH Zurich, 2013. 44p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 28, 2014 at: http://www.css.ethz.ch/publications/pdfs/CH_radicalization_report.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Switzerland URL: http://www.css.ethz.ch/publications/pdfs/CH_radicalization_report.pdf Shelf Number: 132180 Keywords: Counter-Radicalization Programs Extremist Groups Jihadism Muslims Radical Groups Terrorists

Author: Walker, Andrew Title: What Is Boko Haram? Summary: The group Jama'atu Ahlus-Sunnah Lidda'Awati Wal Jihad, known the world over as Boko Haram, is an extremist Islamic sect in Nigeria that has created havoc across the north of the country and in the capital, Abuja. Its violent attacks on government offices, the United Nations, and churches threaten to destabilize the country. A range of conflicting narratives has grown up around Boko Haram, and the group's origins, motivations, and future plans remain a matter of debate. This report addresses the questions stemming from these narratives and suggests how the group can be contained. The report is based on the author's extensive research and reporting on Boko Haram. In March 2011, he conducted an interview with a senior member of the group in the city of Maiduguri, Nigeria, the center of Boko Haram's area of influence. The report also draws on interviews with Nigerian journalists who have covered the group (and who asked to remain anonymous in this report) and on information provided to the author by other researchers working on Boko Haram. Details: Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2012. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: Special Report 308: Accessed July 14, 2014 at: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR308.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Nigeria URL: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR308.pdf Shelf Number: 132605 Keywords: Boko Haram (Nigeria) Extremist Groups Extremist Violence Radical Groups Terrorist Organizations Terrorists (Nigeria)

Author: Olojo, Akinola Title: Nigeria's Troubled North: Interrogating the Drivers of Public Support for Boko Haram Summary: Over the past decade, the northern region of Nigeria has experienced a surge in terrorist violence instigated by the sectarian group known as Boko Haram. Several analysts have advanced the view that poverty, longstanding economic disparities within Nigeria, and structural violence, are key factors underlying the crisis. However, the complex nature of the situation in Nigeria has at the same time caused some observers to characterise Boko Haram's aggression as violent extremism beyond a domestic agenda. The group's use of suicide attacks particularly presents a dreadful trait typical of international terrorist violence; a style of brutality hitherto alien to the Nigerian state. Nevertheless, Boko Haram has been able to draw upon a considerable base of local sympathy and support largely from the ranks of uneducated, unemployed and impoverished youths in northern Nigeria. In addition, the group's ability to manoeuvre and stage-manage the force of religion in achieving its objectives appears to be dangerously reinforced by the influence of political interests and elites. These multi-dimensional challenges continue to confound the Nigerian government, leaving it struggling to clearly define the problem and to devise a comprehensive strategy to prevent and counter it. This paper argues that the effective formulation and implementation of such a strategy requires an incisive understanding of the political, socio-economic and religious/ideological drivers of public support for Boko Haram. Enhanced knowledge of the recruitment dynamics that feed and sustain the group could particularly inform a more proactive counter-terrorism framework for the Nigerian state. This paper therefore presents the case for a thorough examination of the factors that have inspired public support for Boko Haram and the trajectory of the group's mobilisation of various forms of support in northern Nigeria. This study draws upon a considerable number of open sources and it acknowledges the general difficulty which research in the field of (counter-)terrorism encounters while trying to gather primary source data. In the case of Nigeria, this challenge is more apparent due to the manifold (and on-going) security risks involved in acquiring such data in the north-eastern zones of conflict. Nevertheless, the author of this paper has attempted to complement secondary sources with a modest blend of data obtained through interviews and research reports. Two central questions at the core of this study include: To what extent do socio-economic issues such as poverty and underdevelopment among youths, the role of religion, and political interests explain the motivations for public support for Boko Haram? Second, how can the existing leadership in Nigeria address the escalating crisis; and what role can institutional leadership at the local, national and regional levels play in addressing the problem? One of the theoretical considerations in this paper relates to the structural violence paradigm. Its suggestion of how economic deprivation, class discrimination and societal injustice prevent citizens from reaching their full potential helps to place in context the influence which socio-economic drivers exert on public support for Boko Haram. The awareness that a lack of economic, social and/or political development feeds into the structural factors conducive to terrorism is not new; it already played a prominent role in the first ever resolution adopted by the United Nations (UN) General Assembly (GA) on counter-terrorism in 1972 (GA Resolution 3034). In fact, the logic of the structural violence paradigm, as advocated by its chief proponent Johan Galtung, underscores how socio-cultural systems, political structures and state institutions act as indirect instigators of violence. Individual and group grievances, such as poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, discrimination, and economic marginalisation, can be used as mobilising instruments by sinister groups to find support and recruits for terrorist violence. The relevance of this can also be understood in terms of societal challenges that are increasingly being conceptualised within the framework of human security. As already noted, these issues collectively inform one of the central questions of this study primarily because of its causal link with the crisis context of northern Nigeria. While this is the case, the structural violence approach may very well lose some of its potency when evaluated based on the accounts of other country/conflict settings. Even in the Nigerian situation, and as this paper will further highlight, while structural violence helps to explain the motivations for public support for Boko Haram, it nonetheless remains inadequate as a single factor instigating the crisis. Indeed, not every Boko Haram member that has engaged in violence is socio-economically deprived. At the same time, not every socio-economically deprived individual will be motivated to lend support to acts of terror perpetrated by the group. Therefore, this study acknowledges that there will always be nuances reflected in varying contexts both within and outside the Nigerian case study. After briefly tracing the course of Boko Haram's emergence as a group, this paper will shed light on the bearing which political and elite interests may have exerted on public support for Boko Haram. Subsequently, the socio-economic context of the crisis will be examined with a view to determining the degree to which it incites public support for Boko Haram. Beyond these issues are other intervening variables that are frequently at play within the Nigerian state. The fifth section will focus on the most important among these, probing the catalytic role of religion and how this has been exploited by the group in generating mass appeal in the north. The sixth part will explore the often assumed external dimension of Boko Haram's activities within the context of weapons, terrorist funding and foreign fighters. The concluding sections will underscore what is instructive about the lessons emerging from the undercurrents of public support for the group, while also reflecting on implications for the development of more robust and concerted counter-terrorism policies. Details: The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2013. 20 p. Source: Internet Resource: ICCT Research Paper: Accessed July 14, 2014 at: http://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-Olojo-Nigerias-Troubled-North-October-2013.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Nigeria URL: http://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-Olojo-Nigerias-Troubled-North-October-2013.pdf Shelf Number: 132671 Keywords: Boko Haram Counter-Terrorism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Socioeconomic Conditions Terrorism Terrorist Recruitment

Author: Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC) Title: Countering Violent Extremism in Indonesia: Need for a Rethink Summary: The IPAC report, Countering Violent Extremism in Indonesia: Need for a Rethink, says that prevention programs of the National Anti-Terrorism Agency (Badan Nasional untuk Penanggulangan Terorisme) have not been as effective as hoped. At the same time, many local communities, some of them inspired by an anti-salafi backlash, are taking action themselves against extremist preachers and radical media, while some prisoners are deciding on their own to move away from violence. "The trick is to understand when, why and how individuals and communities decide to resist extremism and then to design interventions that can replicate the process," says Sidney Jones, IPAC director. BNPT's prevention programs could usefully benefit from more research on how radicalisation takes place and how local communities fight back. For example, it is planning to train administrators and imams of some 90 mosques across thirteen provinces and provide funding to strengthen their capacity to resist extremist donors. But the case dossiers of the hundreds of convicted terrorists, which contained detailed information on the mosques where they became radicalised in the first place, do not appear to have been used to compile a list of mosques to be targeted. The IPAC report contains a case study of one such mosque, Mesjid Muhammad Ramadhan in South Bekasi, just outside Jakarta, where dozens of men later convicted of terrorism took part in radical discussion groups. In April 2014, the local government, working with community leaders, expelled the extremists, exploiting an internal rift in the mosque administration; the fact that the city owned the land on which the mosque was built; and resentment of influential local religious leaders over chararacterisation of their traditional practices as incorrect or idolatrous. The Bekasi takeover benefited from a particularly good local police chief and subdistrict head (camat), but it is only one of many such incidents across the country. If BNPT could collect such cases and analyse what tactics have been successful, it could make the proposed training of mosque administrators far more effective. The report also examines government programs aimed at prisons and at the media and concludes that much more could be done to target them more effectively. It suggests that a new government taking office later this year might consider a restructuring of BNPT to ensure that the prevention division is better integrated with the division responsible for intelligence and operations. Details: Jakarta: IPAC, 2014. 25p. Source: Internet Resource: IPAC Report No. 11: Accessed July 19, 2014 at: http://file.understandingconflict.org/file/2014/06/IPAC_11_Rethinking_Countering_Extremism.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Indonesia URL: http://file.understandingconflict.org/file/2014/06/IPAC_11_Rethinking_Countering_Extremism.pdf Shelf Number: 132717 Keywords: Extremist Groups Radical Groups Terrorism

Author: Onuoha, Freedom C. Title: Why Do Youth Join Boko Haram? Summary: Summary - Since Nigeria's return to democracy in May 1999, armed nonstate groups have significantly undermined the country's internal security environment, largely using young men as foot soldiers. Among these groups, Boko Haram has grown to become a serious national, regional, and international concern. Estimates of the death toll from Boko Haram attacks since 2009 range as high as ten thousand fatalities. With Boko Haram and other groups seemingly gaining in strength, questions arise as to why young men join them in the first place and what the government and other actors can do to prevent it. - Surveys, interviews, and focus groups conducted in Nigeria in 2013 suggest that poverty,unemployment, illiteracy, and weak family structures make or contribute to making young men vulnerable to radicalization. Itinerant preachers capitalize on the situation by preaching an extreme version of religious teachings and conveying a narrative of the government as weak and corrupt. Armed groups such as Boko Haram can then recruit and train youth for activities ranging from errand running to suicide bombings. - To weaken the armed groups' abilities to radicalize and recruit young men, the Nigerian government at all levels, perhaps with support from interested international actors, could institute monitoring and regulation of religious preaching; strengthen education, job training, and job creation programs; design robust programs to aid destitute children; promote peace education; and embark on an anticorruption campaign. Addressing the conditions that make it possible for insurgents to recruit young men in Nigeria can significantly diminish the strength of the insurgency, if not eliminate it altogether. Details: Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2014. 12p. Source: Internet Resource: Special Report 348: Accessed July 28, 2014 at: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR348-Why_do_Youth_Join_Boko_Haram.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Nigeria URL: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR348-Why_do_Youth_Join_Boko_Haram.pdf Shelf Number: 132797 Keywords: At-Risk Youth Boko Haram (Nigeria) Extremist Groups Radical Groups Terrorist Organizations Terrorist Recruitment Terrorists (Nigeria)

Author: CLEEN Foundation Title: Youths, Radicalisation and Affiliation with Insurgent Groups in Northern Nigeria Summary: The violent activities of the Boko Haram sect in Nigeria, which draws its members largely from the youth, have underpinned growing concern over youth radicalization and religious extremism in Northern Nigeria. Radicalisation as it is understood here entails the process by which an individual or group transits from a state of passive reception of revolutionary, militant or extremist views, ideas and beliefs to active pursuit of the ideals of such views, ideas and beliefs, especially through supporting, promoting or adopting violence as a means to achieving such intentions. It is such transition that underlies violent extremism or terrorism. Against this backdrop, this study examined the reason young Nigerians are inclined to being part of insurgent groups, particularly Boko Haram. The aim of the study was to provide a better understanding of the underlying drivers of radicalisation in Northern Nigeria, and proffer alternative approaches to addressing the crisis. The specific objectives of the study were to: Provide an empirical understanding and assessment of the push and pull factors between youth, radicalisation and affiliation with insurgent groups in the northern part of Nigeria; Identify the patterns, prevalence and potential threats of youth radicalization to the security situation in Northern Nigeria; and Proffer actionable recommendations on how to tackle the root causes of the crisis. The study gathered evidence of the drivers of radicalisation in Northern Nigeria through a combination of desk review of secondary materials such as media reports, databases, policy reports, and academic literature, and primary research involving the conduct of key informant interviews, administration of questionnaires and focus group discussions. Commissioned consultants and researchers conducted the field study in two towns in six states in Northern Nigeria - Borno, Gombe, Kaduna, Kano, Sokoto, and Yobe - selected for the study. It found that ignorance of the true teachings of the religion (Islam) provides the most important source through which youths acquire radical or distorted views of religion, often propagated by roaming (independent) preachers. Furthermore, economic (poverty and unemployment) as well as socio-cultural factors (poor parental upbringing or neglect of children) underpin young people's vulnerability to recruitment and radicalisation by extremist or terrorist groups. The study also found that the excesses of security forces are not a 'major' factor in youth radicalisation, contrary to the popular assumption in some quarters. However, obvious shortcomings of security forces deployed in counter Boko Haram operations need to be urgently addressed by the appropriate authorities. In order to effectively respond to the problem of youth radicalisation and extremism in Northern Nigeria, the study recommended, among others, better monitoring and regulation of religious preaching in Nigeria; creation of job opportunities for the youth; delivery of robust rehabilitation programmes for destitute children; expansion of access to quality education; and promotion of peace education. In view of some limitations encountered, the study concluded that there was still much to be done in unpacking the intricacies of youth radicalisation, particularly in relation to the specificities of each state where the phenomenon of radicalisation has and is taking place in Northern Nigeria. Notwithstanding, the utility of the study lies in the fact that it has taken the very important first step towards understanding the key drivers of youth radicalisation and extremism in Northern Nigeria through an empirical research. The distance it has not covered should inform further action on the part of government, civil society groups and academics in the quest to find the drivers of, and sustainable solutions to, growing radicalisation and extremism in Nigeria. Details: Lagos: CLEEN Foundation, 2014. 117p. Source: Internet Resource: Monograph Series, No. 20: Accessed July 28, 2014 at: http://cleen.org/Youths,%20Radicalisation%20and%20Affiliation%20with%20Insurgent%20Groups%20in%20Northern%20Nigeria.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Nigeria URL: http://cleen.org/Youths,%20Radicalisation%20and%20Affiliation%20with%20Insurgent%20Groups%20in%20Northern%20Nigeria.pdf Shelf Number: 132802 Keywords: At-Risk Youth Boko Haram (Nigeria) Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Religion Terrorist Organizations Terrorists (Nigeria)

Author: Couture, Krista London Title: A Gendered Approach To Countering Violent Extremism. Lessons Learned From Women In Peacebuilding And Conflict Prevention Applied Successfully In Bangladesh And Morocco Summary: As the United States and world transition from a reflexive and hard approach in counterterrorism to a more reflective and soft one for the prevention of terrorism, the search for best practices and lessons learned is more critical than ever. While programming related to countering violent extremism (CVE) continues to grapple with the adoption of official definitions, priorities, evaluation methodologies, and qualitative and quantitative metrics, there is a growing awareness of the importance of harnessing female actors as positive, operational agents of change. Women continue to be an underutilized and under-tapped resource in the fight against extremism. This research identifies best practices through lessons learned from efforts that utilize women to encouragingly affect catalysts and circumstances that drive individuals to engage in terrorism. The empowerment of women not only makes practical sense, but also is a good investment in economics, business, and counterterrorism. In micro lending, for every $1US a woman earns, she reinvests 90 percent back into her family and/or community; men re-invest only 40 percent. When a woman has an education, she marries on average four years later, enters into non-abusive relationships, and has 2.2 children who are healthier and better educated. Extremism is most effectively countered through increased education, better critical thinking, and enhanced opportunities. These empowerment scenarios and positive outcomes become manifest in the impact a woman has within her family and community. In the words of former Secretary to the United Nations Kofi Annan, "There is no development strategy more beneficial to society as a whole - women and men alike - than the one which involves women as central players." While originally intended to only bring awareness of the role of women in preventing terrorism, this research reveals several additional important findings. Most notably, as is the case with their impact on peace and stability, women play a critical role in the security realm, and CVE is no exception. Empowering women in culturally and country-specific ways enables them to be valuable players in the extremism paradigm. Details: Washington, DC: Brookings Institute, 2014. 74p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Paper: Accessed August 4, 2014 at: http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2014/07/30%20gender%20conflict%20prevention%20countering%20violent%20extremism%20couture/women%20cve%20formatted%2072914%20couture%20final2.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Bangladesh URL: http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2014/07/30%20gender%20conflict%20prevention%20countering%20violent%20extremism%20couture/women%20cve%20formatted%2072914%20couture%20final2.pdf Shelf Number: 132873 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Terrorists Violence Prevention Violent Extremism (Bangladesh, Morocco)

Author: Botha, Anneli Title: Radicalisation in Kenya Recruitment to al-Shabaab and the Mombasa Republican Council Summary: Despite a history of extremism and unconventional political developments in Kenya, relatively little empirical research has been done to determine why and how individuals join al-Shabaab and the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC). This paper is based on interviews with Kenyan and Somali-Kenyan individuals associated with al-Shabaab and the MRC. These organisations have very different profiles. Al-Shabaab pursues an Islamist terrorist agenda while the MRC pursues a secessionist agenda; the latter has not carried out terrorist attacks. Muslim youth have joined extremist groups as a counter-reaction to what they see as government-imposed 'collective punishment' driven by the misguided perception that all Somali and Kenyan-Somali nationals are potential terrorists. As long as Kenyan citizens exclusively identify with an ethnic/ religious identity that is perceived to be under threat, radicalisation will increase. Details: Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2014. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: ISS Paper 265: Accessed September 9, 2014 at: http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/Paper265.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Kenya URL: http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/Paper265.pdf Shelf Number: 133184 Keywords: Extremist Groups Muslims Radical Groups (Kenya) Radicalization

Author: Winkler, Carol K., ed. Title: Visual Propaganda and Extremism in the Online Environment Summary: Visual images have been a central component of propaganda for as long as propaganda has been produced. But recent developments in communication and information technologies have given terrorist and extremist groups options and abilities they never would have been able to come close to even 5 or 10 years ago. There are terrorist groups who, with very little initial investment, are making videos that are coming so close to the quality of BBC or CNN broadcasts that the difference is meaningless, and with access to the web they have instantaneous access to a global audience. Given the broad social science consensus on the power of visual images relative to that of words, the strategic implications of these groups' sophistication in the use of images in the online environment is carefully considered in a variety of contexts by the authors in this collection. Details: Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, 2014. 256p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 12, 2014 at: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1213 Year: 2014 Country: International URL: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1213 Shelf Number: 133295 Keywords: Extremism Extremist Groups Online Communication Online Victimization Radical Groups Terrorism

Author: Briggs, Rachel Title: Review of Programs to Counter Narratives of Violent Extremism: What Works and What are the Implications for Government? Summary: It is now recognised that violent extremists have made effective use of the Internet and social media to advance their aims, whether through engagement, propaganda, radicalisation or recruitment. While the quality of their output varies, a growing proportion is professional, well produced, contains compelling messages and is delivered by charismatic individuals. In short, it appeals to the new YouTube generation, which expects high-end products that are well-timed and effective. These extremist groups and networks are also transitioning from their own standalone websites and forums towards social media platforms, such as Facebook, Twitter and YouTube, to take their messages to a much wider audience. Governments are interested in understanding what can be done to counter this content, both illegal and legal, which can incite or glamorise the use of violence. Much of the emphasis to date has been placed on restrictive measures, such as takedowns and filtering. While it is important for governments to enforce the law - and be seen to be doing so - there are severe limitations on the effectiveness of this response, given the speed with which new data is uploaded and the limited capacity of law enforcement agencies. More recently, there has been growing interest in alternative approaches to the problem. One such potential solution is provided by 'counter-narratives'; attempts to challenge extremist and violent extremist messages, whether directly or indirectly, through a range of online and offline means. Counter-narrative has become a catch-all term for a wide range of activities with different aims and tactics, everything from public diplomacy and strategic communications by government, to targeted campaigns to discredit the ideologies and actions of violent extremists. In order to make sense of the complex range of actions and initiatives described as 'counter-narratives', the report sets out a 'counter-messaging spectrum', which is comprised of three main types of activities: government strategic communications, alternative narratives and counter-narratives. The counter-messaging spectrum is summarised in the table overleaf. This report was commissioned by Public Safety Canada. It aims to review the state of knowledge about efforts to counter narratives of violent extremism and make recommendations for governments, such as the Canadian government, to guide their emerging work in this sensitive area of policy. It is important to stress that counter-narrative work as an area of public policy is in its infancy. While community and civil society groups have been conducting this work for many years, governments are new to the issue and the private sector is feeling its way with extreme caution. This means that there are only a small number of case studies to draw upon. For this reason, as well as the limited scope of the project, the recommendations for government are tentative. Details: London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2013. 68p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 15, 2014 at: http://www.strategicdialogue.org/CounterNarrativesFN2011.pdf Year: 2013 Country: International URL: http://www.strategicdialogue.org/CounterNarrativesFN2011.pdf Shelf Number: 133316 Keywords: Extremist Groups Radical Groups Terrorism Violence Prevention Violent Extremism

Author: Schmid, Alex P. Title: Violent and Non-Violent Extremism: Two Sides of the Same Coin? Summary: In this Research Paper, ICCT Visiting Research Fellow Dr. Alex P. Schmid seeks to clarify some conceptual issues that tend to obscure the debate about how best to counter violent extremism. The main focus of this Research Paper is on obtaining a clearer understanding of what "Islamist extremism" entails in the context of the ongoing debate on allegedly "acceptable" non-violent extremists and "unacceptable" violent extremists. The author discusses a number of conceptualisations of religious extremism in the context of liberal democracies and also distinguishes, inter alia, between merely "not (yet) violent" militancy and principled non-violent political activism in the Gandhian tradition. The author argues that the distinction between "non-violent extremism" and "violent extremism" is not a valid one. The paper provides a set of twenty indicators of extremism that can be used as an instrument for monitoring extremist statements and actions, with an eye to challenging and countering such non-democratic manifestations. Details: The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2014. 31p. Source: Internet Resource: ICCT Research Paper, 2014: Accessed September 2, 2014 at: http://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-Schmid-Violent-Non-Violent-Extremism-May-2014.pdf Year: 2014 Country: International URL: http://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-Schmid-Violent-Non-Violent-Extremism-May-2014.pdf Shelf Number: 133388 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Religious Extremism Violent Extremism

Author: Holmer, Georgia Title: Inclusive Approaches to Community Policing and CVE Summary: Summary - Accountable and effective policing institutions are key to stability in volatile environments, especially societies transitioning from conflict or authoritarian rule. From a development or peacebuilding perspective, community policing can aid in reform of security institutions and give civil society an active role in the process. - Community policing-simultaneously an ethos, a strategy, and a collaboration-helps promote democratic policing ideals and advance a human security paradigm. - Challenges to implementing such programs in transitional societies are considerable and tied to demographic and cultural variations in both communities and security actors. Developing trust, a key to success in all community policing, can be particularly difficult. - Challenges are also unique when dealing with marginalized communities and members of society. Neither a police service nor a given community are monolithic. How police interact with one segment of a community might be - might need to be- completely different than how they approach another. - Community policing programs designed to prevent violent extremism require a common and nuanced understanding between the community and the police as to what constitutes violent extremism and what is an effective response. When they agree, they can develop effective joint solutions to mitigate the threat. - Key competencies can be grouped into four categories: those important to success for any community policing programs, those relevant to efforts to reform the security sector, to promote women's inclusion in security, or to prevent violent extremism. These objectives often overlap. Details: Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2014. 8p. Source: Internet Resource: Special Report 352: Accessed September 25, 2014 at: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR352_Inclusive-Approaches-to-Community-Policing-and-CVE.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Africa URL: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR352_Inclusive-Approaches-to-Community-Policing-and-CVE.pdf Shelf Number: 133414 Keywords: Community Policing (Africa) Extremist Groups Radical Groups Violent Extremism

Author: Botha, Anneli Title: Radicalisation and al-Shabaab recruitment in Somalia Summary: Effective counter-radicalisation strategies should be based on an empirical understanding of why people join terrorist organisations. Researchers interviewed former al-Shabaab fighters and identified a complex array of reasons for why they joined the organisation. Interviewers developed a profile of typical al-Shabaab recruits and identified factors facilitating their recruitment, including religious identity, socioeconomic circumstances (education, unemployment), political circumstances and the need for a collective identity and a sense of belonging. The reasons for al-Shabaab's rise are discussed and recommendations are made to the Somali government, countries in the region and international organisations and donors on how to counter radicalisation and recruitment to al-Shabaab. Details: Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2014. 18p. Source: Internet Resource: ISS Paper 266: Accessed October 6, 2014 at: http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/Paper266.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Africa URL: http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/Paper266.pdf Shelf Number: 133566 Keywords: Extremism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism (Africa)

Author: Lacher, Wolfram Title: Challenging the Myth of the Drug-Terror Nexus in the Sahel Summary: The rise of extremist activity in the Sahel-Sahara region from 2005 onwards has gone in parallel with the growth of drug trafficking networks across the area. But are these two developments related - and if so, how? The alleged involvement of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Movement for Monotheism and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) in drug smuggling is being taken for granted by many media outlets. Malian and French government officials have increasingly resorted to dismissing their adversaries in northern Mali as 'narco-jihadists'. This paper reviews the evidence for the links between drug smuggling and extremist activity in the Sahel-Sahara region. While it demonstrates that such links clearly exist, the paper argues that the widespread talk of a drug-terror nexus in the Sahel is misleading, for several reasons. First, much of the evidence presented as basis for such claims can either be easily debunked, or is impossible to verify. Second, rather than the two extremist groups as such, involvement in drug trafficking appears to concern individuals and groups close to, or within, MUJAO and AQIM: within both groups, members are driven by multiple and, at times, conflicting motivations. Third, numerous other actors are playing an equally or more important role in drug smuggling, including members of the political and business establishment in northern Mali, Niger and the region's capitals, as well as leaders of supposedly 'secular' armed groups. Fourth, the emphasis on links between drug trafficking and terrorism in the Sahel serves to obscure the role of state actors and corruption in allowing organized crime to grow. Fifth, the profits derived from kidnap-for-ransom played a much more significant role in the rise of AQIM and MUJAO. Details: West Africa Commission on Drugs, 2013. 17p. Source: Internet Resource: WACD Background Paper No. 4: Accessed October 8, 2014 at: http://www.wacommissionondrugs.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/Challenging-the-Myth-of-the-Drug-Terror-Nexus-in-the-Sahel-2013-08-19.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Africa URL: http://www.wacommissionondrugs.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/Challenging-the-Myth-of-the-Drug-Terror-Nexus-in-the-Sahel-2013-08-19.pdf Shelf Number: 133595 Keywords: Drug Trafficking (Africa) Drug-Terror Nexus Extremist Groups Organized Crime Terrorism Violent Extremism

Author: Carter, David Title: Understanding Law Enforcement Intelligence Processes Summary: The September 11th attacks impacted society generally, and law enforcement specifically, in dramatic ways. One of the major trends has been changing expectations regarding criminal intelligence practices among state, local, and tribal (SLT) law enforcement agencies, and the need to coordinate intelligence efforts and share information at all levels of government. Despite clear evidence of significant changes, very little research exists that examines issues related to the intelligence practices of SLT law enforcement agencies. Important questions on the nature of the issues that impact SLT intelligence practices remain. While there is some uncertainty among SLT law enforcement about current terrorism threats, there is certainty that these threats evolve in a largely unpredictable pattern. As a result there is an ongoing need for consistent and effective information collection, analysis and sharing. Little information is known about perceptions of how information is being shared between agencies and whether technologies have improved or hurt information sharing, and little is known about whether agencies think they are currently prepared for a terrorist attack, and the key factors distinguishing those that think they are compared to those who do not. This study was designed to address these issues, and a better understanding of these issues could significantly enhance intelligence practices and enhance public safety. To develop a better understanding of perceptions about terrorist threats that SLT agencies face and their efforts to prevent terrorism, the research team distributed questionnaires via a web-designed survey to two separate groups of law enforcement personnel. Development of the survey involved several preliminary drafts. Feedback was sought from SLT intelligence workers about question content and coverage, and specifically whether questions were ambiguous or difficult to answer. After making revisions, the final Institutional Review Board approved instrument had 48 structured, semi-structured, or open-ended questions. The survey, despite its length, enabled respondents to share information about issues such as perceptions of terrorist threats, inter-agency interactions, information sharing, intelligence training, and agency preparedness. Additional questions asked about characteristics of the respondent and the respondent's agency. There are three findings that are quite interesting. First, law enforcement perceptions about what is a serious threat in their community has changed significantly over time. Law enforcement is much more concerned about sovereign citizens, Islamic extremists, and militia/patriot group members compared to the fringe groups of the far right, including Christian Identity believers, reconstructed traditionalists (i.e., Odinists), idiosyncratic sectarians (i.e., survivalists), and members of doomsday cults. In fact, sovereign citizens were the top concern of law enforcement, but the concern about whether most groups were a serious terrorist threat actually declined for most groups (e.g., the KKK; Christian Identity; Neo-Nazis; Racist Skinheads; Extremist Environmentalists; Extreme Animal Rights Extremists). Second, when examining whether the respondents thought that various agencies and sources were useful in their counterterrorism efforts, the agencies that appear to be most useful to SLT law enforcement include state/local fusion centers, the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Force(s), the FBI, and DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis. Overall, the internet and the use of open source materials, human intelligence sources, and the media were perceived as providing the most useful information. Security clearances, adequate personnel, adequate training, adequate resources, adequate time, or the organizational culture were all perceived as barriers for the sharing of intelligence and information across agencies. Third, several factors impacted whether an agency was prepared for a terrorist attack. Agencies with satisfied working relationships with state organizations were twice as likely to be prepared, agencies that produce threat assessments and risk assessments more frequently are three-and-a-half times more likely to be prepared than agencies who create them less frequently, and the creation of vulnerability assessments also appears to be a predictor of preparedness as they more than quadruple an agency's preparedness likelihood. In addition, as agencies experience problems related to personnel, training, and resources, the likelihood they will consider themselves prepared is reduced by approximately three-fold. Agencies that felt they were not prepared highlighted problems with resources, training, and quality of working relationships with other organizations. Particularly for practitioners, the most important aspect of this research may not be the findings on the variable analyses, per se, but on the benchmarks identified in trends found in the data. Some clear trends emerged which indicate programmatic successes for information sharing and intelligence, as well as areas where problems remain. When considering these findings in the context of research on organizational development, it is clear that organizational leadership is an important factor for organizational successes in information sharing as well as for preparedness. If the leadership of a law enforcement agency is willing to expend the effort to train personnel, develop partnerships, and participate in state, regional and national information sharing initiatives, then greater levels of success will be achieved. While one would intuitively assume this, the data empirically supports it. Details: College Park, MD: START, 2014. 19p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 9, 2014 at: http://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_UnderstandingLawEnforcementIntelligenceProcesses_July2014.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: http://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_UnderstandingLawEnforcementIntelligenceProcesses_July2014.pdf Shelf Number: 133952 Keywords: Criminal Intelligence (U.S.) Extremist Groups Intelligence Gathering Intelligence-Led Policing Law Enforcement Terrorism

Author: Zenn, Jacob Title: Preventing Violent Extremism in Kyrgyzstan Summary: - Kyrgyzstan, having twice overthrown autocratic leaders in violent uprisings, in 2005 and again in 2010, is the most politically open and democratic country in Central Asia. - Many Kyrgyz observers remain concerned about the country's future. They fear that underlying socioeconomic conditions and lack of public services-combined with other factors, such as drug trafficking from Afghanistan, political manipulation, regional instability in former Soviet Union countries and Afghanistan, and foreign-imported religious ideologies-create an environment in which violent extremism can flourish. - One of the fault lines occurring among its population of 5.7 million is between those who value the Soviet legacy of secularism, svetski in Russian, and an emerging generation that sees Islam as a core part of its identity. The mistrust between these two constituencies prevents them from addressing a mutually recognized problem: the grassroots radicalization of young men and women, especially in Fergana Valley. - The polarizing influences of hyper-ethnic nationalists and uneducated and often unaccredited religious leaders is particularly worrisome for women, whose status has become marginalized over the past two decades. Extremist notions with regard to limited women's rights are a bellwether for instability down the road. - A long-term strategy to counter violent extremism in Kyrgyzstan requires finding common ground between leaders and influential members of the secular and religious constituencies. Together they can develop strategies to foster a national identity inclusive of diverse religious creeds and ethnic backgrounds and to challenge extremist ideas on religious, moral, and cultural grounds. - To offset pressures from Russia and China, its larger neighbors to the north and east, more coherent efforts are needed to find effective practices in countering violent extremism between Kyrgyzstan and its immediate neighbors, such as Kazakhstan, that involve other regional actors and institutions, including the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Details: Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace, 2014. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: Special Report 355: Accessed November 3, 2014 at: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR355_Preventing-Violent-Extremism-in-Kyrgyzstan.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Kyrgyzstan URL: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR355_Preventing-Violent-Extremism-in-Kyrgyzstan.pdf Shelf Number: 133945 Keywords: Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Socioeconomics Conditions and Crime Violent Extremism (Kyrgyzstan)

Author: Saifudeen, Omer Ali Title: The Cyber Extremism Orbital Pathways Model Summary: The starting premise of this study is that internet-based communications possess unique characteristics that warrant the need to have a discrete pathway model to explain online radicalisation. This online radicalisation pathway model would especially apply to the growing communities of young netizens whose socio-psychological makeup is shaping a "new normal" in the way we exchange information and interact. The proposed Cyber Extremism Orbital Pathways Model (CEOP) describes how online cognitive radicalisation can move towards real-world violent extremism. The model also elucidates the multitude of competing forces in cyberspace that promote or impede such radicalization and what this means for online counter-radicalisation strategies. The CEOP model is based on inferences made from content and discourse analysis of extremist narratives on the internet and current studies about internet-based communications. The research took into account distinctive factors that made internet-based messaging more persuasive and this includes the effects of crowdsourcing. Finally, the CEOP model suggests how the same persuasive communication strategies used on the internet by extremists can be conversely used to counter online radicalisation. Details: Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 2014. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: RSIS Working Paper No. 283: Accessed November 20, 2014 at: http://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/WP283.pdf Year: 2014 Country: International URL: http://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/WP283.pdf Shelf Number: 134170 Keywords: Cybercrime Extremism Extremist Groups Internet Radical Groups Radicalization

Author: Canada. Public Safety Canada Title: 2014 Public Report on the Terrorist Threat to Canada. Feature Focus 2014: Responding to Violent Extremism and Travel Abroad for Terrorism-related Pubposes Summary: Understanding how the global threat environment affects the terrorist threat to Canada, Canadians and Canadian interests enables the Government to counter these threats more effectively. This document, the Government's 2014 Public Report on the Terrorist Threat to Canada, examines major international and domestic terrorism-related developments during 2013 and early 2014. It highlights two alleged terrorist plots that resulted in arrests in Canada. It also describes several cases where individuals left Canada to participate in terrorism-related activities abroad. These observations draw on consultations with non-government partners, including Canadian community leaders, academics and those in the private sector. In many cases, the 2014 Public Report explains further developments relating to issues discussed in the 2013 Public Report on the Terrorist Threat to Canada. The 2014 Public Report also contains a Feature Focus detailing Government actions in 2013 to respond to violent extremism and travel abroad for terrorism-related purposes. The 2014 Public Report represents the combined efforts of several Canadian federal departments and agencies. It fulfills a Government commitment made in the February 2012 document, Building Resilience Against Terrorism: Canada's Counter-terrorism Strategy, to update Canadians on the terrorist threat. In accordance with their individual mandates, many departments and agencies also provide separate updates to Canadians on various aspects of the threat. Details: Ottawa: Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, 2014. 49p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 30, 2015 at: https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/2014-pblc-rpr-trrrst-thrt/2014-pblc-rpr-trrrst-thrt-eng.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Canada URL: https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/2014-pblc-rpr-trrrst-thrt/2014-pblc-rpr-trrrst-thrt-eng.pdf Shelf Number: 134499 Keywords: Domestic Terrorism Extremist Groups Terrorism (Canada) Terrorists

Author: Fink, Naureen Chowdhury Title: Thinking Outside the Box: Exploring the Critical Roles of Sports, Arts, and Culture in Preventing Violent Extremism Summary: Unlike traditional law-enforcement and military responses to terrorism and conflict, countering violent extremism (CVE) efforts take a preventive approach aimed at reducing the appeal and recruiting potential of extremist groups. Recent attacks across the world, such as those in Ottawa and Sydney, for example, have highlighted concerns about smaller groups and individuals who may be acting with little or no formal association with a terrorist group. Consequently, preventive approaches that serve to enhance early identification and response capacities have gained greater traction. The relative youth of foreign fighters traveling from both Western and non-Western countries to Iraq and Syria has also highlighted the need for creative and innovative interventions. However, despite the increased emphasis on countering violent extremism by governments and international actors like the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), preventive approaches have continued to focus on measures associated with criminal justice, law enforcement, and legal responses. The use of sports, arts, and culture is sometimes considered by policymakers and practitioners as too peripheral to security issues and yet extremist groups effectively utilize them in their narratives and recruitment strategies. Efforts to prevent and counter violent extremism have sought increasingly to engage youth, communities, and marginalized groups, including women, and sports, arts, and culture offer much underutilized platforms to address the ideologies and root causes of violent extremism. As the 2015 U.S. National Security Strategy notes, in the long term, such efforts "will be more important than our capacity to remove terrorists from the battlefield." To foster a more inclusive discourse on multidimensional approaches to preventing and addressing violent extremism, the Global Center on Cooperative Security and Hedayah, the International Center of Excellence for Countering Violent Extremism, have partnered on a series of workshops to bring together governments, practitioners, and experts to share lessons learned and best practices, as well as to inform the development and implementation of CVE policies and programs. One of these workshops, held at Hedayah in Abu Dhabi in May 2014, focused on the role of sports, arts, and culture in CVE efforts, particularly on the ways they might enhance educational initiatives to directly or indirectly contribute to CVE objectives. The workshop drew on, and complemented, other discussions that focused on the role of education and the roles of families and communities in countering violent extremism and enhancing community resilience, and projects focused on counternarratives and strategic communication, among others. This brief explores the history of cultural diplomacy and use of sports in conflict situations and draws on discussions at the May 2014 workshop, as well as desk research, to examine relevant lessons learned and good practices for integrating sports, arts, and culture into CVE efforts. It concludes with some practical policy and programming recommendations for policymakers and practitioners focusing on countering violent extremism. It is important to note that sports, arts, and cultural interventions for CVE purposes should take into consideration the local push and pull factors leading to radicalization and recruitment into violent extremism as well as the local context where these policies and programs will be carried out. That is, sports, arts, and cultural programming do not necessarily have to be specifically related to countering violent extremism, but this policy brief outlines ways in which sports, arts, and culture could be effectively integrated into CVE programming. Details: Washington, DC: Global Center on Cooperative Security, 2015. 13p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Brief: Accessed April 25, 2015 at: http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/15Feb17_SAC_Brief_Hedayah_GlobalCenter.pdf Year: 2015 Country: International URL: http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/15Feb17_SAC_Brief_Hedayah_GlobalCenter.pdf Shelf Number: 135391 Keywords: Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Sports Violence Preventions Violent Extremism

Author: Vidino, Lorenzo Title: Countering Radicalization in America: Lessons from Europe Summary: In response to the recent surge in the number of American Muslims involved in terrorist activities, several agencies in the U.S. government have begun devising a comprehensive counter-radicalization strategy. In doing so, they are following the lead of certain European countries that have invested significant human, financial, and political capital in counter-radicalization programs. The challenges European authorities have had to face are similar to those their U.S. counterparts are expected to confront, and several lessons are at hand from the European experience. Summary The recent surge in the number of American Muslims involved in terrorism has led U.S. - authorities to question the long-held assumption that American Muslims are immune to radicalization, and to follow the example of other Western democracies in devising a comprehensive counter-radicalization strategy. Radicalization is a highly individualized process determined by the complex interaction of - various personal and structural factors. Because no one theory can exhaustively explain it, policymakers must understand the many paths to radicalization and adopt flexible approaches when trying to combat it. The role of religion in the radicalization process is debated, but theories that set aside - ideology and religion as factors in the radicalization of Western jihadists are not convincing. Policymakers who choose to tackle religious aspects should do so cautiously, however, cognizant of the many implications of dealing with such a sensitive issue. Policymakers need to determine whether a counter-radicalization strategy aims to tackle violent radicalism alone or, more ambitiously, cognitive radicalism. The relation between the two forms is contested. Challenging cognitive radicalism, though possibly useful for both security and social cohesion purposes, is extremely difficult for any Western democracy. Finding partners in the Muslim community is vital to any counter-radicalization program. - In light of the fragmentation of that community, a diverse array of partners appears to be the best solution. There is the risk, however, that counter-radicalization efforts could be perceived by Muslims as unfairly targeting them. Details: Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2010. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: Special Report: Accessed May 14, 2015 at: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR262%20-%20Countering_Radicalization_in_America.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United States URL: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR262%20-%20Countering_Radicalization_in_America.pdf Shelf Number: 135633 Keywords: Counter-Radicalization Programs Extremist Groups Homeland Security Muslims Radical Groups Terrorism

Author: Briggs, Rachel Title: Policy Briefing: Countering the Appeal of Extremism Online Summary: This report was commissioned by the Danish government and has been written by The Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD). It draws on discussions and conclusions from three days of meetings in Copenhagen in June 2013 with a range of relevant stakeholders to discuss ways of tackling online extremism. Co-organised by the Danish government and ISD, these international meetings involved academics, practitioners, central and local government policy makers, intelligence agencies and representatives from the private technology sector. The purpose of this paper is not to summarise those discussions, but drawing on them to offer a framework and series of recommendations for the ways that governments should structure and resource their responses to online extremism. The report offers the following findings and recommendations for governments: Extremists and violent extremists are using the Internet and social media to inspire, radicalise and recruit young people to their cause, whether as passive supporters, active enthusiasts or those willing to become operational. Not enough has been done to date to tackle the use of the Internet and social media by extremists and violent extremists. Most effort has been focused on negative measures, such as take-downs and filtering. While this is important, more focus and resources need to be invested to enable the silent majority to be better equipped to see through extremist propaganda, take control of online spaces, and actively push back on extremist messages. There are three areas where government should focus its efforts: Strengthening digital literacy and critical consumption among young people i. Governments should support mainstream digital literacy and critical consumption programmes through state schools and also support provision through youth and community organisations; ii. Governments should support at arm's length projects working with at risk youth to deconstruct extremist messages Increasing counter-messaging, counter-narrative and alternative narrative activity: i. Government strategic communications need to be centralised and coordinated, either through a dedicated unit or by assigning lead status to a single unit or department ii. Governments need to be realistic about the challenges that limit their ability to play an active 'messenger' role in counter-narrative, apart from in limited circumstances. iii. Governments should make significant investments in funding non-governmental organisations able to offer credible alternatives. Building the capacity of credible messengers: i. Governments should make significant investments in building the skills and expertise of the most effective counter-messengers to build their capacity in technology, production, communications, and campaigning. ii. Governments should use their convening power to bring the private tech sector to the table as their expertise can help the voices of credible messengers. iii. Governments should fund centralised information gathering to provide economies of scale and ensure that effective counter-messengers have the information they need to work, such as analytics, audience profiling, and the sharing of good practice in alternative and counter-narratives. iv. Government must work multilaterally to pool resources in this area, taking an active role in streamlining the cross-border exchange of expertise and lessons learned in capacity building. Details: London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2014. 23p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 14, 2015 at: http://www.strategicdialogue.org/Inspire_Radicalize_Recruit.pdf Year: 2014 Country: International URL: http://www.strategicdialogue.org/Inspire_Radicalize_Recruit.pdf Shelf Number: 135638 Keywords: Counter-Radicalization Extremist Groups Online Extremism Radical Groups Radicalization Social Networks

Author: Ramalingam, Vidhya Title: Far-Right Extremism: Trends and Methods for Response and Prevention Summary: Far-right extremism is a diverse phenomenon. It is composed of movements and parties with different ideological tendencies, mobilising against different conceptions of 'the enemy', and using different methods to achieve their goals. For some, this involves the use of violence. A key challenge facing many European countries is one of definition. Across Europe, there is no consensus on what constitutes far-right extremism, and security agencies record violence from the extreme right in different ways. This has inhibited our ability to assess threat levels and compare trends across countries. Meanwhile, the media and public debate on the threat posed by the 'rise of the far right' remains confused in many ways. Only through a proper understanding of both violent and non-violent far-right movements and parties can policy makers work out where the problem lies, and therefore what to do about it. In other words, should we draw the line at the use of violence, or the spreading of intolerance? Are we concerned about the proliferation of radical right ideologies and narratives in mainstream politics and their impact on wider community relations, or about the potential for violence? And in terms of responses, can we separate the two? Details: London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2012. 27p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 16, 2015 at: http://www.strategicdialogue.org/Policy_Briefing_-_Far_Right_Extremism_FINAL.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Europe URL: http://www.strategicdialogue.org/Policy_Briefing_-_Far_Right_Extremism_FINAL.pdf Shelf Number: 135684 Keywords: Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Violent Extremism

Author: Butt, Riazat Title: European Counter-Radicalisation and De-Radicalisation: A Comparative Evaluation of Approaches in the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark and Germany Summary: This report is a comparative assessment of approaches to counter-radicalisation and de-radicalisation within four countries from the European Policy Planners' Network (EPPN). It begins by setting out the definitions of key terms. It then provides an overview of the recent history of extremist violence and the approaches taken in tackling radicalisation and facilitating de-radicalisation in the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark and Germany in order to contextualise the environment in which the programmes examined in the report operate. The report will then identify some of the key challenges and lessons that can be learned from the outcomes of policies and initiatives in this area. It is part of a larger project funded by the European Commission and is based on research and interviews conducted during visits to countries in question. Although this paper focuses primarily on four EPPN countries, the appendix contains case studies from elsewhere in Europe that offer valuable insights into other successful initiatives and programs in the field of counter-radicalisation. Although the countries focused on in this report are not diverse in terms of their geographical location, their approaches to the challenges presented by radicalisation vary considerably as do the security and socio-cultural environments that inform them. For example, the problems faced by Germany, a large federal state with a history of far-right and far-left terrorism, are quite different to those faced by its smaller neighbour the Netherlands. In addition to this the evidence base within these countries is strong, allowing for effective and in-depth comparisons. The way in which countries have been affected by extremism has a tangible impact on the formulation of policies and programmes designed to prevent or reduce the impact of radicalisation. Before evaluating the approaches to these issues taken in the four selected European countries, it is important to note that counter- and de-radicalisation policies and programmes cannot "simply be transplanted from one country to another, even within the same region. They have to develop organically in a specific country and culture." Despite this, by evaluating the strategies and initiatives in their various national contexts it is possible to identify certain elements of good practice that could potentially inform policy and practice elsewhere. Details: London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2014. 42p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 16, 2015 at: http://www.strategicdialogue.org/De-radicalisation_final.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Europe URL: http://www.strategicdialogue.org/De-radicalisation_final.pdf Shelf Number: 135685 Keywords: De-radicalization Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism

Author: Ramalingam, Vidhya Title: Old Threat, New Approach: Tackling the Far Right Across Europe. Guide for policy makers Summary: Several recent events have focused attention on the growing dangers posed by the far right in Europe. In October 2013, Ukrainian born Pavlo Lapshyn was convicted of racially-motivated murder and for plotting a campaign of terror against mosques in the UK. In May 2013 commenced the trial of Beate Zschape, the only surviving member of the National Socialist Underground (NSU), a far-right terrorist group which has been linked to a series of murders of immigrants, the murder of a policewoman and the attempted murder of her colleague, the 2001 and 2004 Cologne bombings and 14 bank robberies. In August 2012, Anders Behring Breivik was convicted for the murder of 77 people in twin terrorist attacks in Norway. Security agencies such as Europol have documented heightened levels of right-wing extremist activity across a number of countries in Europe. While such high-profile and high impact events hit the headlines, the bulk of the threat posed by the far right is felt through smaller-scale localised harassment, intimidation and bullying by extremists targeting minority communities. The dichotomy between national security and community safety means that, as a result, far-right extremism tends to be relegated to a second tier security threat, even though its impact is felt on a daily basis by individuals and communities across Europe. Far-right extremism takes a number of forms. There are four main types of agents: youth gangs, white power and skinhead groups; terrorist cells and lone actors; political movements and paramilitary groups; and nativist, identitarian and anti-Islam movements. They engage in a wide range of activities: spontaneous hate crime, vandalism and hooliganism; street demonstrations; shock tactics; hate speech and incitement; and planned hate crime and terrorism. Though often rooted in its local context, far-right extremism has impacts across borders. Groups and methods in one country are often mirrored elsewhere, and online connectivity is making this more common. There is also evidence of cooperation between national groups and the pooling of knowledge and expertise. Details: London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2014. 64p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 16, 2015 at: http://www.strategicdialogue.org/ISD_New_Approach_Far_Right_Report.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Europe URL: http://www.strategicdialogue.org/ISD_New_Approach_Far_Right_Report.pdf Shelf Number: 135686 Keywords: Extremist Groups Radical Groups Terrorism Violent Extremism

Author: Ramalingam, Vidhya Title: On the Front Line. A guide to countering far-right extremism Summary: Far-right extremism remains a worrying problem across Europe. The most visible cases are those that hit the headlines, such as the discovery of the National Socialist Underground in Germany or Anders Behring Breivik's attacks in Norway. In the past decade, both Hungary and Sweden were hit by a string of serial murders of Roma and ethnic minorities. Though attacks of this magnitude and scale remain rare, they are not unheard of. In some cases, those personally touched by these violent attacks are still fighting for justice. While high-profile and high-impact events hit the headlines, the bulk of the threat posed by the far right is felt through smaller-scale localised harassment, bullying and hate crime by extremists targeting minority communities. These kinds of incidences often go undetected, and indeed they are hard to quantify. They manifest in the sectioning off of some local areas as no-go zones for ethnic minorities, graffiti of far-right symbols on mosques and synagogues, or threats received by individual members of the community. Those carrying out these actions - far-right extremists - are a broad group, ranging from less ideological youth street gangs to neo-Nazi terrorist cells, anti-Islam activists and registered political parties. Though they differ in their aims and methods, there are some defining features: racism, xenophobia, ultra-nationalism and authoritarianism. The actions they take aim to intimidate and assert power over particular communities and undermine democracy. In some countries, the capacity for violence within the far right is on the rise, and it remains challenging to ascertain at what point ideology can turn to violence. With the proliferation of extremist content online, and the ease with which anyone can access communities advocating violence across the web, this challenge has only grown. There are thousands of front-line professionals across Europe who come face-to-face with this issue on a regular basis, whether it is those working specifically on countering violent extremism, or those who encounter the far right as part of their daily responsibilities policing communities or educating young people. Though European countries differ on the particular problems they face and the ways in which they address them, there are more commonalities than differences when it comes to specific challenges posed by the far right. Front-line professionals and local communities often develop innovative solutions to these challenges, though these rarely make headlines or send ripples beyond the community immediately affected. This project aims to change this. This is one of the first projects aiming to enhance understanding of what works in prevention, intervention and response to far-right extremism across Europe. It has developed a package of resources which include ISD's report Old Threat, New Approach: Tackling the Far Right Across Europe which sets out government approaches to far-right extremism and provides guidance to policymakers, as well as an online platform called The FREE Initiative - Far-Right Extremism in Europe (www.theFREEinitative.com), which aims to inspire and connect those tackling the far right and showcase best practices. This is a practical guide for front-line professionals and activists. It is based on the collective experiences of over 120 individuals tackling far-right extremism across 10 countries (Sweden, UK, the Netherlands, Norway, Finland, Denmark, Germany, Poland, Hungary, Slovak Republic). This includes both governmental and non-governmental professionals coming into contact with far-right individuals or those who are impacted by them, on a daily basis. These professionals are thus in a unique position to influence those within or vulnerable to far-right extremism, and limit their impact. Details: London: Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2014. 77p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 18, 2015 at: http://www.strategicdialogue.org/On_The_Front_Line_Far_RightHANDBOOK.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Europe URL: http://www.strategicdialogue.org/On_The_Front_Line_Far_RightHANDBOOK.pdf Shelf Number: 135709 Keywords: Counter-Extremism Counter-Radicalization Extremist Groups Radical Groups Violent Extremists

Author: International Crisis Group Title: Women, Violence and Conflict in Pakistan Summary: Eight years into its democratic transition, violence against women is still endemic in Pakistan, amid a climate of impunity and state inaction. Discriminatory legislation and a dysfunctional criminal justice system have put women at grave risk. Targeted by violent extremists with an overt agenda of gender repression, women's security is especially threatened in the conflict zones in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) province and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). On 8 March, International Women's Day, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif vowed that his government would take all necessary legislative and administrative steps to protect and empower women. If this pledge was in earnest, his Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) government should end institutionalised violence and discrimination against women, including by repealing unjust laws, countering extremist threats, particularly in KPK and FATA, and involving women and their specially relevant perspectives in design of state policies directly affecting their security, including strategies to deal with violent extremist groups. Women in the past were the principal victims of state policies to appease violent extremists. After democracy's return, there has been some progress, particularly through progressive legislation, much of it authored by committed women's rights activists in the federal and provincial legislatures, facilitated by their increased numbers in parliament. Yet, the best of laws will provide little protection so long as social attitudes toward women remain biased, police officers are not held accountable for failing to investigate gender-based crimes, the superior judiciary does not hold the subordinate judiciary accountable for failing to give justice to women survivors of violence, and discriminatory laws remain on the books. Laws, many remnants of General Zia-ul-Haq's Islamisation in the 1970s and 1980s, continue to deny women their constitutional right to gender equality and fuel religious intolerance and violence against them. Their access to justice and security will remain elusive so long as legal and administrative barriers to political and economic empowerment remain, particularly the Hudood Ordinances (1979), FATA's Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR) (1901) and the Nizam-e-Adl (2009) in KPK's Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA). The government has a constitutional obligation and international commitments, including under the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), to combat gender inequality and remove such barriers to women's empowerment. Repealing discriminatory legislation and enforcing laws that protect women, including by ensuring that they have access to a gender-responsive police and courts, are essential to ending the impunity that promotes violence against women. The extent to which rights violations go unpunished is particularly alarming in FATA and KPK, where women are subjected to state-sanctioned discrimination, militant violence, religious extremism and sexual violence. Militants target women's rights activists, political leaders and development workers without consequences. The prevalence of informal justice mechanisms in many parts of Pakistan, particularly in Pakhtunkhwa and FATA, are also highly discriminatory toward women; and the government's indiscriminate military operations, which have displaced millions, have further aggravated the challenges they face in the conflict zones. In KPK and FATA, and indeed countrywide, women's enhanced meaningful presence in decision-making, including political participation as voters and in public office, will be central to sustainable reform. Pakistan should invest in their empowerment and reflect their priorities in all government policies, including counter-insurgency and peacebuilding efforts. All too often, women comprise a majority of both the intended victims of the insurgency and the unintended victims of the counter-insurgency response. National and provincial legislation to enhance protections for women is a step in the right direction, but much more is needed to safeguard them against violence and injustice and ultimately to consolidate Pakistan's democratic transition. Details: Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2015. 38p. Source: Internet Resource: Asia Report N 265: Accessed May 21, 2015 at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/pakistan/265-women-violence-and-conflict-in-pakistan.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Pakistan URL: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/pakistan/265-women-violence-and-conflict-in-pakistan.pdf Shelf Number: 135746 Keywords: Extremist Groups Gender-Based Violence Violence Against Women

Author: Global Center on Cooperative Security Title: Countering Violent Extremism and Promoting Community Resilience in the Greater Horn of Africa Summary: This report outlines ideas for strategies, programs, and initiatives that can be implemented to prevent and counter violent extremism in the Greater Horn of Africa and increase human security and community resilience. Suggestions include training officials and frontline practitioners to enhance their engagement with communities, improving service delivery and reform of the security and criminal justice sectors, introducing disengagement and reintegration programs, promoting subregional cooperation and information sharing, fostering youth leadership, engaging the media and the private sector, and strengthening the capacity of and engagement with civil society actors. The recommendations are targeted towards (1) states in the subregion; (2) subregional, regional, and international actors, such as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, the African Union, the East African Community, the European Union, the United Nations, and the Global Counterterrorism Forum; and (3) civil society actors, the private sector, and the media. The Action Agenda stresses the importance of holistic and inclusive approaches to preventing and countering violent extremism that involve a range of actors, including states in the subregion, partner governments, and international and multilateral actors, as well as regional, subregional, and nongovernmental organizations. With an eye toward increasing the sustainability and impact of programs aimed at preventing and countering violent extremism, it advises to build on initiatives that are already in place in the Greater Horn of Africa and ensure that current and future activities are embedded in ongoing efforts that aim to build capacity across the criminal justice, security, and development sectors. The ideas proposed in this Action Agenda were developed by the Global Center, based on existing experiences and practices in the Greater Horn of Africa as well as consultations with various stakeholders. An earlier draft of the Action Agenda was circulated at the Global Counterterrorism Forum's Horn of Africa Working Group in March 2015. This report has been made possible by the generous support of the governments of Norway and Turkey. Details: Washington, DC: Global Center on Cooperative Security , 2015. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 1, 2015 at: http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/HoA_Action_Agenda_Low_Res.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Africa URL: http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/HoA_Action_Agenda_Low_Res.pdf Shelf Number: 135838 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Violent Extremism Violent Groups

Author: Global Center on Cooperative Security Title: Strengthening Rule of Law Responses to Counter Violent Extremism: What Role for Civil Society in South Asia? Summary: Across South Asia, civil society has made important contributions to enhancing rule of law based efforts to prevent and counter terrorism and violent extremism. Their roles as advocates, monitors, technical experts, trainers, service providers, and information hubs complement the efforts of law enforcement and security actors, and many opportunities exist for partnerships. Civil society actors have also played an important role in promoting development, improved governance and human rights in the region, and in promoting a resilient social contract between citizens and the state. This policy brief reflects on these contributions and explores opportunities for civil society to support cooperative regional efforts to respond to terrorism and violent extremism in the region. It draws largely from a workshop on "Strengthening Rule of Law-Based Responses to Terrorism and Violent Extremism in South Asia: What Role for Civil Society?" organized by the Global Center, in partnership with the Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS) at the National University of Singapore and The Institute for Inclusive Security. Following an overview of the limitations and challenges faced by civil society actors in the region, it offers a set of recommendations for policymakers and practitioners with a view to informing the design and implementation of programming to prevent violent extremism and terrorism in South Asia. Details: Washington, DC: Global Center on Cooperative Security, 2015. 13p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Brief: Accessed June 1, 2015 at: http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/May-2015_Strengthening-Rule-of-Law-Responses-to-Counter-Violent-Extremism3.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Asia URL: http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/May-2015_Strengthening-Rule-of-Law-Responses-to-Counter-Violent-Extremism3.pdf Shelf Number: 135839 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Violent Extremism

Author: Cheong, Damien Title: Western Muslim Converts and Violent Extremism: Issues and Strategies Summary: This commentary discusses Muslim converts in the West who are becoming involved in violent extremism and contends that community intervention and supportive counseling for converts could help prevent radicalism among such individuals. Islam, like many other religions, is not monolithic; "its form and expression vary from one Muslim to another and from group to group". For example, Indonesian Islam, while sharing similar tenets with say Pakistani Islam, is still different in many fundamental ways. This plurality can cause confusion in the convert, and in some cases, alienation, if the convert, while Muslim, is still excluded because he/she belongs to a different ethnic group. In fact a 2013 Oxford Analytica report identified feelings of personal emptiness and social isolation as a major causal factor of radicalization among Muslim converts. The study also argued that the resentment of "modernity, globalization and secular society"; the absence of formal education and training in Islamic doctrine and theology; and the interpretation of "Islamic ideology as a form of protest" were key push factors toward radicalization. The study found that "radicalization is usually the result of social interaction; it is less common for converts to self-radicalize in isolation. The process, which involves the convert developing a more extreme interpretation of his/her faith to legitimize or justify violence, generally takes months or years". It is for these reasons that increased psychological and community support for converts is necessary as it can enable them to become more knowledgeable about their new faith, more confident about their place in the world, and most importantly, more discerning about alternative interpretations of religious doctrine. Details: Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), 2014. 3p. Source: Internet Resource: RSIS Commentary: Accessed June 4, 2015 at: http://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/cens/co14242-western-muslim-converts-and-violent-extremism-issues-and-strategies/#.VXChWU9FDcs Year: 2014 Country: International URL: http://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/cens/co14242-western-muslim-converts-and-violent-extremism-issues-and-strategies/#.VXChWU9FDcs Shelf Number: 135911 Keywords: Extremist Groups Muslims Radical Groups Violent Extremism

Author: Behr, Ines von Title: Radicalisation in the digital era: the use of the internet in 15 cases of terrorism and extremism Summary: This paper presents the results from exploratory primary research into the role of the internet in the radicalisation of 15 terrorists and extremists in the UK. In recent years, policymakers, practitioners and the academic community have begun to examine how the internet influences the process of radicalisation: how a person comes to support terrorism and forms of extremism associated with terrorism. This study advances the evidence base in the field by drawing on primary data from a variety of sources: evidence presented at trial, computer registries of convicted terrorists, interviews with convicted terrorists and extremists, as well as police senior investigative officers responsible for terrorist investigations. The 15 cases were identified by the research team together with the UK Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) and UK Counter Terrorism Units (CTU). The research team gathered primary data relating to five extremist cases (the individuals were part of the Channel programme, a UK government intervention aimed at individuals identified by the police as vulnerable to violent extremism), and ten terrorist cases (convicted in the UK), all of which were anonymised. Our research supports the suggestion that the internet may enhance opportunities to become radicalised and provide a greater opportunity than offline interactions to confirm existing beliefs. However, our evidence does not necessarily support the suggestion that the internet accelerates radicalisation or replaces the need for individuals to meet in person during their radicalisation process. Finally, we didn't find any supporting evidence for the concept of self-radicalisation through the internet. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2013. 74p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 13, 2015 at: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR400/RR453/RAND_RR453.pdf Year: 2013 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR400/RR453/RAND_RR453.pdf Shelf Number: 136018 Keywords: Extremist Groups Internet Crime Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Terrorists

Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Combating Terrorism: State Should Evaluate Its Countering Violent Extremism Program and Set Time Frames for Addressing Evaluation Recommendations Summary: Terrorism and violent extremism continue to pose a global threat, and combating them remains a top priority for the U.S. government. State leads and coordinates U.S. efforts to counter terrorism abroad. State's Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism was elevated to bureau status in 2012 with the aim of enhancing State's ability to counter violent extremism, build partner counterterrorism capacity, and improve coordination. GAO was asked to review the effects of this change and the new bureau's efforts. This report examines (1) how the bureau's staffing resources have changed since 2011, (2) the extent to which the bureau has assessed its performance since 2011, and (3) the extent to which the bureau's coordination with U.S. government entities on selected programs is in line with key collaboration practices. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed and analyzed State and other U.S. government agency information and interviewed U.S. government officials in Washington, D.C. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that the Secretary of State take steps to (1) ensure that CVE program efforts abroad are evaluated and (2) establish time frames for addressing recommendations from program evaluations. State concurred with both of GAO's recommendations. State indicated that it was currently assessing which programs would benefit from a third-party evaluation and that it would commit to setting a timetable for reviewing each recommendation by a third-party evaluator. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2015. 56p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-15-684: Accessed July 29, 2015 at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/671557.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/671557.pdf Shelf Number: 136242 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Terrorism Violent Extremism

Author: Walther, Olivier J. Title: Mapping and Deterring Violent Extremist Networks in North-West Africa Summary: This article examines the structural and spatial organization of violent extremist organizations (VEOs) across the Sahara. Building on the Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset (ACLED), a public collection of political violence data for developing states, the article investigates structural connections of VEOs and the effect of borders on the spatial patterns of armed groups. Social network analysis reveals that the network involving VEOs had a low density, a low level of transitivity, and contained few central actors, three typical characteristics of negative-tie networks. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is unquestionably the most connected VEO, which in purely network terms can be seen as a liability. Spatial analysis shows that, while violence was almost exclusively concentrated within Algeria between 1997 and 2004, cross-border movements intensified in the mid-2000s following the establishment of military bases by AQIM in Mali. As of late, VEOs have primarily concentrated their operations in Northern Mali as well as Southern Algeria, whereas Mauritania, Niger and Chad have been relatively unaffected. It follows that deterrence and containment strategies should be devised for regions rather than states. The findings have significant implications for multinational security and stability operations and the need to coordinate transnationally. Details: Sonderborg, Denmark: University of Southern Denmark, 2015. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: Department of Border Region Studies Working Paper No. 04/15: Accessed August 3, 2015 at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2593020 Year: 2015 Country: Africa URL: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2593020 Shelf Number: 136293 Keywords: Border Security Extremist Groups Social Networks Terrorism Terrorists Violent Extremism

Author: Pantucci, Raffaello Title: From Boko Haram to Ansaru: The Evolution of Nigerian Jihad Summary: Its orchestration of several major incidents - including the kidnapping of nearly 300 girls from their school in Chibok in Borno State - has sparked national, regional and international responses. The character of these counter-operations, however, has relied overwhelmingly on a military approach unable to defeat a resilient Boko Haram. Nigeria's forceful approach reflects rash decision-making founded neither on a considered strategy nor a thorough understanding of the target group. Drawing on the wide-ranging body of existing literature, this report examines the evolution of Boko Haram from its inception to its modern iteration, deconstructing its supposed cohesive ideology and chain of command. Rather than a single unit, Boko Haram is best considered as falling along a spectrum, with an ideology as fluid and flexible as its relationships with similar jihadist groups, including Ansaru - a breakaway faction with perhaps a close relationship to the core. The report examines how the ideological narratives championed by the key leaders of Boko Haram have shaped the group's present-day structure and tactics and a military approach alone is insufficient to defeat the group. With a newly-elected government, Nigeria has the opportunity to address the Boko Haram threat effectively, but true success will rely on a solid understanding and appreciation of this elusive and resilient opponent. Details: London: Royal United Services Institute, 2015. 46p. Source: Internet Resource: Occasional Paper: Accessed August 8, 2015 at: https://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/201504_OP_From_Boko_Haram_to_Ansaru_web.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Nigeria URL: Shelf Number: 136368 Keywords: Boko Haram Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Violent Exxtremism

Author: Edwards, Charlie Title: Out of Reach? The Role of Community Policing in Preventing Terrorism in Canada Summary: When the Kanishka project was being designed in 2010, there was a widespread perception both within Canada and internationally that the country had largely managed to avoid the threat from Al-Qa'ida-inspired terrorism. While there had been one or two isolated cases, these were rare exceptions. Canadian government officials rightly described the threat picture in Canada as 'limited' in comparison with European states and the country's next door neighbour, the US, where attacks directed by Al-Qa'ida had been successful or had reached a mature stage in planning. In contrast, the domestic threat picture in Canada was relatively benign. During the fieldwork phase the authors found this view to be largely still accepted by politicians, law-enforcement practitioners and the public at large. What was interesting to the authors, however, was that this view - influenced by events in Canada and overseas - was changing. A few cases of predominantly Islamist terrorism with links to Canada had appeared over the years. These cases involved, for example, Ahmed Ressam and Momin Khawaja, two individuals with Canadian passports (indeed, Khawaja is Canadian-born). They had connected with elements close to Al-Qaiida and had been involved in planning attacks at the international level, but neither had planned to launch terrorist attacks within Canada itself. A more 'home-grown' threat appeared to emerge in 2006, when Canada's security and intelligence agencies uncovered the so-called 'Toronto 18' cell; their ambitious plans were the first expression of a maturing and purely domestic threat, seeking connections through a network of young radicals across Europe and North America. The plot was successfully disrupted before it reached fruition. Shortly before the publication of this report, the situation changed dramatically as Canada experienced two significant incidents of domestic lone-actor terrorism. On 22 October 2014, Michael Zehaf-Bibeau shot and killed a soldier at the Canadian National War Memorial in Ottawa; police exchanged fire and eventually shot dead the gunman inside the parliament building. Two days earlier, Martin Couture-Rouleau had deliberately driven a car into a group of Canadian soldiers in Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu, Quebec, killing one and injuring others. Both individuals are thought to have been recent converts to Islam who had become radicalised. Prior to these events, the last major attack that had directly involved Canadian citizens with links to the homeland was the bombing on 23 June 1985 of Air India Flight 182 when Sikh extremists killed 329 people - the majority of whom were Canadian citizens flying from Toronto. Details: London: Royal United Services Institute, 2015. 74p. Source: Internet Resource: Occasional Paper: Accessed August 8, 2015 at: https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201502_op_out_of_reach.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Canada URL: https://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/201502https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201502_op_out_of_reach.pdf Shelf Number: 136369 Keywords: Community Policing Domestic Terrorism Extremist Groups Homeland Security Radical Groups Radicalization

Author: Ginkel, Bibi T. van Title: Responding to cyber jihad: towards an effective counter narrative Summary: "Who is in control of the narrative?" is the mantra that now echoes in the hallways of the EU's headquarters in Brussels. Spurred in part by large-scale jihadist propaganda, approximately 20,000 people from 50 countries have joined the fight in Iraq and Syria. So far, authorities in their countries of origin have not been able to address the jihadist radicalisation messages transmitted via the internet and social media. Many new initiatives were recently announced, however, including the establishment of a European counter-narrative centre in Brussels. In this research paper, ICCT Research Fellow Dr. Bibi van Ginkel analyses the role of the internet and social media in processes of radicalisation. It offers an outline of the various aspects of the jihadist narrative, in order better to understand what message needs to be countered. The counter-actions against this cyber jihad can take different forms. Parallel to the way in which advertisement campaigns are tailored to sell products to a certain target group, strategic communication should take into account how a number of recurring elements play a role in the counter-messaging. The understanding of who the target group is, what jihadist narrative is used and how that message can be countered, who the credible messenger should be, and what medium can best be used to deliver the message are all relevant questions that can only be answered in a context-specific manner. The report concludes with several recommendations on how the recently announced new European counter-narrative centre can effectively contribute to the already diverse landscape of counter-narrative initiatives. Details: The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2015. 21p. Source: Internet Resource: ICCT Research Paper: Accessed August 19, 2015 at: http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/Responding_to_Cyber_Jihad_2015.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Europe URL: http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/Responding_to_Cyber_Jihad_2015.pdf Shelf Number: 136490 Keywords: Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism

Author: Nwabuzo, Ojeaku Title: Racist Crime in Europe: ENAR Shadow Report 2013-2014 Summary: Civil society organisations across the EU report an increase in racist crimes in 2013, in particular against Black and Asian ethnic minorities, Roma, Jews and Muslims - or those perceived as such, according to the European Network Against Racism's latest Shadow Report on racist crime in Europe, covering 26 European countries. A total of 47,210 racist crimes were officially recorded, but this is only the tip of the iceberg, as many EU Member States do not properly record and report racially motivated crimes. There was an increase in anti-Semitic (Bulgaria, Denmark, Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands and Sweden) and Islamophobic (France, England and Wales) crimes in some countries, and these crimes increasingly take the form of online incitement to hatred and/or violence. There were cases of violence, abuse or incitement to violence against Roma in almost all EU Member States, and in particular those with a large Roma population. In many EU countries, including Estonia, Greece, Italy, Poland, Sweden and the United Kingdom, the most violent physical attacks reported are perpetrated against Black and Asian people. In Sweden for example, 980 crimes with an Afrophobic motive were recorded. In addition, crimes perpetrated by members of far-right groups are over-represented (49%) in racist crimes and complaints linked to political groups. In some countries there is no official or systematic data collection of racially motivated crimes; and in others, information about the racial, ethnic or religious background of the victims is not disaggregated. Only one third of EU countries have recorded and published information on racist crimes for 2013. In addition, because many feel ashamed, do not trust the police or think their testimony will not change anything, victims often do not come forward to report racist crimes. The investigation and prosecution of racist crimes is also problematic. Although most EU Member States recognise racially motived crimes in their legislation, narrow definitions of what constitutes racially motivated crime can result in incidents not being recorded, investigated or prosecuted properly. In the Czech Republic and Italy, an estimated 40-60% of reported racist crimes are not fully investigated by police. Under-qualification of racist crimes takes place throughout the justice system, from police reporting to court judgements. Details: Brussels: European Network Against Racism (ENAR), 2015. 44p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 28, 2015 at: http://www.enar-eu.org/IMG/pdf/shadowreport_2013-14_en_final_lowres-2.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Europe URL: http://www.enar-eu.org/IMG/pdf/shadowreport_2013-14_en_final_lowres-2.pdf Shelf Number: 136616 Keywords: Bias-Motivated Crime Extremist Groups Hate Crimes Racism

Author: Great Britain. Prime Minister's Task Force on Tackling Radicalisation and Extremism Title: Tackling Extremism in the UK Summary: The UK deplores and will fight terrorism of every kind, whether based on Islamist, extreme right-wing or any other extremist ideology. We will not tolerate extremist activity of any sort, which creates an environment for radicalising individuals and could lead them on a pathway towards terrorism. The killing of Drummer Lee Rigby in Woolwich was the impetus to look closely at whether the government was doing all it could to confront extremism and radicalisation. We know that the international terrorist threat to the UK comes primarily from those people who are inspired by Al Qa'ida's distorted interpretation of Islam and use that as justification for killing innocent people. But we must tackle extremism of all kinds, including the Islamophobia and neo-Nazism espoused by the murderer of Mohammed Saleem to justify his terrorist attacks against mosques in the West Midlands. The Prime Minister set up the Extremism Task Force to identify any areas where our current approach was lacking and to agree practical steps to fight against all forms of extremism. We have made progress since this government came to power. We have removed over 18,000 items of online terrorist propaganda and intervened more often than ever before to limit the opportunities for hate preachers to spread their messages. But we recognise that we can and should do more. This response is broader than dealing only with those who espouse violence - we must confront the poisonous extremist ideology that can lead people to violence; which divides communities and which extremists use to recruit individuals to their cause; which runs counter to fundamental British values such as freedom of speech, democracy and equal rights; which says that 'the West' is at war with Islam and that it is not possible to be a true Muslim and to live an integrated life in the UK. Details: London: HM Government, 2013. 9p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 28, 2015 at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/263181/ETF_FINAL.pdf Year: 2013 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/263181/ETF_FINAL.pdf Shelf Number: 136617 Keywords: Extremism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization

Author: International Crisis Group Title: Revisiting Counter-terrorism Strategies in Pakistan: Opportunities and Pitfalls Summary: The 16 December 2014 attack on an army-run school in Peshawar, which killed 150, mainly children, claimed by the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (Taliban Movement of Pakistan-TTP), was ostensibly a game changer. A week later, the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) (PML-N) government unveiled a new counter-terrorism strategy, the twenty-point National Action Plan (NAP), with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and Army Chief Raheel Sharif vowing to target all terror groups without distinction. Six months later, amid continued terror attacks, the NAP looks far more like a hastily-conceived wish-list devised for public consumption during a moment of crisis than a coherent strategy. Reliance on blunt instruments and lethal force to counter terrorism risks doing more harm than good when they undermine constitutionalism, democratic governance and the rule of law and provide grist to the jihadis' propaganda mill. A reformed and strengthened criminal justice system is pivotal to countering terror threats and containing violent extremism. The militarisation of counter-terrorism policy puts at risk Pakistan's evolution toward greater civilian rule, which is itself a necessary but not sufficient condition to stabilise the democratic transition. While the report addresses the coercive side of a counter-terrorism policy and how to make it more efficient, without structural and governance reform, the root causes of terrorism and extremism will remain unaddressed, and violent jihadis will continue to exploit the absence of rule of law. The military's continual undermining of civilian authority since democracy's restoration in 2008 will remain a major challenge to meaningful and sustained reform. Yet, the political leadership also bears responsibility for failing to push back and, as a result, undermining its credibility and authority. After inaugurating the NAP on 24 December, the Sharif government implemented two major demands of the military without delay: lifting the predecessor government's 2008 moratorium on the death penalty; and passing on 6 January 2015 the 21st constitutional amendment, empowering special military courts to try all terrorism suspects, including civilians. Yet, the vast majority of the 176 executions since late December have been for crimes unrelated to terrorism, and the military courts weaken constitutional protections and due process. Other newly-created parallel structures, including provincial "apex committees", enable the military to bypass representative institutions and play a more direct role in governance. Armed with new legal tools, the military has further marginalised civilian institutions in devising and implementing counterterrorism policy. Despite claims to the contrary, the military, which has almost complete control over national security and counter-terrorism policy, also still distinguishes between "bad" jihadi groups, those targeting the security forces, and "good" jihadi groups, those perceived to promote its strategic objectives in India and Afghanistan. Anti-India outfits such as Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JD), the renamed version of the banned Lashkare- Tayyaba (LeT), have even expanded their activities through so-called charity fronts. Military-backed Afghan insurgents, such as the Haqqani Network, have not been targeted in ongoing operations in the North Waziristan agency of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Instead, the Haqqanis, like the LeT/JD, have been kept off Pakistan's list of terrorist groups. Details: Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2015. 44p. Source: Internet Resource: Asia Report No. 271: Accessed August 31, 2015 at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/pakistan/271-revisiting-counter-terrorism-strategies-in-pakistan-opportunities-and-pitfalls.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Pakistan URL: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/pakistan/271-revisiting-counter-terrorism-strategies-in-pakistan-opportunities-and-pitfalls.pdf Shelf Number: 136632 Keywords: Counter-terrorism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Terrorism Terrorists Violent Extremism

Author: Tahiri, Hussein Title: Community and Radicalisation: An examination of perceptions, ideas, beliefs and solutions throughout Australia Summary: Community and Radicalisation: an Examination of Perceptions, Ideas, Beliefs and Solutions throughout Australia was a year-long national study designed and conducted as a qualitative research project through a partnership between Victoria Police, Victoria University and the Australian Multicultural Foundation. The key aims of the study were: - To identify how communities understand the meanings of and relationship between radicalisation and extremism. - To explore community perceptions of the underlying drivers for radicalization and extremism. - To explore perceptions of the impact of radicalization and extremism on sense of community and social harmony and cohesion. - To solicit community views about effective approaches to and solutions for eliminating or reducing the threat of violent extremism in Australia. - To provide an evidence base for community views and perceptions that can inform and support the development of effective policies and strategies to counter radicalisation and extremism in Australia. Details: Melbourne: Victoria University and Victoria Police, 2013. 140p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 5, 2015 at: http://www.vu.edu.au/sites/default/files/ccdw/pdfs/community-and-radicalisation.pdf Year: 2013 Country: Australia URL: http://www.vu.edu.au/sites/default/files/ccdw/pdfs/community-and-radicalisation.pdf Shelf Number: 136689 Keywords: Extremism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Violent Extremism

Author: Stys, Yvonne Title: Violent Extremists in Federal Institutions: Estimating Radicalization and Susceptibility to Radicalization in the Federal Offender Population Summary: There is a growing recognition of the need to understand and address violent extremist threats in Western countries. Given that the majority of research in this area has been conducted on nonoffender populations outside of Canada, there is a need to better understand the scope, nature, and process of radicalization in Canada. In recognition of the fact that the Correctional Service of Canada (CSC) is in a position to contribute to addressing this gap, Public Safety Canada entered into a Letter of Agreement with the CSC to produce a report focused on CSC's data holdings on and estimation of violent extremism. This report summarizes the data holdings and gaps in the area, as well as the results of three studies focused on the examination and estimation of radicalization and susceptibility to radicalization of offenders under CSC's jurisdiction. The first study was a qualitative examination of the unique characteristics of offenders who are radicalized and who are susceptible to radicalization, from the perspective of operational staff. Based on data collected at a total of 10 focus groups involving institutional and community security and front-line staff from each of CSC's five regions, a number of themes emerged. Participants recognized the complex, multi-faceted nature of radicalization, and identified a wide range of behaviours indicative of radicalization or susceptibility to radicalization. In most cases, responses (e.g., vocalization of shared grievance, changes in religion) were consistent with the literature, though staff also suggested unique responses. Staff also drew attention to areas of possible improvement. The second study was a quantitative examination of differences between radicalized and nonradicalized offenders. Informed by literature and by the results of study 1, radicalized and nonradicalized offenders were compared on a wide variety of variables which could be measured using administrative data. There were many areas where radicalized offenders were found to differ from other offenders, including ethnicity and citizenship, education and employment, substance abuse history, previous contact with the criminal justice system, and characteristics of their offence(s). The data suggested that, in some ways, radicalized offenders may be more similar to radicalized individuals in the community than to other offenders. The third study involved a theory-drive attempt to identify constructs associated with susceptibility to radicalization. Based on a literature and data review, frequency analysis of variables, and principle component analysis, nine constructs were identified and explored. Though considerable additional work is required to confirm the role and nature of these constructs in influencing susceptibility, this study represents an important first step in this endeavour. Together, the three studies have allowed the CSC to contribute to the evidence base surrounding violent extremism in Canada. The results of these studies may also inform institutional operations and policies at CSC. They consistently demonstrate the need for additional research focused on population management for radicalized offenders, with a particular need for research focused on effective interventions for this group. Details: Ottawa: Correctional Service of Canada, 2015. 130p. Source: Internet Resource: Report No. R-313: Accessed September 16, 2015 at: http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/lbrr/archives/cn34475-eng.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Canada URL: http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/lbrr/archives/cn34475-eng.pdf Shelf Number: 136785 Keywords: Extremist Groups Inmates Prisoners Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Violent Extremists

Author: Haque, Raheem Ul Title: Youth Radicalization in Pakistan Summary: Amid the serious threat of extremism within Pakistan's large young adult population, author Raheem ul Haque explores the process of youth radicalization and recommends how policymakers can best confront the growing challenge. Summary -- - Pakistani leaders face serious domestic extremism challenges; more than 47,000 thousand lives have been lost in terrorism-related violence in Pakistan over the past decade. - Effective counter-radicalization processes must take into account Pakistan's large young adult population (ages 15-29), which collectively accounts for at least 30 percent of the overall population. - Youth radicalization in Pakistan can be understood as the product of an exclusively Islamic identity - meaning a majority of youth identify primarily through their religion over nationality - combined with a broader reactive movement comprised of militant, political and missionary organizations. - A variety of religious, political and militant organizations operating within Pakistan, some with the tacit or active support of the state, have fostered an enabling environment for radicalization and at times violent action. Some groups provide forums for interaction and connections with more militant actors, while others carry out the whole range of social, political and violent activity. - When radical groups can popularize an exclusive Islamic or sectarian identity, even nonviolent organizations can become connected or aligned with more radical organizations and concepts. - Confronting youth radicalization in Pakistan requires a holistic approach that supports political, social and educational alternatives to exclusionary Islamic identities, reducing the space for groups that espouse violence in the name of an exclusive Islamic identity. Details: Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2014. 5p. Source: Internet Resource: Peace Brief 167: Accessed September 21, 2015 at: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PB%20167_Youth_Radicalization_in_Pakistan.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Pakistan URL: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PB%20167_Youth_Radicalization_in_Pakistan.pdf Shelf Number: 136849 Keywords: Extremism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Youth Violence

Author: Cragin, Kim Title: What Factors Cause Youth to Reject Violent Extremism? Results of an Exploratory Analysis in the West Bank Summary: Continued terrorist attacks and the involvement of foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq have prompted a surge of interest among policymakers, law enforcement, journalists, and academics on both sides of the Atlantic on the topic of terrorist radicalization. Many of the factors that push or pull individuals toward radicalization are in dispute within the expert community. Instead of examining the factors that lead to radicalization and the commission of terrorist acts, this report takes a new approach. What Factors Cause Youth to Reject Violent Extremism? Results of an Exploratory Analysis in the West Bank empirically addresses the topic of why youth reject violent extremism. To do this, the authors focus on the Palestinian West Bank. The report begins with a theoretical model and then tests this model with data gathered through structured interviews and a survey. For this study, ten semistructured interviews were conducted with politicians from Hamas and Fatah in 2012. Along with these interviews, the authors conducted a survey among 600 youth (ages 18-30) who lived in Hebron, Jenin, and Ramallah. The overarching findings from this effort demonstrate that (1) rejecting violent extremism, for residents of the West Bank, is a process with multiple stages and choices within each stage; (2) family plays a greater role than friends in shaping attitudes toward nonviolence; (3) demographics do not have a significant impact on attitudes toward nonviolence; and (4) opposing violence in theory is distinct from choosing not to engage in violence. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2015. 20p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 5, 2015 at: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1100/RR1118/RAND_RR1118.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Palestine URL: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1100/RR1118/RAND_RR1118.pdf Shelf Number: 136954 Keywords: Counterterrorism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Violent Extremism

Author: Nielsen, Thomas Galasz Title: Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism: Sharing Experiences in Afghanistan and Pakistan Summary: The era launched by the declaration of the Global War on Terror by America and its allies saw great instability and turmoil in the Central and South Asian regions due to increases in militant and insurgent activities. Consequently, all the regional actors had to develop new strategies to deal with uprisings, unrest, and instability. An elusive and unpredictable enemy, difficult geographical terrain, politico-diplomatic upheavals, and public resentment over governments' decisions to engage in asymmetric warfare - counterinsurgency (COIN) and counterterrorism (CT) - haunted the states with bleak prospects of everlasting military engagement at home or abroad. When the Danish parliament chose to join the American-led Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001, it was greatly motivated by NATO's core principle of coming to the aid of an alliance partner under attack; in this case, one that had suffered an attack by the terrorist network al-Qaeda, which hijacked four planes and used them as weapons on U.S. soil in New York and Washington on September 11, 2001 (9/11). Logically, both the strategic and the operational planning were left to the United States, which relied on a classic Clausewitzian centre-of-gravity approach and engaged itself and its allies in the so-called War on Terror. This resulted in large-scale military operations against the enemy's strongholds - primarily the city of Kabul. At this point, the primary objective for the military operation was to overthrow a regime that sheltered the al-Qaeda terrorist leader responsible for 9/11. The secondary objective was to prevent future terrorist networks from training and operating on Afghan soil. Though capacity building of both civilian and military institutions was carried out concurrently, the offensive operations against the insurgent groups remained a core element in the strategy throughout the entire International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) campaign in Afghanistan. Prior to, and alongside with, the development in Afghanistan, Pakistan faced similar problems with religious extremism and militant groups. Given its status as a key regional actor, the development in Afghanistan created a new situation for Pakistan's security matrix. Afghanistan and its population faced its third big war in four decades. Previous wars, the Soviet Union's 1979-89 intervention, and the 1992-96 civil war, had had a devastating effects in terms of refugees and spill-over to the neighbouring countries of Afghanistan, with Pakistan experiencing the greatest impact by far. This has had massive negative consequences for Pakistani society, especially in relation to its economy and domestic security. While the country has struggled with these consequences, it is important to remember that positive and stable development in Afghanistan will, conversely, have a massive positive effect on all levels of Pakistani society. It has been argued from many NATO countries that the Afghan insurgency groups have been, and still are being, sustained through their connections into Pakistan and their ability to cross the border and obtain safe havens on Pakistani soil. Adding to the problem is, of course, the continued external funding for religious madrassas in the remote areas of the country where government outreach in relation to education, health care, and other civil services is sparse. The lack of governmental outreach presents an opportune environment for establishing and developing insurgencies and terrorist groups. However, a new turn has seemed to take root in Pakistan, and since June 2014 the Pakistani army has been very active in the Federal Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA) in counter-militancy, including CT operations. This turn was underlined by the tragic events in December 2014, when terrorists affiliated with the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)6 killed 132 school children and 9 teachers in an attack on the Army Public School in Peshawar. While claiming responsibility for the dastardly act, the terrorists afterwards stated that the attack was a reaction to the operations conducted by the Pakistani Military in FATA. Details: Copenhagen: Royal Danish Defence College Publishing House, 2015. 376p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 26, 2015 at: http://www.fak.dk/publikationer/Documents/Sharing%20Experiences%20in%20Afghanistan%20and%20Pakistan.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Afghanistan URL: http://www.fak.dk/publikationer/Documents/Sharing%20Experiences%20in%20Afghanistan%20and%20Pakistan.pdf Shelf Number: 137893 Keywords: Counter-terrorism Extremism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism

Author: Institute for Economics and Peace Title: Global Terrorism Index: 2015. Measuring and Understanding the Impact of Terrorism Summary: This report provides a detailed analysis of the changing trends in terrorism since 2000, for 162 countries. It investigates the changing patterns of terrorism by geographic activity, methods of attack, organisations involved and the national economic and political context. The GTI has also been compared to a range of socioeconomic indicators to determine the key underlying factors that have the closest statistical relationship to terrorism. In 2014 the total number of deaths from terrorism increased by 80 per cent when compared to the prior year. This is the largest yearly increase in the last 15 years. Since the beginning of the 21st century, there has been over a nine-fold increase in the number of deaths from terrorism, rising from 3,329 in 2000 to 32,685 in 2014. Terrorism remains highly concentrated with most of the activity occurring in just five countries - Iraq, Nigeria, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Syria. These countries accounted for 78 per cent of the lives lost in 2014. Although highly concentrated, terrorism is spreading to more countries, with the number of countries experiencing more than 500 deaths increasing from five to 11, a 120 per cent increase from the previous year. The six new countries with over 500 deaths are Somalia, Ukraine, Yemen, Central African Republic, South Sudan and Cameroon. While the majority of countries in the world did not have a death from terrorism, the total number of countries which experienced at least one death increased by eight, raising the total to 67 countries in 2014. This includes OECD countries such as Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada and France which experienced high profile terrorist attacks last year. Also notable over the past year is the major intensification of the terrorist threat in Nigeria. The country witnessed the largest increase in terrorist deaths ever recorded by any country, increasing by over 300 per cent to 7,512 fatalities. Boko Haram, which operates mainly in Nigeria, has become the most deadly terrorist group in the world. Boko Haram pledged its allegiance to ISIL (also known as the Islamic State)as the Islamic State's West Africa Province (ISWAP) in March 2015. There was also a shift in the distribution of targets during 2014, with an 11 per cent decrease in the number of deaths of religious figures and worshipers. This was offset by a 172 per cent increase in the deaths of private citizens. The majority of deaths from terrorism do not occur in the West. Excluding September 11, only 0.5 per cent of all deaths have occurred in Western countries in the last 15 years. The West is designated as the countries where ISIL has advocated for attacks. They include the United States, Canada, Australia, and European countries. The report highlights the striking prevalence of lone wolf attacks in the West. Lone wolf attacks account for 70 per cent of all terrorist deaths in the West since 2006. Additionally, Islamic fundamentalism was not the primary driver of lone wolf attacks, with 80 per cent of deaths in the West from lone wolf attacks being attributed to a mixture of right wing extremists, nationalists, anti-government elements, other types of political extremism and supremacism. Details: New York: Institute for Economics and Peace, 2015. 111p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 24, 2015 at: http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Global-Terrorism-Index-2015.pdf Year: 2015 Country: International URL: http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Global-Terrorism-Index-2015.pdf Shelf Number: 137333 Keywords: Extremist Groups Lone Wolf Terrorists Radical Groups Terrorism Terrorists Violent Extremists

Author: Berger, J.M. Title: The ISIS Twitter Census: Defining and describing the population of ISIS supporters on Twitter Summary: The Islamic State, known as ISIS or ISIL, has exploited social media, most notoriously Twitter, to send its propaganda and messaging out to the world and to draw in people vulnerable to radicalization. By virtue of its large number of supporters and highly organized tactics, ISIS has been able to exert an outsized impact on how the world perceives it, by disseminating images of graphic violence (including the beheading of Western journalists and aid workers and more recently, the immolation of a Jordanian air force pilot), while using social media to attract new recruits and inspire lone actor attacks. Although much ink has been spilled on the topic of ISIS activity on Twitter, very basic questions remain unanswered, including such fundamental issues as how many Twitter users support ISIS, who they are, and how many of those supporters take part in its highly organized online activities. Previous efforts to answer these questions have relied on very small segments of the overall ISIS social network. Because of the small, cellular nature of that network, the examination of particular subsets such as foreign fighters in relatively small numbers, may create misleading conclusions. The information vacuum extends to - and is particularly acute within - the sometimes heated discussion of how the West should respond to this online campaign. While there are legitimate debates about the bounds of free speech and the complex relationship between private companies and the public interest, some have argued against suspending terrorist social media accounts on the basis that suspensions are not effective at impeding extremist activity online. These arguments that are usually predicated on very small samples of potentially misleading data, when data is proffered at all. We set out to answer some of these important questions using innovative techniques to create a large, representative sample of accounts that can be clearly defined as ISIS supporters, and to attempt to define the boundaries of ISIS's online social network. The goals of the project included: - Create a demographic snapshot of ISIS supporters on Twitter using a very large and accurate sample of accounts (addressed in sections 1 and 2 of this paper). - Outline a methodology for discovering and defining relevant accounts, to serve as a basis for future research using consistent comparison data (section 3). - Create preliminary data and a path to further investigate ISIS-supporting accounts suspended by Twitter and the effects of suspensions (section 2.5). Our findings, based on a sample of 20,000 ISIS supporter accounts, include: - From September through December 2014, we estimate that at least 46,000 Twitter accounts were used by ISIS supporters, although not all of them were active at the same time. - The 46,000 figure is our most conservative estimate for this time frame. Our maximum estimate is in the neighborhood of 70,000 accounts; however, we believe the truth is closer to the low end of the range (sections 1.1, 3.5, 3.6, 3.8). - Typical ISIS supporters were located within the organization's territories in Syria and Iraq, as well as in regions contested by ISIS. Hundreds of ISIS-supporting accounts sent tweets with location metadata embedded (section 1.4). - Almost one in five ISIS supporters selected English as their primary language when using Twitter. Three quarters selected Arabic (section 1.5). - ISIS-supporting accounts had an average of about 1,000 followers each, considerably higher than an ordinary Twitter user. ISIS-supporting accounts were also considerably more active than non-supporting users (section 2). - Much of ISIS's social media success can be attributed to a relatively small group of hyperactive users, numbering between 500 and 2,000 accounts, which tweet in concentrated bursts of high volume (section 2.1). - A minimum of 1,000 ISIS-supporting accounts were suspended between September and December 2014, and we saw evidence of potentially thousands more. Accounts that tweeted most often and had the most followers were most likely to be suspended (section 2.5.1). - At the time our data collection launched in September 2014, Twitter began to suspend large numbers of ISIS-supporting accounts. While this prevented us from creating a pre-suspension dataset, we were able to gather information on how the removal of accounts affected the overall network (section 2.5.4). - Account suspensions do have concrete effects in limiting the reach and scope of ISIS activities on social media. They do not, at the current level of implementation, eliminate those activities, and cannot be expected to do this. Some critics argue suspensions are ineffective because ISIS propaganda is still available on Twitter. Any balanced evaluation of current levels of suspension activity clearly demonstrates that total interdiction is not the goal. The qualitative debate is over how suspensions affect the performance of the network and whether a different level of pressure might produce a different result (sections 2.5, 4.2). While it is possible to target suspensions in a manner that would be far more devastating to ISIS networks, we do not advise such an approach for several reasons (sections 4.1 and 4.3). - The process of suspension does create certain new risks. Most importantly, while suspensions appear to have created obstacles to supporters joining ISIS's social network, they also isolate ISIS supporters online. This could increase the speed and intensity of radicalization for those who do manage to enter the network, and hinder organic social pressures that could lead to deradicalization (section 4.3). - Further study is required to evaluate the unintended consequences of suspension campaigns and their attendant trade-offs. Fundamentally, tampering with social networks is a form of social engineering, and acknowledging this fact raises many new, difficult questions (section 4.3). - Social media companies and the U.S government must work together to devise appropriate responses to extremism on social media. Although discussions of this issue often frame government intervention as an infringement on free speech, in reality, social media companies currently regulate speech on their platforms without oversight or disclosures of how suspensions are applied (section 4.4). Approaches to the problem of extremist use of social media are most likely to succeed when they are mainstreamed into wider dialogues among the wide range of community, private, and public stakeholders. Details: Washington, DC: Brookings Institute, Center for Middle East Policy, 2015. 68p. Source: Internet Resource: Analysis Paper No. 20: Accessed November 27, 2015 at: http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2015/03/isis-twitter-census-berger-morgan/isis_twitter_census_berger_morgan.pdf Year: 2015 Country: International URL: http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2015/03/isis-twitter-census-berger-morgan/isis_twitter_census_berger_morgan.pdf Shelf Number: 137342 Keywords: Extremism Extremist Groups Islamic State (ISIS) Radical Groups Radicalization Social Media Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Gill, Paul Title: What are the roles of the internet in terrorism? Measuring Online Behaviours of Convicted UK Terrorists Summary: Using a unique dataset of 227 convicted UK-based terrorists, this report fills a large gap in the existing literature. Using descriptive statistics, we first outline the degree to which various online activities related to radicalisation were present within the sample. The results illustrate the variance in behaviours often attributed to 'online radicalisation'. Second, we conduct a smallest-space analysis to illustrate two clusters of commonly co-occurring behaviours that delineate behaviours from those directly associated with attack planning. Third, we conduct a series of bivariate and multivariate analyses to question whether those who interact virtually with like-minded individuals or learn online, exhibit markedly different experiences (e.g. radicalisation, event preparation, attack outcomes) than those who do not. Details: VOX-Pol Network of Excellence, 2015. 64p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 28, 2015 at: http://voxpol.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/DCUJ3518_VOX_Lone_Actors_report_02.11.15_WEB.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://voxpol.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/DCUJ3518_VOX_Lone_Actors_report_02.11.15_WEB.pdf Shelf Number: 137352 Keywords: Extremist Groups Internet Online Communications Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Terrorists Violent Extremism

Author: Bergen, Peter Title: ISIS in the West: The New Faces of Extremism Summary: On Friday, November 13, 2015, France had its 9/11. At least 129 people were killed at multiple locations in and around Paris, including a concert hall, a soccer stadium, and a popular restaurant, the kinds of venues that ordinary Parisians flock to on a Friday night. At, or near, these venues the attackers deployed a mix of terrorist tactics, including multiple suicide attackers, an assault using more than one gunman willing to fight to the death, hostage-taking, and bombings. In the years after 9/11, we have seen various forms of this terrible news story play out before: the multiple bombs on trains in Madrid that killed 191 in 2004; a year later, the four suicide bombings in London that killed 52 commuters; the attacks in Mumbai by 10 gunmen willing to fight to the death in 2008, who killed 166; and the Charlie Hebdo attack in Paris in January 2015 that killed 12 people. The attackers in Paris seemed to have learned lessons from all these attacks. French President Francois Hollande blamed ISIS for the Paris attacks. It is still early in the investigation, but already leading media outlets are reporting that as many as six French nationals who have been identified as among the perpetrators of the attacks had traveled to Syria, while one of the leaders of the attack is a Belgian citizen who also spent time in Syria. According to French prosecutors, one of the attackers identified by fingerprints is a French national known to police, and a Syrian passport was found on one of the bodies of the attackers. Hitherto, the only case of a Western fighter in Syria returning and conducting a deadly terror attack in the West was French citizen Mehdi Nemmouche, who is accused in the May 24, 2014, shooting at the Jewish Museum in Brussels, Belgium, that left four people dead. Returning militants like Nemmouche are a worrying source of terror attacks. And two major factors place Europe at far greater risk of "returnee" violence from veterans of the Syrian conflict than the United States - the much larger number of European militants who have gone to fight in Syria and the existence of more developed jihadist networks in Europe. So who exactly are the estimated 4,500 Westerners who have been drawn to join ISIS and other militant groups in Syria and how great of a threat do they pose? In order to provide some answers to that question, New America collected information on 474 individuals from 25 Western countries who have been reported by credible news sources as having left their home countries to join ISIS or other Sunni jihadist groups in Syria or Iraq. Details: Washington, DC: New America, 2015. 34p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 3, 2015 at: https://static.newamerica.org/attachments/11813-isis-in-the-west-2/ISP-ISIS-In-The-West-Final-Nov-16-Final.66241afa9ddd4ea2be7afba9ec0a69e0.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: https://static.newamerica.org/attachments/11813-isis-in-the-west-2/ISP-ISIS-In-The-West-Final-Nov-16-Final.66241afa9ddd4ea2be7afba9ec0a69e0.pdf Shelf Number: 137432 Keywords: Extremism Extremist Groups ISIS Suicide Bombing Terrorist Terrorists

Author: Anti-Defamation League Title: With Hate in their Hearts: The State of White Supremacy in the United States Summary: The recent tragic shooting spree in June 2015 that took nine lives at Emanuel AME Church, a predominantly African-American church in Charleston, South Carolina, starkly revealed the pain and suffering that someone motivated by hate can cause. The suspect in the shootings, Dylann Storm Roof, is a suspected white supremacist. The horrific incident-following earlier deadly shooting sprees by white supremacists in Kansas, Wisconsin, and elsewhere-makes understanding white supremacy in the United States a necessity. - White supremacist ideology in the United States today is dominated by the belief that whites are doomed to extinction by a rising tide of non-whites who are controlled and manipulated by the Jews-unless action is taken now. This core belief is exemplified by slogans such as the so-called Fourteen Words: "We must secure the existence of our people and a future for white children." - During the recent surge of right-wing extremist activity in the United States that began in 2009, white supremacists did not grow appreciably in numbers, as anti-government extremists did, but existing white supremacists did become more angry and agitated, with a consequent rise of serious white supremacist violence. - Most white supremacists do not belong to organized hate groups, but rather participate in the white supremacist movement as unaffiliated individuals. Thus the size of the white supremacist movement is considerably greater than just the members of hate groups. Among white supremacist groups, gangs are becoming increasingly important. - The white supremacist movement has a number of different components, including 1) neo-Nazis; 2) racist skinheads; 3) "traditional" white supremacists; 4) Christian Identity adherents; and 5) white supremacist prison gangs. The prison gangs are growing in size, while the other four sub-movements are stagnant or in decline. In addition, there are a growing number of Odinists, or white supremacist Norse pagans. There are also "intellectual" white supremacists who seek to provide an intellectual veneer or justification for white supremacist concepts. - White supremacists engage in a wide variety of activities to promote their ideas and causes or to cause fear in their enemies. They also engage in an array of social activities in which white supremacists gather for food and festivities. - Among domestic extremist movements active in the United States, white supremacists are by far the most violent, committing about 83% of the extremist-related murders in the United States in the past 10 years and being involved in about 52% of the shootouts between extremists and police. White supremacists also regularly engage in a variety of terrorist plots, acts and conspiracies. However, white supremacists also have a high degree of involvement with traditional forms of criminal activity as well as ideologically-based criminal activity. Most of the murders committed by white supremacists are done for non-ideological reasons. However, even if such murders are ignored, white supremacists still commit the most lethal violence of any domestic extremist movement in the United States. Details: New York: Anti-Defamation League, 2015. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 11, 2016 at: http://www.adl.org/assets/pdf/combating-hate/state-of-white-supremacy-united-states-2015.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: http://www.adl.org/assets/pdf/combating-hate/state-of-white-supremacy-united-states-2015.pdf Shelf Number: 137446 Keywords: Extremist Groups Hate Crimes Homeland Security Racism Radical Groups White Supremacists

Author: Bergin, Anthony Title: Gen Y Jihadists: Preventing Radicalisation in Australia Summary: In September 2014 the terrorism threat level was raised from 'medium' to 'high' - the first change in 13 years. This year, the government estimated that the number of high risk terrorist threats being monitored by security agencies had doubled and that more than 100 Australians were fighting for groups in Syria and Iraq. A team of ASPI analysts has examined the scope and nature of terrorism motivated by violent Islamist extremism in Australia through a comprehensive database of the high-profile Australians identified as foreign fighters and those that have come to the attention of authorities in Australia. Based on the findings from this research, the paper assesses the policy responses by the government to date and offers recommendations. Details: Barton, ACT, AUS: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2015. 80p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 11, 2016 at: https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/gen-y-jihadists-preventing-radicalisation-in-australia/GenY_jihadists.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Australia URL: https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/gen-y-jihadists-preventing-radicalisation-in-australia/GenY_jihadists.pdf Shelf Number: 137449 Keywords: Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism

Author: Chalk, Peter Title: Black Flag Rising: ISIL in Southeast Asia and Australia Summary: Although the prime focus of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) has been on establishing a state - a caliphate - in the Middle East, it has also sought to gain a presence beyond that area. Southeast Asia is one region that's now receiving increased attention as a potential beachhead for the group. Most concern has focused on Malaysia, Indonesia, the southern Philippines and the Malay Muslim provinces of Thailand. The paper considers how these nations are responding to the threat. Beyond Southeast Asia, ISIL is showing a growing influence in Australia. The measures the Australian Government are taking have been generally well received. However, a number of concerns have been raised about the pace and nature of Australia's emergent counterterrorist strategy and their implications for the nation's democratic character. The paper puts forward national priorities and suggests that regionally greater emphasis needs to be given to formalising genuine counterterrorist cooperation. Details: Barton, ACT, AUS: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2015. 40p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 11, 2016 at: https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/black-flag-rising-isil-in-southeast-asia-and-australia/Black-flag-rising_ISIL.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Australia URL: https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/black-flag-rising-isil-in-southeast-asia-and-australia/Black-flag-rising_ISIL.pdf Shelf Number: 137451 Keywords: Extremist Groups Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant Radical Groups Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Anti-Defamation League Title: Murder and Extremism in the United States in 2015 Summary: When it came to domestic terrorism and extremism, the year 2015 was a grisly one for the United States. In the past twelve months, the names of a number of American cities became unwelcome shorthand for the carnage that extremist killers wreaked in them: Charleston, Chattanooga, Colorado Springs, San Bernardino. Each of these cities became scenes of tragedy and death, thanks to the cold-hearted ideological motivations of angry killers. It is thus no surprise that these and other domestic extremist killers have collectively amassed a higher number of victims in 2015 than in any previous year since 1995, the year of the Oklahoma City bombing. Preliminary tallies by the Anti-Defamation League's Center on Extremism indicate that a minimum of 52 people in the United States were killed by adherents of domestic extremist movement in the past 12 months. This number is bound to grow further still, as extremist connections to some murders often take years to be revealed - and there are likely still other murders whose extremist connections may never see the light of day. Still, the 52 people known to have died at the hands of domestic extremists are disturbing enough, more than the numbers killed in 2013 and 2014 put together. The victims included police officers, government workers, service members, and civilians from all walks of life. Key Findings of Report - In 2015, the 52 deaths came at the hands of adherents of four domestic extremist movements: white supremacists, anti-government extremists, domestic Islamic extremists, and anti-abortion extremists. - As has been the case every year since 1995, white supremacists have been responsible for the largest number of deaths, at 20. One incident, the June 17 mass shooting at the Emanuel AME Church in Charleston, South Carolina, which killed nine, was responsible for almost half of these deaths. - Usually, right-wing anti-government extremists account for the next highest number of murders each year, but in 2015, in a disturbing development, domestic Islamic extremists were responsible for 19 deaths, virtually the same as white supremacists. All of these deaths stemmed from two shooting rampages: the July 16 attacks by Muhammad Youssef Abdulazeez on military targets in Chattanooga and the December 2 rampage by Syed Rizwan Farook and his wife Tashfeen Malik at the Inland Regional Center in San Bernardino, California. - The 52 murders occurred in 17 separate incidents, with nine of the incidents involving multiple murders. This is unusual, in that most extremist-related examples of murder involve a single victim. - Ideology played a primary or substantial role in 10 of the 17 incidents in 2015, accounting for 34 of the 52 victims. Non-ideological killings by extremists, which accounted for the remainder, tend to involve group-related killings (such as killing a suspected informant or a rival gang member) or traditional criminal violent activity (in which extremists also often engage). - Overwhelmingly the extremist weapon of choice in 2015 - as in virtually every year - was firearms. In fact, 48 of the 52 victims were killed by firearms. The other four victims were killed by a variety of means, including two stabbings, a blunt instrument killing, and a motor vehicle incident. All of the multiple murder incidents involved the use of one or more firearms. Details: New York: Anti-Defamation League, 2015. 7p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 11, 2016 at: http://www.adl.org/assets/pdf/combating-hate/Murder-and-Extremism-in-the-United-States-in-2015-web.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: http://www.adl.org/assets/pdf/combating-hate/Murder-and-Extremism-in-the-United-States-in-2015-web.pdf Shelf Number: 137452 Keywords: Domestic Terrorism Extremist Groups Gun Violence Homicides Radical Groups Terrorism Terrorists Violent Crime

Author: Schanzer, David Title: The Challenge and Promise of Using Community Policing Strategies to Prevent Violent Extremism: A Call for Community Partnerships with Law Enforcement to Enhance Public Safety Summary: More than four years ago, the White House issued a national strategy calling for the development of partnerships between police and communities to counter violent extremism. This report contains the results of a comprehensive assessment of the challenges and promise of this strategic approach to preventing violent extremism. It is based on a nationwide survey of law enforcement agencies and hundreds of hours of interviews and site visits with police departments and community members around the country. Based on this research, we reached two fundamental conclusions. First, policing agencies face multiple obstacles to creating community partnerships focused on preventing acts of violent extremism. But, second, some policing agencies are following a set of promising practices which, if applied effectively, can result in increasing trust between the police and the communities they serve. These trusting relationships can serve as a platform for addressing many public safety threats, including, but not limited to, violent extremism. Policing agencies are unlikely to be successful in creating partnerships to address violent extremism until they establish trusting relationships with the communities they serve. This is especially true with respect to Muslim American communities, which have experienced significant trauma since 9/11 and have deep concerns about how they are treated by the government. Police outreach and engagement efforts are viewed with some suspicion by Muslim Americans for a number of reasons. First, Muslim Americans perceive they are being unfairly assigned a collective responsibility to attempt to curb violent extremism inspired by al Qaeda, ISIS, and other likeminded groups, but other communities are not being asked to address anti-government, racist, and other forms of extremism. Our research confirmed that while many policing agencies have robust efforts to conduct outreach with Muslim Americans, they do not have organized, overt efforts to reach out to non-Muslim communities that may be targeted for recruitment by anti-government, racist, or other extremist movements. Second, some Muslim Americans believe that policing outreach and engagement initiatives may be linked with efforts to conduct surveillance on Muslim American individuals and organizations. Third, even though most Muslim Americans have favorable impressions of local law enforcement, they see outreach and engagement efforts as part of a federal counter-terrorism program. Their unpleasant experiences with federal agencies, especially with respect to airport security and immigration control, taint their support for partnerships with policing agencies. We also found that willingness to develop partnerships with the police depends on how effectively the police address other, non-terrorism related, public safety concerns of the community. Some Muslim American communities believe that their public safety concerns are not being fully addressed by the police and therefore are not interested in engaging on other issues. Finally, developing effective community outreach and engagement programs is also difficult for the police because the programs absorb significant resources and may detract from other police priorities. Community policing programs require staffing, specialized training, and interpreters or intensive language classes for officers - all at a time when many police departments around the country are experiencing budgetary stress. Furthermore, we found that preventing violent extremism, while a pressing national issue, is not a top priority for local police that must address violent crime, drugs, gangs, and a host of other public safety concerns. Details: Durham, NC: Triangle Center on Terrorism and Homeland Security, Sanford School of Public Policy, Duke University, 2016. 87p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 27, 2016 at: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/249674.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/249674.pdf Shelf Number: 137690 Keywords: Community Participation Community Policing Extremist Groups Muslims Police-Community Partnerships Radical Groups Terrorism Violent Extremism

Author: Macdonald, Geoffrey Title: Preventing Violent Extremism through Inclusive Politics in Bangladesh Summary: Bangladesh has a long history of political and electoral violence that has shaped its political culture. Since the early 2000s, it has experienced a renewal of violent extremism and an increasingly polarized political climate. By addressing the relationship between radicalization and institutional dysfunctions, this Peace Brief examines how Bangladesh can help undermine the issues that bolster radicalization efforts by strengthening political and social institutions and making them more inclusive. Summary - The role of Islam in Bangladeshi politics is highly contested and presents a focal point of past and current violence. - The polarized political climate and institutionalized repression of Islamic parties appear to enhance radicalization dynamics. - The current environment in Bangladesh presents an opportunity to prevent violent extremism before it fully manifests itself. - Measures to improve democratic governance and inclusive politics could help mitigate the risk of violent extremism in Bangladesh, while also reducing political violence levels. Details: Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2016. 5p. Source: Internet Resource: Peace Brief 200: Accessed January 28, 2016 at: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PB200-Preventing-Violent-Extremism-through-Inclusive-Politics-in-Bangladesh.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Bangladesh URL: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PB200-Preventing-Violent-Extremism-through-Inclusive-Politics-in-Bangladesh.pdf Shelf Number: 137697 Keywords: Extremist Groups Islam Political Violence Radical Groups Terrorism Violent Extremism

Author: Groenewald, Hesta Title: "Hammering the Bread and the Nail": Lessons from counter-terror, stabilisation and statebuilding in Afghanistan Summary: The international intervention in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2014 was in many respects a watershed for the country and for the global agenda on combating terrorism. The decision to react to the al-Qaeda attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001 with a military-led response was intended to close down al-Qaeda's operational space in Afghanistan, which the Taliban regime refused to challenge. Yet, the country was also in ongoing civil conflict and the actions of the Taliban regime were as much targeted against the Afghan population as they were causing insecurity for Western countries and Afghanistan's neighbours. Focusing the international intervention on the narrow counter-terrorism aims of defeating al-Qaeda and removing the Taliban from power meant missing early opportunities to support political transition, development progress and long-term peacebuilding. This research report reviews international engagement in Afghanistan with a view to identifying lessons and recommendations regarding statebuilding, peacebuilding and counterterrorism in the country and elsewhere. Based mostly on existing literature, the report focuses in particular on US, UK and EU involvement. While providing an overview of the key dilemmas, the analysis generates important recommendations for future support to Afghanistan, and also aims to inform ongoing policy debates about international engagement with 'terrorism-generating' contexts. Details: London: Saferworld, 2016. 58p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 1, 2016 at: http://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/view-resource/1031-hammering-the-bread-and-the-nail Year: 2015 Country: Afghanistan URL: http://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/view-resource/1031-hammering-the-bread-and-the-nail Shelf Number: 137727 Keywords: Counter-terrorism Extremist Groups Human Rights Abuses Terrorism Violent Extremism

Author: Suri, Sunil Title: "Barbed Wire on Our Heads": Lessons from counter-terror, stabilisation and statebuilding in Somalia Summary: Since 2007 the US, UK and EU have provided significant funds to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and regional actors aimed at militarily defeating al-Shabaab. These resources have been provided despite questions about the objectives of regional actors and evidence that their actions have undermined efforts to build peace in Somalia. The US, UK and EU have all been prominent backers of the stabilisation and statebuilding agendas in Somalia - the latter of which is enshrined in the Somali Compact - and have been particularly active in political processes to form interim regional administrations and the creation of a federal system. These approaches have wrested much territory from al-Shabaab control, particularly since the establishment of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) in 2012. However, these territorial gains remain both relative and fragile, and have both caused harm and created risks for longer-term stability. With the mandate of the FGS coming to an end in 2016, the US, UK and EU have the opportunity to reflect upon the lessons of over twenty years of involvement and adjust their policies in the country. This report, informed by field research in Somalia and Kenya, aims to inform this debate about the impact of US, UK and EU counter-terror, stabilisation and statebuilding approaches in the southern and central areas of Somalia since 2001. Assessing the impact of their engagement on Somali conflict dynamics from a peacebuilding perspective, it argues that counter-terror, stabilisation and statebuilding efforts have had significant negative impacts, and based on this identifies lessons and recommendations for the future. Details: London: Saferworld, 2016. 66p., bibliography Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 1, 2016 at: http://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/view-resource/1032-barbed-wire-on-our-heads Year: 2016 Country: Somalia URL: http://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/view-resource/1032-barbed-wire-on-our-heads Shelf Number: 137728 Keywords: Counter-terrorism Extremism Extremist Groups Terrorism

Author: Attree, Larry Title: Blown back: Lessons from counter-terror, stabilisation and statebuilding in Yemen Summary: Since serious terror threats emerged in Yemen in 2000, the West has invested significantly in counter-terror and stabilisation. Alongside direct military action to assassinate key militants (by the US), Western actors backed the Government of Yemen to fight, prosecute or punish terrorists, and gave capacity-building support to institutions, hoping to address the weakness of a willing but fragile state. The Western approach reflects a domestic discourse in the West in which Yemen has been defined primarily as a 'threat' - an unstable context that plays host to al-Qaeda and other dangerous groups, which must be defeated by backing the state at all costs. This report analyses external actors' approaches to Yemen and their impacts on its conflict dynamics from a peacebuilding perspective. It argues that counter-terror, stabilisation and statebuilding efforts have had significant negative impacts, and based on this identifies lessons and recommendations for the future. Details: London: Saferworld, 2016. 56p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 1, 2016 at: http://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/view-resource/1033-blown-back Year: 2016 Country: Yemen URL: http://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/view-resource/1033-blown-back Shelf Number: 137729 Keywords: Counter-terrorism Extremism Extremist Groups Terrorism

Author: Angus, Christopher Title: Radicalisation and Violent Extremism: Causes and Responses Summary: The radicalisation of Australian citizens, and the decision by a small number to commit acts of extremist violence, has led to considerable community concern in recent years. In NSW, there was the tragic December 2014 Martin Place Lindt Cafe siege1 and the October 2015 murder of a police civilian finance worker outside the NSW Police Force headquarters. On a global scale, radicalisation and extremism have led Australians to travel to conflict zones to fight in foreign wars. A recent report in the Australian Police Journal estimated that up to 250 Australian jihadis took part in the conflict in Syria in 2014. This number is both numerically and proportionally greater than the number of foreign fighters from other nations, including the United States, the Netherlands and several Scandinavian countries. This e-brief does not purport to be a comprehensive account of all the literature in this expanding area of study. Rather, it seeks only to offer an introduction to this complex subject. One focus is on government counter-radicalisation programs and commentaries on these. The e-brief begins by defining radicalisation and violent extremism, which share certain common elements but are also different in important respects. Details: Sydney: NSW Parliamentary Research Service, 2016. 23p. Source: Internet Resource: e-brief: Accessed February 3, 2016 at: https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/Prod/parlment/publications.nsf/0/72ABFCEDB075A6A1CA257F4C0011969F/$File/Radicalisation+eBrief.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Australia URL: .https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/researchpapers/Documents/radicalisation-and-violent-extremism-causes-and-/Radicalisation%20eBrief.pdf Shelf Number: 137747 Keywords: Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Violent Extremism

Author: European Commission. Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs Title: Europeans' Attitudes Towards Security Summary: Overall perception of security - Around 90% of people say that their immediate neighbourhood and their city, town or village are safe places to live. - Around 80% say that their own country and the EU are secure places to live. - Respect for fundamental rights and freedoms is thought to have the most positive impact on one's personal sense of security - 42% of respondents say this. Perceived threats and challenges - Terrorism is seen as the EU's most important security challenge, with half of all respondents describing it as important. - However, the level of concern varies considerably from country to country: 62% of people in Malta, but only 22% in Latvia, think terrorism is an important challenge. - Since 2011, the proportion of people identifying terrorism and religious extremism as important challenges has increased substantially. Fewer people now think that economic and financial crises are the most important challenge to security. - 65% of people think that terrorism is a very important internal security challenge for the EU, and 92% think it is important. - Over two-thirds of people think that the threat of terrorism is likely to increase over the next three years, with over half also saying that cybercrime and organised crime will increase. - Over eight out of ten respondents think that extremist ideologies, war and political instability, and poverty and social exclusion, are potential sources of threats to EU security. - Only seven out of ten people see climate change and pollution as a potential source of security threats. Responses to address security challenges - The police and the judicial system are seen as being chiefly responsible for ensuring the security of citizens: around nine out of ten respondents say this. - The police are seen as the organisation with the biggest role in ensuring the security of citizens in all but five Member States, where the judicial system is listed first. - Over half of the respondents think the police are doing enough to fight terrorism and drug trafficking, but less than half say enough is being done to fight other crimes. - A majority of respondents think that citizens' rights and freedoms have been restricted for reasons related to fighting terrorism and crime. - People are generally positive about the impact of new technologies, but a quarter think they will have a negative impact on the security of citizens. Details: Luxembourg: The Commission, 2015. 108p. Source: Internet Resource: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_432_en.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Europe URL: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_432_en.pdf Shelf Number: 137809 Keywords: Cybercrime Extremist Groups Organized Crime Police Effectiveness Public Safety Security Terrorism

Author: Stys, Yvonne Title: Examining the Needs and Motivations of Canada's Federally Incarcerated Radicalized Offenders Summary: This study allowed for an enhanced understanding of the motivations and needs of radicalized offenders, while providing the Correctional Service of Canada (CSC) with further evidence that can be used in its considerations of how to intervene and case manage this population of offenders in the future. This research underscores the need for increased attention to offender motivation and how it impacts case management, supervision, and intervention strategies for radicalized offenders. What we found Results indicated that 30% of radicalized offenders had purely ideological motives for their actions, 17% were purely motivated by criminal (non-ideological) drivers, and 53% held both ideological and non-ideological motivations for their crimes. The most common ideological motivations included a desire for political change, and a desire to respond to a group grievance. Non-ideological motivations were most frequently identified as the desire for material gain and the desire for friendship. Those radicalized offenders who committed the more serious acts (as per the definition of radicalized offender) and those who were seen as leaders of the group were more frequently identified as having purely ideological motivations. Assessment of criminogenic needs via the Dynamic Factor Identification and Analysis instrument revealed that a large proportion of radicalized offenders had needs in the associates, attitudes, and personal/emotional domains and a small proportion had needs in the areas of substance abuse and community functioning. These differences were more pronounced when ideologically-motivated offenders were examined separately, indicating that perhaps the needs of non-ideologically motivated radicalized offenders are more similar to those found in the non-radicalized, general offender population. Similarly, ideologically motivated offenders held many more of the other violent-extremist needs than did non-ideologically motivated radicalized offenders. Why we did this study CSC strives to contribute to the safety and security of society through identifying and addressing the criminogenic needs and criminal motivations of the federally incarcerated offender population. While much is known about the needs of the general offender population, there exists significantly less empirical evidence concerning the needs of those federally-sentenced individuals motivated by ideology: radicalized offenders. This research sought to examine and understand the specific motivations and needs of federally incarcerated radicalized offenders, with the ultimate goal of contributing to an evidence-based approach to effective correctional interventions and case management for these offenders. What we did Using data from the Offender Management System (OMS) as well as information coded from various sources, the motivations (ideological Details: Ottawa: Correctional Service of Canada, 2014. 30p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 8, 2016 at: http://www.csc-scc.gc.ca/005/008/092/005008-r344-eng.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Canada URL: http://www.csc-scc.gc.ca/005/008/092/005008-r344-eng.pdf Shelf Number: 137811 Keywords: Extremist Groups Prison Administration Prisoners Radical Groups Radicalization Radicalized Offenders

Author: Denmark. Ministry of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs Title: The Challenge of Extremism: Examples of Deradicalisation and Disengagement Programmes in the EU Summary: In January 2010 a survey on deradicalisation and disengagement was initiated. In this survey five respondent countries have described specific deradicalisation and/or disengagement programmes targeted towards individuals. These five countries are Germany, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden. This report focuses on these intervention programmes, because the main objective of the survey is to map such programmes. The main objectives of the survey were: - To map the practical experiences in EU member states with policies and programmes on deradicalisation and disengagement, focusing on how to intervene when individuals have been attracted to extremism. - To support the exchange of experience and good practice among the EU member states in the further efforts to address the challenges of extremism and radicalisation. The questionnaire was sent to all 27 EU member states. 18 EU member states replied extensively by giving descriptions of their overall strategies on prevention of extremism. All but one of the 18 countries have developed, or are developing, strategies to prevent radicalisation and extremism. Accordingly most of the strategies are broad initiatives on early prevention of radicalisation and extremism. The implementing partners in the strategies are often a mix of different authorities and organisations on a national, regional and local level. Out of 18 countries, 13 countries have experienced problems with right-wing extremism, 12 countries have experienced problems with left-wing extremism, 10 countries have experienced problems with militant Islamism, and seven countries have experienced problems with separatist movements, animal right groups and/or other groups. In most countries right-wing extremism and militant Islamism are assessed as the biggest threats. Details: Copenhagen: The Ministry, 2010. 40p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 9, 2016 at: http://www.youthpolicy.org/library/wp-content/uploads/library/2010_Challenge_Extremisme_Deradicalisation_EU_Eng.pdf Year: 2010 Country: Europe URL: http://www.youthpolicy.org/library/wp-content/uploads/library/2010_Challenge_Extremisme_Deradicalisation_EU_Eng.pdf Shelf Number: 137813 Keywords: Extremism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism

Author: Saltman, Erin Marie Title: The Role of Prevent in Countering Online Extremism Summary: The following White Paper addresses the role of the UK government and social media companies and Internet service providers (ISP) in monitoring and policing the Internet for extremist and/or terrorism-related content. This paper seeks to analyse the effectiveness of the UK government's Prevent strategy and provide recommendations for its improvement in line with the current nature of the threat. Currently, the two biggest challenges for UK counter-terrorism are the radicalisation and recruitment of individuals by the jihadist organisation Islamic State (IS) and the use of the Internet by IS and other extremist organisations to spread unwanted and potentially dangerous ideologies and narratives internationally. This subject is of great importance, especially as government debates how best to tackle extremism and adequately implement counter-extremism measures both in real terms and online. Sections 2 and 3 discuss the framework of the government's Prevent strategy, while sections 4 through 9 detail the challenges extremism and terrorism-related content online pose. Section 10 addresses the role of Prevent in countering online extremism in the UK. Details: London: Quilliam Foundation, 2014. 13p. Source: Internet Resource: White Paper: Accessed February 12, 2016 at: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/white-paper-the-role-of-prevent-in-countering-online-extremism.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/white-paper-the-role-of-prevent-in-countering-online-extremism.pdf Shelf Number: 137849 Keywords: Counter-Extremism Extremism Extremist Groups Online Communications Radical Groups Radicalization Social Media

Author: Stuart, Hannah Title: Community Policing and Preventing Extremism: Lessons from Bradford Summary: Since the 7/7 terrorist attacks in London, police forces nationally have implemented successive counter-radicalisation policies. Community Policing and Preventing Extremism, based on a series of interviews with senior police officers from the West Yorkshire Police and the North East Counter-Terrorism Unit, provides a practical perspective on the challenges of delivering preventative work at grassroots level as well as on policy debates about the remit of counter-extremism in a free society. Key findings include: ◾The police advocate building sustainable relationships with communities based on mutual trust and confidence; and recognise the need to be representative and to respond to changing community dynamics; ◾A focus on successful community policing and "quality of life issues" allows the police to proactively create resilient partnerships rather than attempting to force a relationship in response to a counter-radicalisation-related issue; ◾A strategic mechanism for supporting the ideological challenge against extremism is promoting critical thinking skills and credible voices, which builds resilience against extremism; helps isolate extremists; and promotes dialogue around other controversial issues, such as grooming; ◾Promoting safe giving is a key response to the religious injunction for charity within Muslim communities, which can increase vulnerability to fundraising for criminal or terrorist intent and to intimidating styles of fundraising that take advantage of a generous and permissive cultural attitude towards giving; ◾Police forces are well-placed to identify grievances and negative perceptions within communities. Successful work around education, internet safety and grooming demonstrates the value of promoting counter-radicalisation as a safeguarding issue rather than simply as a counter-terrorism tool; ◾Among the biggest challenges anticipated for 2015 is ensuring consistency in relation to freedom of speech and the thresholds used to measure extremism, particularly as it manifests either online or in public situations, for example at universities and during political protests. Details: London: Henry Jackson Society, 2015. 30p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Paper No. 4: Accessed February 12, 2016 at: http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Community-Policing-and-Preventing-Extremism.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Community-Policing-and-Preventing-Extremism.pdf Shelf Number: 137850 Keywords: Community Policing Counter-Extremism Counter-Terrorism Extremism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism

Author: Hussain, Ghaffar Title: Jihad Trending: A Comprehensive Analysis of Online Extremism and How to Counter it Summary: Online extremism and the role the Internet plays in the radicalisation process is currently being debated and discussed by journalists, academics, technologists and government officials alike. This report demystifies the topic of extremist content online and exposes the manner in which online tools are being used by Islamist extremist organisations and individuals to recruit and propagandise. Current measures to tackle online extremism are also assessed and critiqued, after which the report details a practical strategy for countering extremism online and making the Internet a less hospitable domain for extremists. The research conducted for this report focuses on 30 Islamist extremist groups operating in the UK and France, mapping their use of the Internet and what they hope to achieve through their online activities. Popular online platforms such as YouTube, Facebook, Twitter as well as chat rooms, discussion forums and static websites are analysed with a view to assessing the role online extremist messaging plays in the radicalisation process. The report also addresses the issue of censorship, assessing the effectiveness of current filtering methods available and their overall efficacy. Research for this report was based on original data collection and analyses as well as interviews with a range of experts, mentors and target audiences. Key findings in this report: - With the Internet often being accused of producing radicalisation in isolation of other factors, this report found that the vast majority of radicalised individuals come into contact with extremist ideology through offline socialisation prior to being indoctrinated online. In other words, the Internet does not radicalise in isolation of other factors and should not be targeted as the 'cause' of radicalisation. As such, the Internet's role is less about initiating the radicalisation process; rather it acts as a facilitator and catalyst for the radicalisation process by 1) indoctrinating, 2) educating and 3) socialising individuals. - Although governments are increasingly relying on censorship and filtering methods to counter online extremism, this report found that negative measures, or censorship in general, was not only ineffective and costly but also potentially counter-productive. - Positive measures, such as developing counter-extremist efforts through online counter-speech content and popularising online initiatives that fight against extremism are much more effective in challenging extremist ideologies. However, there are currently not enough materials that counter extremist content online, allowing extremists to monopolise certain issues. - We found that results from search engines rarely, if ever, provide links to content that supported Islamist extremism. It was equally rare to find content countering extremist narratives. - Research also found that available Islamist extremist content websites were most successful if they provided more subtle, non-illegal information platforms with links to active social media platforms for users. Available static websites served primarily to 1) propagate the Islamist narrative through specific interpretations of scriptures, 2) promote martyrdom and 3) solidify a 'self versus other' allegiance to Muslims, rejecting non-Muslims. This report seeks to differentiate itself from previous reports on online extremism in two ways; firstly the research itself is much more in-depth and diverse, combining qualitative and quantitative data to reach conclusions. Secondly, this report offers a comprehensive and practical list of recommendations which, if implemented fully, could unleash a new wave of online activism that will take the fight to extremists online, breaking the current monopoly they hold over certain socio-political issues. Recommendations to public, private and third party sectors based on our findings: - Establishing a forum that deals with online extremism and brings stakeholders from key sectors together in order to do so. - Improving digital literacy and critical consumption skills in schools and communities. - Encouraging the establishment of a social media outlet that clarifies government policies and debunks propaganda. - A mapping exercise that explores current efforts to tackle extremism online and identifies partners that could be given support to develop an effective online presence. - Establishing a central body that offers seed funding and training for grassroots online counter-extremism initiatives. - More research into how the far right is using the Internet to propagandise giving a broader view of 'extremism online'. The findings and recommendations of this report suggest a clearer understanding of the role the Internet plays in radicalisation process and an appreciation of the dangers of relying on illiberal censorship can contribute towards the development of a more holistic approach to tackling extremism online. Relying on the cultivation of grassroots initiatives to develop and promote counter-speech online, as opposed to censorship, could help turn the tide against current extremist efforts. However, co-operation and regular communication between stakeholders from key sectors is vital in order for the above vision to be realised and, thus, the establishment of a forum that allows this to take place is also important. Details: London: Quilliam Foundation, 2014. 132p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 12, 2016 at: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/jihad-trending-quilliam-report.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/jihad-trending-quilliam-report.pdf Shelf Number: 137854 Keywords: Counter-Extremism Counter-Terrorism Extremism Extremist Groups Internet Islamists Online Communications Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism

Author: Southern Poverty Law Center Title: Terror from the Right: 75 Plots, Conspiracies and Racist Rampages since Oklahoma City Summary: A synopsis of radical-right terrorist plots, conspiracies and racist rampages since the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995. It includes a roster of murdered law enforcement officials. Details: Montgomery, AL: Southern Poverty Law Center, 2009. 23p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 18, 2016 at: https://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/terror_from_the_right_0.pdf Year: 2009 Country: United States URL: https://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/terror_from_the_right_0.pdf Shelf Number: 137880 Keywords: Extremism Extremist Groups Homeland Security Radical Groups Radicalism Terrorism

Author: Georgetown University, Justice Policy Institute Title: Report: Lone Wolf Terrorism Summary: The United States (US) is the primary target among western states for lone wolf terrorist (LWT) attacks, and the frequency of attacks continues to increase. Even though LWT attacks remain less common and precipitate fewer casualties than terrorist attacks conducted by organizations, the US must continue to focus counterterrorism resources and encourage further research to combat this threat to national security. In this assessment, the Georgetown National Security Critical Issue Task Force (NSCITF) hopes to inform key stakeholders about the most critical lone wolf terrorism issues and spark new policy discussions on how to address the problem. The NSCITF articulates eight findings that inform the collective understanding of lone wolf terrorism and offers three actionable recommendations to address those findings. First, the NSCITF finds that no single USG definition on lone wolf terrorism exists. Second, the NSCITF identifies the following four current trends in domestic LWT attacks, each of which highlight multiple issues that US policymakers must consider when drafting counterterrorism policies directed at LWTs: 1) Increased targeting of law enforcement (LE) and military personnel; 2) Overwhelming use firearms to conduct attacks, compared to LWTs in other western countries who rely on hijackings or bombs; 3) Increased radicalization via the Internet, extremist media, and the civilian workplace; and, 4) Proclamation of an individual ideology instead of claiming affinity to specific, organized extremist groups. Third, despite the presence of overarching trends among domestic LWTs, the NSCITF determines that profiling fails to target potential LWTs effectively. Consequently, in the fourth finding, the NSCITF provides a framework to understand how an individual becomes a LWT and to identify possible intervention points. Fifth, the NSCITF develops a typology that organizes lone wolves in terms of their ideological autonomy and social competence to explicate why lone wolves operate alone, a key gap in the extant literature on terrorism. The final three findings address US federal and local law enforcement policies to prevent LWT attacks. In the sixth finding, the NSCITF identifies the challenges of using traditional law enforcement tactics to identify and stop LWTs. Specifically, the NSCITF highlights how the expansion of the Internet and social media offers individuals an ability to become radicalized without physically interacting with others and research various attack methodologies undetected. The seventh finding demonstrates that aggressive law enforcement tactics - namely, surveillance and monitoring of targeted individuals - risk community mistrust because of perceived infringements on civil liberties and privacy rights. In the final finding, the NSCITF notes that the US lacks a comprehensive, "whole of government" approach that coherently and systematically organizes the federal, local, and state efforts to combat lone wolf terrorism. Based on the above findings, the NSCITF offers three recommendations. First, the USG should adopt a standard definition of lone wolf terrorism. Second, the USG should appoint clear leadership over the problem of lone wolf terrorism to streamline future policy responses and improve governmental coordination at the federal, state, and local levels. Finally, the USG should emphasize the prevention and short-circuiting of the radicalization process. Each recommendation will help the USG streamline future policy responses and improve governmental coordination at the federal, state, and local levels to prevent future LWT attacks. Details: Washington, DC: Georgetown University, 2015. 58p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 18, 2016 at: http://georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/NCITF-Final-Paper.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United States URL: http://georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/NCITF-Final-Paper.pdf Shelf Number: 137881 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Domestic Terrorism Extremist Groups Homeland Security Law Enforcement Lone Wolf Terrorism Radicalization Terrorism

Author: Cold-Ravnkilde, Signe Title: Boko Haram: From local grievances to violent insurgency Summary: It is estimated that Boko Haram has killed more than twenty thousand people since 2009, making it the world's deadliest terror organisation that threatens to destabilise not only Nigeria, but the entire region of the Sahel. Since the inauguration of a regional multi-national joint task force heavily supported by western international security actors, attacks in the affected neighbouring countries has increased remarkably. This suggests that more international and regional military responses might in fact fuel more attacks by Boko Haram. Rather than rephrasing decontextualised discourses of trans-Saharan terrorism, this new DIIS report by Signe Cold-Ravnkilde and Sine Plambech suggests that international support to the fight against Boko Haram should be based on a careful understanding of the complex local and regional dynamics of conflict. The report provides an overview of the situation and the historic development as well as suggesting a number of policy recommendations. -There is a dire need to ensure that the current military operations do not repeat the mistakes of the Nigerian security forces in 2013: human rights violation and economic sanctions that may transform a jihadist uprising into a people's revolt. - Gender norms and how men and women are affected by and take part in the insurgency both as combatants and protesters against Boko Haram should be taking into account in policy makers' response to the insurgency. -Insecurity in Nigeria and the affected neighbouring countries requires a comprehensive approach including socio-economic perspectives on contending local incitements to engage in illicit economic and terrorist activities. Details: Copenhagen: DIIS - Danish Institute for International Studies, 2015. 39p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 25, 2016 at: http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/DIIS_Report_21_Boko_Haram_WEB.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Nigeria URL: http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/DIIS_Report_21_Boko_Haram_WEB.pdf Shelf Number: 137976 Keywords: Boko Haram Extremist Groups Violence Against Women, Girls Violent Crime

Author: Hemmingsen, Ann-Sophie Title: An Introduction to the Danish Approach to Countering and Preventing Extremism and Radicalization Summary: Preventing and countering violent extremism and radicalization is increasingly gaining momentum as a supplement to more traditional counterterrorism activities in the efforts to protect societies against terrorism. The Danish approach has attracted attention not least because of its gentler approach to returnees from Syria and Iraq and the fact that it has been developing for nearly a decade. In this report, Ann-Sophie Hemmingsen provides an introduction to the approach and pinpoints the challenges and dilemmas with which it is faced. The Danish approach to preventing and countering violent extremism and radicalization is based on extensive multi-agency collaboration between various social-service providers, the educational system, the health-care system, the police, municipalities, and the intelligence and security services. It benefits greatly from four decades' experience with such collaboration in relation to crime-prevention and from existing structures. As could be expected, the approach is faced with dilemmas, challenges and criticisms. The biggest challenge remains the lack of clear definitions of radicalization and extremism, which leads to a lack of consensus on criteria, standards and procedures. The inherent difficulty of cooperation and the substantial task of coordinating the efforts also continue to represent practical challenges. The Danish approach focuses on the individual and many of the initiatives developed revolve around help to self-help through, for example, mentoring, counselling and exit programmes. The prevalent focus on the individual represents a risk of overlooking social and political aspects that might require and inspire other types of responses than those already included. To meet contemporary challenges, the approach is continuously being developed, both top-down and bottom-up, but it rests on a set of fundamental premises ranging from understandings of the welfare state to understandings of crime and of how behavior can be changed. In order for other countries to determine whether there are lessons to be learned from the Danish approach, knowledge is required about these understandings and the existing structures into which the efforts are incorporated. Details: Copenhagen: DIIS - Danish Institute for International Studies, 2015. 29p. Source: Internet Resource: DIIS Report 2015: 15: Accessed February 25, 2016 at: http://pure.diis.dk/ws/files/369882/DIIS_Report_2015_15.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Denmark URL: http://pure.diis.dk/ws/files/369882/DIIS_Report_2015_15.pdf Shelf Number: 137977 Keywords: Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Terrorists Violent Extremism

Author: Khan, Khalida Title: Preventing Violence Extremism (PVE) and PREVENT: A Response from the Muslim Community Summary: The vast majority of Muslims are against violent extremism and terrorism and would like to help to counteract it. They are as appalled by violent extremism as anyone else and reject any justification that it can be condoned by Islamic teachings. However, the government's approach to dealing with terrorism by targeting the whole Muslim community as 'potential terrorists' in its Prevent Strategy is flawed and fraught with perils. We believe that rather than creating community cohesion and eliminating terrorism it has the potential to create discord and inflame community tensions. Furthermore, we believe this unprecedented strategy constitutes an infringement of civil liberties and human rights. There is a danger that PVE is becoming a well-funded industry with vested interests. Our concern is that political considerations and frictions that have nothing to do with the Muslim community or the hundreds of people who, like us, have been working on the ground for decades are obstructing the vital work of producing communities at peace with themselves and each other. As an organisation with extensive experience of working for the welfare of Muslim families we are seriously concerned about the implications of the Prevent strategy and how it is impacting in local Muslim communities. In this paper we intend to highlight why we believe the government's approach towards its Muslim community is flawed and will offer constructive recommendations as to what the government should be doing. Details: London: An-Nisa Society, 2009. 37p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 29, 2016 at: https://muslimyouthskills.files.wordpress.com/2010/05/pve__prevent_-__a_muslim_response.pdf Year: 2009 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://muslimyouthskills.files.wordpress.com/2010/05/pve__prevent_-__a_muslim_response.pdf Shelf Number: 137995 Keywords: Extremist Groups Muslims Radicalization Terrorism Violent Extremism

Author: Vittori, Jodi Title: Idealism is not enough: The role of resources in the autonomy and capability of terrorist groups Summary: Terrorism scholars have posited that 90 percent of terrorist groups survive less than a year, and half of those which remain will not live to see the ten year-mark. This dissertation addresses the variety of means through which terrorist groups seek to acquire, move and store money, tangible and intangible resources, and how these strategies shape their autonomy in conducting operations and theoretical capabilities to engage in violent actions. The combination of a terrorist group's capability and autonomy leads to the identification of seven different categories: state-sponsored terrorist groups, franchises, popularly-supported groups, lone wolves, state-sponsoring groups, shell states and transnational corporation-like groups (TNCs). Within these groups, those with medium to high levels of both autonomy and capability are proven to have the highest average lifespan. Utilizing the Terrorism Knowledge Base database, 100 terrorist groups out of a total of 897 were examined. Each was coded according to its level of autonomy (measured as low, medium or high) and capability (measured as very low, low, medium or high) with respect to the conduct of terrorist actions; the longevity of each group was determined from the time of its first terrorist attack until the most recent one. Statistical analysis utilizing a Weibull distribution verifies that those groups with medium to high capability and autonomy do indeed achieve a longer lifespan than those with only low capabilities and/or low autonomy. Moreover, the sample indicates that the average lifespan for all terrorist groups may be much longer than what terrorism scholars have anticipated. This dissertation addresses four significant gaps in the literature on terrorism. First, it provides a typology for examining the resourcing of terrorism, as none currently exists. Second, it analyzes how the institution of terrorism resourcing has evolved over time and how new institutional variations influence groups' autonomy and capability. Third, as the above criteria correlate to the lifespan of individual terrorist groups, this dissertation explains why some outfits are more likely to survive and flourish while others are short-lived. Finally, this study develops objective criteria for measuring the capability and autonomy of terrorist organizations Details: Denver, CO: University of Denver, 2008. 485p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed March 5, 2016 at: http://gradworks.umi.com/33/03/3303538.html Year: 2008 Country: International URL: http://gradworks.umi.com/33/03/3303538.html Shelf Number: 138111 Keywords: Extremist Groups Radical Groups Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Williams, Lauren Title: Islamic State propaganda and the mainstream media Summary: Islamic State's use of social media to disseminate its propaganda is generally well understood. What receives far less attention is how the group also uses the Western mainstream media to spread its key messages. Islamic State tailors the production and release of its material to the needs of mainstream media outlets and to the media cycle. The danger involved in sending Western journalists to Syria and Iraq has made the media more reliant on material produced by Islamic State. The group's propaganda is often unwittingly used by the mainstream media in ways that serve Islamic State's objectives. Islamic State's propaganda effort is central to its ability to recruit new members, intimidate its opponents, and promote its legitimacy as a state. Countering that effort means more than just combatting it online and cancelling Twitter accounts. Counter-messaging efforts need to take place through the mainstream media as well as social media. The mainstream media also has a responsibility to treat Islamic State's material more critically, including by providing more contextual coverage of the conflict in Syria and Iraq, and using less sensationalist or polarising rhetoric when it discusses terrorism. The adoption of better standards and practices can help the mainstream media to limit the appeal of Islamic State propaganda in ways that do not detract from media independence and the public-s right to know. Details: Sydney: Lowry Institute for International Policy, 2016. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed march 5, 2016 at: http://www.lowyinstitute.org/files/islamic-state-propaganda-western-media_0.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://www.lowyinstitute.org/files/islamic-state-propaganda-western-media_0.pdf Shelf Number: 138119 Keywords: Extremist Groups Islamic State Radical Groups Radicalization Social Media Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Russell, Jonathan Title: Countering Islamist Extremist Narratives: A Strategic Briefing Summary: The majority of this report was written as part of Quilliam's evidence to the Home Affairs Select Committee's (HASC) inquiry on Countering Extremism. In addition to the analysis of the Islamist narrative and the strategic framework required to counter it, this strategic briefing includes three case studies of counter-narratives put together by Quilliam (not included in the HASC submission), and recommendations based on experience, expertise and these case studies for future counter-narrative approaches. Details: London: Quilliam, 2016. 20p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 8, 2016 at: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/countering-islamist-extremist-narratives.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/countering-islamist-extremist-narratives.pdf Shelf Number: 138130 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Extremism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism

Author: Schmid, Alex P. Title: Challenging the Narrative of the "Islamic State" Summary: ISIS has brought terrorist propaganda to a new level, targeting its main audiences in nearly two dozen languages with up to 90,000 tweets every day. Governments have generally been at a loss as how to counter the ISIS narrative with persuasive counter-arguments to reduce its attraction for rebellious Muslim youths in Western diasporas and Muslim-majority countries. At the core of ISIS' narrative are themes familiar to most Muslims. ISIS has appropriated and instrumentalised them for its main purpose: to expand the Caliphate proclaimed in mid-2014. In this Research Paper, Dr. Alex Schmid identifies a dozen narrative themes of ISIS and discusses them from theological, historical and other angles in an attempt to show vulnerabilities and point the way towards developing convincing counter-arguments. While the potential of this approach is demonstrated, Dr. Schmid argues that a concerted and systematic approach, based on synergetic, inter-disciplinary teamwork, is required to develop successful counter-narratives and that these need to be tested on audiences with a cultural affinity to ISIS main target groups before being utilised by credible Muslim voices who wish to engage terrorist ideologues and their potential followers with rational and faith-based arguments. The Research Paper concludes with the observation that developing counter-narratives, while necessary, is not enough. It is even more necessary to develop credible alternative narratives - narratives that can give a new sense of purpose, meaning and hope to those who feel that they have no future in their and our societies. Details: The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2015. 21p. Source: Internet Resource: ICCT Research Paper: Accessed March 10, 2016 at: http://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/ICCT-Schmid-Challenging-the-Narrative-of-the-Islamic-State-June2015.pdf Year: 2015 Country: International URL: http://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/ICCT-Schmid-Challenging-the-Narrative-of-the-Islamic-State-June2015.pdf Shelf Number: 138159 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Extremist Groups Islamic State Online Communications Radical Groups Religious Extremism Social Media Violent Extremism

Author: Ochsner, Christian Title: Migrating Extremists Summary: We show that migrating extremists shape political landscapes toward their ideology in the long run. We exploit the unexpected division of the state of Upper Austria into a US and a Soviet occupation zone after WWII. Zoning prompts large-scale Nazi migration to US occupied regions. Regions that witnessed a Nazi influx exhibit significantly higher voting shares for the right-wing Freedom Party of Austria (FPO) throughout the entire post-WWII period, but not before WWII. We can exclude other channels that may have affected post-war elections, including differences in US and Soviet denazification and occupation policies, bomb attacks, Volksdeutsche refugees and suppression by other political parties. We show that extremism is transmitted through family ties and local party branches. We find that the surnames of FPO local election candidates in 2015 in the former US zone are more prevalent in 1942 phonebook data (Reichstelefonbuch) of the former Soviet zone compared to other parties. Details: Dresden, Germany: Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute, 2016. 58p. Source: Internet Resource: CESifo Working Paper No. 5799: Accessed march 16, 2016 at: https://www.cesifo-group.de/ifoHome/publications/working-papers/CESifoWP/CESifoWPdetails?wp_id=19190307 Year: 2016 Country: Austria URL: https://www.cesifo-group.de/ifoHome/publications/working-papers/CESifoWP/CESifoWPdetails?wp_id=19190307 Shelf Number: 138259 Keywords: Extremism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Terrorism

Author: Ubaydi, Muhammad Title: The group that calls itself a state : understanding the evolution and challenges of the Islamic State Summary: In an attempt to paint a more complete picture of the Islamic State (IS), this report identifies key areas where the IS has shown strength, learning, and adaptation. This report also highlights key areas of weakness, mistake, and failure. In doing so, the reader should be well aware that this product provides such an overview with the explicit understanding that there is more to learn in each of these areas. The report proceeds as follows. The first section traces the historical evolution of the group, with emphasis on the fact that well executed design and an ability to take advantage of accidents led to the creation of the IS. The second section provides a very brief and preliminary comparison of the IS to other prominent militant organizations against which the United States has fought: al-Qa'ida and the Taliban. This section is followed by a third that outlines and explores the strengths and weaknesses of the IS as a whole, noting that the IS's success comes from its ability to leverage all parts of its organization to achieve maximum gain. This section also points out that, despite this success, the fact that the IS is attempting to operate across multiple functional areas will test the group's ability to adapt over time and will ultimately expose the group's shortcomings. The fourth and final section steps back to examine, at the strategic level, some of the challenges faced and opportunities available to those combating the IS. Details: West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 2014. 102p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 16, 2016 at: https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/CTC-The-Group-That-Calls-Itself-A-State-December20141.pdf Year: 2014 Country: International URL: https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/CTC-The-Group-That-Calls-Itself-A-State-December20141.pdf Shelf Number: 138260 Keywords: Extremism Extremist Groups ISIS Islamic State Radical Groups Terrorism Terrorists

Author: International Crisis Group Title: Exploiting Disorder: al-Qaeda and the Islamic State Summary: The Islamic State (IS), al-Qaeda-linked groups, Boko Haram and other extremist movements are protagonists in today's deadliest crises, complicating efforts to end them. They have exploited wars, state collapse and geopolitical upheaval in the Middle East, gained new footholds in Africa and pose an evolving threat elsewhere. Reversing their gains requires avoiding the mistakes that enabled their rise. This means distinguishing between groups with different goals; using force more judiciously; ousting militants only with a viable plan for what comes next; and looking to open lines of communication, even with hardliners. Vital, too, is to de-escalate the crises they feed off and prevent others erupting, by nudging leaders toward dialogue, inclusion and reform and reacting sensibly to terrorist attacks. Most important is that action against "violent extremism" not distract from or deepen graver threats, notably escalating major- and regional-power rivalries. The reach of "jihadists" (a term Crisis Group uses reluctantly but that groups this report covers self-identify with; a fuller explanation for its use is on page 2) has expanded dramatically over the past few years. Some movements are now powerful insurgent forces, controlling territory, supplanting the state and ruling with a calibrated mix of coercion and co-option. Little suggests they can be defeated by military means alone. Yet, they espouse, to varying degrees, goals incompatible with the nation-state system, rejected by most people in areas affected and hard to accommodate in negotiated settlements. Most appear resilient, able to adapt to shifting dynamics. The geography of crisis today means similar groups will blight many of tomorrow's wars. IS has reshaped the jihadist landscape: its strategy bloodier than that of al-Qaeda, from which it split in 2013; its declared caliphate across much of Iraq and Syria and grip on a Libyan coastal strip; thousands of foreigners and dozens of movements enlisted; its attacks in the Muslim world and the West. Fighting on multiple fronts - against Iran's allies, Sunni Arab regimes and the West - it has woven together sectarian, revolutionary and anti-imperialist threads of jihadist thought. Its leadership is mostly Iraqi but the movement is protean: millenarian and local insurgent; to some a source of protection, to others of social mobility and yet others of purpose; with strands aiming to consolidate the caliphate, take Baghdad or even Mecca, or lure the West into an apocalyptic battle. Primarily, though, its rise reflects recent Iraqi and Syrian history: Sunni exclusion and anomie after the disastrous U.S invasion; harsh treatment under Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki; and the brutality of President Bashar al-Assad's regime and its allies. Any response must factor in IS's many faces. But mostly it needs to address Sunni suffering in the Levant and the dangerous sense of victimisation that has helped spawn across the Sunni Arab world. In part obscured by IS's rise, al-Qaeda has evolved. Its affiliates in the Maghreb, Somalia, Syria and Yemen remain potent, some stronger than ever. Some have grafted themselves onto local insurrections, displaying a degree of pragmatism, caution about killing Muslims and sensitivity to local norms. Around the Lake Chad Basin, Boko Haram, the latest in a string of revivalist movements rooted in the marginalised political economy and structural violence of northern Nigeria, has morphed from isolated sect to regional menace, though formally joining IS has changed little about it. Movements of different stripes - the largely nationalist Afghan Taliban, resurgent as foreign troops draw down from Afghanistan, and Pakistani groups including sectarian movements, tribal militants fighting the central state and Kashmir- or Afghanistan-focused elements aligned to its military establishment - comprise an evolving South Asian jihadist scene. The roots of this expansion defy generic description. Patterns of radicalisation vary from country to country, village to village, individual to individual. Autocrats, political exclusion, flawed Western interventions, failing governance, closing avenues for peaceful political expression, the distrust of the state in neglected peripheries, traditional elites' declining authority and the lack of opportunity for growing youth populations have all played their part. So, too, has the dwindling appeal of other ideologies, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood's peaceful political Islam - jihadists' main ideological competitor - diminished by President Muhammed Morsi's ouster and the subsequent crackdown in Egypt. Proselytising of intolerant strands of Islam has, in places, helped prepare the ground. The sectarian currents coursing through much of the Muslim world both are aggravated by IS and give it succour. But if roots are complex, the catalyst is clear enough. The descent of most of the 2011 Arab revolutions into chaos has opened enormous opportunity for extremists. Movements have gathered force as crises have festered and evolved, as money, weapons and fighters flow in, as violence escalates. Mounting enmity between states means regional powers worry less about extremists than about traditional rivals, leverage the fight against IS against other enemies or quietly indulge jihadists as proxies. Especially in the Middle East, jihadists' expansion is more a product of instability than its primary driver; is due more to radicalisation during crises than beforehand; and owes more to fighting between their enemies than to their own strengths. Rarely can such a movement gather force or seize territory outside a war zone or collapsed state. Geopolitics hinders a coherent response. The starting point should be to dial back the Saudi-Iranian rivalry that drives Sunni and Shia extremism, deepens crises across the region and is among the gravest threats to international peace and security today. Easing other tensions - between Turkey and Kurdish militants, for example, Turkey and Russia, conservative Arab regimes and the Muslim Brotherhood, Pakistan and India, even Russia and the West - is also essential. In Libya, Syria and Yemen, tackling jihadists requires forging new orders attractive enough to deplete their ranks and unite other forces. Of course, none of this is easy. But redoubling efforts to narrow other fault lines would be wiser than papering them over in an illusion of consensus against "violent extremism". Vital, too, is to learn from mistakes since the 9/11 (2001) attacks. Each movement, notwithstanding the links between and transnational ties of some, is distinct and locally rooted; each requires a response tailored to context. They can, however, pose similar dilemmas and provoke similar blunders. Major and regional powers and governments in areas affected should: - Disaggregate not conflate: Making enemies of non-violent Islamists, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood, prepared to accept political and religious pluralism and engage in politics is self-defeating. Also important is to distinguish movements seeking a place within the international order from those wanting to upend it. Even IS, its local branches and al-Qaeda affiliates, despite belonging to the latter category, are not monolithic. They have dedicated cores with transnational goals, but rank-and-files with diverse, mostly local motives whose loyalty can shift, and perhaps be shifted, with changing conditions. Governments should disaggregate even radical movements with an eye to ending violence, not lump others in with them looking for a fight. - Contain if no better option exists: Foreign powers should always have a viable plan for what comes next if they undertake to oust militants; the same applies to governments in their hinterlands. Today's strategy in Iraq - razing towns to defeat IS in the hope Sunni leaders in Baghdad can regain lost legitimacy through reconstruction - is unlikely either to meet Sunnis' grievances or create conditions in which they can forge a new political identity. In Libya a heavy bombardment or deployment of Western troops against IS without a wider political settlement would be a mistake, likely to deepen the chaos. In both cases, slowing military operations also carries grave risks but, without a workable alternative, is the safer option - for those contemplating going in and those in areas affected alike. - Use force more judiciously: Although force usually must be part of the response, governments have been too quick to go to war. Movements with roots in communities, tapping genuine grievances and sometimes with foreign backing are hard to extirpate, however unappealing their ideology. Wars in Somalia and Afghanistan show the shortfalls of defining enemies as terrorists or violent extremists and of combining efforts to build centralised state institutions with military action against them absent a wider political strategy that includes reconciliation. Nor can Russia's scorched-earth approach in Chechnya - even leaving aside the human cost - be replicated in areas affected today, given porous borders, collapsed states and proxy warfare. - Respect rules: Too often military action against extremists helps them recruit or leaves communities caught between their harsh rule and indiscriminate operations against them. Jihadists' ability to offer protection against predation by regimes, other militias or foreign powers is among their greatest assets, usually more central to their success than ideology. While often guilty of atrocities, they fight in conflicts in which all sides violate international humanitarian law. Recovering the rulebook must be a priority. - Curb targeted killings: Drone strikes can, in places, hinder groups' operations and ability to hit Western interests and their leaders' movements. But they feed resentment against local governments and the West. Movements weather the deaths of leaders, and the replacements that emerge are often harder-line. Foreseeing the impact of killings is hard in a reasonably stable order; doing so amid urban warfare and jihadist infighting - with al-Qaeda and others confronting IS - is impossible. Even leaving aside questions of secrecy, legality and accountability, targeted killings will not end the wars jihadists fight in or decisively weaken most movements. - Open lines of communication: Notwithstanding the difficulties, governments should be more willing to talk, even with radicals. Opportunities to engage in ways that might have de-escalated violence - with some Taliban and al-Shabaab leaders, Boko Haram and Ansar al-Sharia in Libya, for example - have been lost. The decision whether a group is irreconcilable rests with its leaders not governments. Although policy-makers can entertain no illusions about the nature of the IS and al-Qaeda top commands, opportunities to open unofficial, discreet lines of communication, through community leaders, non-state mediators or others, are usually worth pursuing, particularly on issues of humanitarian concern, where there may be shared interest. - Narrow the "countering violent extremism" (CVE) agenda: As a corrective to post-9/11 securitised policies, the CVE agenda, pioneered mostly by development actors, is valuable; so, too, are recognising the underlying conditions that can, in places, enable extremists' recruitment and shifting funds from military spending to development aid. But re-hatting as CVE activities to address "root causes", particularly those related to states' basic obligations to citizens - like education, employment or services to marginalised communities - may prove short-sighted. Casting "violent extremism", a term often ill-defined and open to misuse, as a main threat to stability risks downplaying other sources of fragility, delegitimising political grievances and stigmatising communities as potential extremists. Governments and donors must think carefully what to label CVE, further research paths of radicalisation and consult widely across the spectrum of those most affected. - Invest in conflict prevention: IS's and al-Qaeda's recent expansion injects new urgency into prevention, both during crises, to halt their radicalisation, and upstream. Any further breakdown in the belt running from West Africa to South Asia is likely to attract an extremist element - whether these movements provoke crises themselves or, more likely, profit from their escalation. Although generic prescriptions are of limited value, nudging leaders toward more inclusive and representative politics, addressing communities' grievances and measured responses to terrorist attacks usually make sense. Overall, in other words, preventing crises will do more to contain violent extremists than countering violent extremism will do to prevent crises. The past quarter-century has seen waves of jihadist violence: a first in the early 1990s, when volunteers from the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan joined insurrections elsewhere; a second pioneered by al-Qaeda culminating in the 9/11 attacks; and a third sparked by the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Today's fourth wave is the most perilous yet. Partly this is thanks to IS's territorial control and ideological innovation - its tapping of both local Sunni and wider anti-establishment discontent. Mostly, though, it is dangerous because of the currents propelling it, particularly the Middle East's upheaval and fraying state-society relations there and elsewhere. World leaders' concern is well-founded: IS's attacks kill their citizens and threaten their societies' cohesion. They face enormous pressure to act. But they must do so prudently. Missteps - whether careless military action abroad; crackdowns at home; subordinating aid to counter-radicalisation; casting the net too wide; or ignoring severer threats in a rush to fight "violent extremism" - risk aggravating those deeper currents and again playing into jihadists' hands. Details: Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2016. 62p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 22, 2016 at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/exploiting-disorder-al-qaeda-and-the-islamic-state.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/exploiting-disorder-al-qaeda-and-the-islamic-state.pdf Shelf Number: 138368 Keywords: al-Qaeda Extremist Groups ISIS Islamic State Jihadists Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Violent Extremism Violent Extremists

Author: Kessels, Eelco Title: Countering Violent Extremism and Development Assistance: Identifying Synergies, Obstacles, and Opportunities Summary: A consensus is building that violent extremism and terrorism are both international security and development issues. It is well documented that economic and social development are better attained in the absence of violent conflict. Furthermore, although poverty does not have a direct causal relationship with violent extremism and terrorism, poorer countries are the most affected by terrorism. Beyond socioeconomic challenges, a lack of hope and future prospects, real or perceived marginalization and sociopolitical exclusion, and weak governance and rule of law are considered conducive to the spread of terrorism and challenging to sustainable development. Indeed, Sustainable Development Goal (SDG)16, one of the United Nations - supported set of targets related to international development, focuses on the promotion of peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, the provision of access to justice for all, and the building of effective, accountable, and representative institutions at all levels. Moreover, violent extremism and terrorism are direct threats to development as they impact economic stability, tourism, and the human security and freedom of citizens, including their freedom from physical threat, freedom of religion, and freedom of expression. Lastly, violent extremism is increasingly part of the context in which development organizations operate, with violent extremist groups impeding, endangering, and diverting the delivery of development assistance and aid services. In certain cases, terrorism and violent extremism are the primary factors contributing to the need for continued assistance. Details: Washington, DC: Global Center on Cooperative Security, 2016. 17p. Source: Internet Resource; Policy Brief: Accessed March 24, 2016 at: http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Feb-2016-CVE-and-Development-policy-brief.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Feb-2016-CVE-and-Development-policy-brief.pdf Shelf Number: 138408 Keywords: Development Assistance Extremism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Terrorism Violent Extremists

Author: Anti-Defamation League Title: The ISIS Impact on the Domestic Islamic Extremist Threat: Homegrown Islamic Extremism 2009-2015 Summary: In 2015, 80 U.S. residents were linked to terror plots and other activity motivated by Islamic extremist ideology. They were either arrested, charged or otherwise publicly identified for their involvement in crimes ranging from providing support, attempting to fund or traveling to join terrorist groups abroad, or planning or assisting in plots here at home. This is a level of activity by U.S. residents inspired by foreign terrorist organizations never before seen. The 2015 numbers - up 180% from 2014 - are a result of a confluence of global trends, technological advances and the constant tide of terrorist messages and propaganda. In 2015 for the first time, nearly as many Americans were killed by domestic Islamic extremists as by white supremacists. And the spike in arrests and violence does not seem to be confined to 2015. In the first month of 2016, at least 6 U.S. residents were linked criminal activity motivated by Islamic extremist ideologies. Following on the heels of the record-breaking number of terror related arrests in 2015, these new arrests further underscore the persistent nature of the threat. Ongoing unrest in the Middle East, particularly in relation to the ongoing Syrian civil war, continued to provide opportunities for terrorist organizations to operate and gain strength. As in 2014, the majority of the U.S. residents linked to terror in 2015 supported the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS, also known as IS or ISIL), which is based in Syria and Iraq and has affiliates in a number of other countries including Egypt, Libya and Afghanistan. Meanwhile, ISIS and other terrorist groups continue to take advantage of technology to mobilize followers, spread their messages and expand their influence worldwide. The internet and social media sites in particular, remain a pivotal element of the modern radicalization process. Online social interactions facilitate the spread of extremist messages - making them available to almost anyone, virtually anywhere - and create a climate where susceptible individuals are simultaneously targeted by recruiters and are able to develop remote networks that reinforce their burgeoning extremist allegiances. Understanding the progression of U.S. residents engaged in activity motivated by Islamic extremist ideology can provide valuable insights into future security challenges. Details: New York: Anti-Defamation League, 2016. 27p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 25, 2016 at: http://www.adl.org/assets/pdf/combating-hate/CR_4473_HomegrownExtremismReport-2009-2015_web2.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: http://www.adl.org/assets/pdf/combating-hate/CR_4473_HomegrownExtremismReport-2009-2015_web2.pdf Shelf Number: 138415 Keywords: Extremist Groups Extremist Violence ISIS Islamic State Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism

Author: Brett, Julian Title: The Evaluation Study: Lessons learned from Danish and other international efforts on Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) in development contexts Summary: This evaluation study collates lessons being learned from Danish efforts and those of other development actors on Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) that can inform evidence based policy making and increase shared understanding on CVE-related programming in development contexts. The study is based on the premise that CVE concerns policies and actions designed to prevent individuals from engaging in violence associated with radical political, social cultural and religious ideologies and groups. As such, it forms part of the broader response to countering terrorism. The study notes that, while violent extremism is clearly a global problem, it is developing countries that bear the brunt of its social and economic costs. In the countries most affected, it increases insecurity, has links to organised crime, lowers investment and increases the costs of economic activity, destroys infrastructure, and can cause significant human displacement and migration. The foreign fighter phenomenon, whereby nationals from one country join extremist movements in another, is a significant factor fuelling conflict. With many of these individuals coming from developing countries, preventing and mitigating radicalisation and violent extremism is becoming a development priority. The study provides an overview of current thinking on CVE and the key challenges being faced. The central feature of this is that radicalisation processes are individual and include a range of push, pull and enabling or facilitating factors. Push factors are the political, socio-economic and cultural conditions that favour the propagation of extremist ideologies and narratives. Pull factors are the personal rewards that embarking on an extremist cause may confer. These may include financial and other material benefits and social status. Enabling factors relate to the radicalisation process and include social networks and the activities of motivators who groom potential recruits. It follows that, to be successful, CVE initiatives need to address in a holistic way the particular set of factors affecting the individual or group identified as being at risk. In non-permissive environments, this is likely to be particularly challenging. Details: Copenhagen: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, 2015. 55p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 29, 2016 at: http://tanacopenhagen.com/evaluation-study-on-cve/ Year: 2015 Country: Denmark URL: http://tanacopenhagen.com/evaluation-study-on-cve/ Shelf Number: 138466 Keywords: Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Violent Extremism

Author: Phillips, Peter J. Title: Geographic Profiling of Lone Wolf Terrorists: The Application of Economics, Game Theory and Prospect Theory Summary: This paper presents an economic analysis of the choices made by lone wolf terrorists. Using RAND-MIPT data about the fatalities that are inflicted by different attack methods, the paper develops an analysis on a foundation of orthodox utility theory and Markowitz-Tobin approximations. This approach permits a computable opportunity set within a risk-reward or mean-variance framework. Optimal choices can be determined using the Markowitz quadratic programming technique. The framework may provide a useful foundation for an economic perspective on 'offender profiling' applied within a terrorism context. Mapping attack methods into mean-variance space provides a more definitive categorisation of the riskiness of attack methods from the terrorist's perspective and suggests the possibility of identifying the terrorist's revealed risk preference. Inferences about the unknown offender may be drawn that complement other aspects of the investigative process. One of the key challenges of law enforcement is drawing inferences about the offender's location and the location of potential targets. Superimposing a game theoretical payoff matrix over a geographic location where payoffs are partially informed by the terrorist's choices and risk preference may contribute another, economic, perspective to this part of the law enforcement process. Prospect theory may also contribute useful insights into the geographical profiling problem. Details: Toowoomba, QLD: University of Southern Queensland - Faculty of Business, 2014. 19p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 29, 2016 at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2468272 Year: 2014 Country: International URL: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2468272 Shelf Number: 138469 Keywords: Extremist Groups Extremists Geographic Profiling Lone Wolf Terrorists Offender Profiling Radicalization Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Pinheiro, Alvaro de Souza Title: Knowing Your Partner: The Evolution of Brazilian Special Operations Forces Summary: If combined special operations are to be conducted effectively in the complex strategic environment of a post 9/11 world, then it is necessary to have a sound understanding of each nation's interests, defense policies, and Special Operations Forces (SOF) capabilities and practices. This monograph contributes to that goal by exploring avenues for U.S.-Brazilian SOF interaction and cooperation. It provides on an overview of Brazil, its national security and defense policy, and current relations with the United States. This monograph describes the history and present organization of Brazilian SOF and considers its future. To this end, the purpose of this monograph is to offer the U.S. Special Operations Forces (USSOF) community a portrait of Brazilian SOF in areas such as the Tri-Border Area of the Southern Cone, and other operational environments. Details: MacDill AFB F: Joint Special Operations University, 2012. 124p. Source: Internet Resource: JSOU Report 12-7: Accessed March 30, 2016 at: http://jsou.socom.mil/JSOU%20Publications/12-7%20Brazilian%20SOF.pdf Year: 2012 Country: Brazil URL: http://jsou.socom.mil/JSOU%20Publications/12-7%20Brazilian%20SOF.pdf Shelf Number: 138476 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Extremist Groups National Security Violence

Author: Smith, Brent L. Title: Identity and Framing Theory, Precursor Activity, and the Radicalization Process Summary: Research on terrorism prior to 2010 had been described as too descriptive and atheoretical. To partially address this deficiency, the current project is anchored theoretically and empirically in two of the most widely cited perspectives on social movements and the process of radicalization: role identity theory and framing theory (Snow and Machalek, 1983; Snow and McAdam, 2000; Snow, 2004; Stryker 1980). Drawing on these two overlapping perspectives, we contend that radicalization towards violence can be theorized as a process which entails a journey. Typically, this journey begins with a non- or less-radical identity and corresponding orientation, and moves toward a more radical identity and corresponding orientation. This process enhances the likelihood of employing targeted forms of violence because the prospect of desired change is seen as laying outside the realm of legitimate modes of challenge and expression within the targeted institutional arena. As implied, a key component of the process is the adoption or evolution of a radical identity. Five key concepts associated with the identity and framing perspectives are central to the analyses and findings: identity salience and pervasiveness, identity work, and diagnostic and prognostic framing. Identity salience is premised on the observation that identities are arrayed in a hierarchy, with those at the top, or most salient, in a given situation being most likely to be called on or invoked. Pervasiveness extends the notion of salience from one situation to multiple situations or encounters, such that the identity is in play in numerous situations. Identity work (Snow and Anderson 1987; Snow and McAdam 2000) encompasses a range of activities individuals and groups engage in that give meaning to themselves and others by presenting or attributing and sustaining identities congruent with individuals or group interests. Five types of identity work have been identified: (1) Engagement in group relevant demonstration acts or events, such as engaging in activities preparatory for the commission of violence; (2) arrangement and display of physical settings and props, such as flying or posting the confederate flag; (3) arrangement of appearance, such as engagement in cosmetic face work or body work; (4) selective association with other individuals and groups; and (5) identity talk, which involves not only the avowal and/or attribution of identities, but also talk relevant to framing. The two key framing concepts - diagnostic and prognostic framing - direct attention to the ways in which some issue or grievance is problematized and blame is attributed and to the call or plan for dealing with the problem. Details: Fayetteville, AR: Terrorism Research Center in Fulbright College, University of Arkansas, 2016. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed march 30, 2016 at: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/249673.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/249673.pdf Shelf Number: 138501 Keywords: Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism

Author: Great Britain. Home Office. Secretary of State Title: Counter-Extremism Strategy Summary: 1. Life in our country is based on fundamental values that have evolved over centuries, values that are supported and shared by the overwhelming majority of the population and are underpinned by our most important local and national institutions. These values include the rule of law, democracy, individual liberty, and the mutual respect, tolerance and understanding of different faiths and beliefs. 2. All people living in Britain are free to practise a faith or to decide not to follow any faith at all. We are free to build our own churches, synagogues, temples and mosques and to worship freely. We are free to establish our own faith schools and give our children - boys and girls alike - the best education possible. 3. Our values are not exclusive to Britain, nor have they been arrived at by accident, or imposed from above. They have been shaped by our history. Our acceptance of the freedom of religious choice was born of religious conflict, which taught us that the alternative to tolerance is violence and bloodshed. Our support for democracy developed over centuries as a guard against the abuse of power. Our belief in equality followed a history in which we have seen injustice, misery and damage caused by discrimination on the basis of religion, race, gender, disability or sexual orientation. 4. These values are under attack from extremists operating at a pace and scale not before seen. We will meet this challenge with a new and more assertive approach to defeat extremists. We will challenge their ideology, and defend and promote the values that unite us, not just because we are proud of these values, but because they are the means by which we have made a diverse, multi-racial, multi-faith society succeed. Our society works because we have responsibilities as well as rights. We all have the freedom to live how we choose, but in return it is vital that we respect the choices made by others. 5. The greatest current challenge comes from the global rise of Islamist extremism. We see this in the violence of Al Qa'ida (AQ) and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). The appalling attack in Tunisia in June 2015 took the lives of 38 people, 30 of them British. More than 750 UK-linked individuals have travelled to take part in the Syrian conflict. Worryingly we have seen examples of women, children and families buying into ISIL's extremist narrative and travelling to live under their brutal regime. Islamist extremists have also inspired the overwhelming majority of over 40 terrorist plots which have been disrupted since the London bombings of 2005. 6. Islamist extremism is not the only threat, as seen by the vicious actions of a number of extreme right-wing and neo-Nazi groups. In 2013 Mohammed Saleem, an 82 year old British Muslim from Birmingham, was murdered by Pavlo Lapshyn, an extreme-right fanatic who went on to bomb mosques in Walsall, Wolverhampton and Tipton. In January 2015, Zack Davies attempted to murder Dr Sarandev Bhambra in a racially-motivated attack in a supermarket in North Wales, and was sentenced to life in prison. He had claimed the attack was 'revenge for Lee Rigby', and extreme-right publications were found at his home. The Government is determined that such violence, and the Islamophobia that underpins it, will be defeated and perpetrators brought to justice. Details: London: Home Office, 2015. 41p. Source: Internet Resource: Cm 9148: Accessed March 31, 2015 at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/470088/51859_Cm9148_Accessible.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/470088/51859_Cm9148_Accessible.pdf Shelf Number: 138503 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Extremism Extremist Groups Islamic State Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism

Author: Hofmann, David Title: Warriors and Prophets: The Role of Charismatic Authority in the Radicalization Towards Violence and Strategic Operation of Terrorist Groups Summary: In the past four decades, there has been increased multi-disciplinary scholarly interest in the study of charismatic authority and charismatic leadership. However, there is little systematic theoretical and empirical examination of charismatic authority and charismatic leadership in the context of terrorism, despite widespread acknowledgement of the importance of charismatic leaders in the formation, operation, and demise of terrorist groups. This dissertation seeks to re-orient and stimulate future scholarship through an in-depth theoretical and empirical analysis of the relationship between charismatic authority, the radicalization towards violence, and strategic operation of terrorist groups. The introductory chapter grounds the subsequent research by providing working definitions of core concepts, reviewing the current literature on terrorist leadership, discussing methods to improve future analyses of terrorist leadership, before ending with a brief consideration of methods, data, and research questions. Chapter 2 is a critical examination of how the current terrorism literature misuses the social-scientific concepts of charisma and charismatic authority. After examining where and how the literature has fallen short, it provides a synthesis of the available multi-disciplinary social-scientific research on charismatic authority, identifies the three common ways in which the concept of charisma is commonly misused in terrorism studies, and explores several challenges and opportunities for future research. Building upon this foundational analysis, chapter 3 contributes to future research by presenting and justifying a theoretical framework for measuring the presence of charismatic authority in terrorist groups based upon Max Weber's seminal work on legitimate domination (herrschaft) and on theoretical insights drawn from the study of charismatic leadership in new religious movements. This framework is then applied to an illustrative case study of the relationship between the presence of charismatic authority and the radicalization towards violence within the far-right terrorist group 'The Covenant, the Sword, and the Arm of the Lord'. Chapter 4 applies the same theoretical framework to a quantitative analysis of the relationship between varying levels of the presence of charismatic authority, choice in operational tactics (e.g., weapon and target choices), and results of attack outcomes (e.g., success rates, lethality) within a sample of thirty international terrorist groups. The concluding chapter provides a synthetic summary of the findings, discusses the contributions of the dissertation to the literature, makes several policy-relevant suggestions, considers study limitations, and outlines avenues for future research. Details: Waterloo, ONT: University of Waterloo, 2015. 184p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed April 6, 2016 at: https://uwspace.uwaterloo.ca/bitstream/handle/10012/9651/Hofmann_David.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Year: 2015 Country: International URL: https://uwspace.uwaterloo.ca/bitstream/handle/10012/9651/Hofmann_David.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Shelf Number: 138583 Keywords: Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Cirlig, Carmen-Cristina Title: EU-US cooperation on justice and home affairs - an overview Summary: The United States is the key partner of the European Union in the area of justice and home affairs (JHA), including in the fight against terrorism. While formal cooperation on JHA issues between the US and the EU goes back to the 1995 New Transatlantic Agenda, it is since 2001 in particular that cooperation has intensified. Today, and for the period up until 2020, the key areas of transatlantic efforts in the JHA field are personal data protection, counter-terrorism and countering violent extremism, migration and border controls, tracing of firearms and explosives, money laundering and terrorism financing, cybercrime, drugs and information exchange. Regular dialogues at all levels, extensive operational cooperation and a series of legal agreements demonstrate the development of the transatlantic partnership on JHA. Assessments state that cooperation on law enforcement and counter-terrorism has led to hundreds of successful joint operations each year, and many foiled terrorist plots. Nevertheless, important challenges remain, in particular in light of the revelations of US mass surveillance activities and the resultant growth in EU concerns about US standards for data privacy. The European Parliament is making use of its extended powers in the JHA field, by urging a high level of data protection as well as effective and non-discriminatory means of redress for EU citizens in the US over improper use of their personal data. Details: Strasbourg: European Parliamentary Research Service, 2016. 12p. Source: Internet Resource: Briefing: Accessed April 8, 2016 at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/580892/EPRS_BRI(2016)580892_EN.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Europe URL: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/580892/EPRS_BRI(2016)580892_EN.pdf Shelf Number: 138606 Keywords: Border Security Counter-Terrorism Cybercrime Data Protection Drug Trafficking Extremist Groups Information Sharing Money Laundering Partnerships Terrorism Violent Extremism

Author: Human Rights First Title: Breaking the Cycle of Violence: Countering Antisemitism and Extremism in France Summary: The deadly terrorist attacks on November 13 in Paris, coming less than a year after the killings at Charlie Hebdo and a kosher supermarket, have focused long overdue attention on the resurgence of antisemitism and extremism in France. France has both the largest Jewish and one of the largest Muslim communities in Europe. With the rise of the xenophobic far-right National Front party, this situation is a tinderbox. "Antisemitism is unacceptable no matter where it comes from," said the Chief Rabbi of France, Haim Korsia, in July 2015. "When there is a Republic with strong values - liberty, equality, fraternity, which we often forget - we have security and serenity for everyone, including Jews." Violence targeting Jews and Jewish sites has led to a heightened sense of insecurity, and an increasing number of Jews are relocating in or outside of France for security reasons. Some observers have drawn comparisons to Europe in the 1930s. While that dark history continues to cast a cautionary shadow, as it should, the comparison is inapt. Nonetheless, antisemitism is a grave threat to human rights, and its resurgence in France should be of great concern to the French government and its allies, including the United States. Antisemitic violence harms not only its direct victims but entire Jewish communities, preventing them from being able to exercise their fundamental rights. And the potential damage is even greater: Left unchecked, antisemitism leads to the persecution of other minorities, and to an overall increase in repression and intolerance. An increase in antisemitism is a harbinger of societal breakdown. This report analyzes the nature and extent of antisemitism in France and presents recommendations for combating it by promoting tolerance and inclusiveness. Based on public information and interviews with a range of government officials, civil society representatives, and academic experts, the report examines this problem within broader and interrelated phenomena, including the ascendancy of the far-right party the National Front, mounting anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim sentiment, the spread of Islamic extremism, and the increasing alienation of many Muslims in France. While the report assesses spikes in antisemitic incidents related to developments in the Middle East, it focuses on France and the domestic dynamics contributing to this problem. However, we see France as a test case for the plight of Jews on the continent because the pertinent trends there also exist in other European countries. Details: New York: Human Rights First, 2016. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 16, 2016 at: http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/HRF-Breaking-the-Cycle-final.pdf Year: 2016 Country: France URL: http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/HRF-Breaking-the-Cycle-final.pdf Shelf Number: 138697 Keywords: Bias-Motivated Crimes Extremism Extremist Groups Hate Crimes Human Rights Abuses Terrorism

Author: Robinson, Linda Title: Assessment of the Politico-Military Campaign to Counter ISIL and Options for Adaptation Summary: This report assesses the campaign against the Islamic State (ISIL), focusing on the military and political lines of effort. The capabilities and motivations of the various counter-ISIL forces on the battlefield are assessed, as well as the U.S.-led efforts to provide training, equipment, advice, and assistance, including air support. While the campaign has degraded ISIL by targeting leadership and retaking a portion of territory, achieving lasting defeat of ISIL will be elusive without local forces capable of holding territory. Successful conclusion of the campaign will require significantly increased effort on two fronts. First, more-comprehensive training, advising, and assisting will be required to create more-capable, coordinated indigenous forces of appropriate composition and enable them to regain and hold territory. Second, political agreements must be forged to resolve key drivers of conflict among Iraqis and Syrians. Without these elements, resurgent extremist violence is likely. Many factors complicate the prospects for success, including sectarian divisions in Iraq, Iranian support for Shia militias in Iraq and Syria, the Syrian civil war, and Russian intervention to support the besieged regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. However, the Syrian regime also lacks sufficient competent local forces and is heavily reliant on external militia support. The government in Iraq, led by Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, has pledged decentralization efforts to address Sunni concerns, but lacks sufficient Shia support to enact them. This report offers recommendations for a more comprehensive advisory approach, emphasizing the political line of effort, and achieving synergy between the military and political efforts. Key Findings U.S. Efforts to Bolster Counter-ISIL Forces Have Achieved Limited Results - The advisory effort was circumscribed by location, unit, and function. Lack of advisers at the operational level in Iraq and lack of support to Syrian opposition fighters limited effectiveness of indigenous forces. - The training effort was also limited: Some 20,000 Iraqi army and Peshmerga forces were trained in 18 months, including 2,000 Iraqi special operations personnel. Efforts to arm and train Sunni tribes were halting. Anti-ISIL Forces Suffer from Capability Gaps and Lack of Coordination Among Disparate Forces - Iraqi's military crumbled after the 2014 ISIL offensive due to cumulative weaknesses. - Iraq's Counter Terrorism Service carried the brunt of the fighting, suffering extensive casualties and materiel losses. - Shia militias, some of them advised and supported by Iran, were not integrated with the overall military effort. Effective command and control of the overall effort was lacking. - In Syria, most territory was retaken by the Syrian Kurdish militia, and other efforts such as the New Syrian Forces were inadequate in numbers and capability. Coordination was also lacking among Syrian forces. Detailed Political Strategies to Resolve Underlying Conflicts Were Not Developed and Not Synchronized with the Military Effort for Maximum Effect - The Iraqi government under Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi articulated proposals to address Sunni concerns, but insufficient Shia support was provided to implement them. U.S. senior-level engagement with Abadi was also limited. - No overarching Syria strategy was developed. Relying on Syrian Kurds has escalated tensions with Turkey dramatically and created concern among Syrian Arabs. Recommendations - More comprehensive advisory support from senior echelons through the brigade level to increase coordination of forces, morale, and leadership. - A long-term training and equipping effort will be required to create capable indigenous security forces that incorporate sufficient Sunnis. - The successful support to Iraq's Counter Terrorism Service provides a replicable model. - An unconventional warfare approach may regain Mosul and Raqqa from ISIL with less material damage by leveraging internal discontent and underground forces. - Syria's counter-ISIL effort cannot succeed in seizing and holding key terrain without Syrian Arabs; their support may require unified effort with the counter-Assad campaign. - Increased materiel aid to anti-Assad forces including tube-launched, optically tracked, wireless guided weapon systems and surface-to-air missiles may preserve the moderate opposition and create leverage in negotiating a transition under the Geneva terms. - The Abadi government and Shia parties should craft proposals with international support to resolve the political drivers of conflict in Iraq. Visible, high-level U.S. support to such detailed political proposals may include linkage with military support. - The United States should elevate its focus on advisory support to indigenous forces, not just eliminating ISIL leadership and resources. It should, above all, prioritize the political line of effort, backed by military measures. Syrian opposition fighters may become increasingly radicalized in the absence of greater U.S. commitment and coordination. U.S. allies have backed disparate opposition groups, increasing the fragmentation and ineffectiveness of the Syrian opposition. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2016. 92p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 2, 2016 at: http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1290.html Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1290.html Shelf Number: 138893 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Extremist Groups ISIS Islamic State Radical Groups Terrorist

Author: Human Rights Watch Title: "We Feel We Are Cursed": Life under ISIS in Sirte, Libya Summary: In February 2015 the extremist armed group Islamic State (also known as ISIS) began taking over the Mediterranean port city of Sirte, Libya. By the following August ISIS had turned Sirte into its largest stronghold outside of Iraq and Syria. This report documents serious crimes committed by ISIS in Sirte including the executions of 49 people the group accused of "spying," "sorcery," and "insulting God." "We Feel We Are Cursed," based on research including interviews with 45 Libyans who lived under ISIS in Sirte, details how the group imposed its severe interpretation of Sharia (Islamic law) on all aspects of life. Meanwhile, ISIS has failed to provide basic necessities to the local population, diverting food, medicine, fuel, and cash, along with homes of residents who fled, to its fighters and functionaries. With war-wracked Libya's institutions in near-collapse, countries able to exercise criminal jurisdiction should take immediate steps to apprehend and prosecute those responsible for atrocities by ISIS and other parties. The International Criminal Court should prioritize an investigation of ongoing serious crimes in Libya as well. The United Nations Human Rights Council should appoint an independent expert to document serious, ongoing abuses in Libya. The Security Council should impose sanctions on those found responsible for serious crimes in Libya while ensuring appropriate due process. International parties have repeatedly failed to act on their promises to identify and punish the perpetrators of serious crimes in Libya. Continued failure to act will result in more horrific crimes by groups including ISIS. Details: New York: HRW, 2016. 47p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 8, 2016 at: https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/libya0516web_1.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Libya URL: https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/libya0516web_1.pdf Shelf Number: 139336 Keywords: Extremist Groups Human Rights Abuses ISIS Islamic State Radical Groups Terrorists

Author: Kessels, Eelco Title: Violent Extremism and Instability in the Greater Horn of Africa: An Examination of Drivers and Responses Summary: This report is part of a program implemented by the Global Center, supported by the U.S. Department of State, and aimed at understanding and strengthening capacities to prevent and counter violent extremism in the Greater Horn of Africa. It focuses on a subset of countries in the region - Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda. In short, this report aims to - provide an easily accessible overview of the Greater Horn's regional and national trends and drivers of violent extremism and related sources of insecurity - identify relevant actors and describe their responses aimed at preventing and countering violent extremism, and - highlight entry points for developing holistic strategies on countering violent extremism (CVE) inclusive of governmental and civil society actors that promote good governance and community-based responses to violent extremism. Details: Goshen, IN: Global Center on Cooperative Security, 2016. 80p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 9, 2016 at: http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/GCCS_VIOLENT-EXTREMISM_low_3.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Africa URL: http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/GCCS_VIOLENT-EXTREMISM_low_3.pdf Shelf Number: 139346 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Terrorism Violent Extremism

Author: Allan, Harriet Title: Drivers of Violent Extremism: Hypotheses and Literature Review Summary: Violent extremism is multi-factorial and extremely diverse: it cannot be predicted by one variable alone. For violent extremist movements to develop, and for individuals to join them, requires an alignment of situational, social/cultural, and individual factors. It is useful to conceptualise these factors in three levels, with situational factors working at the macro level (i.e. country or community-wide), social/cultural at the meso-level (i.e. affecting smaller communities or identity groups), and individual factors at the micro level. Interventions can also be conceptualised using a three-tier model, with development working at the macro level, countering violent extremism (CVE) at the meso-level, and law enforcement and specialist interventions at the micro level. While the effect of political factors - governance deficit, state failure, and grievances - is significant, social/psychological factors concerning group and individual identity are also recognised as important. Although the evidence is mixed, on balance the literature shows that blocked participation can create grievances which may be harnessed to promote extremist violence. Civil society may be crucial in countering extremism. However, under oppression some organisations may also be drawn to violent responses. Religion and ethnicity have been recognised as powerful expressions of individual and group identity. There is robust evidence that radicalisation is a social process and that identity is a key factor in why individuals become involved in violent movements. Psychological research is beginning to examine how identity formation can become 'maladaptive' and whether certain cognitive 'propensities' can combine to create a 'mindset' that presents a higher risk. Although most violent extremists are young men, there is little convincing research to suggest that ideals of masculinity and honour play a significant role in causing violent extremism. More generally, gender issues do not appear to be significant. Education has a minor and/or largely unsubstantiated influence, and there is little evidence that certain types of education (e.g. faith-based) increase the risk of radicalisation, and research shows that the problem of madrassa-based radicalisation has been significantly overstated. Indeed, some research suggests that religious training can be a protective factor. The findings on the relationship between education, employment, poverty and radicalisation are mixed. However, in a departure from earlier studies which identified the absence of any causal or statistical relationship between poverty and transnational terrorism, this study recognises the relevance of economic factors in the context of broad-based violent extremist groups. In conflict situations involving violent extremist groups (as opposed to terrorism directed against the West), socio-economic discrimination and marginalisation do appear to partly explain why extremist groups are able to recruit support in large numbers. However, because poverty may be a side-effect of some other cause, it is not possible to isolate it as a cause of violent extremism. In a number of contexts, extremist groups have proven able to deliver services through which they gain support and legitimacy. While the failure of the state to provide security and justice may not be a necessary factor in the development of violent extremism, failed and failing states are often breeding grounds for extremist activity. The perceived victimisation of fellow Muslims can be instrumentalised by leaders of Islamist violent extremist groups as a justification for extremist violence, although the use of a narrative of oppression to justify violence and recruit and motivate supporters is near-universal among violent extremist groups. Details: London: Royal United Services Institute, 2015. 65p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 9, 2016 at: http://r4d.dfid.gov.uk/pdf/outputs/Misc_Gov/Drivers_of_Radicalisation_Literature_Review.pdf Year: 2015 Country: International URL: http://r4d.dfid.gov.uk/pdf/outputs/Misc_Gov/Drivers_of_Radicalisation_Literature_Review.pdf Shelf Number: 139347 Keywords: Extremist Groups Muslims Radical Groups Radicalism Terrorism Violent Extremism

Author: Hallowell, Beth Title: Mixed Messages: How the Media Covers "Violent Extremism" and What You Can Do About It Summary: Every day, the U.S. news consumer is bombarded with images of spectacular extremist violence and increasingly aggressive and bellicose rhetoric from politicians and pundits. This coverage warrants a close look, as public discourse sinks to new lows in justifying violence against entire racial and religious groups. In this public conversation, the stakes are high; lives are on the line. How is the media helping or hurting our public discussion about political violence? What are they covering when they cover extremism? Ninety percent of the time they also mention Islam, even when it's not part of the events covered, and three-quarters of the time journalists report on violent responses to conflict. And they also amplify voices promoting and stories depicting military intervention far more than peace building or nonviolent resistance to violent extremism - solutions to conflict that research has shown are more effective. How can the U.S. public be expected to do anything but support further military intervention in the Middle East and other Muslim-majority countries, given this framework for covering violent extremism? In Mixed Messages, the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) shares the results of its original content analysis of three months of media coverage of extremism sampled from 20 U.S. news outlets. We sampled articles from 15 national media outlets as well as five major "influencer" outlets that reach a high-level audience of policymakers and government staff. Details: Philadelphia: American Friends Service Committee, 2016. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 11, 2016 at: http://afsc.org/sites/afsc.civicactions.net/files/documents/Mixed%20Messages_WEB.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: http://afsc.org/sites/afsc.civicactions.net/files/documents/Mixed%20Messages_WEB.pdf Shelf Number: 139388 Keywords: Discrimination Extremist Groups Media Muslims Radical Groups Terrorism Terrorists Violent Extremism

Author: Mercy Corps Title: Investing in Iraq's Peace: How Good Governance Can Diminish Support for Violent Extremism Summary: According to new Mercy Corps research, the success of armed groups in Iraq - such as the Islamic State (ISIS) - is rooted less in deep-seated sectarianism than in poor governance. Where the government is perceived to be unjust, support for non-state armed actors among marginalized groups is high. But support for groups like ISIS can shift quickly and dramatically when public perceptions of government institutions and services improve. Forging a just, peaceful future for Iraq will require a comprehensive good governance approach. Building on a series of nationwide public opinion surveys between 2013 and 2015, and in-depth interviews with Iraqi citizens, youth, internally displaced persons (IDPs), civil society leaders, government officials, and activists, this report finds that improving governance in Iraq will require new partnerships with civil society. The timing has never been better: civil society is gaining acceptance in Iraq and is increasingly seen as bridging the gap between citizens and government. But the clock is ticking. The rise of sectarian militias will likely present new challenges to the future of a cohesive state. Donor support for civil society and good governance in Iraq is waning. Meanwhile, popular goodwill toward the current government may diminish if meaningful reforms are not implemented. In popular demonstrations throughout the country, thousands of Iraqi youth have, in recent months, peacefully advocated for an end to sectarianism and corruption. Iraq must capitalize on this energy, or it risks antagonizing a new generation. Key findings 1. Poor governance that results in injustice, real or perceived, is a key driver of conflict: Iraq's instability is rooted in poor governance, not in ancient group rivalries. When marginalized groups begin to believe the government is going to be more responsive and fair, support for armed violence decreases. 2. While sectarianism is often incorrectly credited for being the main source of conflict, it is nonetheless a threat to future stability: As the violent conflict continues or escalates, sectarian divisions have the potential to increase as political opportunists-both domestic and foreign - stoke tensions to gain power. 3. Civil society is vital to improving governance and advancing reconciliation: Though civil society is playing a critical role bridging the gap between citizens and government, the key question is whether, in the face of rising expectations and frustrations, it can direct new energies into nonviolent change. 4. Iraqi youth, too often side-lined, are of vital importance to governance and civil society efforts: Iraq's political, social and economic future hinges on its youth. Building a peaceful future for Iraq will require empowering the country's youth and positively channeling their energies. Recommendations - Build a stronger cooperative relationship between civil society and government on key policy issues by formalizing relations with civil society actors and encouraging donors to commit multi-year investments in Iraqi civil society. - Improve the capacity of local actors to play an active role in good governance by engaging civil society partners more deeply in informing programs, and facilitating stronger relationships between youth activities and civil society. - Avert further conflict by ensuring governance investments are long-term and informed by local feedback, strengthening Iraq's Reconciliation Committee, and continuing to improve government responsiveness and accountability. Details: Portland, OR: Mercy Corps, 2016. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 11, 2016 at: https://d2zyf8ayvg1369.cloudfront.net/sites/default/files/Investing%20in%20Iraqs%20Peace_Final%20Report.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Iraq URL: https://d2zyf8ayvg1369.cloudfront.net/sites/default/files/Investing%20in%20Iraqs%20Peace_Final%20Report.pdf Shelf Number: 139390 Keywords: Extremist Groups ISIS Islamic State Radical Groups Terrorism Violent Extremism

Author: Dzhekova, Rositsa Title: Understanding Radicalisation: Review of Literature Summary: The phenomena of radicalisation today develop and change at high speed, with their extreme forms manifested globally. The destructive dimensions of (violent) Islamist or right-wing radicalisation have become dramatically visible in Europe posing serious challenges to European societies. This literature review presents key academic conceptualisations and debates on the phenomena of radicalisation that might lead to violence. It deals with three different forms of radicalisation, including Islamist radicalisation, right-wing as well as left-wing radicalisation. In addition, an overview is provided of current academic debates regarding the role of the internet in radicalisation processes. The review is intended to help social scientists who are entering the field of radicalisation studies navigate through the complexity of underlying processes and factors that lead different individuals or groups to adopt radical ideas and commit acts of violence. The review is particularly relevant for countries of Central and Eastern Europe where radicalisation remains understudied, although most countries in the region share histories of extremism and political radicalism. Details: Sofia, Bulgaria: Center for the Study of Democracy, 2016. 85p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 13, 2016 at: http://www.csd.bg/artShow.php?id=17560 Year: 2016 Country: Europe URL: http://www.csd.bg/artShow.php?id=17560 Shelf Number: 139409 Keywords: Extremism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Shentov, Ognian Title: Radicalisation in Bulgaria: Threats and Trends Summary: The phenomena of radicalisation today develop and change at high speed, with their extreme forms manifested globally. The destructive dimensions of (violent) Islamist or right-wing radicalisation have become dramatically visible in Europe posing serious challenges to European societies at large. This report aims to address a knowledge gap with regard to how and to what extent internationally observed radicalisation processes are manifested in Bulgaria. Four different forms of radicalisation are investigated, including Islamist radicalisation, right-wing and left-wing radicalisation, as well as football hooliganism. The report provides policy makers and the expert community with a systematic overview of the main risks to which the Bulgarian society is exposed, as well as of the main actors and ideas, the repertoire of actions and the groups at risk associated with radicalisation. The report outlines recommendations for improvement of the policy and institutional response with regard to radicalisation by way of monitoring and prevention measures as well as multi agency collaboration and community engagement. Details: Sophia, Bulgaria: Center for the Study of Democracy, 2015. 190p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 13, 2016 at: http://www.csd.bg/artShow.php?id=17621 Year: 2015 Country: Bulgaria URL: http://www.csd.bg/artShow.php?id=17621 Shelf Number: 139314 Keywords: Extremism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism

Author: Netherlands. Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations Title: Violent Jihad in the Netherlands: Current trends in the Islamist terrorist threat Summary: The murder of film maker Theo van Gogh in 2004 deeply shocked Dutch society. People began to realise that the ideology of violent jihad against the West, which explicitly manifested itself in the attacks on the Twin Towers on 11 September 2001, had also established a foothold in the Netherlands. Since the bomb attacks in Madrid on 11 March 2004, the threat of a terrorist attack on European soil had loomed over a number of European countries. The murder of Van Gogh on 2 November 2004 proved that the Netherlands as well had become a scene of terrorist violence. Although it was an individual assassination rather than the large-scale attack feared in the aftermath of the Madrid bombings, its background, motives and justification suggested a type of religious- inspired terrorism as propounded by Al-Qaeda since the late 20th century. It ensued that the murderer, and most other members of the extremist network to which he belonged, were young Muslims born and bred in the Netherlands. While on 11 September 2001 New York was hit by an enemy from abroad and the Madrid attacks were perpetrated by a group of North African migrants, the Netherlands had to face the fact that a group of indigenous Muslims had metamorphosed into (potential) terrorists within a short period of time. At an international level, the murder of Van Gogh thrust the Netherlands into the limelight as a country which had now - after years of ethnic and religious tolerance - produced its own jihadists. The attacks on public transport in London in July 2005 by British-Pakistani Muslims, however, have shown that the Dutch situation is by no means unique and that a new phase in the threat from Islamist terrorism appears to have set in. This phase, in which the threat emanates principally from extremist European Muslims who are prepared to commit attacks in their own country, is hereinafter referred to as European jihad. This new phase is in line with developments in Islamist terrorism during recent years. In December 2002 the AIVD pointed out that the future threat would manifest itself in and emanate from the West, and that it would possess a more endogenous character. There were indications that radical Muslims brought up in Europe were beginning to regard Europe as a frontline for jihad and that they might proceed to perpetrating localised terrorist attacks. The attacks in Madrid, London and Amsterdam confirmed these fears. Increasing numbers of migrants' children with an Islamic background are going through a radicalisation process in Europe, which in some cases leads them to use violence. Young jihadists justify this violence by referring to the Koran - often on the basis of interpretations by radical ideologists - and view themselves as prospective martyrs. In addition to the acute threat of possible terrorist attacks, the problems involved in Islamist radicalism and terrorism also represent a long-term threat, as a polarization between various ethnic-religious population groups may undermine social cohesion. In the long term this may have an undesirable effect on the democratic order in the Netherlands. The murder of Van Gogh inflamed certain interethnic and social issues in the Netherlands. The murder set in motion processes involving both positive and negative aspects as regards the threat assessment in the immediate future, the consequences of which are as yet unpredictable. One negative development is the intensification of radicalisation tendencies among sections of ethnic minorities and the indigenous population, which poses an increasing risk that groups or individuals will resort to violence. It is alarming that certain youth groups among the younger generation of Muslims in the Netherlands not only appear receptive to radicalisation, but perceive violent jihad as positive and 'cool'. A positive aspect, however, is the fact that a process of political and social consciousness-raising has set in, involving a cautious mobilisation of moderate forces in society - also among ethnic minorities - who are prepared to counteract radical and extremist tendencies. The complexity of the problem as well as the lack of organization within certain communities account partly for this initial reluctance. The shortcomings of certain spokespersons also play a part. Furthermore, fear for lack of support from the rest of Dutch society as well as uncertainty about possible repercussions which might ensue as a result of clearly establishing their position within their ethnic group, as well as in regard to their supporters, can delay or impede such initiatives. This paper describes how the threat from Islamist terrorism currently manifests itself in the Netherlands. It attempts, for instance, to answer the question of why young people born and bred in the Netherlands turn their backs on society to propagate and commit acts of violence in the name of Islam. Another question is, to what extent the situation in the Netherlands differs from that in neighbouring countries. Details: The Hague: General Intelligence and Security Service, 2006. 65p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 13, 2016 at: https://fas.org/irp/world/netherlands/violent.pdf Year: 2006 Country: Netherlands URL: https://fas.org/irp/world/netherlands/violent.pdf Shelf Number: 139419 Keywords: Extremist Groups Islamic Terrorism Radicalization Terrorism Violent Extremism Violent Jihad

Author: Kustermans, Jorg Title: Dealing with radicalization: Four reflections on Flemish radicalization policy Summary: The problems of radicalization has been an issue for European policy-makers since 2004. This report offers a number of reflections on radicalization policy for Belgium. Details: Brussels: Flemish Peace Institute, 2015. 23p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 11, 2016 at: http://www.flemishpeaceinstitute.eu/sites/vlaamsvredesinstituut.eu/files/files/reports/dealing_with_radicalization.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Belgium URL: http://www.flemishpeaceinstitute.eu/sites/vlaamsvredesinstituut.eu/files/files/reports/dealing_with_radicalization.pdf Shelf Number: 139585 Keywords: Extremism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization

Author: Williams, Michael J. Title: Evaluation of a Multi-Faceted, U.S. Community-Based, Muslim-Led CVE Program Summary: This project represents the first ever evaluation of a CVE (Countering Violent Extremism) program in the United States. The evaluation will be conducted in Montgomery County, MD, in collaboration with the community-based, Muslim-led CVE program (The World Organization for Resource Development and Education), the Montgomery County Department of Police, and the Montgomery County Office of Community Partnerships. The first phase of the project will use a multi-method evaluation design to a) understand recruitment and retention practices of participants in a multi-faceted, U.S. community-based, Muslim-led CVE program, b) identify the outcomes of participation in that program, c) assess and explore community knowledge of risk factors associated with radicalization, and individuals' natural inclinations in response to those factors, and d) identify barriers to individual help-seeking and community-law enforcement collaborations in a CVE context. What will emerge from this phase is a set of working theories that clarify the relationships among these four subcomponents and lead to enhanced CVE programming and implementation. The second phase will develop survey instruments designed to measure quantifiably each of the Phase I subcomponents. Additionally, formalized curricula (i.e., educational materials and a manual for law enforcement) will be developed regarding a) awareness of risk factors of radicalization and civic-minded responses to them, and b) training for law enforcement officers regarding ways to build effective collaborations with local Islamic communities. Additionally, the CVE program will adjust its recruitment practices, based on 'lessons learned' from Phase I. The final phase of the project will assess the effectiveness of the CVE programs' adjusted (i.e., Phase II) recruitment practices. Additionally, the CVE programs' outcomes will be tested by comparing participant involvement groups (i.e. those who have never participated vs. participated once vs. participated multiple times). Details: Atlanta: Georgia State University, 2016. 167p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 12, 2016 at: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/249936.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/249936.pdf Shelf Number: 139624 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Domestic Terrorism Extremist Groups Islamic Extremists Muslims Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Violent Extremism

Author: International Crisis Group Title: Political Conflict, Extremism and Criminal Justice in Bangladesh Summary: As the Awami League (AL) government's political rivalry with the Bangladesh National Party (BNP) reaches new heights, so has its repression. At the same time, a deeply politicised, dysfunctional criminal justice system is undermining rather than buttressing the rule of law. Heavy-handed measures are denting the government's legitimacy and, by provoking violent counter-responses, benefitting violent party wings and extremist groups alike. The government needs to recognise that it is in its interest to change course, lest it fail to either contain violent extremism or counter political threats. A key part of a more prudent course would be to de-politicise and strengthen all aspects of the criminal justice system, including the judiciary, so it can address the country's myriad law and order challenges and help stall a democratic collapse. The political conflict between the AL and BNP has resulted in high levels of violence and a brutal state response. The government's excesses against political opponents and critics include enforced disappearances, torture and extra-judicial killings. Police tasked with targeting the government's rivals and an overstretched justice system compelled to prosecute opposition leaders and activists now also face a renewed threat from violent extremists. The permissive legal environment, however, is creating opportunities for extremist outfits to regroup, manifested in the killings of secular bloggers and foreigners and attacks on sectarian and religious minorities in 2015. The government's reaction to rising extremism, including arrest and prosecution of several suspects without due process and transparency, is fuelling alienation that these groups can further exploit. Reconciling with the opposition and hence stabilising the state requires both political compromises and an end to the repressive use of law enforcement agencies and abuse of the courts. Politicising the police and using elite forces, particularly the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB), to silence political dissent, are laying the seeds of future violence. By concentrating on targeting the opposition, the police are failing to curb criminality; the prisons are overburdened by the mass arrests of opposition leaders and activists; and the judiciary, perceived as partisan for trials and sentences based on political grounds, is losing credibility. The result is a justice system that swings between two extremes: woefully slow and dysfunctional for ordinary cases and speedy, undermining due process, in politically charged ones. Any effort to reform a dysfunctional criminal justice system, including by investing in training, equipping and otherwise modernising the police, prosecution and judiciary, will be insufficient unless it is also taken out of politics. Years of partisan recruitment, promotions and postings have polarised these institutions to the point that officials no longer conceal their allegiances. Partisanship tends to determine the kinds of complaints and cases that get filed and prioritised and even informs verdicts and sentences. The problems surrounding delivery of justice are further compounded by legal mechanisms to silence civil society and prevent media scrutiny and parallel processes that undermine due process in politically charged cases. The deeply flawed International Crimes Tribunal (ICT), established in 2010 to prosecute individuals responsible for atrocities committed during the 1971 liberation war, is an important example of the dangers of using rule of law institutions for political ends. Perceptions of injustice are creating opportunities for extremist groups and fuelling political conflict. The BNP and its Jamaat-e-Islami ally marked the anniversary of the disputed 2014 elections with indiscriminately violent strikes and traffic blockades, which were matched brutally by the state. The BNP now appears less willing to resort to violence to unseat the government; its decision to re-enter the political mainstream gives the government an opportunity it should exploit by urgently resuming dialogue with the opposition. To demonstrate sincerity and as a first step, it should end use of the rule of law institutions to target opponents and silence critics. Accepting legitimate avenues of participation and dissent would also help regain some lost legitimacy and the trust of citizens in the state's provision of both justice and security. So long as there is no independent court system to arbitrate disputes fairly, the parties are likely to continue taking those disputes to the streets, but a neutral judiciary could help defuse tensions by upholding fundamental principles and preventing executive excesses. The international community can help to promote political reconciliation by, in the U.S. and EU case, using economic levers to pressure Dhaka to respect civil and political rights, and in New Delhi's by using close ties to urge the AL to allow the opposition legitimate political expression and participation. There is no time to lose. If mainstream dissent remains closed, more and more government opponents may come to view violence and violent groups as their only recourse. Details: Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2016. 37p. Source: Internet Resource: Asia Report No. 277: Accessed July 25, 2016 at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/bangladesh/277-political-conflict-extremism-and-criminal-justice-in-bangladesh.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Bangladesh URL: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/bangladesh/277-political-conflict-extremism-and-criminal-justice-in-bangladesh.pdf Shelf Number: 139829 Keywords: Extremism Extremist Groups Political Violence Radical Groups Radicalization Violence Violent Extremists

Author: Mercy Corps Title: "Motivations and Empty Promises": Voices of Former Boko Haram Combatants and Nigerian Youth Summary: Boko Haram, one of the world's deadliest armed groups, is waging an insurgency in the name of creating an Islamic caliphate. This violent conflict in Nigeria's Northeast has killed nearly 17,000 people since 2009, displaced nearly 2.2 million people, devastated thousands of communities, and slowed the economy. New Mercy Corps research investigates key motives for youth to join Boko Haram, so that government actors, donors and civil society can design responsive programming to reduce youth participation in the violence. Through this research, Mercy Corps spoke directly to the youth involved to learn why youth join or were vulnerable to forced recruitment into Boko Haram. We spoke with 47 former members of Boko Haram in Nigeria's Borno, Yobe, and Gombe states, in addition to dozens of youth who did not join, family and friends of members, and community leaders. We found that in the midst of challenges, the local strategies to prevent violence and support youth exercised by so many communities can form a strong foundation for the future of youth and stability in Northeast Nigeria. Key Findings There is no demographic profile of a Boko Haram member. Members we spoke to came from diverse backgrounds. Some had jobs, and others did not. Some had attended secular school, others Islamic school, and others had dropped out. Influence from social and business peers is a key factor in recruitment. Almost all former members cited a friend, family member, or business colleague as a factor in their joining Boko Haram. Youth see in Boko Haram an opportunity to get ahead through business support. Many youth described either accepting loans prior to joining or joining with the hope of receiving loans or capital for their mostly small, informal businesses; loans fueled their economic ambitions in an atmosphere of high inequality. Broad frustrations with government created initial community acceptance of Boko Haram. Boko Haram took advantage of deep grievances around government inadequacies and security abuses to gain a foothold in communities. About half of former members said their communities at some time generally supported the group, hoping it would bring a change in government. Local counter-narratives on the hypocrisy of Boko Haram are working. Youth who resisted joining shared a narrative of Boko Haram as a corrupt, greedy organization focused on enriching its leaders. These messages are being crafted by local religious and traditional leaders. Key Recommendations Build trust in government by addressing the needs of conflict-affected youth and communities. Prepare for comprehensive reintegration of former members. Amplify local counter-narratives that already work to prevent recruitment into Boko Haram. Develop opportunities for youth and government officials to improve communities together. Facilitate connections to role models and support family dialogue on violent extremism. Help youth achieve their ambitions, starting with increasing their access to financial and business services. Details: Portland, OR: Mercy Corps, 2016. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 2, 2016 at: https://d2zyf8ayvg1369.cloudfront.net/sites/default/files/Motivations%20and%20Empty%20Promises_Mercy%20Corps_Full%20Report_0.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Nigeria URL: https://d2zyf8ayvg1369.cloudfront.net/sites/default/files/Motivations%20and%20Empty%20Promises_Mercy%20Corps_Full%20Report_0.pdf Shelf Number: 139949 Keywords: Boko Haram Extremist Groups Extremists Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorists

Author: Human Rights Watch Title: Extreme Measures: Abuses against Children Detained as National Security Threats Summary: Conflict-related violence and the rise of extremist armed groups such as the Islamic State and Boko Haram has also brought an increase in the detention of children perceived to be "security threats." In countries embroiled in civil strife or armed conflict, children are apprehended and detained without charge for months or even years on suspicion of, or involvement in, violent activity, or due to links to non-state armed groups. Many are subjected to torture, and an unknown number have died in custody. This multi-country report looks at the detention of children perceived as a threat to national security in Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Iraq, Israel/Palestine, Nigeria, Syria, and by the United States. Human Rights Watch urges governments to immediately end all use of detention without charge for children, transfer children associated with armed groups to child protection authorities for rehabilitation, and ensure that children charged with a recognizable criminal offense are treated in accordance with international juvenile justice standards. Details: New York: HRW, 2016. 45p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 27, 2016 at: https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/crd_detained0716web_1.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/crd_detained0716web_1.pdf Shelf Number: 140056 Keywords: Child Protection Conflict-related Violence Extremist Groups Juvenile Detention National Security

Author: Gold, Zack Title: Salafi Jihadist Violence in Egypt's North Sinai: From Local Insurgency to Islamic State Province Summary: Militancy in Egypt's North Sinai governorate-a serious problem since that country's January 2011 uprising - was compounded in November 2014 when Ansar Bayt al Maqdis ("Supporters of Jerusalem", ABM), the main salafi jihadist organisation in Sinai, swore allegiance to the group that calls itself the Islamic State (IS). This Research Paper closely inspects ABM/Wilayat Sinai and ways in which the group changed over three phases of its existence: from the 2011 uprising to Morsi's 2013 ouster, from that point until the group's pledge to IS in 2014, and since the emergence of Islamic State affiliate Wilayat Sinai. This in-depth documentation is meant to serve as a case study of the impact that affiliating with IS has on local salafi jihadist groups. Details: The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2016. 44p. Source: Internet Resource: ICCT Research Paper: Accessed September 13, 2016 at: https://www.icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/ICCT-Zach-Gold-Salafi-Jihadist-Violence-in-Egypts-North-Sinai-April2016.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Egypt URL: https://www.icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/ICCT-Zach-Gold-Salafi-Jihadist-Violence-in-Egypts-North-Sinai-April2016.pdf Shelf Number: 147915 Keywords: Extremist Groups Islamic State Jihadists Terrorism

Author: Sebastian, Sofia Title: Atrocity Prevention through Dialogue: Challenges in Dealing with Violent Extremist Organizations Summary: Dialogue with violent extremist groups is a controversial practice, even when used to prevent widespread violence or atrocities. Humanitarian dialogue may serve as a crisis-mitigation instrument, offering short-term relief and civilian protection. When the risk of atrocities is remote, political dialogue can be used for structural or upstream prevention aimed at conflict resolution or addressing community grievances. Though dialogue as a peacebuilding tool has potential in any stage of a conflict, it is ideally undertaken before widespread violence occurs. However, the conditions for successful atrocity prevention through dialogue with violent extremist groups are rarely in place. Summary Various forms of dialogue have traditionally been a central mechanism in the toolbox for atrocity prevention. The utility of this noncoercive peacebuilding practice merits reconsideration as violent extremist organizations (VEOs) increasingly embrace mass violence as a means to advance their objectives. If atrocities are imminent or ongoing, dialogue may serve as a crisis-mitigation instrument, with the potential of offering short-term humanitarian relief and civilian protection. When the risk of atrocities is remote, political dialogue can be used for structural or upstream prevention aimed at conflict resolution or addressing community grievances. Despite the broadening recognition of the need to engage extremist groups through dialogue when possible, controversy continues to surround this practice. The conditions for successful atrocity prevention through dialogue with VEOs are rarely in place. Those pursuing dialogue need to gradually build trust, conduct a thorough actor mapping, and reflect on their own role and preparedness to engage. Engaging extremists presents significant risks as well, including extremists' manipulation of the dialogue to buy time for planning atrocity campaigns. Efforts to engage VEOs directly through dialogue have been inconsistent and are handled with the utmost discretion. Restrictive legislative frameworks may limit the ability to exploit opportunities for atrocity prevention through dialogue with these groups. Details: Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2016. 12p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 15, 2016 at: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR390-Atrocity-Prevention-through-Dialogue.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR390-Atrocity-Prevention-through-Dialogue.pdf Shelf Number: 147891 Keywords: Extremist Groups Radical Groups Violence Violent Extremism

Author: Ali, Abdisaid M. Title: Islamist Extremism in East Africa Summary: The growth of Salafist ideology in East Africa has challenged long established norms of tolerance and interfaith cooperation in the region. This is an outcome of a combination of external and internal factors. This includes a decades-long effort by religious foundations in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states to promulgate ultraconservative interpretations of Islam throughout East Africa's mosques, madrassas, and Muslim youth and cultural centers. Rooted within a particular Arab cultural identity, this ideology has fostered more exclusive and polarizing religious relations in the region, which has contributed to an increase in violent attacks. These tensions have been amplified by socioeconomic differences and often heavy-handed government responses that are perceived to punish entire communities for the actions of a few. Redressing these challenges will require sustained strategies to rebuild tolerance and solidarity domestically as well as curb the external influence of extremist ideology and actors. Highlights While Islamist extremism in East Africa is often associated with al Shabaab and Somalia, it has been expanding to varying degrees throughout the region. Militant Islamist ideology has emerged only relatively recently in the region-imported from the Arab world-challenging long-established norms of tolerance. Confronting Islamist extremism with heavy-handed or extrajudicial police actions is likely to backfire by inflaming real or perceived socioeconomic cleavages and exclusionist narratives used by violent extremist groups. Details: Washington, DC: Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2016. 8p. Source: Internet Resource: Africa Security Brief, No. 32: http://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/ASB32EN-Islamist-Extremism-in-East-Africa.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Africa URL: http://africacenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/ASB32EN-Islamist-Extremism-in-East-Africa.pdf Shelf Number: 145573 Keywords: Extremism Extremist Groups Islamist Extremism Radical Groups Violence Violent Extremism

Author: Canada. Public Safety Canada Title: 2016 Public Report on Terrorist Threat to Canada Summary: Threat Environment The principal terrorist threat to Canada remains that posed by violent extremists who could be inspired to carry out an attack in Canada. Violent extremist ideologies espoused by terrorist groups like Daesh and al-Qaida continue to appeal to certain individuals in Canada. As in recent years, the Government of Canada has continued to monitor and respond to the threat of extremist travellers, that is, individuals who are suspected of travelling abroad to engage in terrorism-related activity. The phenomenon of extremist travellers - including those abroad, those who return, and even those prevented from travelling - poses a range of security concerns for Canada. As of the end of 2015, the Government was aware of approximately 180 individuals with a nexus to Canada who were abroad and who were suspected of engaging in terrorism-related activities. The Government was also aware of a further 60 extremist travelers who had returned to Canada. The National Terrorism Threat Level This Report, for the first time, includes a description of Canada's National Terrorism Threat Level system. The threat level has been unchanged since October 2014; it is MEDIUM, meaning a violent act of terrorism could occur in Canada. The threat level aims to ensure a consistent understanding across the Government of the general terrorism threat to Canada. The threat level serves as a tool for government officials, including those in law enforcement, to identify risks and vulnerabilities from threats and, in turn, determine appropriate responses to prevent or mitigate a violent act of terrorism. The Global Environment The threat environment has also evolved beyond Canada's borders. Daesh has continued to dominate the landscape in the Middle East, where other terrorist groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra and Hizballah also operate. Elsewhere in the Middle East, al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has taken advantage of the civil conflict in Yemen to capture territory there and strengthen itself. This past year also saw Daesh's expansion in Africa, and Boko Haram (now rebranded as an Daesh affiliate in West Africa) continues to pose a major threat to regional stability. In South and Southeast Asia, Daesh expansionism and entrenched regional groups shaped the threat environment. Emerging Issues This Report includes a feature on emerging issues in terrorism. These issues - the role of technology in terrorism, the participation of women in terrorist activities, and use of chemical weapons by terrorist organizations - have been widely discussed in the media over the past year. They represent only a fraction of many evolving issues that make terrorism such a complex problem. Responding to the Threat Since 2002, 20 individuals have been convicted of terrorism offences under the Criminal Code. Another 21 have been charged with terrorism-related offences (including 16 since January 2015) and are either awaiting trial or have warrants outstanding for their arrest. Canada is contributing in a robust way, with more than 60 other countries, to the Global Coalition to Counter Daesh. This includes military initiatives and efforts to stem the flow of "foreign terrorist fighters," cut off Daesh's funding sources, support stabilization, and expose and counter Daesh's ideology. More broadly, Canada has maintained a Counter-Terrorism Capacity Building Program as a key part of its terrorism prevention efforts. The Government of Canada's counter-terrorism efforts to address this evolving threat continue to be guided by the twin obligations to both keep Canadians safe and safeguard fundamental Canadian values and liberties. The Terrorist Threat to Canada In October 2014, Canada suffered two terrorist attacks by lone-actors who had been inspired by extremist ideologies and radicalized to the point of violence. The attacks, in Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu and Ottawa, left two Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) personnel dead. More recently, the RCMP, working in close collaboration with domestic and international partners, took action in Strathroy, Ontario, to disrupt an imminent terrorist threat and ensure public safety. These incidents reminded Canadians that Canada is not immune to terrorism. Canada remains the target of direct threats by groups such as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (Daesh) and al-Qaida, and by individuals inspired by the violent extremist ideologies of these groups. The United States of America (U.S.) and Western Europe experienced multiple attacks in 2015. Some notable incidents included, in the U.S., attacks on police officers in Boston (June, 2015), military facilities in Chattanooga, Tennessee (July, 2015) and an office party in San Bernardino, California (December, 2015). European incidents included attacks on the offices of the magazine Charlie Hebdo and a grocery store in Paris (January, 2015), an attack on an Amsterdam-Paris train (August, 2015) and coordinated attacks directed by Daesh at several public spaces in Paris (November, 2015). In 2014 and 2015, Australia experienced three attacks - two targeting law enforcement officers in Melbourne and Sydney (September 2014, October 2015) and another targeting civilians in Sydney (December 2014). Terrorist incidents continue to occur with terrible regularity. In June 2016, 49 people were killed and 53 injured when a gunman, who may have been inspired by Daesh, opened fire at an Orlando, Florida night club. In July, 85 people were killed and hundreds more were injured when an attacker drove a truck through a crowd in Nice. There have been other attacks in Western Europe as well, for example, in Brussels, Belgium and in Rouen, France. In Turkey this past June, suicide bombers believed to be affiliated with Daesh struck Istanbul's international airport, killing 45 and injuring over 200. Globally, a few countries bear the heaviest burden of attacks and casualties, particularly during civil conflicts or where terrorist groups have taken part in insurgencies. The Global Terrorism Database for 2015 shows that terrorist activities continue to be highly concentrated. Five countries - Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, and Nigeria - sustained more than 55 per cent of all attacks that year, and five countries - Iraq, Afghanistan, Nigeria, Syria and Pakistan - sustained 74 per cent of all terrorism-related fatalities. This threat environment worldwide affects Canadians and Canadian interests. CAF personnel, government officials and private citizens are under constant threat in certain regions. In September 2015, two Canadians were kidnapped in the Philippines. Both were killed by their captors in the spring of this year. In January 2016, an al-Qaida-affiliated group based in Mali attacked a hotel in Burkina Faso, killing six Canadians. That same month, attackers linked to Daesh targeted a coffee shop in Jakarta, Indonesia, killing one Canadian. In June 2016, a Somali government minister with Canadian citizenship was killed in an al-Shabaab terrorist attack on a hotel in Mogadishu, Somalia. Also in June, 15 Nepalese security guards who protected the Embassy of Canada to Afghanistan in Kabul were killed when terrorists targeted the bus that was transporting them to work. Current Threats The Principal Threat The principal terrorist threat to Canada remains that posed by violent extremists who could be inspired to carry out an attack. Violent extremist ideologies espoused by terrorist groups like Daesh and al-Qaida continue to appeal to certain individuals in Canada. Some individuals have engaged in terrorism-related activities such as promoting violence online, radicalizing peers, recruiting and fundraising. Others may consider travelling abroad to join a terrorist group or conducting terrorist attacks themselves. Details: Ottawa: Public Safety Canada, 2016. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 30, 2016 at: https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/2016-pblc-rpr-trrrst-thrt/2016-pblc-rpr-trrrst-thrt-en.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Canada URL: https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/2016-pblc-rpr-trrrst-thrt/2016-pblc-rpr-trrrst-thrt-en.pdf Shelf Number: 140520 Keywords: Extremism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Suicide Bombings Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Great Britain. Parliament. House of Commons. Home Affairs Committee Title: Radicalisation: the counter-narrative and identifying the tipping point Summary: Key Facts - 800 UK-linked fighters are estimated to have travelled to Syria and Iraq since the conflicts began in those countries. 50% of these foreign fighters are thought to have returned. - Terrorism-related arrests in the UK were 35% higher in 2015 than in 2010. - The UK's annual counter-terrorism policing budget has risen from L594 million in 2015-16 to L670 million for 2016-17. - The Counter Terrorism Internet Referral Unit has secured the removal of more than 120,000 pieces of terrorist-related content between 2010 and 2016. On average about 100 removal requests per day contain Syria-related content, which would amount to 36,500 requests per year. - The EU Internet Referral Unit (EU IRU) made over 500 referrals in the first 16 weeks after it was established in July 2015, of which 90% were successfully removed. - Between mid-2015 and February 2016, Twitter had suspended over 125,000 accounts globally that were linked to terrorists. Google removed over 14 million videos globally in 2014 which related to all kinds of abuse. - Over 90% of Bangladeshi, Indian and Pakistani Muslims living in the UK think of themselves as British - a higher proportion than in other ethnic groups. Over 80% believe it is possible to maintain both British and other cultural/religious identities effectively. - Less than 0.5% of UK journalists are Muslim, compared to almost 5% of the national population. Details: London: House of Commons, 2016. 51p. Source: Internet Resource: HC 135: Accessed October 12, 2016 at: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmhaff/135/135.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmhaff/135/135.pdf Shelf Number: 140678 Keywords: Extremism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Acheson, Ian Title: Summary of main findings of the review of Islamist extremism in prisons, probation and youth justice Summary: 1. This summary provides an overview of the review led by Ian Acheson into Islamist extremism in prisons, probation and youth justice, namely its context, key findings and principal recommendations. 2. In September 2015 the then Secretary of State for Justice commissioned a departmental review, supported by external expertise, to:  assess the threat which Islamist Extremism (IE) and the radicalisation which sustains it pose to prisons and probation services; and  assess the capability of the National Offender Management Service (NOMS) to manage that threat. 3. The review team submitted a detailed report of their findings and recommendations to the then Secretary of State on 17 March 2016. 4. Given the nature of its content, and implications for public safety and security, the review is in the form of a classified report to the then Secretary of State. The subject matter is complex, with significant policy implications. The main findings of the review have been summarised below. 5. The then Secretary of State welcomed the review as a vital element of the MoJ's overall approach to addressing the threat presented by extremism and radicalisation in prisons and probation. Its findings will inform future policy development and operational practice, about which more will be said in the coming months. Details: London: Ministry of Justice, 2016. 18p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 15, 2016 at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/547032/acheson-review-summary-aug-2016.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/547032/acheson-review-summary-aug-2016.pdf Shelf Number: 140760 Keywords: Extremist Groups Islamist Extremists Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Parvez, Tariq Title: The Islamic State in Pakistan Summary: - The Islamic State, or Daesh, formally established its Khorasan branch for Pakistan, Afghanistan, and nearby areas in January 2015. - There is currently no evidence of Daesh's central leadership directing terrorist activities in Pakistan, but its ideology has inspired individuals and groups to recruit, raise funds, and carry out attacks to demonstrate their support. - Daesh's far-reaching ideology -- which includes opposition to the Shia minority, the Pakistani state, and the West, and support for a global Islamic Caliphate - can make it appealing to both existing and potential militants in Pakistan. - A comprehensive response to this threat by the Pakistani government would include greater security cooperation with Afghanistan, the elimination of terrorist safe havens, prioritizing police training in national counterterrorism strategies, and promoting programs to counter Daesh's dangerous ideology. Details: Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2016. 5p. Source: Internet Resource: Peace Brief 2013: Accessed October 17, 2016 at: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PB213-The-Islamic-State-In-Pakistan.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Pakistan URL: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PB213-The-Islamic-State-In-Pakistan.pdf Shelf Number: 145074 Keywords: Extremist Groups ISIS Islamist State Radical Group Radicalization Terrorism Violent Extremism

Author: International Centre for the Prevention of Crime (ICPC) Title: Crime Prevention and Community Safety: Cities and the New Urban Agenda. 5th International Report Summary: The fifth edition of the International Report on Crime Prevention and Community Safety develops, from the urban perspective, various topics relevant to the current context in cities. As with previous editions of the Report, the first chapter is a constant of ICPC's International Reports, reviewing major trends in crime and in its prevention. The following two chapters address the relationship between the urban setting and the prevention of crime through two distinct lenses: the first gives a general overview of the issues and major trends facing cities; the second, in contrast, offers a comparative perspective, particularly in relation to national-local relationships in the Latin American context. The final three chapters address three fundamental topics on the prevention of urban crime: public transport, the prevention of drug-related crime, and the prevention of violent radicalization. Details: Ottawa: ICPC, 2016. 204p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 19, 2016 at: http://www.crime-prevention-intl.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Publications/International_Report/CIPC_5th-IR_EN_17oct_Final.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://www.crime-prevention-intl.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Publications/International_Report/CIPC_5th-IR_EN_17oct_Final.pdf Shelf Number: 145994 Keywords: Crime Prevention Drug-Related Violence Extremist Groups Public Transport Radical Groups Radicalization Urban Areas and Crime

Author: Schmid, Alex P. Title: Radicalisation, De-radicalisation, Counter-Radicalisation: A Conceptual Discussion and Literature Review Summary: The 'radicalisation', 'de-radicalisation' and 'counter-radicalisation' are used widely, but the search for what exactly 'radicalisation' is, what causes it and how to 'de-radicalise' those who are considered radicals, violent extremists or terrorists has so far been a frustrating experience. The popularity of the concept of 'radicalisation' stands in no direct relationship to its actual explanatory power regarding the root causes of terrorism. In Europe, it was brought into the academic discussion after the bomb attacks in Madrid (2004) and London (2005) by policymakers who coined the term 'violent radicalisation'. It has become a political shibboleth despite its lack of precision. Historical Roots and Definitions Based on an in-depth literature review, this paper seeks to explore key terms and the discourses surrounding them in greater detail. Much of the literature on radicalisation focuses on Islamist extremism and jihadist terrorism and this is also reflected in this Research Paper. Looking at the historical roots of radicalism, the subject is a relative one and has often been a force of progress. As such, its derivative, 'radicalisation' is not necessarily a synonym for terrorism. The paper proposes a distinction between radicalism and extremism. While both stand at some distance from mainstream political thinking, the first tends to be open-minded, while the second manifests a closed mind and a distinct willingness to use violence against civilians. A re-conceptualisation of radicalisation is proposed after a discussion of numerous academic and governmental definitions of radicalisation. The Two Sides of Radicalisation The paper also seeks to differentiate between terrorism and other forms of political violence - some worse and some less unacceptable than terrorism itself. It acknowledges that there are certain forms of violent resistance to political oppression that, while illegal under certain national laws, are accepted under international humanitarian law. For analytical purposes, political violence should be situated in the broader spectrum of political action - persuasive politics, pressure politics and violent politics - by those holding state power as well as non-state militant actors. With this in mind it should also be recognised that radicalisation is not necessarily a one-sided phenomenon, it is equally important to examine the role of state actors and their potential for radicalisation. The use of torture techniques and extra-judicial renditions in recent years, has been a drastic departure from democratic rule of law procedures and international human rights standards. These are indicative of the fact that in a polarised political situation not only non-state actors but also state actors can radicalise. Drivers of Radicalisation An exploration of the literature also confirms the pitfalls of profiling those individuals 'likely' to become terrorists. The current propensity to focus in the search for causes of radicalisation on 'vulnerable' young people has produced inconclusive results. The number of push and pull factors that can lead to radicalisation on this micro-level is very large - the same is true for the factors which can impact on de-radicalisation and disengagement. However, in the literature most findings are derived from small samples and few case studies, making comparison and generalisations problematic, and findings provisional. The paper pleads to look for roots of radicalisation beyond this micro-level and include a focus on the meso-level - the radical milieu - and the macro-level - the radicalisation of public opinion and party politics - to gain a better understanding of the dynamic processes driving escalation. The paper synthesises what we think we know about radicalisation and identifies those areas where our knowledge is 'thin'. Conclusions When it comes to de-radicalisation/dis-engagement and counter-radicalisation the paper concludes that it is difficult to identify what works and what does not work in general, or what is even counter-productive. Local context matters very much and academics and policy makers alike are increasingly recognising this fact. At this stage we still lack rigorous evaluations that allow us to determine the relative merits of various policies with a high degree of certainty. The lack of clarity and consensus with regard to many key concepts (terrorism, radicalisation, extremism, etc.) - ill-defined and yet taken for granted � still present an obstacle that needs to be overcome. The paper concludes with a set of findings and recommendations and identifies two major gaps in current counter-radicalisation efforts - one referring to the role of the media and the Internet and the other to the role of counter-narratives to those of jihadist terrorists. It identifies credibility and legitimacy as core ingredients of any political narrative hoping to catch the imagination of people at home and abroad. They are key resources in counter-radicalisation and counter-terrorism. Governments need not be perfect before they can effectively engage in successful de-radicalisation and counter-radicalisation efforts. However, they have, in the eyes of domestic and foreign publics, to be markedly better than extremist parties and terrorist organisations. Details: The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT), 2013. 97p. Source: Internet Resource: ICCT Research Paper March 2013: Accessed October 21, 2016 at: https://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-Schmid-Radicalisation-De-Radicalisation-Counter-Radicalisation-March-2013.pdf Year: 2013 Country: International URL: https://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-Schmid-Radicalisation-De-Radicalisation-Counter-Radicalisation-March-2013.pdf Shelf Number: 130117 Keywords: Counter-Radicalization De-Radicalization Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorists Violent Extremism

Author: Khalil, James Title: Qualitative Study on Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) Programming Under the Kenya Transition Initiative (KTI) Summary: While Kenya received global attention in September 2013 due to the attack at the Westgate shopping mall, this event represents just one of many violent incidents in the country over recent years, often considered to be in part a spill-over from instability in Somalia. The tensions in Coastal Kenya also take additional forms and are driven to a considerable degree by the perceived political and economic marginalisation of the region. Drawing upon professed historical injustices, the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC) reportedly relies upon violence to promote independence, and has encouraged local residents to boycott elections. Tensions between Christians and Muslims are also pronounced on the Coast, particularly after the killing of prominent Muslim clerics such as Aboud Rogo. In this context fits the Kenya Transition Initiative (KTI) and its Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) programme. Since 2011 KTI has been operational in Eastleigh and its environs, and in 2012 it expanded to the Coastal regions of Lamu, Kilifi, Kwale, Malindi and Mombasa. The KTI programme was essentially a pilot of the new CVE concept, operating through flexible funding mechanisms that supported individuals, networks and organisations, often with small grants implemented over a short duration. The grants were designed to target the key ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors responsible for driving Violent Extremism (VE). As understood by KTI, the former ‘drive youth to join extremist movements,’ whereas the latter ‘attract youth towards extremism as an emotional struggle for purpose, direction and identity.’1 Examples of push factors may include, for instance, police harassment, elevated unemployment and racial profiling, whereas KTI’s identified pull factors included personal appeal of radical preachers and a radicalised religious environment. 2. THIS STUDY As part of the learning process during closedown, KTI engaged Integrity Research and Consultancy (Integrity) to undertake a qualitative study into its intervention. Following an introduction looking at the background, objectives and the study methods (Section 1), this report is structured loosely to mirror KTI’s lifecycle, sequentially focusing upon the research undertaken to inform the intervention (Section 2), programme design (Section 3), and the selection of grants (Section 4). This is followed by conclusions (Section 5), and a series of actionable recommendations designed to inform future CVE initiatives in Kenya and elsewhere (Section 6). The KTI Terms of Reference (TOR) largely advised our research methods, with a primary focus upon a review of KTI documentation being complemented by key informant interviews with KTI staff, grantees and other stakeholders, focus group discussions with grant beneficiaries, and grantee observations. Details: Washington, DC: United States Agency for International Development, 2014. 56p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 7, 2016 at: https://www.integrityglobal.com/wp-content/uploads/KTI-End-of-Programme-Qualitative-Study-R.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Kenya URL: https://www.integrityglobal.com/wp-content/uploads/KTI-End-of-Programme-Qualitative-Study-R.pdf Shelf Number: 145395 Keywords: Extremism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Terrorist Violent Extremism

Author: Van Metre, Lauren Title: Community Resilience to Violent Extremism in Kenya Summary: Focusing on six urban neighborhoods in Kenya, this report explores how key resilience factors have prevented or countered violent extremist activity at the local level. It is based on a one-year, mixed-method study led by the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) and supported by Sahan Research. Summary - Over the years, Kenya has conveyed an idyllic public image of a peaceful society in a region of conflict-ridden states. A much more contested narrative of a violent past exists, however. - Despite initiatives related to Christian-Muslim conflicts in the 1990s, a new regional security threat emerged, mainly revolving around the activities of al-Shabaab. - Groups like al-Shabaab understand and use a combination of political realities, socioeconomic factors, and individual characteristics that render many vulnerable to recruitment. - Qualitative studies show a relationship between heavy-handed counterterrorism operations by security forces and radicalization of Kenya's Muslim population. - A paradox has emerged, where emphasis on winning the hearts and minds of target populations has collided with the dominance of hard military and security approaches to countering violent extremism. - The challenge with a concept like resilience to violence, which is both ambiguous and dynamic, is "for analytical purposes" to identify a concrete and measurable relationship. - Communities that prevent the emergence of violent conflict, or rebound more quickly after it, have everyday capacities to successfully harness against extremist violence. Communities with genuine associations with religious members from different groups experience less violent extremist activity. - Fluid religious and ethnic identities, which might lead to higher tolerance of and openness to members of other religions and tribal groups, do not explain community resilience to violent extremism. - Communities facing violent extremist threats need to develop resilience capacities and strategies. Without commensurate capacity and action, threats can overwhelm even highly resilient communities. - Heavy-handed security approaches not only increase the risk of violent extremist activity, they also undermine community resilience factors and relationships. Details: Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2016. 48p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 7, 2016 at: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PW122-Community-Resilience-to-Violent-Extremism-in-Kenya.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Kenya URL: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PW122-Community-Resilience-to-Violent-Extremism-in-Kenya.pdf Shelf Number: 145392 Keywords: Communities and Violence Extremist Groups Extremist Violence Radical Groups Urban Areas Violence

Author: Green, Shannon N. Title: Turning Point: A New Comprehensive Strategy for Countering Violent Extremism Summary: The United States lost nearly 3,000 lives in the devastating terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. On that day, a problem that had been slowly festering and barely noticed in the West broke onto the world stage in a forceful and heart-wrenching way. Those events and many that would follow have prompted trillions of dollars to be poured into military, law enforcement, and intelligence operations. Yet the problem of violent extremism has grown more severe and urgent. Despite the many efforts to extinguish the flames of violence, new and powerful extremist movements have taken root. Terrorist groups around the world have used technology, the media, religious schools and mosques, and word of mouth to sell their twisted ideologies, justify their violence, and convince too many recruits that glory can be found in the mass murder of innocent civilians. The spread of extremist ideologies and increasingly frequent terrorist attacks are stoking anxiety and fear across the globe. According to a survey conducted by the Commission, people are willing to try just about anything to stop the bloodshed: from military action to stronger border controls and mandatory identification cards to relinquishing privacy and accepting constraints on speech. The increasing potency and reach of terrorist groups—and a sense that governments’ response to the threat has been inadequate—is creating deep political divisions and fueling support for populist solutions. There are no easy solutions to this problem. Neither troops nor police nor economic sanctions alone can address this threat. We cannot close our borders and hope that the problem goes away. And we cannot abandon our commitment to human rights and freedom of expression in an attempt to quell violent extremism. Diminishing the appeal of extremist ideologies will require a long-term, generational struggle. The United States and its allies must combat extremists' hostile and apocalyptic world view with the same level of commitment that we apply to dealing with its violent manifestations. We urgently need a new comprehensive strategy for countering violent extremism—one that is resolute, rests in soft and hard power, and galvanizes key allies and partners from government, civil society, and the private sector. Details: Washington, DC: Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2016. 90p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 2, 2016 at: https://www.csis.org/features/turning-point Year: 2016 Country: International URL: https://www.csis.org/features/turning-point Shelf Number: 147863 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Extremism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Terrorism Violent Extremism

Author: Weine, Stevan Title: Building Resilience to Violent Extremism Among Somali-Americans in Minneapolis-St. Paul Summary: This study asked members of the Somalia-American community in Minneapolis-St. Paul to describe the challenges of living in a refugee community, how violent extremists try to exploit their condition for recruitment purposes, and what resources and strategies are needed to minimize their vulnerability. Using ethnographic methods, this study looked at the everyday lives of Somalia-American adolescent boys and young men in the context of their families and communities. It found opportunities for entering violent extremism as well as capacities for diminishing those opportunities. Based on empirical data and informed by relevant theory, it identified themes and built a model, Diminishing Opportunities for Violent Extremism (DOVE), which can help to inform prevention strategies for building community resilience to violent extremism in the Somalia-American community in Minneapolis-St. Paul. No one risk factor explained involvement in violent extremism. Rather it was the interaction of multiple risk factors at the peer, family, community, global, state, and societal levels. These risk factors combined to create an opportunity structure for violent extremism with three levels of opportunity: 1) youth's unaccountable times and unobserved spaces; 2) the perceived social legitimacy of violent extremism; and 3) contact with recruiters or associates. Involvement in violent extremism depended on the presence of all three, with decreasing proportions of adolescent boys and young men exposed to the latter two. Efforts to increase resilience should involve strengthening protective resources or what are called opportunity-reducing capacities. Furthermore, family and youth, community, and government can help to strengthen protective resources at each of the three levels of opportunity. Priorities include diminishing: 1) youth's unaccountable times and unobserved spaces; 2) the perceived social legitimacy of violent extremism; and 3) the potential for contacts with terrorist recruiters or associates. Building community resilience to violent extremism should be approached through community collaboration and capacity building. Interventions may involve government, community, and families working collaboratively to improve each other's capacities. Shared goals could be to: 1) collaboratively strengthen families; 2) develop community support for families and youth; and 3) adopt new governmental strategies for community support and protection. One way to determine priority areas for prevention might include identifying protective resources with the greatest potential for addressing multiple risk factors. Collaborations between government, community, and families and youth can then be built to enhance these capacities. Based on the current study, promising preventive interventions in the Somalia-American community in Minneapolis-St. Paul might include: 1) building a web-based resource that includes information and training about risks and safeguards for use by youth, parents, and community service providers; 2) providing Somali youth and young adults with opportunities for service in their community and humanitarian and peace work, thus creating alternative ways for youth to channel their passion for Somalia; and 3) providing logistical support and training to elders and critical voices in the community and on the web. Additional research is needed in communities under threat to show which acts of building resilience work with whom under what circumstances and why. One way to do this would be to collaborate with the community to develop, pilot, and evaluate a multilevel community resilience-based prevention strategy in Minneapolis-St. Paul based on the DOVE model. Another would be to use the DOVE model as a basis for assessing other communities targeted by violent extremists, in the United States and abroad, so as to refine the model and approaches that can reliably assess communities at risk and help to inform and prioritize prevention strategies Details: College Park, MD: START, 2012. 40p. Source: Internet Resource: Final Report to Human Factors/Behavioral Sciences Division, Science and Technology Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland Security: Accessed December 10, 2016 at: https://www.start.umd.edu/sites/default/files/files/publications/Weine_BuildingResiliencetoViolentExtremism_SomaliAmericans.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: https://www.start.umd.edu/sites/default/files/files/publications/Weine_BuildingResiliencetoViolentExtremism_SomaliAmericans.pdf Shelf Number: 146042 Keywords: Extremist Groups Homeland Security Radical groups Terrorism Terrorist Recruitment Violent Extremism

Author: United States Institute of Peace Title: The Jihadi Threat: ISIS, Al Qaeda, and Beyond Summary: The West failed to predict the emergence of al-Qaeda in new forms across the Middle East and North Africa. It was blindsided by the ISIS sweep across Syria and Iraq, which at least temporarily changed the map of the Middle East. Both movements have skillfully continued to evolve and proliferate — and surprise. What’s next? Twenty experts from think tanks and universities across the United States explore the world’s deadliest movements, their strategies, the future scenarios, and policy considerations. This report reflects their analysis and diverse views. his report is a collaboration by 20 experts on the Middle East, Islamic extremism, and jihadism who held a series of conferences between August and November 2016. "The Jihadi Threat" reflects the broad — and often diverse — views of the coauthors. Not every one agreed on all points, but the variety of findings, trend lines, and scenarios for the future covers the best thinking about the evolution of the Islamic State, al-Qaeda, and their affiliates. The United States Institute of Peace was the primary sponsor of this initiative, with the backing of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Fifteen other think tanks and universities were represented in the Working Group on Extremism. The goal was always to reflect the widest expertise and the full spectrum of views. Details: Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2016. 48p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 14, 2016 at: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/The-Jihadi-Threat-ISIS-Al-Qaeda-and-Beyond.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/The-Jihadi-Threat-ISIS-Al-Qaeda-and-Beyond.pdf Shelf Number: 146146 Keywords: Al Qaeda Extremist Groups ISIS Islamic State Radical Groups Terrorists Violent Extremism

Author: Mulholland, Sean E. Title: Hate Source: White Supremacist Hate Groups and Hate Crime Summary: The relationship between hate group activity and hate crime is theoretically ambiguous. Hate groups may incite criminal behavior in support of their beliefs. On the other hand, hate groups may reduce hate crime by serving as a forum for members to verbally vent their frustrations or as protection from future biased violence. I find that the presence of an active white supremacist hate group chapter is associated with an 18.7 percent higher hate crime rate. White supremacist groups are not associated with the level of anti-white hate crimes committed by non-whites, nor do they form in expectation of future hate crimes by non-whites. Details: Munich: Munich Personal RePEc Archive, 2011. 33p. Source: Internet Resource: MPRA Paper No. 28861: Accessed December 14, 2016 at: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/28861/1/MPRA_paper_28861.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/28861/1/MPRA_paper_28861.pdf Shelf Number: 144917 Keywords: Extremist Groups Hate Crime Radical Groups White Supremacists

Author: Berger, J.M. Title: Making CVE Work: A Focused Approach Based on Process Disruption Summary: One of the biggest barriers to designing a comprehensive Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) programme is defining its scope. This paper argues for a narrow approach, focusing on disengagement and the disruption of recruitment. The author develops a simplified model of radicalisation and the concurrent terrorist recruitment process, proposing concrete themes for disruptive intervention and messaging. After analysing case studies of disengagement, the author offers recommendations for specific action to accomplish CVE goals by disrupting recruitment processes and deploying targeted messaging within the framework of the correlated models. Details: The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2016. 40p. Source: Internet Resource: ICCT Research Paper: Accessed December 15, 2016 at: https://www.icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/J.-M.-Berger-Making-CVE-Work-A-Focused-Approach-Based-on-Process-Disruption-.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: https://www.icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/J.-M.-Berger-Making-CVE-Work-A-Focused-Approach-Based-on-Process-Disruption-.pdf Shelf Number: 146161 Keywords: Counter-terrorism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Terrorism Terrorist Recruitment Violent Extremism

Author: Owens, Kimberly B. Title: Beyond hate: countering violent extremism from the white power movement Summary: Counterterrorism efforts are a major focus for the homeland security enterprise. Throughout the world, however, efforts have largely focused on countering violent extremism from Islamist organizations. While Islamist terrorists have been responsible for more deaths in the United States, this research focuses on white power domestic terrorism. It considers successful methods from the United States and the United Kingdom (UK), but applies them to factions of the right-wing movement, rather than Salafi-jihadist groups. This research is a case study comparison of former right-wing leaders, both of whom were associated with planned domestic terror plots. Significantly, the research included participation of individuals formerly active within the politically motivated Ku Klux Klan, and the religiously motivated the Covenant, the Sword, and the Arm of the Lord (CSA). It revealed a common anti-government theme between the vastly different groups, as well as the sociological underpinnings for participation in the Klan, within the theoretical framework of Social Identity Theory. While extremism is an unpleasant fact, perhaps violence can be mitigated, and having dialogue with those who once carried the torch of white power rhetoric may hold some answers, or provide a starting point for successful counterterrorism efforts. Details: Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2013. 160p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed December 16, 2016 at: http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/38992/13Dec_Owens_Kimberly.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/38992/13Dec_Owens_Kimberly.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Shelf Number: 146134 Keywords: Counter-terrorism Domestic Terrorism Extremist Groups Homeland Security Radical Groups Violent Extremism

Author: Bhulai, Rafia Title: Strengthening Regional Cooperation to Prevent and Counter Violent Extremism in South Asia. What Role for Civil Society? Summary: Since 2011, the Global Center has worked with the UN Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED), with generous support from the government of Norway, to implement a process that engages civil society actors and experts in efforts to enhance regional cooperation in South Asia. This process, undertaken in partnership with the Institute of South Asian Studies at the National University of Singapore, included regular dialogue and engagement with nongovernmental actors in South Asia to foster deeper understanding of local and regional drivers of terrorism and violent extremism and to identify critical gaps, opportunities, and priorities for capacity-building support to address the threat. This assessment presents key outcomes of the multiyear civil society and experts process. It provides an overview of regional challenges and the efforts by the Global Center and CTED to identify key needs and priorities to inform responsive policies and programs to address the threat of terrorism and violent extremism in South Asia. A set of recommendations highlight practical ways that multilateral and regional organizations and national governments can work with civil society, experts, and practitioners to address this threat in the region. Details: Washington, DC: Global Center on Cooperative Security, 2016. 17p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 16, 2016 at: http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/2016-12_Bhulai-Fink-South-Asia-CSE-Process.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Asia URL: http://www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/2016-12_Bhulai-Fink-South-Asia-CSE-Process.pdf Shelf Number: 146118 Keywords: Counter-terrorism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Terrorism Violent Extremism

Author: Intergovernmental Authority on Development Title: Al-Shabaab as a Transnational Security Threat Summary: Harakaat Al-Shabaab Al-Mujaahidiiin, Al-Qaeda's affiliate in the Horn of Africa, has long been perceived as a Somali organisation – albeit one that represents a security threat to the wider region. But since at least 2010, Al-Shabaab has aspired to become a truly regional organisation, with membership and horizons that transcend national borders. In 2010 the group staged its first major external operation, in Kampala, Uganda, and issued its first propaganda video in the Swahili language. Since then, Al- Shabaab has become active in no less than six countries of the region, striking five of them with terrorist attacks. Al-Shabaab is clearly no longer an exclusively Somali problem, and requires a concerted international response. This determined expansion of Al-Shabaab’s ambitions and operational reach is in large part the result of the strategic direction adopted by Al-Shabaab's former leader, Ahmed Abdi Godane, and his successor, Ahmed Diiriye, who currently heads the movement. In late 2013, Godane re-organised Al-Shabaab's military wing to include two transnational units: one, the Jaysh Ayman, directed against Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda, and another dedicated to operations against Ethiopia. While the latter formation has yet to mount an effective operation on Ethiopian soil, the Jaysh Ayman launched a series of cross-border attacks into Kenya in 2014 and, despite a Kenyan counter-offensive in late 2015, the group remains a serious threat to the country's national security. In 2013, Godane also gave instructions for Al-Shabaab’s special operations wing, the Amniyaad, to step up attacks against neighbouring countries, notably those contributing troops to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). This resulted in a spate of attacks between 2013 and 2015 in Kenya that claimed over 350 lives, an attempted suicide bombing of a football match in Addis Ababa in October 2013, and the suicide bombing of a popular restaurant in Djibouti in May 2014. In October 2014, Al-Shabaab again attempted a suicide bombing in Addis Ababa, this time apparently targeting a busy shopping mall, but the plot was detected and foiled. Al-Shabaab-affiliated networks in Kenya also continued to plan terror attacks during this period, but less successfully than Jaysh Ayman. Al-Hijra, Al-Shabaab’s Kenyan affiliate, experienced growing pressure from the security services, and suffered a steady attrition of its leadership. As a result, Al-Hijra cadres withdrew from major hubs of activity in Nairobi and Mombasa, dispersing their radicalisation and recruitment efforts throughout the country – notably within the prison system. Al-Hijra operatives and recruits – including a growing proportion of women – continued to travel back and forth to Somalia, typically receiving training and instructions before returning to Kenya to engage in operations. Kenya also witnessed increasing activity among Al-Shabaab sympathisers, organising themselves spontaneously online via social media and mobile applications. While many of these individuals remain purely aspirational, some have gone on to plan operations, reaching out to members of Al-Shabaab or Al-Hijra for guidance and support. Others have sought advice concerning travel to Somalia or Syria. Confronted by the evolving threat, regional states are exploring ways to strengthen their common response to Al-Shabaab. AMISOM, whose forces are drawn mainly from IGAD countries, continues to support the efforts of the Somali Federal Government and emerging federal member states to confront Al-Shabaab militarily, steadily driving the jihadists out of the last remaining strongholds and helping to build the capacity of Somali security forces. Outside Somalia, IGAD Member States have devoted greater efforts to monitoring and disrupting Al-Shabaab activities within their borders. The Heads of Intelligence and Security Services (HISS) of the member countries of IGAD and the East African Community (EAC) met twice in 2015 to deepen security cooperation and harmonise efforts to fight terrorism and violent extremism. In August 2015, a two-day experts’ meeting in Djibouti took the first steps towards the establishment of a Centre of Excellence to Counter Violent Extremism for the IGAD region. In addition, the IGAD Security Sector Program (ISSP) launched a new Transnational Security Threats (TST) Initiative to promote security cooperation between member states: the initiative under which this report has been commission and published. The report concludes with a series of recommendations for further action, including: • Enhanced security cooperation in countering Al-Shabaab, including a joint review to identify gaps, challenges, and opportunities in strengthening cooperation to combat Al-Shabaab, such as the types of information to be shared and the processes for doing so; more joint activities to confront Al- Shabaab; and inviting Tanzania to participate in any IGAD-led efforts to counter this threat. • Better understanding of the Improvised Explosive Device (IED) threat and possible counter-measures, including appropriate Counter-IED (C-IED) strategies, enhanced technical capabilities for post-blast investigation and analysis, and improved information sharing within the region. • Adaptation to evolving patterns of radicalisation and recruitment, such as the shifting of extremist activities away from former hubs, such as Nairobi and Mombasa in Kenya, to new geographic areas; sensitisation and training of public officials, in order to help them identify and react appropriately to potential threats; enhance surveillance of terrorism suspects and networks inside the prison system and put in place appropriate responses; and undertake additional research and analysis into current trends of radicalisation and recruitment among young women, in order to formulate appropriate responses. Details: Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: IGAD Security Sector Program (ISSP), 2016. 53p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 20, 2016 at: http://www.igadssp.org/index.php/documentation/reports/igad-report-al-shabaab-as-a-transnational-security-threat?layout=table Year: 2016 Country: Africa URL: http://www.igadssp.org/index.php/documentation/reports/igad-report-al-shabaab-as-a-transnational-security-threat?layout=table Shelf Number: 147782 Keywords: Al-Qaeda Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Terrorist Recruitment

Author: Klausen, Jytte Title: Finding Online Extremists in Social Networks Summary: Online extremists in social networks pose a new form of threat to the general public. These extremists range from cyberbullies who harass innocent users to terrorist organizations such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) that use social networks to recruit and incite violence. Currently social networks suspend the accounts of such extremists in response to user complaints. The challenge is that these extremist users simply create new accounts and continue their activities. In this work we present a new set of operational capabilities to deal with the threat posed by online extremists in social networks. Using data from several hundred thousand extremist accounts on Twitter, we develop a behavioral model for these users, in particular what their accounts look like and who they connect with. This model is used to identify new extremist accounts by predicting if they will be suspended for extremist activity. We also use this model to track existing extremist users as they create new accounts by identifying if two accounts belong to the same user. Finally, we present a model for searching the social network to efficiently find suspended users' new accounts based on a variant of the classic Polya's urn setup. We find a simple characterization of the optimal search policy for this model under fairly general conditions. Our urn model and main theoretical results generalize easily to search problems in other fields. Details: Unpublished paper, 2016. 49p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 23, 2016 at: https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/3a42/19deb22b90f807cec920ade6470a7bd44c3b.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/3a42/19deb22b90f807cec920ade6470a7bd44c3b.pdf Shelf Number: 147812 Keywords: Extremist Groups Extremists Online Extremism Radical Groups Social Networks

Author: Helmus, Todd C. Title: Promoting Online Voices for Countering Violent Extremism Summary: Key Findings - American Muslims are increasingly using the Web and social media to help counter violent extremism. Discussions with a number of Muslim leaders active in social media suggest that it is possible to expand such efforts even further, and doing so is a major objective of the August 2011 White House strategy to counter violent extremism. - While Muslim Americans play an active role in countering extremism, several factors may work to undermine higher-level engagement, including: low radicalization rates among American Muslims, negative perceptions of U.S. counterterrorism policies, a limited reservoir of leadership capacity and CVE funding (which prevents effective outreach), and being viewed as sell-outs to those most sympathetic to jihadi causes. - In some cases, the First Amendment may limit U.S. government attempts to fund CVE programs of an ideological bent, but this restriction could ultimately benefit CVE discourse as it frees Muslim groups of the taint of government funding and prevents the government from having to "choose sides" in intra-Muslim discourse and debate. - Both the U.S. State Department and the "think-do tank" Google Ideas have initiated insightful programs that seek to build capacity and otherwise promote credible Muslim voices. - Recommendations include desecuritizing efforts to counter violent extremism, addressing sources of mistrust within the Muslim community, focusing engagements and CVE education on social media influencers, building leadership and social media capacity in the Muslim community, enhancing private sector funding and engagement, and finding avenues to enhance government funding. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2013. 18p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 11, 2017 at: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR100/RR130/RAND_RR130.pdf Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR100/RR130/RAND_RR130.pdf Shelf Number: 144830 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Extremist Groups Muslims Radicalization Social Media Violent Extremism

Author: Davis, Lynn E. Title: A Strategy to Counter ISIL as a Transregional Threat Summary: The debate in the past over counter-ISIL strategies has tended to focus on rather stark alternatives that are based on different ways to employ U.S. military forces: disengagement, containment, and aggressive rollback using combat forces. Our strategy seeks to broaden the focus to policies beyond the military dimension. Even though U.S. leverage is limited to affect the political situations in Iraq and Syria, the United States should focus on removing the underlying conditions sustaining ISIL and other violent jihadist groups, i.e., the lack of security, justice, and political representation. In addition, the United States needs to re-evaluate how to balance the aims of the counter-ISIL campaign with future territorial and political ambitions of the Kurds, given the risk of violence between Shia and Kurds in Iraq and Turkey and the YPG in Syria. In the absence of commitments on the part of the Kurds to limit their territorial ambitions, and to avoid fueling conflict across the region, the United States should be cautious in the ways it supports the YPG and peshmerga in its counter-ISIL military campaign. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2017. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Perspective: Accessed February 11, 2017 at: http://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE228.html Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: http://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE228.html Shelf Number: 145032 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Extremist Groups Homeland Security ISIS Islamic State Radical Groups Terrorist

Author: Patel, Sophia Title: The Sultanate of Women: Exploring female roles in perpetrating and preventing violent extremism Summary: This paper examines the appeal of Islamic State (IS) to Western women and explores how women can be employed in countering violent extremism (CVE) structures to prevent further involvement. It aims to deliver a comprehensive analysis for academics, policymakers and practitioners working in CVE program and policy design and implementation in order to bridge the gap between community development work and security and intelligence. Two case studies of Australian women - Zehra Duman (a.k.a. Umm Abdullatif al-Australi) and Zaynab Sharrouf (a.k.a. Umm Hafs) - illustrate the appeal as well as the contradictions. A series of recommendations suggests changes to existing CVE structures and their approaches to integrating, women. Details: Barton, ACT, Australia: Australian Strategic Policy Institute. 2017. 48p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 15, 2017 at: https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/the-sultanate-of-women-exploring-female-roles-in-perpetrating-and-preventing-violent-extremism/SR100_Sultanate-of-women_v2.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/the-sultanate-of-women-exploring-female-roles-in-perpetrating-and-preventing-violent-extremism/SR100_Sultanate-of-women_v2.pdf Shelf Number: 145767 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Extremist Groups ISIS Islamic State Violent Extremism

Author: Trautmann, Catrin Title: Systematic Classification of in Germany Offered and Implemented (Prevention) Programmes Against Islamist Motivated Radicalisation Outside the Justice System Summary: Prevention clearly includes a wide range of social, educational and therapeutic approaches. Its success often depends on the extent to which adolescents and young adults are able to participate within society and that they are shown a direction in life that is worth pursuing. Development psychology and educational science show that the path of discovering one's identity during youth does not always run smoothly for some young people. Unfortunately, the "search for meaning" is, on occasions, first answered by the attention and support provided by extremists, due, for example, to prolonged personal experiences of exclusion and rejection. The prevention of radicalisation is the job of those who have taken on responsibility for young persons, for example, in schools, in training or education programmes and, of course, not least of all, in families and their networks. The state is obliged to offer advice and support, in certain cases, very intensively and for longer periods. Germany's national programmes, "Demokratie leben!"[Living Democracy] and "Zusammenhalt durch Teilhabe" [Cohesion through Participation] along with additional state initiatives, provide the financial support for the local prevention work of authorities, independent organisations and civil society. Germany's federal government alone has provided well over 50 million euros. This amount is expected to double in the budget for 2017. It is necessary for the dissemination and quality of the measures to continue to be evaluated in different ways. The positive effects are difficult to measure, the evaluation method at times touching the sensibilities of the actors involved. In some places, there are not sufficient programmes in place, while in others the quality may be lacking. To avoid any misunderstandings: without the numerous initiatives, projects and programmes being offered by dedicated experts and professionals, there would be even greater problems. Thus it is necessary to further qualify the programmes that are in place, to monitor the effects, to fill any regional gaps and to consolidate successful approaches that are in place. An agreement on central quality standards would represent ground-breaking progress. In the area of violence prevention, the DFK, along with researchers, provides well-structured information and recommendations on programmes as well as their successful implementation at the website www.wegweiser-praevention.de. An extension of the portal to the prevention of extremism and radicalisation would be desirable, for example, linking the programmes to the Federal Centre for Political Education [Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung]. A cross-over with state initiatives, for example, in the state prevention committees, is one of DFK’s working principles. I continue to be optimistic that the undeniable obstacles to cooperation can be overcome and urge for cooperation for the purposes of a common "prevention strategy". I recommend politicians to provide valuable support for preventative work, both at federal and state level, which at times has to be carried out with very limited personnel and financial resources. This Systematic classification of Prevention Programmes against Islamist Motivated Radicalisation (here as a short version) is the beginning of a growing culture of cooperation, in which knowledge and experiences are shared and new quality standards are developed. Academic and practical partners are warmly invited to participate! This inventory excludes initiatives and measures taking place within the judicial system because these are being analysed and structured in parallel in a project initiated by the Centre for Criminology [Kriminologische Zentralstelle]. Details: Bielefeld: Institute for Interdisciplinary Research on Conflict and Violence [IKG], University of Bielefeld, 2016. 45p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 16, 2017 at: http://www.kriminalpraevention.de/files/DFK/sprachen/en/2016_classification_of_programmes_against_violent_islamist_extremism.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Germany URL: http://www.kriminalpraevention.de/files/DFK/sprachen/en/2016_classification_of_programmes_against_violent_islamist_extremism.pdf Shelf Number: 141054 Keywords: Extremist Groups Extremists Islamic Terrorism Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism

Author: Institute of Race Relations Title: State intelligence agencies and the far right: A review of developments in Germany, Hungary and Austria Summary: Far-right and neo-Nazi violence – on the increase across Europe – is the subject of ongoing research by the Institute of Race Relations which releases today an interim report on the security services’ approach to the far Right in Austria, Hungary and Germany. This timely report, State intelligence agencies and the far Right: A review of developments in Germany, Hungary and Austria, is issued just two weeks before the largest trial on far-right extremism in the history of the Federal Republic of Germany opens in Munich. Beate Zschäpe, the sole surviving member of the National Socialist Underground and four co-defendants face charges relating to ten murders that took place between 2000 and 2007. Of the victims, shot in the head at close range, eight were Turkish or of Turkish origin, one was a Greek citizen, one a female German police officer. While the Munich trial is guaranteed international attention, the most significant trial on far-right extremism in eastern Europe in recent years has been ongoing since March 2011 at the Pest County High Court in Hungary, with barely any coverage. Four neo-Nazis face charges relating to the serial killing of six Roma and many other violent crimes. Austria faces its own neo-Nazi scandal too, since Nazi propaganda, sawn-off shotguns, machine guns and explosives were seized during a raid on the headquarters of the neo-Nazi criminal fraternity, Objekt 21 in January 2013. The IRR’s research into intelligence services’ methods suggests that far from clamping down on growing fascism, some of the tactics of security services are enhancing conditions for its growth. The report also reveals evidence of: a generalised failure to recognise the danger posed by the far Right; institutional racism and institutional negligence; a failure to interact with police murder investigations; a will to protect neo-Nazi informers at the expense of law enforcement. ‘There has systematic betrayal of minority communities’, concludes Liz Fekete, author of the report and Director of IRR. ‘The sad truth is that the families of the Roma in Hungary and those men of Turkish origin killed by the NSU in Germany carry permanent scars, the result of botched investigations that in some cases treated them not as grieving relatives but potential suspects. Given the harmonisation of so much of European police and security policies, I am seriously concerned that what has happened in Austria, Germany and Hungary could represent the European norm. On the evidence I have seen, BME communities cannot trust security services to protect them from the murderous violence of the far Right. A thorough audit of all European intelligence services’ programmes to counter far-Right violence is overdue.’ Details: London: Institute of Race Relations, 2013. 11p. Accessed February 28, 2017 at: http://www.irr.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/ERP_BP6_State_intelligence.pdf Source: Internet Resource: Briefing Paper No. 6 Year: 2013 Country: Europe URL: Shelf Number: 141106 Keywords: Extremist Groups Race Relations Radical Groups

Author: Fekete, Liz Title: Exit from White Supremacism: the accountability gap within Europe's de-radicalisation programmes Summary: In a timely report, the IRR cautions against the importation to the UK of Scandinavian-style Exit programmes for dealing with far-right extremists. It was one of the big news stories of October 2013 and something of a coup for 'counter-radicalisation', when Tommy Robinson and Kevin Carroll quit the EDL - and think-tank Quilliam claimed the credit for choreographing their exit. Ever since then, a head of steam has built up in favour of a UK deradicalisation programme for the far Right. But in Exit from White Supremacism: the accountability gap within Europe's de-radicalisation programmes, the IRR reveals the problems of such existing Exit programmes across Europe. The IRR suggests that: Considerable resources are being invested in Exit, but there has been scant evaluation of its methodology or statistical analysis of its vaunted success rate; There needs to be more critical evaluation of Exit's methods. Programmes, often run and designed by 'formers' ignore questions of political ideology and past racist activity, but focus instead on the social alienation and psychological problems of 'clients'; In Sweden, past failures and bitter controversies about lack of oversight within Exit have been airbrushed from the official record; In Norway, Exit practitioners have been accused of claiming credit for work done outside Exit, principally by dedicated police and youth workers; In Germany, victim support groups show concern that some 'formers' have been faking political conversion to reduce a sentence, secure probation or otherwise manipulate the security services which, in turn, has its own agenda of recruiting neo-Nazis to act as paid informants. One German 'former' who was helped by federal intelligence services to write a confessional account of his disengagement from the neo-Nazi scene, went on to become a leading light within the counter-jihadi movement. Liz Fekete, Director of the IRR and author of the report said today: 'After months of research into these Exit programmes, I am quite frankly baffled by the lack of official acknowledgement of its many manifest failures. I hope that this report will act as a wake-up call to all those hitherto seduced by the Exit brand that the total lack of transparency and accountability within Exit is not only unacceptable but potentially dangerous.' Details: London: Institute for Race Relations, 2014. 8p. Source: Internet Resource: http://www.irr.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/ERP-Briefing-No-8-Exit.pdf: http://www.irr.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/ERP-Briefing-No-8-Exit.pdf Year: 2014 Country: Europe URL: http://www.irr.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/ERP-Briefing-No-8-Exit.pdf Shelf Number: 146688 Keywords: Counter-Radicalization Extremist Groups Extremists Radical Groups Radicals

Author: Ellis, B. Heidi Title: Understanding Pathways to and Away from Violent Radicalization among Resettled Somali Refugees Summary: The overall objective of the proposed project was to understand pathways to diverse outcomes among Somali immigrants: why do some embrace greater openness to violent extremism, while others with shared life histories move towards gangs, crime, or resilient outcomes such as civic engagement? To what degree do these outcomes overlap? In this project we empirically examined the principle of multi-finality, or pathways leading from a shared refugee experience to multiple outcomes. Understanding these different trajectories, and the factors that shape an individual's progress towards diverse outcomes, provides critical information to local and state government agencies as they respond to the potential threat of domestic radicalization. Somalis in North America offer a window into the remarkable potential that can be realized by refugees/immigrants despite experiences of severe adversity as well as the challenges some subgroups encounter when adjusting to life in a new country. Somalia has endured one of the longest and most brutal wars of the past 30 years. Civil war broke out in 1991 and the nation has existed in what has been described as a "perpetual anarchy" to this day (Agbiboa 2014). This enduring conflict has led to millions of Somalis being dispersed as refugees across the globe. As refugees with limited resources, many Somalis in North America are resettled in poor urban neighborhoods where they are visibly different, not only because of race or ethnicity but also because of dress, especially for women who wear a Muslim head covering. Somali refugees have also found themselves inserted into the unfamiliar black and white dichotomy that dominates American racial discourse (Kusow 2006). In this regard, though Somalis came to North America to escape the horrors of war, they often find themselves facing new problems, such as lack of jobs, loss of status, high levels of neighborhood violence, and racial and ethnic discrimination (Betancourt et al. 2014; Abdi 2015). In addition, the community has been plagued by violence. For example, in Minneapolis, MN, where the greatest number of Somali refugees in the US has settled, the community has faced gang violence and the threat of youth radicalizing simultaneously. In the two-year period between December 2007 and January 2010, eleven Somali American youth were killed in gang violence in the twin cities and twenty left to join Al-Shabaab (Yuen 2010). More recently, nine Somali youth have been arrested and have been sentenced or are awaiting sentences for their attempts to join (Yuen, Ibrahim, and Aslanian 2015;Yuen, Ibrahim, & Xaykaothao, 2016). While the number of Somali American youth joining these groups are small and while the majority of Somali Americans are law-abiding citizens, the terrorist groups' ability to recruit these youth and to convince some of them to engage in violent acts is concerning not only to policymakers and law enforcement but also to the Somali community's which fears losing more youth to violence or having the community reputation sullied by being associated with terrorism. While some of the social and cultural factors affecting Somalis are unique to that ethnic group, they also share experiences common to many immigrants - navigating identity development and duality as they move between home and host cultures, contending with discrimination as religious, racial and ethnic minorities, and striving to achieve their dreams while struggling to gain socioeconomic stability. Thus understanding their developmental trajectories may inform our understanding of other immigrant and refugee groups as well. Details: Boston: Boston Children’s Hospital and Harvard Medical School, 2016. 39p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 21, 2017 at: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/250415.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/250415.pdf Shelf Number: 146650 Keywords: Extremism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Refugees Somali Immigrants Terrorism Violent Radicalization

Author: Barrett, Richard Title: The Islamic State Summary: The self-styled Islamic State is an accident of history, emerging from multiple social, political and economic tensions in the Middle East and beyond. It has challenged the territorial divisions imposed on the region following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire by carving out for itself a large area of territory. But ultimately, its impact will flow as much from its challenge to established concepts of government, national sovereignty, and national identity. The Islamic State is most notable for the violence with which it asserts control, but its ruthless tactics will likely prevent the group from ruling effectively and building broader support beyond the front line fighters who protect its security and the authoritarian killers who patrol its streets. The Islamic State is a highly visible but clandestine organization. Despite the vast amount of publicity and analysis it has generated since 2011, verifiable facts concerning its leadership and structure remain few and far between. The picture is obscured by the misleading propaganda of the State itself and by the questionable accounts of people who claim to be familiar with it. It is a movement that has accelerated fast along the path from terrorism through insurgency towards proto-statehood, but it is also one that for all its bravado seems fearful that it could just as quickly be forced back underground. As a result, this paper relies on the group's own publications, the observations of defectors, and analysis by others who take an interest in its progress, despite the paucity of information. Nonetheless, The Soufan Group believes that enough is available to draw a useful picture of the evolution of the State, its structure and its operations, even though it may lack clarity and detail. The paper refers throughout to the organization as The Islamic State, being the name it uses to describe itself. The only alternative would be to call it by its Arabic acronym, commonly transliterated as Da'ish or Daesh (al Dawla al Islamiya fi al Iraq wa al Sham). Clearly, the use of its full name does not imply any endorsement or recognition of its self-description. Details: New York: Soufan Group, 2014. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 22, 2017 at: http://soufangroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/TSG-The-Islamic-State-Nov14.pdf Year: 2014 Country: International URL: http://soufangroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/TSG-The-Islamic-State-Nov14.pdf Shelf Number: 141177 Keywords: Extremist Groups Islamic State Radical Groups Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Snair, Justin Title: Countering Violent Extremism Through Public Health Practice: Proceedings of a Workshop Summary: Countering violent extremism consists of various prevention and intervention approaches to increase the resilience of communities and individuals to radicalization toward violent extremism, to provide nonviolent avenues for expressing grievances, and to educate communities about the threat of recruitment and radicalization to violence. To explore the application of health approaches in community-level strategies to countering violent extremism and radicalization, the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine held a public workshop in September 2016. Participants explored the evolving threat of violent extremism and radicalization within communities across America, traditional versus health-centered approaches to countering violent extremism and radicalization, and opportunities for cross-sector and interdisciplinary collaboration and learning among domestic and international stakeholders and organizations. This publication summarizes the presentations and discussions from the workshop. Details: Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2017. 100p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 28, 2017 at: https://www.nap.edu/download/24638 Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: https://www.nap.edu/download/24638 Shelf Number: 141257 Keywords: Counter-Extremism Extremist Groups Public Health Radical Groups Terrorism Violence Prevention Violent Extremism

Author: Botha, Anneli Title: Understanding Nigerian citizens' perspectives on Boko Haram Summary: This monograph presents the findings of a study aimed at understanding Boko Haram from the perspective of ordinary Nigerian citizens. Using field and desktop research, the study analyses a cross section of perspectives on the political context of Boko Haram and the dynamics surrounding the group's existence. The study identifies complex factors, including financial incentives, that motivate individuals to join the group, and underscores the need for multifaceted and multi-layered responses. Details: Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2017. 112p. Source: Internet Resource: ISS Monograph Number 196: Accessed March 2, 2017 at: https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/monograph196.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Nigeria URL: https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/monograph196.pdf Shelf Number: 141292 Keywords: Boko Haram Citizen Attitudes Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Terrorist Recruitment Terrorists

Author: Ewi, Martin Title: Money Talks: A key reason youths join Boko Haram Summary: This policy brief is an overview of key findings from a study aimed at understanding violent extremism in northern Nigeria, and identifying factors that are key in Boko Haram recruitment and membership. This analysis contributes to knowledge about the political and socio-economic preferences of the individuals involved in the group. This policy brief highlights one of the major findings of the study, namely the perception that financial incentives, not religion, are a key motivator for individuals who join Boko Haram. Recommendations The following recommendations could assist the Nigerian government in combating Boko Haram: 1 Promoting a common Nigerian identity that transcends ethnic, religious and geographic lines by reviewing school curricula and programmes to mainstream national identity. 2 Declare, but don't negotiate the terms of amnesty with Boko Haram: government should declare a blanket amnesty for low- and mid-level Boko Haram militants who may wish to give up arms. 3 Establishing a criminal tribunal to investigate and prosecute Boko Haram militants and others who bear the greatest responsibility for the group’s atrocities. 4 Preventing and combating sources of radicalisation by working with local communities and religious leaders to identify strategies for dissuading vulnerable individuals from turning to violent extremism Details: Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2017. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: Police Brief 98: Accessed march 2, 2017 at: https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/policybrief98.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Nigeria URL: https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/policybrief98.pdf Shelf Number: 141293 Keywords: Boko Haram Extremism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Socioeconomic Conditions and Crime Terrorist Recruitment Violent Extremism

Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Title: Handbook on the Management of Violent Extremist Prisoners and the Prevention of Radicalization to Violence in Prisons Summary: This Handbook is one of a series of tools developed by UNODC to support Member States in the implementation of the rule of law and the development of criminal justice reform. It is designed to be used by prison managers and prison staff, in particular, but will also be relevant for other actors involved in the criminal justice system, such as policymakers, legislators and members of non-governmental organizations. It can be used in a variety of contexts, both as a reference document and as the basis for staff training. While some elements of the Handbook may not be achievable immediately in some jurisdictions, particularly in post-conflict situations, the Handbook provides national authorities with guidelines for the development of policies and protocols that meet international standards and good practice. This Handbook constitutes the first technical guidance tool to addresses the manifestation of radicalization to violence and violent extremism in prison settings at the level of the United Nations. It provides practical guidance on: • The management of violent extremist prisoners (prisoners who have embraced violent extremism) • Preventing the progression to violent extremism in prisons (prisoners who may be vulnerable to radicalization to violence) • Interventions aimed at disengaging violent extremist prisoners from violence and at facilitating their social reintegration upon release. Within these parts, the Handbook covers key prison management policies and mechanisms, such as the need for: overall prison conditions to be in line with international minimum standards; effective assessment and classification systems; physical, procedural and dynamic security; professional prison staff training; fair, humane and non-discriminatory treatment; preventing corruption; various categories of disengagement interventions involving experts from different disciplines; and social reintegration and post-release support. Overall, the Handbook advocates an approach aimed at strengthening these key components of prison management. Not only is such an approach explicitly called for in the international good practice documents, it also provides value by creating sustainable benefits for the entire prison system. The following considerations summarize the key principles underlying all recommendations made in the Handbook: • Adherence to fundamental rights, international standards, and good prison practice: It is crucial that any efforts in prison to address violent extremism must not lead to undermining human rights to which all persons, including violent extremist prisoners, are entitled. Under international human rights law, no exceptions or restrictions are permissible to the prohibition of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. Equally relevant is the protection of the right to hold an opinion and to have or adopt a religion or belief of one’s choice,1 although certain manifestations may be subject to limitations, if strictly necessary and provided by law (e.g. for the protection of public order or the respect of others’ rights). At the same time, Member States should prohibit by law any propaganda for war and any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence. • Relevance of overall prison conditions and prison management: Guidance on the management of violent extremist prisoners and the prevention of radicalization to violence in prisons must ensure that any proposed intervention is closely embedded in broader prison reform efforts. Stand-alone disengagement interventions, which are implemented in isolation of the broader prison context are unlikely to yield positive results, in particular if the latter fails to adhere to international standards and norms. Vulnerability to radicalization to violence is exacerbated in prisons that are overcrowded, understaffed, fail to provide basic services to prisoners, or are otherwise managed in a disorderly manner. • The importance of definitions and differentiation: This Handbook reiterates that prisoner radicalization, far from being a new phenomenon, is a very old issue which is not in itself a threat to the prison administration or society if not connected to violence. Not all radicalization is negative or a precursor to violent extremism. Only a very small number of radicals actually become violent extremists. Definitions and differentiation are important, therefore, when dealing with the sensitive topic of (violent) extremism and radicalization (to violence), in particular in order to differentiate between thought and action. • Specific challenges posed by violent extremist prisoners: The above notwithstanding, prison managers should not forget that while both violent extremists and other criminals may employ violence to attain specific goals, most violent extremists are motivated by ideological, religious, or political gain, and believe that they are fighting for a cause. This can have a significant impact on the way violent extremist prisoners should be managed, as this Handbook will set out. The focus of this Handbook is on adult male and female violent extremist prisoners. The specific issue of children alleged as, accused of, or recognized as having committed violent extremist offences will be dealt with in a separate UNODC publication, recognizing the different legal regime applicable to children deprived of their liberty. Collective disengagement from violent extremism is also not covered in this Handbook, as its focus is on the individual prisoner and interventions aimed at individual disengagement from violence. Groups may also abandon their use of violent methods, but the reasons for them doing so are not necessarily the same as when an individual disengages from violence. Details: New York: UNODC, 2016. 160p. Source: Internet Resource: Criminal Justice Handbook Series; Accessed March 2, 2017 at: https://www.unodc.org/pdf/criminal_justice/Handbook_on_VEPs.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: https://www.unodc.org/pdf/criminal_justice/Handbook_on_VEPs.pdf Shelf Number: 141300 Keywords: Correctional Administration Extremist Groups Extremist Prisoners Extremists Prison Violence Radical Groups Radicalization

Author: Salifu, Uyo Title: Boko Haram and violent extremism: Perspectives from peacebuilders Summary: The atrocities unleashed by Boko Haram since 2009 have affected millions of people in Nigeria and the region as a whole. This policy brief presents the results of a field-based study on peacebuilders' perspectives of the drivers of violent extremism; and the underlying socio-economic and political factors that influence individuals to join Boko Haram. The study reveals that peacebuilders consider religious dynamics as the most influential factor in individuals' decision to join the terrorist group. As such, the study reveals that peacebuilders' views regarding the drivers of violent extremism are often markedly different to those expressed by former Boko Haram members themselves. Details: Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2017. 16p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Brief 97: Accessed March 3, 2017 at: https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/policybrief97.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Nigeria URL: https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/policybrief97.pdf Shelf Number: 141318 Keywords: Boko Haram Extremist Groups Peacebuilders Radical Groups Violent Extremism

Author: Gartenstein-Ross, Daveed Title: Islamic State 2021: Possible Futures in North and West Africa Summary: The Islamic State (referred to in this report as ISIL) has seen its prospects in North and West Africa grow increasingly dim since early 2015. ISIL has experienced significant losses in North Africa in the past year, especially in Libya, which was once ISIL's most valuable territory outside of Syria and Iraq, and was home to the group’s unofficial African capital. Meanwhile, the Nigerian militant group popularly known as Boko Haram, which is ISIL's West Africa Province (ISWAP), has experienced major internal schisms, as different factions vie for resources, compete for the attention of ISIL's senior leadership, and renew longstanding personal, ideological and strategic disputes. But despite these setbacks, ISIL continues to pose a threat to North and West Africa, and is capable of mounting high-profile terrorist attacks in the region and beyond. Additionally, continued political instability and conflict in countries like Mali and Libya could undermine counter-ISIL efforts, and provide the group an opportunity to rebuild its networks and mount a resurgence. Indeed, two recent occurrences – the reemergence of ISIL in northern Mali and the group's temporary takeover of the town of Qandala in Puntland (a region in northeastern Somalia) – illustrate ISIL's ability to exploit ungoverned spaces and fragile states. It is possible that ISIL's global decline could also paradoxically help the group in North and West Africa, as state and non-state actors shift resources from combatting ISIL to other seemingly more urgent issues, giving ISIL the breathing room it needs to regenerate. Several factors will have a fundamental impact on ISIL’s future trajectory in North and West Africa: 1. The future of ISIL’s Sirte network: In order to survive and rebuild in North and West Africa, ISIL will likely need to preserve at least some of the militant infrastructure it developed during its year-plus in control of the Libyan city of Sirte. The Sirte network has been a key bridge between ISIL's Syria-Iraq leadership and its African allies, and ISIL has relied heavily on the Sirte network to maintain its patronage of its provinces (as ISIL refers to its affiliates) in the region. While ISIL has lost its foothold in Sirte, the group may be able to preserve some of the jihadist apparatus that had ruled and administered the city. 2. ISWAP's organizational dynamics: ISWAP's internal schisms threaten to cripple the group and weaken, if not sever, its ties to ISIL. The loss of its Nigerian province would be a major blow to ISIL's expansion efforts in Sub-Saharan Africa, and would further tarnish the group’s brand. Conversely, if ISWAP remains in ISIL's orbit, ISWAP could provide ISIL with a vehicle through which to expand its presence into other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, including Senegal and Mali. 3. The resilience of ISIL in northern Mali: ISIL's recent resurgence in northern Mali gives the group a new foothold at a time when it is struggling elsewhere in the region, and across the globe. But ISIL's presence in Mali remains tenuous, as both regional and French security forces, as well as rival al-Qaeda militants, will likely target ISIL. 4. Political stability in North Africa: ISIL's prospects in North Africa hinge to a considerable extent on the future of the region's politics, especially in Libya. Ongoing tensions between rival political and armed factions in Libya continue to threaten to escalate into a high-intensity civil conflict, with destabilizing effects for the rest of the region. Spillover from Libya would test Tunisia's already fragile young democracy. Algeria’s political future is similarly uncertain, given the lack of a clear successor to the ailing president, Abdelaziz Bouteflika. Political turmoil could provide ISIL with the opening it needs to rebuild its flagging networks. Details: Washington, DC: Foundation for Defense of Democracies, 2017. 48p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 4, 2017 at: http://www.defenddemocracy.org/content/uploads/documents/022017_DGR_ISIL_Report.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Africa URL: http://www.defenddemocracy.org/content/uploads/documents/022017_DGR_ISIL_Report.pdf Shelf Number: 141325 Keywords: Extremist Groups ISIL Islamic State Radical Groups Radical Violence Terrorism Terrorists

Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Countering Violent Extremism: Actions Needed to Define Strategy and Assess Progress of Federal Efforts Summary: Why GAO Did This Study - Violent extremism - generally defined as ideologically, religious, or politically - motivated acts of violence - has been perpetrated in the United States by white supremacists, anti-government groups, and radical Islamist entities, among others. In 2011, the U.S. government developed a national strategy and SIP for CVE aimed at providing information and resources to communities. In 2016, an interagency CVE Task Force led by DHS and DOJ was created to coordinate CVE efforts. GAO was asked to review domestic federal CVE efforts. This report addresses the extent to which (1) DHS, DOJ, and other key stakeholders tasked with CVE in the United States have implemented the 2011 SIP and (2) the federal government has developed a strategy to implement CVE activities, and the CVE Task Force has assessed progress. GAO assessed the status of activities in the 2011 SIP; interviewed officials from agencies leading CVE efforts and a non-generalizable group of community-based entities selected from cities with CVE frameworks; and compared Task Force activities to selected best practices for multi-agency efforts. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that DHS and DOJ direct the CVE Task Force to (1) develop a cohesive strategy with measurable outcomes and (2) establish a process to assess the overall progress of CVE efforts. DHS and DOJ concurred with both recommendations and DHS described the CVE Task Force's planned actions for implementation. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2017. 62p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-17-300: Accessed April 6, 2017 at: http://www.gao.gov/assets/690/683984.pdf Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/assets/690/683984.pdf Shelf Number: 144734 Keywords: Extremism Extremist Groups Muslims Radical Groups Terrorism Terrorists Violent Extremism

Author: Schomerus, Mareike Title: Countering violent extremism: Topic guide Summary: Definitions and concepts There is no consensus on what violent extremism is and how best to prevent or counter it. The term 'violent extremism' has become a catch-all for a number of phenomena, and there is considerable variation in how terminology is used. Radicalism, terrorism, and violent extremism are often used interchangeably, even though they describe different processes. The term violent extremism conflates belief and use of force. Critics also see the use of 'extremist' as always politically motivated: it can be used to denounce those that threaten the political status quo. Its use to describe primarily Islamist groups has obscured the fact that extremist beliefs and support for violence are found across different cultures, religions, and political situations. More attention is now being paid to, for example, right-wing or left-wing violent extremism. The breadth of definitions and debate may offer an opportunity for more creative policy and programme engagement. However, it can also encourage ad hoc policymaking. What we know about violent extremism Rigorous empirical research that would allow conclusive statements on violent extremism is rare, so extremist violence tends to be explained through untested theories. Political interests may also inform an explanation or definition. Causes of violent extremism are often divided into 'push' and 'pull' factors. This overlooks links between them, however, and can lead to over-generalisation. 'Individual' and 'community' factors are more useful categories - though still interconnected. Factors at the individual level include:  Personal relationships: These are important in spreading or reinforcing extremist ideas, and a radicalising peer group can provide a sense of belonging.  Beliefs, values and convictions: Extremist beliefs can be religious, spiritual, moral, or political and tend to express the conviction that a group, a way of life, or a political system needs to be challenged or destroyed. The perception of being denied recognition at a collective and personal level is considered critical.  Manipulation: Manipulation by extremist groups happens in a complex interplay of identity formation and other enabling factors. Whether there is a causal relationship between access to information (including to social media) and extremism is under-researched. This also challenges counter-approaches that use media strategies.  Trauma and humiliation: How emotions of humiliation and betrayal result in the reproduction of violence is a topic in urgent need of research. Factors at the community level include:  History and narratives: Legacies of oppression, subjugation, and interference by dominant powers matter. Sharing an oppression narrative with a community can create a sense of belonging in a marginalised situation.  Rejection of an external system: Externally imposed or international systems that are associated with injustice and humiliation can create resistance that can turn violent.  Governance: Poor/unjust governance can promote acceptance of an extremist group. Failure of a government to deliver services may enable violent extremists to establish safe havens.  Business and crime: Commercial interests can drive violent behaviour. Some extremist groups act as credit institutions where no others are available.  Marginalisation and lack of choices: Violence can be seen as a way of gaining more choices, an audible political voice, or a stronger economic position. Those who join violent extremist groups come from diverse backgrounds and arrive via different paths. Violent extremism is not the consequence of a long-term political or religious 'maturation'. There is no straightforward link between violent extremism and religious faith or specific practices. Many of those radicalising have only a faint grasp of the holy texts of the religion they are purportedly defending. This highlights that a belief - which can be a strong driver of violence - is not to be equated with a religious faith based on the interpretation of scriptures. A large-scale public opinion survey in Pakistan found neither religious practice nor support for political Islam was related to support for violent extremist groups. A direct link between education and specific attitudes has not been established: lack of education does not cause extremist views. Neither radicalisation nor state collapse necessarily leads to violent extremism. Some scholars argue that in a situation of collapse it is in fact more difficult for extremist ideologies to gain traction. Violent extremism involves local, regional and international dimensions, so strategies to tackle it are needed at different levels. Details: Birmingham, UK: GSDRC, University of Birmingham, 2017. 37p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 12, 2017 at: http://www.gsdrc.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/CVE.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: http://www.gsdrc.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/CVE.pdf Shelf Number: 144892 Keywords: Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Violent Extremism

Author: Basra, Rajan Title: Criminal Pasts, Terrorist Futures: European Jihadists and the New Crime-Terror Nexus Summary: About this Study - The presence of former criminals in terrorist groups is neither new nor unprecedented. But with Islamic State and the ongoing mobilisation of European jihadists, the phenomenon has become more pronounced, more visible, and more relevant to the ways in which jihadist groups operate. In many European countries, the majority of jihadist foreign fighters are former criminals. - The purpose of this report is to describe the nature and dynamics of the crime-terror nexus, and understand what it means. To do so, a multi-lingual team of ICSR researchers compiled a database containing the profiles of 79 recent European jihadists with criminal pasts. - What we have found is not the merging of criminals and terrorists as organisations but of their social networks, environments, or milieus. Criminal and terrorist groups have come to recruit from the same pool of people, creating (often unintended) synergies and overlaps that have consequences for how individuals radicalise and operate. This is what we call the new crime-terror nexus. Radicalisation and Recruitment - The profiles and pathways in our database suggest that the jihadist narrative - as articulated by the Islamic State - is surprisingly well-aligned with the personal needs and desires of criminals, and that it can be used to curtail as well as license the continued involvement in crime. - For up to ten of the individuals in our database, we found evidence for what we termed the 'redemption narrative': jihadism offered redemption for crime while satisfying the same personal needs and desires that led them to become involved in it, making the 'jump' from criminality to terrorism smaller than is commonly perceived. - Whether or not jihadist groups are reaching out to criminals as a deliberate strategy remains unclear. Prisons - Fifty-seven per cent of the individuals in our database (45 out of 79 profiles) had been incarcerated prior to their radicalisation, with sentences ranging from one month to over ten years, for various offences from petty to violent crime. More significantly, at least 27 per cent of those who spent time in prison (12 out of 45 profiles) radicalised there, although the process often continued and intensified after their release. - Our database highlights different ways in which prisons matter: (1) they are places of vulnerability in which extremists can find plenty of 'angry young men' who are 'ripe' for radicalisation; (2) they bring together criminals and terrorists, and therefore create opportunities for networking and 'skills transfers'; and (3) they often leave inmates with few opportunities to re-integrate into society. - Given the recent surge in terrorism-related arrests and convictions, and the rapidly expanding number of convicted terrorists in custody, we are convinced that prisons will become more - rather than less - significant as 'breeding grounds' for the jihadist movement. 'Skills Transfers' - There are many 'skills' that terrorists with criminal pasts may have developed. For example, criminals tend to have experience in dealing with law enforcement, and more importantly, may be familiar with the limits of police powers. Criminals are also innovative, and often have an ability to control nerves and handle pressure. - Beyond these, there are three 'skills' which our database provides evidence for: (1) that individuals with a criminal past tend to have easier access to weapons; (2) that they are adept at staying 'under the radar' and planning discreet logistics; and (3) that their familiarity with violence lowers their (psychological) threshold for becoming involved in terrorist acts. Financing - The vast majority of terrorist attacks in Europe does not require large sums of money or rely on the largesse of Islamic State's leadership or central command. Whether small-scale or sophisticated, as part of its wider strategy, Islamic State and other jihadist groups are trying to keep financial barriers to entry low, making it possible for all their supporters - no matter how rich or poor - to participate. - Jihadists not only condone the use of 'ordinary' criminality to raise funds, they have argued that doing so is the ideologically correct way of waging 'jihad' in the 'lands of war'. Combined with large numbers of former criminals in their ranks, this will make financing attacks through crime not only possible and legitimate but, increasingly, their first choice. - Already, up to 40 per cent of terrorist plots in Europe are at least part-financed through 'petty crime', especially drug-dealing, theft, robberies, the sale of counterfeit goods, loan fraud, and burglaries. Based on our database, jihadists tend to continue doing what they are familiar with, which means that terrorist financing by criminal means will become more important as the number of former criminals is increasing. Details: London, United Kingdom : International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, 2016. 56p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 21, 2017 at: http://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/ICSR-Report-Criminal-Pasts-Terrorist-Futures-European-Jihadists-and-the-New-Crime-Terror-Nexus.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Europe URL: http://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/ICSR-Report-Criminal-Pasts-Terrorist-Futures-European-Jihadists-and-the-New-Crime-Terror-Nexus.pdf Shelf Number: 145139 Keywords: Extremism Extremist Groups Jihadists Radicalization Terrorism Terrorist Financing Terrorist Recruitment Terrorists

Author: Swedberg, Jeffrey Title: Mid-Term Evaluation of USAID's Counter-Extremism Programming in Africa Summary: Based on a review of quantitative and qualitative information and data from the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP), it can be concluded that USAID-s Niger, Chad and Mali programs have had some positive impact - most strikingly on lower-level programmatic goals such as civic engagement and listenership for USAID-sponsored radio. Results on higher-level goals, measured through surveys on attitudes towards extremism, were also positive in the aggregate but less dramatic. Despite this empirical evidence of program impact, implementation of the TSTCP has coincided with a worsening of the terrorist threat in parts of the Sahel, indicating a continued need for counter-extremism programming. Background - In 2010, USAID's Bureau for Africa commissioned AMEX International and its subcontractor, the QED Group LLC, to conduct a mid-term evaluation of USAID's counterextremism-programming in Africa, focusing on the TSCTP. The evaluation team was composed of Team Leader Jeffrey Swedberg (QED Group LLC) and Peace and Security Specialist Steven A. Smith (AMEX consultant). The Sahel has been a concern to USG policy makers for several years as a possible staging area for violent extremists. These fears are becoming more pronounced as Mauritania, Niger and Mali have all experienced a worrisome uptick in kidnappings and killings of foreigners, while Chad continues to be plagued by chronic instability. To counter extremist forces in the Sahel, USAID has worked for the past five years in concert with the Departments of Defense and State on the TSCTP. The USG's interagency strategy is aimed at defeating terrorist organizations and their ability to gain recruits by (a) strengthening regional counter-terrorism capabilities; (b) enhancing and institutionalizing cooperation among the region's security forces; (c) promoting good governance; (d) discrediting terrorist ideology; and (e) reinforcing bilateral military ties. USAID implements the non-military portions of this partnership in cooperation with State and Defense. USAID's current TSCTP activities include: a regional multi-sector Peace for Development (PDEV) program in Niger and Chad (and in Mauritania until activities were suspended), implemented by the Academy for Educational Development (AED); and community development activities in Mali, implemented by multiple partners. For USAID, the program seeks to provide tangible benefits to populations, particularly youth, at risk for recruitment by violent extremist (VE) organizations and communities in at-risk regions through youth employment and outreach programs, vocational skills training, and community development and media activities. The program also gathers beneficiaries from different communities, ethnic groups, and countries together through outreach events on topics related to religion and tolerance. Methodology - The evaluators developed qualitative information (focus groups and key informant interviews) and quantitative data (surveys), and conducted an in-depth review of literature and past reports. Utilizing a quasi-experimental design, this impact evaluation analyzed survey data to determine if treatment populations in Niger, Chad and Mali, where TSCTP programming was present, had more favorable responses to the survey questionnaire than comparison populations in areas where less TSCTP programming had been present. In all, the evaluators analyzed the results of 1,064 surveys administered in five treatment and four comparison clusters across three countries. The evaluators used the same survey mechanism in both Niger and Chad, and a slightly different version in Mali. The questions for the surveys were chosen from previous questionnaires that had been administered in these countries before, allowing for comparison with baseline data. These - source surveys included the 2009 PDEV Baseline Survey for Niger and Chad; the Afrobarometer for Mali; and the Public Attitudes in the Sahel 2007-2008 survey commissioned by AFRICOM for all three countries. The survey questions were designed so that the most favorable answer to each question would be coded as a -- with the least favorable answer coded as a .... This system allows comparability of analysis of questions or groupings of questions, which are averaged to produce a score on the 1-5 Likert Scale . In order to measure these results, the evaluation team surveyed households identified as ―treatment‖ clusters, and -comparison clusters.‖ The survey was administered by trained enumerators in the local language of the community. Survey Results - While results from this quasi-experimental survey design cannot be considered definitive proof of impact, the findings are consistent with existing literature on the TSTCP. According to the surveys, the program appears to be having modest yet significant impact across all three countries. The graphic on the following page (Figure 1) highlights the differences on the survey questions shared in all three countries covered by this evaluation - The differences between treatment and comparison areas, when shown on a one to five scale, are modest - an average of 5.67% in aggregate in favor of the treatment clusters. However, the impact appears mostly consistent across countries. The biggest impact for all three countries came on the survey question regarding whether respondents listen to TSCTP-sponsored peace and tolerance radio. Since residents of all treatment and comparison clusters were in broadcast range of these radio signals, data indicates that complementary TSCTP programming, such as governance, youth, micro-enterprise, religious outreach and education, significantly boosts listener-ship. Scores on whether respondents -participate in decision-making - , a governance indicator, indicate significant results for Mali, where there has been a long-standing governance program, as well as for Chad where governance and civil society has been a focus of PDEV and its predecessor program. The level of - satisfaction with services, -- a key socio-economic indicator, shows marginal but positive results across the countries. The aggregated AFRICOM cultural questions - measuring respondents' views on the degree to which they were against Al Qaeda; against violence in the name of Islam; their opinion of the United States; whether they approved of working with West to combat terrorism; and felt that the U.S. was fighting terrorism not Islam - measure progress on the hardest goals to achieve, and are arguably the most important indicators for demonstrating TSCTP's long-term impact. Predictably, the differences between treatment and comparison areas are the smallest on the cultural/attitudinal questions. However, the relatively better results for Chad and Niger over Mali may indicate the value of having a holistic TSTCP program, in which programs directed at the various drivers of VE are more intensively coordinated but less integrated with other USAID programming. Details: Washington, DC: United States Agency for International Development, 2011. 110p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 13, 2017 at: http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pdacr583.pdf Year: 2011 Country: Africa URL: http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pdacr583.pdf Shelf Number: 145465 Keywords: Counter-Extremism Counter-Terrorism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Terrorism Terrorist Recruitment Violent Extremism

Author: Zeiger, Sara Title: Undermining Violent Extremist Narratives in South East Asia: A How-To Guide Summary: The aim of this compendium is to provide guidance and insight for practitioners, policymakers, governments and civil society organizations in South East Asia that are interested in developing counter-narratives and alternative narratives to the messaging produced by violent extremists. The compendium will draw on international good practice and lessons learned to inform and inspire these actors to utilize the most effective methods and strategies. The compendium begins with a step-by-step approach to counter-narratives, with clear examples from South East Asia. The compendium then dives deeper into several case studies, highlighting elements of good practice from the region before presenting a detailed annex of 80 existing counter-narratives from South East Asia (Annex 3). It should be noted that the narratives and subsequent analysis of the narratives and counter-narratives contained in this report mostly focus on violent extremism of groups that claim to be Islamic, primarily because the majority of the threats posed by violent extremist groups in South East Asia fall under this category. However, this is not to say that violent extremism only relates to the above category, and there are case examples from other non-Islamic forms of violent extremism. For a more robust assessment of the threats of violent extremism in the region, refer to Annex 2: Violent Extremism in South East Asia. It is important to establish the terminology that has been adopted throughout the compendium. The term "narrative" generally refers to the story or recruitment pitch of violent extremists, whereas "counter-narrative" generally refers to the story or counter-argument utilized to reduce the appeal of violent extremism. Counter-narratives include counter-arguments as well as positive, alternative narratives and government strategic communications. The contents of this compendium rely on a number of sources: 1) research on the academic and policy literature conducted by the author; 2) an expert workshop on "South East Asia Counter-Narratives for Countering Violent Extremism (CVE)" hosted by Hedayah and the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation (JCLEC) in Semarang, Indonesia in March 2016 and the subsequent report;1 and 3) a consultation process on draft versions of the compendium with regional experts and policymakers from the region. Details: Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates: Hedayah Center, 2016. 45p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 13, 2017 at: http://www.hedayahcenter.org/Admin/Content/File-3182016115528.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Asia URL: http://www.hedayahcenter.org/Admin/Content/File-3182016115528.pdf Shelf Number: 145466 Keywords: Counter-Extremism Extremist Groups Terrorism Terrorists Violent Extremism

Author: Buchanan-Clarke, Stephan Title: Violent extremism in Africa: Public opinion from the Sahel, Lake Chad, and the Horn Summary: Over the past two decades, the threat posed by violent extremist groups that espouse fundamentalist religious narratives has grown substantially across Africa (Hallowanger, 2014). The colonial era and the undemocratic rule that characterized many post-independence governments generated anti-Western and jihadist movements across the Middle East and the wider Islamic world (Moore, 2016). These movements advocate conservative religious rule as a cure for modern societies' social ills. By the 1990s, these ideologies had begun to spread to Africa, where porous borders, poor security apparatuses, weak governance, corruption, ethnic divisions, and high youth unemployment created conditions under which violent extremist groups thrived (Institute for Economics & Peace, 2014). In Nigeria and Somalia, for example, violent extremist organisations began as ethnically homogenous movements with purely domestic concerns - the overthrow of their respective governments. Over time they have evolved toward more ambitious political goals and established an active presence in neighbouring states. These groups generally favour border regions due to lower levels of government presence and security, which facilitate illicit networks and vulnerable border communities. Such a situation challenges not only the internal stability of many countries, but also the stability of the broader region. Moreover, links between national and international jihadist groups have increased over the past decade. In 2012, al Shabaab declared allegiance to al Qaeda, but there has been recent infighting over whether to shift this allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). In early 2015, the Nigerian group Boko Haram publicly declared allegiance to ISIL leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (Guardian, 2015). These international networks not only help these groups with material and operational support, but also build their credibility within the broader jihadist movement, thereby facilitating international recruitment (CNN, 2015). Security-led approaches have largely failed to contain the geographic footprint of violent extremists in sub-Saharan Africa. This has prompted the emergence of more development-oriented approaches, such as countering violent extremism (CVE) and preventing violent extremism (PVE) initiatives, which seek to address root political and socioeconomic causes of extremism (Zeiger & Aly, 2015). In the past two years, both the United States and the European Union have officially outlined their approaches to CVE. 1 Several initiatives have also emerged on the African continent, including Nigeria's Soft Approach to Countering Terrorism (NACTEST). These development-oriented approaches place emphasis on the environments in which violent extremism thrives. Public opinion research offers insight into violent extremism's impact on ordinary citizens by presenting their perceptions, attitudes, and policy preferences. It also allows researchers to identify areas and populations in which possible drivers of extremism, such as low levels of social cohesion or high levels of distrust toward the state, are present. Afrobarometer's Round 6 surveys in 2014/2015 asked security-related questions in several countries that have experienced growth in violent extremism in recent years. This paper provides exploratory analysis of new opinion data from three of sub-Saharan Africa's regional "hotspots" of extremist activity, which are home to some of the continent's most prolific groups: 1. Boko Haram in the Lake Chad region (Cameroon, Niger, and Nigeria) 2. Ansar Dine, al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and al Mourabitoun (among others) in the Sahel region (Mali). 3. Al Shabaab in the Horn of Africa (Kenya and Uganda). Afrobarometer survey data suggest that security-related issues are a top priority for citizens of countries that have experienced high levels of extremist activity. Public trust in security forces varies widely by country; trust is generally lower in the police than in the army. Public approval of government counter-extremist efforts ranged from about four in 10 in Nigeria and Kenya to three-fourths or more in Mali, Cameroon, Niger, and Uganda. Support for strengthening military responses and capabilities was high in all countries in which the question was asked. Among citizens' perceptions of what motivates people to join extremist groups, personal gain was a far more common response than religious beliefs. While the exploratory analysis presented here must be considered in light of changes in government and of evolving extremist and counter-extremist strategies, it suggests the value of tracking and expanding insights into citizens' perceptions and attitudes related to violent extremism. Details: Afrobarometer, 2016. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 13, 2017 at: http://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Policy%20papers/r6-afropaperno32-violent-extremism-in-ss-africa-en.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Africa URL: http://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Policy%20papers/r6-afropaperno32-violent-extremism-in-ss-africa-en.pdf Shelf Number: 145467 Keywords: Counter-Extremism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Terrorism Terrorists Violent Extremism

Author: Fenstermacher, Laurie Title: Countering Violent Extremism: Scientific Methods and Strategies Summary: It has now been five years since the events of the "Arab Spring," and initial optimism about lasting democratic reforms and an era of lessened tensions has been replaced by fear and skepticism. Many countries are now experiencing greater instability and violence than before. The vestiges of Al Qaeda in Iraq have morphed into the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (or the Levant)-ISIS or ISIL, sweeping through Iraq and Syria and leaving behind much death and destruction. The growth of violent extremism initiated by Al Qaeda and its radical interpretation of the Islamic ideology is continuing. ISIL's deft manipulation of social media to compel and mobilize individuals to act out violently is both remarkable and frightening. Research reveals important factors to consider as well as questions to ask when developing policies and strategies to counter violent extremism (CVE): 1. Are the CVE goals achievable? 2. Do we have the right balance between security and development/stabilization? Do we have the right balance between strategies to take violent extremists off the streets and those aimed at preventing extremists from becoming violent in the first place? 3. Do we understand why some strategies have failed to deliver significant reductions in extremist violence? Do we understand the potential unintended consequences of strategies (e.g., use of targeted killings, treatment in prison, etc.)? 4. Are we failing in execution of strategies-by not partnering enough or following when we should lead/leading when we should follow? Have we implemented strategies through smart partnerships-"whole of government" partnerships, partnerships with other countries, partnerships with the private sector, partnering with organizations and communities, etc.? 5. Are we failing to communicate effectively? Do we really seek to understand those with whom we are communicating? Should others be doing the communicating at times? Are our actions consistent with our words? Like most utopian movements, ISIL is riding the winds of change. It will be increasingly difficult for them to recruit new members as the focus shifts from expansion/change to maintenance/status quo. Consequently, the best solution to countering ISIL may be to take an approach that will minimize the potential for unintended outcomes. A "whack a mole" strategy may result in further metastasis of violent extremism. It is imperative to avoid unwittingly serving as the "common enemy" and thus igniting a much larger, sectarian conflict. Queen Rania recently said, "What the extremists want is to divide our world along fault lines of religion and culture...this is about all of us coming together to defend our way of life." Likewise, keeping the conversation at the "binary," Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Air Force, 2015. 202p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 15, 2017 at: https://info.publicintelligence.net/ARL-CounteringViolentExtremism.pdf Year: 2015 Country: International URL: https://info.publicintelligence.net/ARL-CounteringViolentExtremism.pdf Shelf Number: 145473 Keywords: Al Qaeda Counter-Terrorism Countering-Extremism Extremist Groups ISIS Islamic State Radical Groups Terrorism Terrorists Violent Extremism

Author: Great Britain. Parliament. House of Commons. Home Affairs Committee Title: Hate Crime: Abuse, hate and extremism online Summary: Hate crime 1. Hate crime is defined as any criminal offence which is perceived, by the victim or any other person, to be motivated by hostility or prejudice based on a personal characteristic. Hate crime can be motivated by disability, gender identity, race, religion or faith and sexual orientation. The inquiry 2. We announced this inquiry into hate crime and its violent consequences in early July 2016. Our decision to undertake the inquiry followed the murder of Jo Cox MP in June in the lead-up to the EU referendum. There was also evidence of an increase in the number of attacks on people from ethnic minorities and of non-British nationality, including on their community centres and places of worship, immediately following the referendum. In addition, our inquiry into antisemitism was already under way, which was raising serious questions about how to address wider issues around the actions of those holding extremist or fixated views. It therefore seemed particularly timely and necessary to launch this inquiry. 3. We have received a large volume of written evidence. We have taken oral evidence on a wide range of issues including Islamophobia, misogyny, far-right extremism, the role of social media in hate crime and the particular issues faced by Members of Parliament in relation to hate crime and its violent manifestations. Our witnesses have included academics, community organisations, social media companies, police forces and their representative organisations, the principal Deputy Speaker of the House of Commons, and Ministers. We are grateful to everyone who has contributed to the inquiry. 4. The announcement by the Prime Minister on 18 April that she would seek a General Election on 8 June means that we have not had time to consider our conclusions on the wide range of issues raised during the inquiry. We hope that the Home Affairs Select Committee in the next Parliament is able to consider this evidence further and propose wider recommendations on tackling hate crime and some of the central issues that emerged in our hearings, including far-right extremism and islamophobia. We are publishing this short report in the meantime to address one aspect of our inquiry - the role of social media companies in addressing hate crime and illegal content online - on which we have taken considerable evidence and where we want our conclusions to inform the early decisions of the next Government, as well as the immediate work of social media companies. 5. We also wished to record our deep sadness about the tragic death of Jo Cox MP and we hope that in the next Parliament the Home Affairs Committee will also look further at the risks from hate, abuse and extremism in public life. Details: London: House of Commons, 2017. 34p. Source: Internet Resource: Fourteenth Report of Session 2016-17: Accessed May 16, 2017 at: https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmhaff/609/609.pdf Year: 2017 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmhaff/609/609.pdf Shelf Number: 145484 Keywords: Extremism Extremist Groups Far-Right Extremism Hate Crimes Islamophobia Online Victimization Social Media

Author: Centre for the Prevention of Radicalization Leading to Violence Title: Women and Violent Radicalization: Research Report Summary: Highlights - Women are victims of all forms of violent radicalism, but can also be participants, or active accomplices, of violence in the name of an ideology. - Pursuant to the mandate in the 2015-2018 Government Action Plan, Radicalization in Quebec: Act, Prevent, Detect and Live Together, the Secretariat a la condition feminine (SCF) and the Conseil du statut de la femme (CSF) were asked to collaborate in defining the angle and scope of the present study, whose purpose is to document the differentiated radicalization factors among women and men in Quebec. The CSF and SCF also drew on the expertise of the Centre for the Prevention of Radicalization Leading to Violence (CPRLV) for empirical information. - Radicalization leading to violence is a complex process whereby people adopt a system of extreme beliefs and a willingness to use, encourage or facilitate violence, to promote an ideology, political project or cause as a means of social transformation. - Throughout history, women have been involved in violent radicalism, whether during the French Revolution, in extreme left-wing or right-wing movements, nationalist groups like the Tamil Tigers, or revolutionary groups like the FARC in Colombia. The violent radicalization of women is not a new phenomenon. - Despite the historical presence of women in violent extremist movements, and episodes of political violence perpetrated by them, violent radicalism is a marginal phenomenon among women in comparison to men. - Often viewed through the distorting lens of gender stereotypes and a presumption of passivity, women who join radical groups, or who engage directly in political violence, should not be thought of exclusively as victims, since they are also active participants. To understand their choices, we must explore the particular paths they have taken. The scholarly literature and most media reports have long seen radical women as manipulated and subservient to men, who are seen as the "true" drivers and actors of violent radical movements. - The current phenomenon of women involved with jihadist groups in Syria rarely escapes the interpretive grid by which radicalized young Western women become little more than stereotypes, naive, manipulated, controlled by romantic urges, dependent on the men who have indoctrinated them. That approach reduces a complex phenomenon to a caricatural explanation, denying women any form of agency. It also contributes to the belief that women who are recent immigrants are by definition more submissive toward men than women who are not. In contrast, a postcolonial approach avoids this simplistic, erroneous view of immigrant women by considering the perspective of those directly concerned. Details: Montreal: Conseil du statut de la femme, 2016. 102p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 17, 2017 at: https://www.csf.gouv.qc.ca/wp-content/uploads/radicalisation_recherche_anglais.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Canada URL: https://www.csf.gouv.qc.ca/wp-content/uploads/radicalisation_recherche_anglais.pdf Shelf Number: 145556 Keywords: Extremist Groups Immigrant Women Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Violent Extremism

Author: Ginkel, Bibi T. van Title: Engaging Civil Society in Countering Violent Extremism: Experiences with the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy Summary: In this ICCT Research Paper Dr. Bibi van Ginkel takes an in depth look at how multi‐lateral institutions, engage with civil society to counter violent extremism. Dr.van Ginkel argues that civil society can play a crucial role in preventing and countering violent extremism in numerous ways - by working on development programs, through their work in conflict transformation, in providing a platform to raise political grievances and to facilitate dialogue, or through their work in empowering victims and survivors of terrorism. The paper finds that over the last decade there has been a more intensive coordination of activities between the UN and other multi‐lateral organisations and civil society but the question remains whether the implementation as well as the drafting of these policies will live up to their potential effectiveness. This paper gauges how effective these measures have been and what more there is to do. The final section concludes with a series of policy recommendations Details: The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2012. 14p. Source: Internet Resource: ICCT Research Paper: Accessed May 24, 2017 at: https://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-Van-Ginkel-Civil-Society-in-CVE-August-2012.pdf Year: 2012 Country: International URL: https://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-Van-Ginkel-Civil-Society-in-CVE-August-2012.pdf Shelf Number: 145749 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Extremist Groups Terrorists Violent Extremism

Author: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization Title: Preventing violent extremism through education: A guide for policy-makers Summary: Over the past years, the number of reported attacks perpetrated by violent extremist groups has risen. As we witness tragedies on all continents, we understand that violent extremism knows no boundaries and affects every society. Young people are, however, most at risk. They are the main targets of recruitment strategies and fall victim to extremist violence. This phenomenon alerts us to the risk of losing a generation of youth to despair and disengagement. In the face of such threats, there is no single solution. Security responses are important, but not sufficient, and will not tackle the many underlying conditions that breed violent extremism and drive youth to join violent extremist groups. We need soft power, such as education. In particular, we need relevant, inclusive and equitable quality education. This is the sine qua non to effective action and requires countries to simultaneously implement short, medium and long-term responses. To assist countries in their efforts, UNESCO has developed this publication Preventing violent extremism through education: A guide for policy-makers. The Guide also responds to the decision of UNESCO's Executive Board at its 197th session (197 EX/Dec46) through which Member States acknowledged the importance of preventing violent extremism through education and requested that UNESCO assist them in this endeavour. Together with the Teachers' Guide on the Prevention of Violent Extremism produced by UNESCO, this Guide offers technical guidance for education professionals (policy-makers, teachers and various education stakeholders) on how to address the concrete challenges posed by violent extremism within each society. The Guide particularly aims to help policy-makers within ministries of education to prioritize, plan and implement effective preventive actions. Details: Paris: UNESCO, 2017. 72p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 26, 2017 at: http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0024/002477/247764e.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0024/002477/247764e.pdf Shelf Number: 145803 Keywords: Crime Prevention Educational Programs Extremist Groups Radical Groups Terrorist Recruitment Violence Prevention Violent Extremism

Author: Cachalia, Raeesah Cassim Title: Violent extremism in South Africa: Assessing the current threat Summary: Transnational extremist groups are expanding their networks across the globe. South Africa has been linked to al-Shabaab, al-Qaeda and, more recently, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, with 60-100 South Africans estimated to have joined the group. The country also has a history of violent extremism stemming from domestic grievances that remain prevalent. Based on interviews with 40 stakeholders, this brief examines the threat that violent extremism poses to South Africa and the government's response to this challenge. Recent years have shown the threat of violent extremism to be increasingly fluid in nature, and this development has challenged states to review their approach to the issue. While South Africa has not experienced a terrorist attack in over a decade, it is not immune to the global challenges posed by violent extremism. In the years following the 9/11 attacks in the United States (US), several allegations have emerged linking South Africa to international extremist organisations, along with incidents suggesting that South Africa has served as an operational base for individuals connected to extremist groups abroad. In addition, terror alerts issued by the US Diplomatic Mission to South Africa over the last two years have caused concern over potential attacks in the country. In 2014 the reach of international extremism became evident when reports emerged of South Africans travelling to the Middle East to join the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). South Africa has also faced local extremist threats, with the last known plot thwarted in 2012 when a far-right group planned an attack on the African National Congress' National Conference in Manguang. Collectively, these events have raised a number of questions around violent extremism in South Africa and the state's capacity to respond. While the threats previously posed by domestic extremist groups have diminished, new concerns have emerged relating to international extremist groups. This policy brief provides an overview of South Africa's post-apartheid experience of violent extremism and assesses the threat that violent extremism currently poses to the country. It also provides a brief overview of government responses to the challenge and highlights emerging concerns for violent extremism in South Africa. This policy brief examines preventing violent extremism as it relates to South Africa as an actor in the global community. This is one of a series of three focusing on violent extremism and South Africa. Details: Institute for Security Studies, 2017. 20p. Source: Internet Resource: Policy Brief, 2017: Accessed May 27, 2017 at: http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/resources/docs/ISS_Africa-sareport7.pdf Year: 2017 Country: South Africa URL: http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/resources/docs/ISS_Africa-sareport7.pdf Shelf Number: 145835 Keywords: Extremist Groups Radical Groups Terrorism Terrorists Violent Extremism

Author: Idris, Iffat Title: Women and countering violent extremism Summary: There is no consensus on the definition of countering violent extremism (CVE), in part because there is no consensus on the definition of violent extremism (Glazzard & Zeuthen, 2016; Striegher, 2015). The UN Secretary-General's Plan of Action on Preventing Violent Extremism (UN, 2015) does not provide one because consensus could not be reached due to the political sensitivities involved. A working definition cited in Foreign Affairs that encompasses the key concepts is: 'the use of non-coercive means to dissuade individuals or groups from mobilizing towards violence and to mitigate recruitment, support, facilitation or engagement in ideologically motivated terrorism by non-state actors in furtherance of political objectives'. The idea underpinning CVE is that violent extremists should not be fought exclusively with intelligence, police, and military means, but the structural causes of violent extremism must also be tackled (Frazer & Nunlist, 2015). Prevention is a major aspect of CVE, aiming to get at the root causes and factors that contribute to extremism and terrorism, by engaging with individuals, communities and others. 'It is not enough to counter violent extremism - we need to prevent it' (UNESCO2). This review looks at the role that women can play in CVE, lessons from programmes on women and CVE, donor policy guidance and programming approaches, and networks supporting women and CVE. Note that 'women' refers to women and girls: this is consistent with concepts of gender equality, gender violence, and so on, which all encompass both women and girls. (Moreover perceptions of when womanhood starts vary across cultures, with some considering puberty as the point at which a girl becomes a woman.) The available literature largely comprised of government and donor agency reports, think-tank papers and grey literature. Note that some literature refers to just women and CVE, and some to women and preventing/countering violent extremism (P/CVE). For each source, the review uses the term (CVE or P/CVE) used in that source. Details: Birmingham, UK: GSDRC, University of Birmingham, 2017. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: Helpdesk Research Report: Accessed June 2, 2017 at: http://www.gsdrc.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/HDR_1408.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: http://www.gsdrc.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/HDR_1408.pdf Shelf Number: 145907 Keywords: Counter-terrorism Countering Violent Extremism Extremist Groups Terrorism Violent Extremism

Author: Bondokji, Neven Title: Understanding Radicalisation: A Literature Review of Models and Drivers Summary: Interest in the drivers of, and models to explain, the processes of radicalisation has increased exponentially since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. Attention has focused on the West Asia North Africa (WANA) region due to the expansion and reach of armed radical groups, manifesting in acts of violence both domestically and aboard. Within the radicalisation debate, scholars and practitioners have wrestled to understand the ideologies that inspire the members of self-described 'Islamic' armed groups and other causal drivers, be they social, economic, or reactionary. While this has contributed to a diversity of literature on violent radicalism, terrorism, and extremism, there is little academic consensus let alone empirical studies to validate existing theories. This paper seeks to synthesise current knowledge on the drivers of radicalisation. It examines literature on radicalisation in the WANA region, Western states, Central Asia, and Africa. Because the aim is to understand these phenomena in relation to those joining Daesh (also known as ISIS, IS, ISIL), al-Nusra (generally considered al-Qaeda's Syrian branch), and their affiliates, the analysis focuses on radicalisation at the level of the individual, not radical organisations. The paper is divided into six sections. The first defines radicalisation. The second and third sections discuss the typologies of radicals and extant radicalisation models with particular emphasis on the factors that affect individuals. The fourth section examines the literature on political, socio-economic, social, and cultural drivers of radicalisation. It then identifies knowledge gaps and weaknesses in the existing literature, and makes suggestions on the development of a more reliable empirical evidence base on violent radicalisation. The principal findings are that radicalisation is a personal process that starts with grievances and perceived injustices concerning political or social contexts, the subsequent identity crisis and, lastly, the search for purpose that follows. Moreover, radicalisation should be understood in the context of 'push' and 'pull' factors. Such factors include those of a political, economic, and ideological nature, as well as psycho-social drivers, such as a search for adventure, status, and belonging. Radicalisation also develops within supporting social environments that include family influence and narratives of victimhood. These insights are important for the development of targeted and workable policy interventions to counter the growth of violent extremism. However greater empirical evidence is necessary, particularly geared towards capturing the family dynamics at work in the radicalisation process, the role of women and female preachers, the causal relations between single factors, and driver confluence. The key challenge is limited access to radical individuals and those who have participated in violence. Until this can be overcome, a comprehensive understanding of their motives will be difficult, thus limiting the development of effective policies and programs to counter violent extremism. Details: Amman, Jordan: WANA Institute, Royal Scientific Society, 2016. 30p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 6, 2017 at: http://wanainstitute.org/sites/default/files/publications/Understanding%20Radicalisation%20-%20A%20Literature%20Review%20of%20Models%20and%20Drivers_0.pdf Year: 2016 Country: International URL: http://wanainstitute.org/sites/default/files/publications/Understanding%20Radicalisation%20-%20A%20Literature%20Review%20of%20Models%20and%20Drivers_0.pdf Shelf Number: 145934 Keywords: Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Terrorist Recruitment Violent Extremism

Author: United States Agency for International Development Title: The Development Response to Violent Extremism and Insurgency: Putting Principles into Practice Summary: This policy on The Development Response to Violent Extremism and Insurgency is the first of its kind produced by USAID. Its purpose is to provide a policy framework that USAID can use to improve the effectiveness of its development tools in responding to violent extremism and insurgency, as well as its capacity to interact constructively with its interagency and other partners in these challenging environments. The policy will also help USAID focus more tightly on capacity building and sustainability which are critical to our long-term security and development goals. The policy defines terms necessary for a shared understanding within USAID of these challenges and differentiates at a general level between a development response to violent extremism and a development response to insurgency. At the same time, it acknowledges that each situation is different and that these terms and the development response will need to be defined and understood in their particular context and guided by U.S. foreign policy. Building on a growing knowledge base, the policy identifies those factors, or drivers, that can favor the rise of violent extremism or insurgency as well as those that can influence the radicalization of individuals. Broadly speaking, these include structural "push" factors, including high levels of social marginalization and fragmentation; poorly governed or ungoverned areas; government repression and human rights violations; endemic corruption and elite impunity; and cultural threat perceptions. Simultaneously, "pull" factors that have a direct influence on individual level radicalization and recruitment include access to material resources, social status and respect from peers; a sense of belonging, adventure, and self--esteem or personal empowerment that individuals and groups that have long viewed themselves as victimized and marginalized can derive from the feeling that they are making history; and the prospect of achieving glory and fame. The policy identifies what USAID has learned strategically and programmatically about the role of development assistance to counter these drivers and affect a country's development. In the context of the U.S. Global Development Policy and the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) on enhancing civilian power, the policy identifies ways that USAID can work with its interagency partners and amplify the development voice within the USG. It also emphasizes the importance of local partnership with committed stakeholders and enhanced engagement with bilateral counterparts and multilateral institutions. The policy affirms the importance of the development discipline to, and USAID's distinct and critical role in, addressing these critical national security and development challenges. This includes USAID's focus on sustainability and building ownership and capacity at all levels. If applied correctly, a development response can serve as an effective tool to address these issues. Details: Washington, DC: USAID, 2011. 23p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 6, 2016 at: http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pdacs400.pdf Year: 2011 Country: International URL: http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pdacs400.pdf Shelf Number: 145940 Keywords: Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Terrorists Violent Extremism

Author: Aldrich, Daniel P. Title: First Steps Towards Hearts and Minds? USAID's Countering Violent Extremism Policies in Africa Summary: The United States government has adopted new approaches to counter violent extremist organizations around the world. "Soft security" and development programs include focused educational training for groups vulnerable to terrorist recruitment, norm messaging through local radio programming, and job creation in rural communities. This article evaluates the effectiveness of one set of these multi-vectored, community-level programs through analysis of data from 200 respondents in two similar, neighboring cities in northern Mali, Africa. The data show that residents in Timbuktu who were exposed to the programming for up to five years displayed measurably altered civic behavior and listening patterns in comparison with their counterparts in the control city of Dire which had no programming (controlling for potential covariates including age, ethnicity, and political and socioeconomic conditions). However, there was little measurable difference between the groups in terms of their cultural identities and attitudes towards the West. This article suggests that the process of "winning hearts and minds" can be effective at certain levels but may require extended time and dedicated resources to have higher-level results. Details: West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University, 2012. 36p. Source: Internet Resource: http://docs.lib.purdue.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1008&context=gpridocs Year: 2012 Country: Africa URL: http://docs.lib.purdue.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1008&context=gpridocs Shelf Number: 146097 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism Extremist Groups Terrorism Violent Extremism

Author: Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies Title: Culture in Crisis: Preserving Cultural Heritage in Conflict Zones Summary: There is nothing new about the looting and destruction of cultural property. The Roman Emperor Titus looted and then razed the Jewish temple in Jerusalem, Napoleon shipped art taken during his conquests back to the Louvre, the Nazis and Soviets emptied museums and private collections, their fellow Americans have looted Native American sites. Even in peacetime, monuments like the Elgin marbles and the Pergamon Altar have found their way into foreign hands, often claiming to provide protection. The monuments and works of art that remain intact and in place from prior civilizations are only those that happened to survive. Twenty-first-century technology has, however, changed the scale and quality of the looting and destruction. When the Islamic State took over a large part of Syria and Iraq in 2014, it organized a massive effort to loot artifacts that could be transported and destroyed what it could of the rest. The objective was two-fold: to demonstrate disdain for the culture that preceded Islam and to enrich the Islamic State's financial resources. Modern technology, including high explosives and earth-moving equipment, and global transportation networks made this possible on a scale not previously attempted. Many thousands of sites were looted and their artifacts sold into a world market, major monuments were destroyed, and many millions of dollars flowed into Islamic State coffers. This appalling contemporary evolution of an age-old practice has attracted a good deal of public attention in the United States, Europe, and beyond. The 2001 Taliban destruction of the Bamian Buddhas and the looting of the Baghdad Museum after the 2004 invasion had sensitized Europeans and Americans, but they were still unprepared for the systematic, high-profile destruction that the Islamic State indulges in. The desire to "do something" was immediate and compelling. What to do is far less clear. That was the issue the Antiquities Coalition raised in December 2015 with six master's students at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) enrolled in a practicum on "cultural racketeering and cleansing." Antiquities Coalition wanted to know about best practices for law and law enforcement in the fight against the illicit antiquities trade, including what is done that works for nature conservation and historical preservation. Could easements or buying land be used to protect archaeological sites? How does the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) compare with the UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Import, Export, and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property? How can the UNESCO Convention be improved and strengthened? For those of us who live and work in the U.S., American government policy is an area of particular concern. Through the use of bilateral agreements, the U.S. has imposed import restrictions on archaeological material from 16 countries, in an effort to reduce the incentive for pillage by discouraging trade in undocumented cultural objects. What effect have these memoranda of understanding had on the antiquities market? On imports into the U.S.? The U.S. has not designated a lead agency for combatting the illicit antiquities trade. Duties currently fall variously to the Departments of Homeland Security, Justice, State, Treasury, and others. How can the government develop an internal reporting structure to better address interagency coordination - especially as antiquities trafficking relates to terrorist financing? International peacekeeping forces, whether through the United Nations or other intergovernmental organizations like NATO, could do more to protect cultural resources in times of instability. Have archaeological sites, museums, or other heritage sites ever been included in a peacekeeping mandate? Are there parallels for the protection of natural resources or even similar economic resources? What is the process for inclusion? The SAIS students divvied up these issues and worked through the spring 2016 semester to elucidate them, with guidance from their Antiquities Coalition "client." This small volume contains the results of their work, which was presented both to the Antiquities Coalition and publicly at SAIS in April 2016. We plan some further work in spring 2017 on these and related issues, in a practicum devoted to the broader issue of "Dealing With Extremists." The already ongoing implosion of the Islamic State and its control of territory should not lull us into forgetting the cultural destruction it has wrought. We should do what we can to beef up efforts to counter cultural racketeering and cleansing. The trade will continue with objects already looted and no doubt grow with the next insurgent onslaught. "Never Again" is a motto all too often observed in the breach. There will be a next time. We need to be ready for it. Details: Washington, DC: Johns Hopkins University; and The Antiquities Coalition, 2017. 150p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 14, 2017 at: http://media.wix.com/ugd/b976eb_fd1b6c924a3f4743897d6990327e99d1.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: http://media.wix.com/ugd/b976eb_fd1b6c924a3f4743897d6990327e99d1.pdf Shelf Number: 146167 Keywords: Antiquities Archaeological Sites Conflict Zones Cultural Property Extremist Groups Islamic State Looting Pillaging Terrorism

Author: Robinson, Eric Title: What Factors Cause Individuals to Reject Violent Extremism in Yemen? Summary: Why do some individuals become terrorists? Why do some choose to travel overseas to become foreign fighters and others remain home to engage in political violence? More than academic, the answers to these questions inform a central component of U.S. national security strategy: countering violent extremism. This report addresses the topic of radicalization - or individual motivations to engage in political violence-in Yemen. This report uses data from focus groups and a national survey conducted during the spring of 2016. Yemen is in the midst of a civil war. In the wake of the collapse of the government of Tunisia in 2011, Yemeni protesters took to the streets in major cities to protest the reelection of then-President Ali Abdullah Saleh. After protracted negotiations by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi, who was Saleh's vice president, took over the presidency in February 2012. By then, the internal strife had gained momentum. The Houthis, who had fought several wars against Saleh's forces, had used the unrest to expand from their stronghold in the Sa'ada governorate. They eventually seized the capital of Sana'a in September 2014. President Hadi and his forces retreated to Aden and southern Yemen, but the Houthis pushed south and assaulted Aden's international airport in March 2015. The civil war had begun. More than 10,000 people have died in Yemen's civil war. Nearly 2.2 million-out of a total population of 27 million-are internally displaced and an additional 200,000 are refugees overseas. Various nonstate armed groups exist. Some fight with the aforementioned Houthi movement. Others have joined the local al Qaeda affiliate, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Still, others are associated with the Islamic State. These armed groups fight against one another as well as the Yemeni military forces and those of the Arab coalition. With such a widespread conflict, it would be easy to understand the motivations of those who are sympathetic to, or become involved in, political violence. But rather than focus on support for political violence per se, the report looks at the other side of the coin - why individuals reject violent extremism in Yemen. It argues that the more effective approach to countering violent extremism is to reinforce a propensity toward nonviolence. Details: Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2017. 73p. Source: Internet Resource: accessed June 17, 2017 at: https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1700/RR1727/RAND_RR1727.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Yemen URL: https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1700/RR1727/RAND_RR1727.pdf Shelf Number: 146245 Keywords: Counter-Extremism Counter-Terrorism Extremist Groups Radicalization Terrorism Violent Extremism

Author: Vidino, Lorenzo Title: Fear Thy Neighbor: Radicalization and Jihadist Attacks in the West Summary: "What is coming is tougher and worse for the worshippers of the Cross and their helpers", the so-called Islamic State declared in its statement taking credit for the May 22, 2017 bombing of a crowded Manchester, England arena. Among the victims were scores of children and their parents - callously derided in the IS claim as "polytheists" and "Crusaders" attending "a profligate concert". Seven children perished, including an eight-year-old girl. It is worthwhile to recall that only a few years ago the end of terrorism was being heralded with the killing of bin Laden and advent of the Arab Spring. As one pundit then reassuringly pleaded, "So, can we all take a deep breath, stop cowering in fear of an impending caliphate, and put [the] problem of Islamic terrorism in perspective?". Today, there is indeed a very different perspective on this ongoing and, as some analysts believe, worsening threat: shaped not only by this most recent tragedy but by the events of the past two years that have seen a succession of attacks linked to IS convulse the West. Within the span of four weeks last summer, for instance, persons pledging or professing some allegiance to the IS were responsible for four terrorist incidents in three European countries that claimed the lives of more than 120 persons. It is too soon to tell whether the Manchester attack will prove to be a harbinger of another summer of tragedy and terrorism. But we now fortunately have a better understanding of this campaign along with an ability to anticipate the future evolution of the jihadist terrorist threat to the West as a result of the publication of Fear Thy Neighbor. Written by Lorenzo Vidino, Francesco Marone and Eva Entenmann, this report sheds important light on the historical record and characteristics of jihadist attacks against the West between 2014 and 2017. Among the study's most revealing findings is the United States' own prominence in this pantheon of Islamist terrorist attacks in the West as the country targeted most frequently after France - and with the second highest number of casualties. The report also incisively assesses the role of women and persons with criminal backgrounds in this campaign; the involvement of converts; and, most importantly the exact nature and dimensions of the ties between the attackers and the IS. The emergence of "radicalization hubs" in abetting or facilitating these heinous acts of violence is perhaps this work's single most important conclusion. Fear Thy Neighbor is an invaluable resource that will be of great use to scholars, students, governmental agencies, non-governmental and community organizations, and the media. It presents a sober and compelling depiction of this threat and the measures needed to counter it. Details: Milano, IT, Ledizioni LediPublishing, 2017. 108p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 21, 2017 at: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/FearThyNeighbor-RadicalizationandJihadistAttacksintheWest.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/FearThyNeighbor-RadicalizationandJihadistAttacksintheWest.pdf Shelf Number: 146333 Keywords: Counter-Radicalization Counter-Terrorism Extremist Groups Extremist Violence Islamic State Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Terrorists

Author: Police Executive Research Forum Title: Building Interdisciplinary Partnerships to Prevent Violent Extremism Summary: On June 17, 2015, nine people were shot and killed in Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church in Charleston, South Carolina. The shooter, 21-year-old Dylann Roof, reportedly hoped that his act of violence would spark a race war. In November 2015, Robert Dear left three people dead and four wounded after he opened fire on a Planned Parenthood facility in Colorado Springs, Colorado. At a court appearance following his arrest, Dear referred to himself as a "warrior for the babies." Two weeks later, 14 people were killed and 22 wounded in a terrorist attack in San Bernardino, California. The assailants, a married couple named Syed Riawan Farook and Tashfeen Malik, were self-identified supporters of the Islamic State (ISIL). Malik even proclaimed her loyalty to Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi on Facebook as their attack was under way. Acts of violence inspired by extremist ideologies are a real threat with which communities across the country are increasingly contending. In the wake of each of these attacks, our nation and others have been left to grapple with why they occurred and how they can be prevented. Increasingly, solutions for addressing these types of attacks have been found in partnerships among various types of government service providers-such as between the police and health and human services departments - as well as between government service providers and members of the community. The aims of these partnerships are to strengthen social cohesion within the community and to provide assistance to community members at risk of radicalization to violent extremism, diverting them from the path to violence. Violent extremism is not a problem that law enforcement agencies can solve through arrests and prosecutions alone. At a 2015 National Institute of Justice conference, called "Radicalization and Violent Extremism: Lessons Learned from Canada, the U.K., and the U.S.," researchers identified issues with identity, a desire for belonging, past trauma, personal connections to violent extremists and extremist narratives, and mental illness among some of the potential risk factors for radicalizing to violence. These are issues that police can address more effectively in cooperation with community leaders, social service providers, and other non-law enforcement stakeholders. To explore these issues, on September 18, 2015, the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) and the Department of Justice's Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS Office) held a forum on Building Interdisciplinary Partnerships to Prevent Violent Extremism. This forum, which took place in Minneapolis in partnership with the Hennepin County Sheriff's Office, the Minneapolis Police Department, and the Saint Paul Police Department, brought together police leaders and community partners from across the country to share their recommendations for how to build successful partnerships to prevent violent extremism. Details: Washington, DC: PERF, 2017. 81p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 28, 2017 at: https://ric-zai-inc.com/Publications/cops-w0829-pub.pdf Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: https://ric-zai-inc.com/Publications/cops-w0829-pub.pdf Shelf Number: 146441 Keywords: Extremist Groups Police-Community Partnerships Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Violent Extremism

Author: Youth Justice Board for England and Wales Title: Process Evaluation of Preventing Violent Extremism Programmes for Young People Summary: The original Prevent Strategy, launched by the previous Labour government in 2007, aimed to stop radicalisation, reduce support for terrorism and violent extremism and discourage people from becoming terrorists. The strategy had five central objectives, which were to: - challenge violent extremist ideology and support mainstream voices - disrupt those who promote violent extremism and support the institutions where they are active - support individuals who are being targeted and recruited to the cause of violent extremism1 - increase the resilience of communities to violent extremism - address the grievances which ideologues are exploiting. In 2008, under the original Prevent Strategy, the Youth Justice Board (YJB) secured resources from the Office of Security and Counter Terrorism (OSCT) at the Home Office to fund the development of programmes within youth offending teams (YOTs) and the secure estate to prevent at-risk young people (primarily young Muslims) from becoming involved in Islamic radicalisation and violent extremism. The money was directed towards YOTs located in areas which intelligence suggested were at the highest risk of violent extremism. For the most part, the projects were given responsibility for designing their own interventions within the parameters of the 2007 Prevent objectives and with the OSCT exercising high-level oversight. The aims of this evaluation, which was commissioned by the YJB, were to: - collate and assess the existing evidence relating to preventing violent extremism (PVE) - describe and evaluate the implementation of the funded PVE programmes within the youth justice system - identify emerging good and promising practice by relating the findings of the process evaluation to the evidence identified in the literature review. Details: London: Youth Justice Board, 2012. 112p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 21, 2017 at: http://dera.ioe.ac.uk/16233/1/preventing-violent-extremism-process-evaluation.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United Kingdom URL: Shelf Number: 146800 Keywords: At-Risk Youth Extremist Groups Preventing Violent Extremism Radicalization Violent Extremism

Author: Sullivan, Brandon A. Title: Financial Crime and Material Support Schemes Linked to al-Qa'ida and Affiliated Movements (AQAM) in the United States: 1990 to June 2014 Summary: This research examines the financial crime and material support schemes linked to al-Qa'ida and affiliated movements (AQAM) in the United States between 1990 and June 2014. It addresses a crucial gap in the current knowledge of terrorism, as studies tend ot focus almost exclusively on violence as opposed to financial crimes. The data analyzed in this report come from the United States Extremist Crime Database (ECDB) and include information on financial crimes and material support schemes in which at least one perpetrator was indicted at either the state or federal level Details: College Park, MD: The Consortium, 2014. 20p. Source: Internet Resource: Report to the Resilient Systems Division, Science and Technology Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland Security. College Park, MD: START, 2014: Accessed September 11, 2017 at: https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_TEVUS_ECDB_Financial%20Crime%20and%20Material%20Support%20Schemes%20Perpetrated%20by%20Supporters%20of%20AQAM_Nov2014_0.pdf Year: 2014 Country: United States URL: https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_TEVUS_ECDB_Financial%20Crime%20and%20Material%20Support%20Schemes%20Perpetrated%20by%20Supporters%20of%20AQAM_Nov2014_0.pdf Shelf Number: 147205 Keywords: Extremist Groups Financial Crimes Homeland Security Terrorism Terrorism Financing

Author: O'Driscoll, Dylan Title: Violent Extremism and Terrorism in Yemen Summary: This rapid review synthesises findings from rigorous academic, practitioner, and policy references, focusing on research produced after 2014 and the most recent escalation of conflict in Yemen, in order to examine the drivers behind, and the (un)appeal of, violent extremism in the country. As a conflict site, Yemen has been much under reported and researched and as a result there are limited studies on the various dynamics of violent extremism in Yemen. Consequently, this report will also point to research gaps and highlight areas where further research on violent extremism in Yemen is needed. Details: Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies, 2017. 33p. Source: Internet Resource: K4K Helpdesk Report, 2017: Accessed September 14, 2017 at: https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/bitstream/handle/123456789/13165/154-156%20Violent%20Extremism%20and%20Terrorism%20in%20Yemen.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Year: 2017 Country: Yemen URL: .https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/bitstream/handle/123456789/13165/154-156%20Violent%20Extremism%20and%20Terrorism%20in%20Yemen.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Shelf Number: 147257 Keywords: Extremist Groups Terrorism Violent Extremism

Author: Ligon, Gina Scott Title: The Jihadi Industry: Assessing the Organizational, Leadership, and Cyber Profiles Summary: The Leadership of the Extreme and Dangerous for Innovative Results (LEADIR) project, funded by DHS S&T OUP since 2010, uses a longitudinal, industrial and organizational (I/O) psychology approach to assess organizational features in relation to their capacity for innovative and violent performance. The scope of the present effort is to use the LEADIR database and an internal strategic organizational approach to gain insight into 10 different violent extremist organizations (VEO) with a foothold in the current "Jihadi Industry." In addition, a VRIO analysis was performed to assess each VEO's unique set of strategic resources (e.g., cyber infrastructure) and capabilities (e.g., attack innovation) that provide a competitive advantage among their industry peers. When examining 10 VEOs in the Jihadi Industry, what are the features that differentiate them? This report, commissioned by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), seeks to address this question by examining a sample of 10 active jihadi organizations through December 31, 2015. Drawing on longitudinal data analytics, organizational science literature, and computer science techniques, this report provides a picture of key organizations operating in the Jihadi Industry. The report's main findings indicate that leadership, organizational structure, and innovation vary across the Jihadi Industry, which has implications for how government resources should be allocated for monitoring and analysis. In addition, the findings highlight the need for additional research to determine advanced indicator and warning signals of which groups will emerge as the most strategically differentiated and capable of malevolent innovation in coming years. Details: College Park, MD: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2017. 63p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 16, 2017 at: https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_CSTAB_JihadiIndustryAssessingOrganizationalLeadershipCyberProfiles_July2017.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_CSTAB_JihadiIndustryAssessingOrganizationalLeadershipCyberProfiles_July2017.pdf Shelf Number: 147366 Keywords: Extremist Groups Extremist Violence Terrorists Violent Extremism

Author: Anti-Defamation League Title: Murder and Extremism in the United States in 2016 Summary: ONE WORD LOOMS OVER THE LANDSCAPE of deadly extremism and terrorism in the United States in 2016: Orlando. The June 2016 shooting spree at the Pulse nightclub in Orlando, Florida, by Omar Mateen - who killed 49 people and wounded 53 more - dwarfed in its lethality all other extremist-related murders this past year. Mateen, who claimed his attack in the name of ISIS, though there are no known connections between him and that terror organization, achieved the dubious distinction of being the deadliest domestic terrorist since Timothy McVeigh bombed the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City in 1995. Last year, the Anti-Defamation League reported that, in 2015, domestic extremists had killed more people than in any previous year since 1995. Largely because of Mateen's attack, 2016 now supplants 2015 in its deadly toll. ADL's preliminary tally of extremist-related deaths at the end of 2015 was 52. However, information that has emerged since then has now brought the 2015 total to 65 deaths at the hands of extremists, as it can sometimes take months or years for an extremist connection to a death to come to light. ADL's preliminary tally for 2016 is already at 69, a figure that includes the 49 killed by Mateen as well as 20 other murders committed by white supremacists, anti-government extremists such as sovereign citizens, and black nationalists. This grisly toll puts 2016 as the second deadliest year for domestic extremist-related deaths in the United States since 1970, the earliest year for which ADL maintains such statistics. The number will inevitably grow higher still as more 2016 murders turn out to have extremist ties. Were it not for the Orlando shootings, 2016 might have been considered a "mild" year for extremist-related deaths. Including Orlando, there were only 11 lethal incidents in the U.S. in 2016 that can be connected to extremism, compared to 29 incidents in 2015. Moreover, the number of incidents involving multiple fatalities in 2016 was only five, half the number of such incidents in 2015. Leaving out the Orlando shootings, one would have to go back all the way to 2006 to find a number of people killed by extremists smaller than that in 2016. The Pulse massacre was a single event so egregious in its casualty tolls that it can actually distort statistics and perceptions surrounding the extremist landscape. It is important to note that the number of Americans killed by domestic extremists is small compared to the total number of murders in the United States or even the number of those who die from gun violence each year. But these deaths represent merely the tip of a pyramid of extremist violence and crime in this country. For every person killed at the hands of an extremist, many more are wounded or injured in attempted murders and assaults. Every year, police uncover and prevent a wide variety of extremist plots and conspiracies with lethal intentions. And extremists engage in a wide variety of other crimes related to their causes, from threats and harassment to white collar crime. To give just one other measure of extremist violence as an example, for the five years from 2012-2016, at least 56 shooting incidents between police and domestic extremists occurred (the vast majority of them shootouts or incidents in which extremists shot at police). During these encounters, extremists shot 69 police officers, 18 fatally. Additionally, compared to many other types of violence, extremist-related violence has the power to shock or spread fear within an entire community - or an entire nation - as the Orlando shootings so tragically demonstrated this past year. The enormity of the attack in Orlando shocked and frightened all Americans, but it was a particular blow to the LGBT community in the United States, as the Pulse nightclub was a gay bar and dance club and most of the victims were gay, lesbian, or transgender. Details: New York: Anti-Defamation League, 2017. 8p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 21, 2017 at: https://www.adl.org/sites/default/files/documents/MurderAndExtremismInUS2016.pdf Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: https://www.adl.org/sites/default/files/documents/MurderAndExtremismInUS2016.pdf Shelf Number: 147425 Keywords: Domestic Terrorism Extremist Extremist Groups Extremist Violence Homicides Terrorism White Supremacists

Author: Parkin, William S. Title: Criminal Justice & Military Deaths at the Hands of Extremists Summary: As there have been a number of high profile incidents where extremists have targeted criminal justice personnel generally, and law enforcement officers specifically, it is important to provide some context with data on attacks over time. START researchers examined the United States Extremist Crime Database (ECDB) to provide analysis on attacks on agents of the criminal justice system and military personnel in the United States between 1990 and 2015. The ECDB identifies 66 criminal justice/military homicides perpetrated by an offender associated with either al-Qaida and its associated movement (AQAM) or far-right extremism (FRE) in this time period. This background report presents information on these incidents, the offenders and victims of these attacks. Details: College Park, MD: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), 2016. 7p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 26, 2017 at: https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_CriminalJusticeMilitaryDeathsbyExtremists_BackgroundReport_Nov2016.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: https://www.start.umd.edu/pubs/START_CriminalJusticeMilitaryDeathsbyExtremists_BackgroundReport_Nov2016.pdf Shelf Number: 147461 Keywords: Extremist Groups Extremist Violence Homeland Security Homicides Military Personnel Terrorists

Author: Webster, William H. Title: Final report of the William H. Webster Commission on the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Counterterrorism Intelligence, and the events at Fort Hood, Texas, on November 5, 2009 Summary: Judge William H. Webster has delivered to the FBI the Final Report of the William H. Webster Commission on The Federal Bureau of Investigation, Counterterrorism Intelligence, and the Events at Fort Hood, Texas, on November 5, 2009. The FBI requested a full investigation of the manner in which the FBI and its Joint Terrorism Task Forces handled and acted on counterterrorism intelligence before and after the Fort Hood shootings, as well as a review and assessment of the FBI's governing authorities and the FBI's remedial measures after the Fort Hood shootings. The investigation did not probe the shootings, which are the subject of a U.S. Army-led inquiry and military criminal proceeding against Major Nidal Hasan. The FBI and Department of Justice provided the commission with more than 100 formal and informal interviews, meetings, and briefings, and more than 10,000 pages of documents. The commission also consulted with outside experts on counterterrorism and intelligence operations, information technology, and violent extremism; public interest groups; and staff from congressional committees with responsibility for oversight of the FBI. The commission found shortcomings in FBI policy guidance, technology, information review protocols, and training, and made 18 important recommendations for corrective and enhancing measures in those areas. The FBI concurs with the principles underlying all the recommendations and has already taken action to implement them based on a combination of the commission's work, the FBI's own internal review of the Fort Hood shootings, and the report of the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. The commission also found that, working in the context of the FBI's pre-Fort Hood authorities, policies, operational capabilities, and technology, personnel who handled counterintelligence information made mistakes. The final report concludes, however: "We do not find, and do not suggest, that these mistakes resulted from intentional misconduct or the disregard of duties. Indeed, we find that each special agent, intelligence analyst, and task force officer who handled the [intelligence] information acted with good intent." Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2009. 173p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 30, 2017 at: https://archives.fbi.gov Year: 2009 Country: United States URL: https://archives.fbi.gov Shelf Number: 147510 Keywords: Counter-terrorism Extremist Groups Foot Hood, Texas Intelligence Gathering Terrorism U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation Violent Extremism

Author: Victoria State Government Title: Expert Panel on Terrorism and Violent Extremism Prevention and Response Powers. Report 2 Summary: In June 2017, the Victorian government established the independent Expert Panel on Terrorism and Violent Extremism Prevention and Response Powers ('Expert Panel'), led by former Victoria Police Chief Commissioner, Ken Lay AO, and former Victorian Court of Appeal Justice, the Hon David Harper AM. The panel was tasked with examining and evaluating the operation and effectiveness of Victoria's key legislation and related powers and procedures of relevant agencies to prevent, monitor, investigate and respond to terrorism. This second report from the panel extends the focus of the first report to include the full spectrum of policies and programs to prevent and intervene early in relation to emerging risks of violent extremism, or to respond rapidly to risks after they have eventuated. It contains 26 recommendations relating to: countering violent extremism; enhancing disengagement programs; changing the definition of a terrorist act; creating a support and engagement order; creating an offence for the possession of terrorism related material; extending the preventative detention scheme to minors; and creating a post-sentence supervision scheme for high-risk terrorist offenders. Details: Melbourne: Department of Premier and Cabinet, 2017. 121p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 21, 2017 at: http://apo.org.au/system/files/120241/apo-nid120241-482731.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Australia URL: http://apo.org.au/system/files/120241/apo-nid120241-482731.pdf Shelf Number: 148285 Keywords: Counter-terrorism Extremist Groups Homeland Security Preventive Detention Terrorism Terrorists Violent Extremism

Author: Eerten, Jan-Jaap van Title: Developing a social media response to radicalization The role of counter-narratives in prevention of radicalization and de-radicalization Summary: Radical groups thrive by spreading their message. They have increasingly used social media to spread their propaganda and promote their extremist narratives. Including on websites such as YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter. In this study, the main question that we investigate is to what extent it is possible to use counter-narrative programs via social media to de-radicalize individuals or prevent violent extremism. We focus on violent radicalization connected to SalafiJihadism. Due to the political and societal context in which this project was initiated, NCTV and WODC were interested in this specific form of radicalization. The method we used consisted of a literature study, interviews (n=8) and three focus groups (n=6, n=7 and n=8) with people with different expertise and backgrounds (including academics, field workers, social media students and a former radical. In this study, narratives are conceptualized as strategically constructed storylines that are projected and nurtured through (online) strategic communication activities by state and non-state actors in attempts to shape how target audiences feel about or understand events or issues, and ultimately, guide their behavior in a manner that is conducive to their aims and goals. We conceptualize counter-narratives as strategically constructed storylines that are projected and nurtured through strategic communication (or messaging) activities with the intention to undermine the appeal of extremist narratives of violent extremist groups. Narratives have been projected by radical groups through a wide range of social media, including YouTube, Twitter and Facebook. For counter-narratives on social media, we identify three domains: (1) countermessaging (e.g., activities that challenge extremist narratives head on); (2) alternative messaging (e.g., activities that aim to provide a positive alternative to extremist narratives); and (3) strategic communication by the government (e.g., activities that provide insight in what the government is doing). A central outcome of our analysis is that to the extent that people have become more radical and strongly identify with an extremist ideology or group, they are less likely to be persuaded by any counter-narrative campaign. In general, it's challenging to persuade people with strong convictions through (online) campaigning. They are typically not very receptive to messages that aim to change their views. However, it will be very difficult to challenge people with extremist attitudes. They may not pay attention to these messages or even may adopt a stronger attitude in the other direction than intended as a reaction to this persuasive attempt. Thus, we argue that counter-narrative campaigns may be most useful for prevention purposes. They could perhaps focus on those that appear to be sensitive to extremist views and information - to the extent that they can be identified meaningfully. In addition, we have raised the question whether or not such counter narrative efforts may have some effect for the individuals from radical groups who show a glimpse of doubt about their group. For such individuals, a counter-narrative message may fall on fertile grounds and a seed may be planted, although this is highly speculative at the moment and more research is needed to support this notion. A sound starting point for designing a counter-narrative campaign is research. One should develop a sound understanding of (the context of) 'the problem', underlying determinants, where communication can potentially contribute to a solution. Here it is advisable to consider relevant theories and insights about radicalization and attitude and behavioral change. Beyond borrowing from existing theory, program planners do well to develop a sound theory of change that explicates how campaign efforts are expected to lead to the desired result. In addition, the audience should be carefully defined and segmented on the bases of meaningful variables. This requires thorough audience research. Campaigns targeting an overly broad and general target audience run the risk of being ineffective and may be counterproductive. It is therefore recommendable to focus on narrow, specific audience segments. In addition to studying the audience, it is important to develop an in-depth understanding of the extremist narratives one aims to counter. When deciding upon which elements of, for example, the Salafi-Jihadi narrative one aims to counter, we argue it is also important to consider why members of the target audience in question may be attracted to these narratives. Radicalizing individuals that are looking for extremist content may have different motives. Different motives of radical people may request different alternative or counter-narrative content. Some may be drawn to an extremist ideology. However, there are a variety of other reasons that may motivate people, such as the need for group-membership and camaraderie, a search for meaning, the need for excitement and adventure. As suggested, it is important to clarify the desired outcome, and the steps towards that outcome. Relatedly, at the outset of a campaign, goals and objectives should be delineated that clearly specify which change one aims to achieve. Well-defined objectives are specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, and time-bound. Running an effective social media effort also requires adequate resources (time, finances, people) which should be assessed at the outset of a program. It is also important to give consideration to potential partners. Involving partners from within local communities in campaign development and delivery may benefit a campaign effort. Control over the message is not strictly assured when it is released on social media. Of course, it is still important to give consideration to the content of the message. As put forward earlier, to the extent that this is possible, it may be fruitful to consider the different motives of radical people. Besides content, it is important to think about different aspects of the message. Messages that use the narrative format have the advantage of using subtle ways to influence people and may overcome various forms of resistance. In addition, double-sided messages (in which one side is being discredited) and messages with a strong emotional appeal may prove to be particularly persuasive. In terms of sources, it is clear that they need to be perceived as credible by the audience in order to function as trustworthy messengers. Commonly mentioned candidates are former extremists, victims of violence, peers and family, as well as key members of communities and civil society actors. The potential of the government to serve as a credible source might be limited. Among other things, the government often suffers from a say-do gap in the eyes of relevant target audiences. Yet, which messenger will in fact effective will depend on the context, the target audience, and the message one wants to relay. Also, it should be noted that source is a murky entity in social media environments. For instance, processes of information transfer may obscure the original source of a message or make it difficult to interpret who the source is. Some researchers also maintain that social media environments complicate traditional insights about credibility indicators. In terms of selected channels, obviously they should be frequently utilized by the audience one intends to reach. Using multiple channels is argued to be beneficial. Importantly, social media may not be appropriate in all circumstances, and linking online with offline activities is suggested to be particularly effective. In terms of message dissemination, one may join already on-going 'conversations'. Also, it may be beneficial to partner up with people and organizations that have already established a strong social media presence and are popular among the target audience. In some cases, it may also be useful to ask established online (news) outlets to share the message. Furthermore, it may be important to create opportunities for audience engagement. One should also give consideration to aspects such as timing and volume. Finally, we argue it is important to assess the potential risks, challenges and limitations when developing a communication strategy. These might include losing control of the message, counter-campaigns, threats to safety and well-being of messengers, and multi-tier approval processes that hamper campaign efforts, as well as the notorious difficulty of demonstrating the effect of counter-narrative efforts. Generally speaking, it is not easy to establish an effect of a policy or measure in counter violent extremism (CVE). For the potential effectiveness of a counter-narrative campaign, it is important to distinguish between a formative evaluation, a process evaluation and a summative evaluation. Specifically tailored at online interventions, we argue that a combination of awareness (e.g., reach and views) and engagement metrics (e.g., likes, shares, comments and emoji responses) can provide some insight into the extent to which a counter-narrative campaign achieved its desired effect. More traditional research techniques such as interviews and focus groups can give insight in the reception of online materials (thus useful in the formative phase), but can also provide input in the interpretation of quantitative data in the summative evaluation phase. Experiments (either offline or online) offer insight in the cause-and-effect-relationship, while "netnography" makes use of data usually obtained from observations of people in their regular social media environments. Sentiment and content analyses are methods to distract the overall evaluation towards a counter-narrative campaign as well as the specific narratives that were put forward in a particular online community. Finally, social network analyses may give insight into the structure of a group and potentially how this might change over time, although the use of this technique in this field has not yet been fully established. Government actors are not well-suited to act as a counter-narrative producer or messenger. They tend to lack credibility as effective messengers with relevant target audiences. In part, because they are perceived to suffer from a say-do gap, which means their actions and words do not always match in the view of the audience. However, they still can still their part. First, governments can fruitfully engage in streamlining their own strategic communications in terms of explaining their own actions locally and in an international context. Second, the government can play a valuable role by facilitating grassroots and civil society actors best placed to act as counter-narrative messengers. They can do so by establishing an infrastructure to support these initiatives and by sponsoring such efforts (providing help, expertise or financial support) as well as. Yet, they should be cautious, as government endorsement or support for such initiatives may act as a 'kiss of death' and undermine them. Thirdly, they could stimulate thorough monitoring and evaluation, as there is only limited evidence for the effectiveness of counter-narrative efforts. Finally, government efforts could focus on supporting the development of programs in the area of strengthening digital literacy and critical consumption skills In terms of limitations of the current study, in our analysis, we have focused only on counter-narratives with respect to the Jihadi ideology. As such, it is not possible to generalize these findings to other groups (e.g., extreme right wings groups). Furthermore, due to the fact that there is hardly any strong empirical research available, we had to base some of our analysis on the general literature on persuasion and communication campaigns, as well as some "grey literature" (e.g., policy papers, working papers, and recommendations). This undermines the options to draw strong conclusions from the current analysis, as one might question the extent to which it is possible to generalize from the general field of persuasion to the specific field of online counternarratives. We conclude that, although presenting online counter-narratives appears to be intuitively an appealing strategy to employ, our analysis shows that this may not be an ideal option to deradicalize people. It might be more fruitful to use counter-narratives in a prevention context, in which people's minds are still open enough to register and process the information presented. Alternatively, it might be possible to explore the options to expose known individuals (e.g., a convicted prisoner) with specific counter-narratives, but ideally not in an online context, but an offline context, in order to directly monitor the reactions of the individuals. Details: Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam - Department of Psychology/Department of Political Science, 2017. 152p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 28, 2017 at: https://english.wodc.nl/binaries/2607_Volledige_Tekst_tcm29-286136.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Netherlands URL: https://english.wodc.nl/binaries/2607_Volledige_Tekst_tcm29-286136.pdf Shelf Number: 148510 Keywords: Counter-radicalization Extremism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Social Media Terrorism Violent Extremism

Author: St. George, Sarah Title: Assessing the Vulnerability in Targets of Lethal Domestic Extremism Summary: Domestic terrorism is a significant issue of concern and in recent years there has been a notable rise in deadly attacks committed by extremists. Extensive government resources have been allocated to prevent domestic terrorist attacks and to harden vulnerable targets. Scholars have conducted numerous studies on domestic terrorism and target selection. However, very little is known about target vulnerability and more specifically about the relationship between target vulnerability, victims and lethality. This dissertation fills this gap and examines the victims of lethal domestic extremist attacks and the situational context that surrounds these incidents. Eight separate measures of vulnerability are examined that are derived from Clarke and Newman (2006)'s EVIL DONE framework. This dissertation expands this framework by applying the framework to human targets and considering the victim and the situational context the victim was in at the time of the attack. The ideological motivation for each attack is examined to determine if there are differences in vulnerability based on motive (ideologically motivated homicides vs. non-ideologically motivated homicides) as well as the ideology of the suspect (right-wing vs. jihadist). Several factors relating to the victim and suspect are also examined. This project utilizes the Extremist Crimes Database (ECDB) and examines lethal incidents of domestic extremism that occurred between 1990-2014. This research makes several important contributions by filling a gap in terrorism literature and helps policymakers with target prioritization. Details: East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University, 2017. 189p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: Accessed January 18, 2018 at: https://search.proquest.com/docview/1949665158?pq-origsite=gscholar Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: https://search.proquest.com/docview/1949665158?pq-origsite=gscholar Shelf Number: 148869 Keywords: Domestic Terrorism Extremist Groups Extremist Violence Homicides Terrorism

Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Title: Handbook on Children Recruited and Exploited by Terrorist and Violent Extremist Groups: The Role of the Justice System Summary: In the past few years, the international community has been increasingly confronted with the recruitment and exploitation of children by terrorist and violent extremist groups. Numerous reports have shed some light on the extent of this disturbing phenomenon. Estimates indicate that, since 2009, about 8,000 children have been recruited and used by Boko Haram in Nigeria. According to a report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, some boys have been forced to attack their own families to demonstrate loyalty to Boko Haram, while girls have been forced to marry, clean, cook and carry equipment and weapons. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights received consistent reports that some boys and girls were increasingly being used as human shields and to detonate bombs. In May 2015, for example, a girl about 12 years old was used to detonate a bomb at a bus station in Damaturu, Yobe State, killing seven people. Similar incidents were reported in Cameroon and the Niger. During attacks by Boko Haram, abducted boys were used to identify those who refused to join the group, as well as unmarried women and girls. In 2015 alone, the United Nations verified 274 cases of children having been recruited by Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in the Syrian Arab Republic. The United Nations verified the existence of centres in rural Aleppo, Dayr al-Zawr and rural Raqqah that provided military training to at least 124 boys between 10 and 15 years of age. Verification of the use of children as foreign fighters has increased significantly, with 18 cases involving children as young as 7 years of age. The use of children as child executioners was reported and appeared in video footage. In Iraq, in two incidents in June and September 2015, more than 1,000 children were reportedly abducted by ISIL from Mosul district. While the lack of access to areas in conflict undercuts the possibility to gather precise data, it is known that recruited children were used to act as spies and scouts, to transport military supplies and equipment, to conduct patrols, to man checkpoints, to videotape attacks for propaganda purposes and to plant explosive devices, as well as to actively engage in attacks or combat situations. These figures are likely to be significant underestimates because of the limited opportunities to gain access and monitor violations against children. Child recruitment is also perpetrated by Al-Shabaab in Kenya and Somalia,5 by the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa, Ansar Eddine and Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb in Mali and neighbouring countries and by the Abu Sayyaf Group in the Philippines, to name a few. Owing to the expanding reach and propaganda of terrorist and violent extremist groups, child recruitment and exploitation are in no way limited to conflict-ridden areas. More and more children are travelling from their State of residence to areas controlled by terrorist and violent extremist groups, in order to join them. They may travel with their families or by themselves, and obtaining comprehensive data on their participation in hostilities is often difficult. In the case of ISIL, for instance, information often becomes available only after the children's death, when they are eulogized as martyrs and their country of origin is revealed. Data collected for more than one year, during the period 2015-2016, concerned 89 children who died in hostilities. They included not only nationals of Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic, but also nationals of Australia, France, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, the Sudan, Tajikistan, Tunisia, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and Yemen. These figures do not include children taken to ISIL territory by their families. Finally, children may also be recruited to support the groups, or even carry out attacks, in countries that are not experiencing armed conflict. Details: Vienna: UNODC, 2017. 160p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 1, 2018 at: https://www.unodc.org/documents/justice-and-prison-reform/Child-Victims/Handbook_on_Children_Recruited_and_Exploited_by_Terrorist_and_Violent_Extremist_Groups_the_Role_of_the_Justice_System.E.pdf Year: 2017 Country: International URL: https://www.unodc.org/documents/justice-and-prison-reform/Child-Victims/Handbook_on_Children_Recruited_and_Exploited_by_Terrorist_and_Violent_Extremist_Groups_the_Role_of_the_Justice_System.E.pdf Shelf Number: 148961 Keywords: Child Exploitation Child Protection Extremist Groups Radicalization Terrorism Terrorist Recruitment

Author: London Assembly. Police and Crime Committee Title: Preventing extremism in London Summary: Preventing individuals from participating in, or supporting, the kinds of extremism that harm individuals and communities is crucial to our safety and security. Extremism, particularly violent extremism, is one of the most serious challenges facing society today. It has the potential to not only manifest itself in physical attacks on people and places, but to isolate individuals and create a breakdown in relationships between communities. Our investigation focused on the implementation of the Government's Prevent Strategy in London. The Strategy-and more recently its Counter-Extremism Strategy-sets out how it intends to help public sector bodies and communities dissuade individuals from engaging in extremism. Throughout our work, one thing stood out to us: that the risk of being drawn into extremist activity is a vulnerability in the same way that some are at risk of exploitation by others. Engaging the person at risk, and all those around them, in an open and honest way is vital to success. Only by being candid about the issues, open about how they are being tackled, and by delivering a strong and positive message, can efforts to prevent extremism be expected to make a difference. The context: the challenges in preventing extremism Instances of violent extremism are sadly not new. However, there has in recent years been a step change in the volume, range, and pace of extremist activity. The nature of the threat from extremist groups is now not only from large scale coordinated attacks, but increasingly from lone individuals inspired and encouraged to carry out attacks in the UK. The violent extremism promoted and carried out by supporters of the so called Islamic State (ISIL) poses the biggest current threat to UK security. But while there will be different priorities at different times, depending on the nature of the threat, it is important that the agenda covers all forms of extremism. For example, London has-and continues to-experience the impact of far right-wing extremism. Examples include the 1999 nail-bomb attacks in Soho, and a neo-Nazi demonstration in June 2015. Extremist groups establish a narrative that is used to encourage people to support them. We heard that attempts to deliver a strong counter-narrative- one that rebuts the claims made by an extremist group and tells a different story-to date have been poor. It was suggested that the current emphasis on de-radicalisation has reduced the focus on developing a broader counternarrative. While this is understandable and necessary, it needs to be in addition to strong preventive work, and both elements need to be funded in a proper way. The internet has opened up new ways to promote extremism. It has also made it more difficult to identify, monitor, and support those at risk. The Met's Counter-Terrorism Internet Referral Unit removes around 1,000 items of material from a range of extremist groups from the internet each week, and this is a trend that is continuing. Engaged and computer-savvy parents and families are critical to addressing the risk present online in their homes, but education for parents and families on managing risk and on their own IT skills needs to improve. The policy: the Government's Prevent Strategy The Government's approach to tackling extremism is set out in its Prevent Strategy. The strategy commits to challenging extremist ideas that can be used to legitimise terrorism, and to intervene to stop people moving towards terrorist-related activity. All local authorities, the police, and the wider public sector are expected to support efforts to prevent extremism. But recently, greater emphasis has been placed on public services through the introduction of a statutory duty for Prevent. This places an obligation on sectors to have due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism, and as a minimum, organisations should demonstrate an awareness and understanding of the risk of radicalisation in their area. It is hard to measure the impact of the Government's approach to preventing extremism. It was suggested to us that the real success of Prevent is achieved through public confidence and through the confidence and buy-in of public services and institutions. The Prevent Strategy has, however, had a troubled history and the feedback we received suggests that neither of these elements is being fully achieved at the moment. Definitions of extremism and radicalisation are highly debated. Each can be defined in different ways and can exist in different forms, and broad definitions could risk labelling some of the more moderate voices as extremist. The Government's increased focus on non-violent extremism, for example, has raised questions with academics and communities. It has also raised questions about the approach that public services need to take when delivering Prevent. The implications of the Government's definition for issues such as freedom of speech and open debate need further consideration, and we recognise that the debate is ongoing. What is meant by extremism, and the types of behaviour considered extreme, is a fundamental concern that communities have with the Government's approach. It needs to get the right balance in both the eyes of communities and public services. Details: London: The Assembly, 2015. 50p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 8, 2018 at: https://www.london.gov.uk/sites/default/files/preventing_extremism_in_london_report.pdf Year: 2015 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://www.london.gov.uk/sites/default/files/preventing_extremism_in_london_report.pdf Shelf Number: 149033 Keywords: Counter-Extremism Counter-Terrorism Extremism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorism Terrorists Violent Extremism

Author: Webb, Emma Title: Wolves in Sheep's Clothing: How Islamist Extremists Exploit the UK Charitable Sector Summary: The British taxpayer has handed over more than L6 million to charities that are currently, or have been in the past, used by extremists to further their radical agenda, according to a new report from the Henry Jackson Society. The report's case studies are illustrative - so L6 million is likely the tip of the iceberg. The money is enough to fund 27,328 hospital beds per day, the annual salary of 234 infantry soldiers, or the salary of 264 new teachers - but instead, it is being handed over to individuals some of whose involvement in extremism can be traced back to the Islamist scene in the early 2000s. Wolves in Sheep's Clothing: How Islamist Extremists Exploit the UK Charitable Sector finds that, despite more than a decade of attempts to improve regulations, a concerning number of UK-registered charities continue to fund and support extremism. Figures from across the Islamist spectrum, including the Muslim Brotherhood, form a network which seeks to delegitimise and push out moderate voices, while masquerading as representatives of 'true' Islam. For example, Helping Households Under Great Stress (HHUGS) is involved in prisoner advocacy - but extreme and illiberal individuals are involved at all levels of the organisation, from trustees to supporters, speakers and beneficiaries. The Charity Commission - legally unable to de-register these 'bad' charities - has been particularly ill-equipped to deal with these organisations. Its powers have been extended in recent legislation, but the public is still waiting for those new powers to be put to use to tackle this problem. The report makes a number of recommendations, including: The Charity Commission must urgently exercise the powers given to it under the Charities Act 2016 to direct the winding up of charities and the removal of inappropriate trustees - as well as become much more proactive in checking the background of trustees. The Government should consider increasing the resources available to the Commission so that they can effectively implement their new powers. HM Revenue & Customs should work closely with the Commission to prevent the misuse of Gift Aid. Ofcom should be granted more powers - and use its current powers more effectively - to deal with channels providing a platform for extremist content, individuals or fundraising for extremist charities. Crowd-funding and event platforms such as Eventbrite, JustGiving and Virgin Giving should do more to prevent extremist charities from raising money and advertising events through their websites. Details: London: The Henry Jackson Society, 2018. 172p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed February 28, 2018 at: http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Wolves-in-Sheeps-Clothes.pdf Year: 2018 Country: United Kingdom URL: http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/Wolves-in-Sheeps-Clothes.pdf Shelf Number: 149289 Keywords: Charities Extremist Groups Islamist Extremists Terrorism Terrorist Financing

Author: Institute for Economics and Peace Title: Global Terrorism Index 2017: Measuring and understanding the impact of terrorism Summary: This is the fifth edition of the Global Terrorism Index (GTI). The report provides a comprehensive summary of the key global trends and patterns in terrorism over the last 17 years in covering the period from the beginning of 2000 to the end of 2016. The GTI is produced by the Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP) and is based on data from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD). Data for the GTD is collected and collated by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START); a Department of Homeland Security Centre of Excellence led by the University of Maryland. The GTD is considered to be the most comprehensive global dataset on terrorist activity and has now codified over 170,000 terrorist incidents. The 2017 GTI report highlights a turning point in the fight against radical Islamist extremism. The main positive finding shows a global decline in the number of deaths from terrorist attacks to 25,673 people, which is a 22 per cent improvement from the peak in 2014. Terrorism has fallen significantly in the epicentres of Syria, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Nigeria, which are four of the five countries most affected by terrorism. The ten countries with the largest improvements experienced 7,348 fewer deaths while the 10 countries with the largest deteriorations experienced only 1,389 terrorism deaths. This highlights the strength of the positive trend with the number of people killed by terrorism decreasing for the second successive year. The largest improvement occurred in Nigeria where terrorism deaths attributed to Boko Haram decreased by 80 per cent in 2016. However, counteracting this, was the number of terrorism deaths attributed to ISIL, which increased by 49 per cent in 2016. The majority of these deaths occurred in Iraq, which accounted for 40 per cent of the increase. ISIL has suffered major battlefield defeats and in sign of its desperation has increased the number of suicide attacks and terrorist attacks on civilians. The group has now been pushed out of most of Iraq and at time of writing no longer controls any major urban centres in the country. However, while the global numbers of deaths and attacks improved in 2016, other trends are disturbing. More countries experienced at least one death from terrorism. This is more than at any time in the past 17 years and reflects an increase from 65 countries in 2015 to 77 in 2016. Two out of every three countries in the Index, or 106 nations, experienced at least one terrorist attack. This is an increase from 95 attacks in the prior year and resulted in the overall global GTI score deteriorating by four per cent since 2015. Aside from the increase in terrorism in Iraq, which is related to ISIL's tactics to delay its defeat, the next largest increases were much smaller. These smaller increases occurred in South Sudan, Turkey, Ethiopia and the Democratic Republic of Congo although it should be noted that the majority of Turkey's terrorism is not related to ISIL. The major battlefield defeats of ISIL in Iraq and Syria in the 18 months prior to June 2017 signalled the beginning of the end of the group's long term territorial ambitions and military strength. As the group has lost territory, it has also suffered a significant loss of revenue, which is estimated to have declined threefold between 2015 and 2016. This decline in revenue is likely to continue throughout the remainder of 2017 and into 2018. Due to its territorial losses, the group has a dramatically smaller revenue base from tax collections with much of its oil deposits also either lost or destroyed. As its battlefield losses have intensified, many foreign and domestic fighters have deserted and sought to return to their countries of origin. These developments fundamentally undermine the group's ability to recruit based on its existing marketing strategy and brand, which has been partly centred on an image of invincibility. More troubling, is the potential for many hardened fighters and leaders to leave Iraq and Syria to join new radical permutations of ISIL or existing ISIL affiliates in other countries. This has contributed to a continuation of last year's trend of an expansion of ISIL expanded activities into other countries. However while the number of countries that suffered an ISIL directed attack increased from 11 in 2015 to 15 in 2016, six fewer countries suffered an attack from an ISIL affiliated group. The major challenge facing post-conflict Iraq will be whether the government can build a more inclusive society and address the grievances that have fuelled sectarian violence and terrorist activity. There still remain large supplies of small arms and weapons as well as many former combatants and radicalised individuals. The decline of Boko Haram following interventions from the Multinational Joint Task Force has contributed to an 80 per cent fall in the number of deaths caused by the group in 2016. Consequently there were substantial improvements in the GTI ranking of Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger and Chad. This coincided with the splintering of the group into three separate groups although Nigeria will likely continue to face challenges as 13 separate groups undertook attacks in 2016. This includes attacks in the Niger Delta, as well as by Fulani extremists in the Middle Belt. The picture in Afghanistan is more complex. While the Taliban reduced their use of terrorist tactics in 2016, especially against civilians, the group stepped up their conventional armed conflict with the government. The Taliban was responsible for nearly 18,000 battle-related deaths in 2016, which is nearly 700 more than in 2015. This is the most since the war commenced in 2001. Consequently, the group expanded its direct territorial control and as of April 2017 controlled at least 11 per cent of the country and contested at least 29 per cent of Afghanistan's 398 districts. In Europe and other developed countries, ISIL's activity was the main driver for a continuation of a negative trend. The year 2016 was the most deadly for terrorism for OECD member countries since 1988; although this analysis excludes the September 11 attacks. However, ISIL's diminishing capacity has coincided with positive trends in the first half of 2017 with the number of deaths dropping to 82 compared to 265 deaths in 2016; although this analysis excludes Turkey and Israel. Since 2014, 75 per cent of terrorist deaths in OECD countries have been ISIL directed or inspired. Associated with this trend was a change in terrorist tactics used in OECD countries. Since 2014, there has been a general shift towards simpler attacks against non-traditional and softer civilian targets. ISIL inspired attacks also increased to 68 in 2016 from 32 in 2015. A greater number of attacks were foiled by security services with half of the attacks using bombs and explosives thwarted. Two years ago, only a third of these types of attacks were foiled by security services. These more sophisticated types of attacks involve more people and planning, and therefore are more likely to be detected. Less sophisticated attacks that can be executed at lower cost can be more difficult to detect. It should be noted the 2016 levels of terrorism in OECD counties is not without precedence. Since 1970 there have been nearly 10,000 deaths from terrorism in OECD countries, excluding Turkey and Israel, with 58 per cent of these deaths occurring prior to 2000. ISIL is only the fourth most deadly group and accounts for 4.7 per cent of terrorist deaths in OECD countries since 1970. Separatist groups such as Irish separatists (IRA) and Basque nationalists (ETA) have killed over 2,450 people since 1970, accounting for 26 per cent of the total deaths from terrorism since 1970. The 2017 report highlights how terrorism remains unevenly spread throughout the world. Central America and the Caribbean continues to be the least affected region. There were only 12 deaths recorded in 2016, which accounts for less than 0.4 per cent of all terrorism deaths. Meanwhile, 94 per cent of all terrorist deaths are located in the Middle-East and North Africa, sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. When examining the drivers of terrorism the presence of armed conflict, political violence by governments, political exclusion and group grievances remain critical factors. The analysis finds that 99 per cent of all deaths over the last 17 years has been in countries that are either in conflict or have high levels of political terror. Political terror involves extrajudicial killings, torture and imprisonment without trial. This shows that the great majority of terrorism is used as a tactic within an armed conflict or against repressive political regimes. It also demonstrates the risks of political crackdowns and counterterrorism actions that can exacerbate existing grievances and the drivers of extremism and terrorism. Both Egypt and Turkey recorded substantially higher levels of terrorism following government crackdowns. The global economic impact of terrorism in 2016 was slightly lower than 2015 although it still cost the global economy US$84 billion. While this is a significant number in its own right, it is important to note that the economic impact of terrorism is small compared to other major forms of violence. This amount is only one per cent of the total global economic impact of violence, which reached $14.3 trillion in 2016. However, the figures for terrorism are conservative as they do not account for the indirect impacts on business, investment and the costs associated with security agencies in countering terrorism. As a result, terrorism is one of the few categories of violence where the costs associated with containment likely exceed its consequential costs. However, while the economic impact of terrorism is small it is still critical to contain it as it has the potential to spread quickly and with major social ramifications. Details: New York: Institute for Economics & Peace, 2018. 120p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 12, 2018 at: http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2017/11/Global-Terrorism-Index-2017.pdf Year: 2018 Country: International URL: http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2017/11/Global-Terrorism-Index-2017.pdf Shelf Number: 149443 Keywords: Extremist Groups Lone Wolf Terrorists Radical Groups Terrorism Terrorists Violent Extremists

Author: Sheikh, Sanah Title: Literature review of attitudes towards violent extremism amongst Muslim communities in the UK Summary: The Office of Public Management (OPM) has been commissioned by the Department for Communities and Local Government (CLG) to conduct a literature review that provides a better understanding of the perceptions of, and attitudes towards, violent extremism. The specific objectives of the review are to provide an overview of evidence on: - what Muslim communities' attitudes are towards violent extremism; - what Muslim communities understand by 'violent extremism' and how this understanding is shaped; - the reasons given for supporting or condemning violent extremism; - any patterns of change in attitudes over the last decade, and reasons for this change; and - how attitudes relate to behaviour towards violent extremism. The literature search, review and synthesis were informed by good practice guidelines issued by government agencies1 and universities. 2,3 These have been developed with the specific aim of synthesising diverse material to inform the evidence-based policy and practice movement within the UK. The search was conducted in partnership with search specialist, Alan Gomersall, Deputy Director of the Centre for Evidence-Based Policy and Practice (CEBPP). The review as conducted over a number of stages and literature was identified from a number of sources including database searches, expert and prevent lead consultation, website searches and OPM and CLG collected literature. After a rigorous sifting process, 36 items were included for review. The review found that there is a lack of clarity around the terminology used to describe violent extremism and 'support' for it. Additionally, there are also some limitations to the methods utilized in the material reviewed, and hence the data generated. Methodological weaknesses and a lack of detail around certain aspects of the methods used meant that it was difficult to assess the representativeness and significance of findings. This is the case, for example, for a number of polls and surveys, 4 which have been quoted extensively in this report. In the case of these studies, there is a lack of explanation about the methodology used, including the construction of the sample. Additionally, the purpose of these studies is to conduct a snap shot of public attitudes, rather than a more rigorous research study of the attitudes and beliefs in the Muslim community. Caution should therefore be used when interpreting findings. Details: London: Great Britain, Office for Public Management, Department for Communities and Local Government, 2010. 93p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed March 20, 2018 at: https://lemosandcrane.co.uk/resources/Violent%20extremism%202.pdf Year: 2010 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://lemosandcrane.co.uk/resources/Violent%20extremism%202.pdf Shelf Number: 118589 Keywords: Extremist Groups Muslims Public Attitudes Radical Groups Terrorism Violent Extremism

Author: Baldo, Suliman Title: Radical Intolerance: Sudan's Religious Oppression and Embrace of Extremist Groups Summary: The Obama and Trump administrations, in temporarily and then permanently lifting comprehensive sanctions on Sudan, cited improvements in the Sudanese government's counterterrorism and its broader humanitarian and human rights record. But a closer look reveals these claims to be very problematic, with major implications for the next stage of dialogue and policy between the United States and Sudan. Now that the comprehensive sanctions have been lifted, it is essential that the United States pivot rapidly and aggressively to the relationship's next phase, which should focus on creating leverage in support of American counterterrorism interests and much more fundamental reforms that could change the nature of the authoritarian, kleptocratic Sudanese state and better secure the rights of Christians, minority Muslims, war-affected Sudanese people, and others who have been victimized by this regime for nearly 30 years. Khartoum's track record raises critical questions about its role and true interests as a counterterrorism partner. Top U.S. policymakers who chart the next phase of engagement with Sudan should account for this as they engage in anticipated discussions about remaining sanctions, a significant shift in bilateral relations, terminating Sudan's designation as a state sponsor of terrorism, and forgiving Sudan's debt, estimated to have mushroomed to $50 billion.[i] Sudan's intolerant regime has a long-established tradition of religious persecution that continues today despite its bid for normalized ties with the United States and the rest of the world. It also has maintained long relationships with active extremist groups. This record suggests Sudan may be an untrustworthy partner in the bid to push back against religious extremism that is gaining momentum in the region and is essential for combatting international terrorism. The next phase of the policy effort should therefore focus on more structural changes in Sudan to address these core problems that continue to be central to the Sudanese regime: links to extremists and deep discrimination against religious minorities. Details: Washington, DC: Enough Project, 2017. 26p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 30, 2018 at: https://enoughproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/SudanReligiousFreedom_Enough_Dec2017_final.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Sudan URL: https://enoughproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/SudanReligiousFreedom_Enough_Dec2017_final.pdf Shelf Number: 149962 Keywords: Extremism Extremist Groups Muslims Radical Groups Terrorism

Author: Global Witness Title: "At Any Price We Will Take the Mines": The Islamic State, The Taliban, and Afghanistan's White Talc Mountains Summary: In April 2017, the largest non-nuclear weapon in the United States arsenal, the 'Mother of All Bombs', crashed into a hillside in the district of Achin in eastern Afghanistan, targeting a network of tunnels held by the Afghan affiliate of the Islamic State (known as Islamic State - Khorasan Province, or ISKP). But on satellite photos, craters of another sort stand out, starting just a few hundred meters from the impact area: the marks of extensive mining for minerals at sites along the length of the valley. ISKP controls a limited amount of territory in Afghanistan, but that includes parts of the country's rich mineral wealth, especially talc, chromite and marble. There are conflicting indications about how much they have exploited the mines so far: the available satellite imagery does not appear to show vehicles in the main ISKP-controlled area around Achin's Momand valley, and several sources denied mining had taken place since ISKP seized it in mid-2015. At the same time, multiple other credible sources reported that they have indeed benefitted at least to some extent from extraction and from taxing the minerals trade, and that they had done so with a tighter grip than the Taliban. Whatever the reality, the danger is clear. Natural resources have long had a place in ISKP strategy in other countries, and that seems to be echoed in Afghanistan. In late 2017 more than 60,000 people were displaced by fighting between ISKP and the Taliban for control of other mineral-rich districts close to Achin: a Taliban official explicitly linked the ferocity of the battle to the struggle over the mines. An Afghan police source said ISKP had attempted to build a road to smuggle minerals south over the border to Pakistan. As early as 2015 an Afghan ISKP commander described control of mines in one mineral-rich province as a key priority, saying: "at any price we will take the mines." But the threat from ISKP is just one dramatic illustration of the much wider danger of conflict and corruption around Afghanistan's resources. In Nangarhar, our research documented the Taliban�s grip on the talc trade, which generates millions for them from just a few districts. Satellite imagery shows extensive activity, including use of heavy machinery, at sites reported to be under Taliban influence, and trucks carrying minerals are routinely taxed. The onward trade is reportedly dominated by politically-connected strongmen, and widespread corruption costs the government millions in revenue. Beyond Nangarhar, mining has been a key revenue source for insurgents, strongmen and illegal militias - and a key driver of instability - across the whole country. And while talc may be the least glamorous of conflict minerals, ultimately much of its value comes from America and Europe. Our research indicated that almost all Afghan talc generates revenue for the Taliban, and almost all is exported to Pakistan. The majority of Pakistani exports in turn actually originate in Afghanistan: and the largest single market for them is the United States, with European countries not far behind. Consumers in those countries are almost certainly unwittingly helping to fund the insurgency. There are no easy responses to this challenge. But there are basic measures which are realistic and could help, and which the government and its allies have yet to implement so far. Part of this is direct pressure. Minerals like talc and marble need trucks to transport and are relatively easy to interdict. Much more could also be done to increase controls on the trade in Pakistan, and further up the supply chain. A greater emphasis on security in mining areas is another fundamental step, although clearly a difficult and risky one: it is hard to deal with illegal mining if armed groups hold the mines. Those measures would help to target the Islamic State and Taliban directly, but returning the mines to government control will be of limited benefit if abusive extraction simply continues under other masters. And durably displacing abusive extraction is difficult without filling the resulting vacuum, with a cleaner extractive sector that benefits all Afghans. That is the ultimate endgame in any case: the aim is not to close down the trade but to make it legitimate. In other words, the Islamic State's interest in Afghanistan's minerals should be an urgent wake-up call not just for the fight against extremist armed groups, but for the wider reform that the sector has been lacking so far. And there are eminently realistic measures to implement that reform, based on the three core principles of transparency, community benefit and monitoring, and stronger oversight. They include amending the law to make contract publication a condition of validity, creating a single transparent account to be used for all payments as a condition for their receipt, and using the network of Community Development Councils to deliver a percentage of mining revenues to local communities. If ordinary traders and local communities can profit from legal mining, it will give them a reason to push back (to the extent they are able) against the takeover of resources by armed groups or corrupt strongmen, and reduce the political pressure on the government to turn a blind eye to abuses. For its part, the Afghan government is relying on mining to help fund its budget and grow the economy, and has specifically identified talc as a priority for development. But without stronger action, it is hard to see those hopes being realistic. To be fair, the government says it recognises the problem, and it deserves real credit for publishing mining contracts and making some strong commitments on more systematic reforms. But progress in actually implementing those reforms has been much more limited, with critical measures like revenue transparency and community benefit often more of an ideal than a reality, and amendments to the mining law still under discussion. A 2015 ban on the talc trade showed that the government could impose effective restrictions on illegal mining, but was dropped within months under pressure from traders. And as a whole, the international response has also been inadequate (with some exceptions): the key concern of the Trump administration, for example, seems to be to press the Afghan government to give US companies a greater stake in Afghan resources. The scale of the challenge is significant - especially for the Afghan government, which faces many other problems, not least a large-scale insurgency. None of our recommendations offers a silver bullet. But even if the government and its partners cannot tackle illegal mining everywhere, they could start by making limited, key areas (like the Nangarhar mines) a particular focus for security and a showcase for reforms, and put in place the higher-level changes which are within their control. Without action, as Nangarhar so powerfully demonstrates, the reasonable expectation is that Afghanistan's resources will do much more harm than good. That is a threat which must not be ignored Details: London: Global Witness, 2018. 76p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 3, 2018 at: https://www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/afghanistan/talc-everyday-mineral-funding-afghan-insurgents/ Year: 2018 Country: Afghanistan URL: https://www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/afghanistan/talc-everyday-mineral-funding-afghan-insurgents/ Shelf Number: 150455 Keywords: Conflict Minerals Extremist Groups Illegal Mining Islamic State Natural Resources Taliban Terrorist Financing Terrorists Theft of Natural Resources

Author: European Police Office - EUROPOL Title: TE-SAT 2017: Terrorism Situation and Trend Report Summary: In 2016 a total of 142 failed, foiled and completed attacks were reported by eight Member States. More than half (76) of them were by the UK2. France reported 23 attacks, Italy 17, Spain 10, Greece 6, Germany 5, Belgium 4 and Netherlands 1. Of the 142 attacks, less than half (47) were completed. Member States reported that 142 victims died as a result of terrorist attacks and 379 people were injured. Nearly all reported fatalities and most of the casualties were the result of jihadist terrorist attacks. The total number of 142 attacks is a continuation of a downward trend that started in 2014 when there were 226 attacks, followed by 211 in 2015. The largest number of attacks in which the terrorist affiliation could be identified were carried out by ethno-nationalist and separatist extremists (99). Attacks carried out by left-wing violent extremists have been on the rise since 2014; they reached a total of 27 in 2016, of which most (16) were reported by Italy. The number of jihadist terrorist attacks decreased from 17 in 2015 to 13 in 2016, of which 6 were linked to the so-called Islamic State (IS). However, a precise ranking amongst and within terrorist affiliations across the EU cannot be established because the UK does not provide disaggregated data on attacks. Explosives were used in 40% of the attacks, with similar numbers to 2015. The use of firearms dropped considerably from 57 in 2015 to 6 in 2016. Apart from jihadist, ethno-nationalist and left-wing extremist attacks, an increasing stream of violent assaults by right-wing extremist individuals and groups was noted across Europe, in particular over the past two years, targeting asylum seekers and ethnic minorities in general4. These assaults however do not generally qualify as terrorism5 and are therefore not included in the numbers of terrorist attacks being reported by Member States, with only one exception in 2016, reported by the Netherlands. The number of arrests for terrorist offences in 2016 (1002) is lower than that of 2015 (1077). Most arrests were related to jihadist terrorism, for which the numbers rose for the third consecutive year: 395 in 2014, 687 in 2015 and 718 in 2016. Numbers of arrests for left-wing and separatist terrorist offences dropped to half of what they were in 2015 (from 67 and 168 in 2015 to 31 and 84 in 2016 respectively). Numbers of arrests for rightwing terrorism remained low at 12 in 2016 compared to 11 in 2015. France is the only Member State in which the overall numbers of arrests continue to increase: from 238 in 2014, to 424 in 2015 and to 456 in 2016. Almost one-third of arrestees (291) were 25 years old or younger. Only one in ten arrestees (9%) in 2016 was older than 40 years. Arrests for terrorist activities (preparing, financing, assisting, attempting or executing attacks) decreased from 209 in 2015 to 169 in 2016. Arrests for travelling to conflict zones for terrorist purposes also decreased: from 141 in 2015 to 77 in 2016. This was similar to the decrease in numbers of arrests of people returning from the conflict zones in Syria and Iraq: from 41 in 2015 to 22 in 2016. Details: The Hague: EUROPOL, 2017. 62p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 20, 2018 at: https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/main-reports/eu-terrorism-situation-and-trend-report-te-sat-2017 Year: 2017 Country: Europe URL: https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/main-reports/eu-terrorism-situation-and-trend-report-te-sat-2017 Shelf Number: 150609 Keywords: Extremist Groups ISIS Jihadists Security Terrorism Violent Extremists

Author: Institute for Integrated Transitions Title: The Limits of Punishment: Transitional Justice and Violent Extremism Summary: The Limits of Punishment is a research project led by the United Nations University's Centre for Policy Research, in partnership with the Institute for Integrated Transitions, and supported by the UK Department for International Development. It seeks to understand if, when and how transitional justice, in combination with other conflict resolution tools, can contribute to transitions away from conflict in settings affected by major jihadist groups. Specifically, it aims to answer two questions: 1. What are the effects of current approaches toward punishment and leniency for individuals accused of association with jihadist groups in fragile and conflict-affected states? 2. What factors should policymakers consider in designing alternative and complementary strategies leveraging transitional justice tools to better contribute to sustainable transitions away from conflict? To answer the first question, the project undertook three fieldwork-based case studies that assessed nationally-led approaches to handling individuals accused of having been associated with: al Shabaab in Somalia; Boko Haram in Nigeria; and the Islamic State (IS) in Iraq. The case studies look at a broad range of formal and informal mechanisms of punishment and leniency. These include, inter alia: amnesties; prosecutions; traditional justice; and disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration (DDR), rehabilitation, and similar programs that, in practice, offer some individuals alternatives to criminal justice. The case studies demonstrate the risks of excessively heavy-handed and at times indiscriminate approaches that penalise broad sectors of local populations accused of association with these groups, and assess the quality and limitations of existing leniency programs for such individuals. To answer the second question, the Institute for Integrated Transitions' Law and Peace Practice Group - a group of leading transitional justice experts - analysed the empirical evidence of the case studies in light of broader lessons learned from decades of international practice in the field of transitional justice. On this basis, the Group developed a framework to assist national policymakers and practitioners - as well as their international partners - in applying transitional justice tools as part of a broader strategy to resolve conflicts involving groups deemed violent extremist. The framework offers a range of approaches toward effectively balancing leniency and accountability, that can be tailored to conflict settings marked by violent extremism. Details: Tokyo: United Nations University, 2018. 146p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 29, 2018 at: http://ifit-transitions.org/resources/publications/major-publications-briefings/the-limits-of-punishment-transitional-justice-and-violent-extremism/final-the-limits-of-punishment-01062018.pdf/view Year: 2018 Country: International URL: http://ifit-transitions.org/resources/publications/major-publications-briefings/the-limits-of-punishment-transitional-justice-and-violent-extremism/final-the-limits-of-punishment-01062018.pdf/view Shelf Number: 150732 Keywords: Conflict Resolution Extremist Groups Jihadists Punishment Radical Groups Terrorists Transitional Justice Violent Extremism

Author: International Centre for the Prevention of Crime (ICPC) Title: Dispositif d'intervention sur la radicalisation violente en milieu ouvert : identification des difficultes et des besoins des professionnels des SPIP, aide a l'adaptation des pratiques Summary: The International Centre for the Prevention of Crime (ICPC) carried out a research-action over 18 months in collaboration with the French Penitentiary Administration (DAP) in order to develop an intervention response for individuals who have been radicalized or are in the process of radicalization within the Penitentiary Services for Integration and Probation (SPIP) within the probation system. This project was developed in three pilot sites: Grenoble, Lyon and Nice. This "intervention response" is understood as a set of actions and initiatives implemented at the institutional level to counter violent radicalization, namely: - A decision-making support system in the process of identifying and reporting individuals who have been or are being radicalized. For this purpose, the following products were developed by the research-action: - An Identification and Reporting Protocol for individuals who have initiated a process of radicalization leading to violence, and - A Semi-Structured Interview Guide for the Identification of individuals who have initiated a process of radicalization leading to violence. - A support system for individuals who are at risk or are already radicalized. For this component, three different actions were developed: - Two collective actions, one of which is primary-secondary prevention (Vivre Ensemble) and the other is secondary-tertiary prevention (CODE), as well as - An individual program for the prevention of recidivism (Accordeon). This research-action is a world first. Never has a project of such magnitude been implemented within the probation system. Violent radicalization although very popular remains very difficult to apprehend. This is the reason why this research-action is quite unique considering its very great ambition that is to think of and create identification and support procedures and methods. This Report is aiming to present the work achieved from July 4, 2016 to December 31, 2017, by pilot research units (mainly professionals of the Ministry of Justice and the ICPC) in the framework of the project: "Intervention response to violent radicalization within the probation system: identifying the challenges and the needs of the SPIPs professionals, and support to adapt practices". This report describes the methodology used, developed products, the results of the process evaluation and the impact of this approach as well as the actions implemented. Details: Montreal: The Centre, 2018. 146p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 3, 2018 at: http://www.crime-prevention-intl.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Publications/2018/Rapport_final_RAMO__Copie_securisee_.pdf Year: 2018 Country: France URL: http://www.crime-prevention-intl.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Publications/2018/Rapport_final_RAMO__Copie_securisee_.pdf Shelf Number: 150761 Keywords: Extremism Extremist Groups Extremist Violence Prisoners Probationers Radical Groups Radicalization Terrorists Violent Extremists

Author: Qehaja, Florian Title: The unexplored nexus: Issues of radicalisation and violent extremism in Macedonia Summary: Violent extremism and radicalisation in Macedonia are at the crux of the complex puzzle in the broader jigsaw of state-building and societal cohesion. While the individual drivers of violent extremism in Macedonia are consistent to findings elsewhere, this study uncovers structural drivers rooted specifically in the Macedonian context, all of which have contributed to the longer-term consequences that paved the way to radicalisation. As a consequence, the myriad of societal and inter-ethnic problems led to the religionization of a part of the society and the entrenchment of ethnic groups in their own particular identity, with some adopting a more conservative national or religious ideology. The growth of radicalisation and extremism has occurred "under the surface", within a context of uneven domestic politics and the contested international political standing of the country pertaining name issue. On occasion there have even been cases where the previous ruling party of Macedonia has misrepresented the presence of religious extremism to deepen the ethnic cleavages in the country. With the new government of mid-2017, however, the country is taking a clear and more comprehensives tandon the issue. There have been tangible efforts to properly invest on the prevention of violent extremism specifically and facilitate better inter-ethnic relations generally in the country. Details: Pristine: Kosovar Centre for Security Studies, 2018. 45p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 30, 2018 at: http://www.qkss.org/en/Reports/The-unexplored-nexus-Issues-of-radicalisation-and-violent-extremism-in-Macedonia-1070 Year: 2018 Country: Macedonia URL: http://www.qkss.org/en/Reports/The-unexplored-nexus-Issues-of-radicalisation-and-violent-extremism-in-Macedonia-1070 Shelf Number: 150966 Keywords: Extremist Groups Radical Groups Radicalization Violent Extremism

Author: Kosovo Centre for Security Studies Title: Kosovo Security Barometer: Citizens' perceptions on Violent Extremism Summary: This report is a special edition of the Kosovo Security Barometer (KSB). It represents a detailed quantitative analysis reflecting citizens' opinion on violent extremism. The results of this report show that religiously motivated violent extremism continues to be perceived as a threat to Kosovars, though not to a large extent. Respondents consider that internal religious extremism presents a larger threat to the Kosovan society rather than internationally functioning terrorism such as ISIS. The results of this survey reaffirmed that the vast majority do not support the decision of individuals to join foreign conflicts. The results showed that the respondents are largely concerned of the potential threat posed by the radicalized individuals, thus majority remained against reintegration of foreign fighters. The report measured citizens' trust towards security institutions, underlining the importance of understanding the national experts to prevent and combat violent extremism. However, the results showed that only Kosovo Police gains sufficient trust while citizens� trust towards the judicial bodies and the Government in general continues to bear extremely low trust. Finally, the report also underlined that when it comes to violent extremism, there is a low frequency of communication between citizens and respective municipal institutions. Likewise, it highlighted the potentially important role of media when it comes to developing the citizens' mind-set regarding the violent extremism. Details: Prishtina, Kosova: Kosovar Centre for Security Studies, 2017. 57p. Source: Internet Resource: Kosovo Security Barometer: Accessed August 9, 2018 at: http://www.qkss.org/repository/docs/KSB_MENTORI_FINAL_605403.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Europe URL: http://www.qkss.org/repository/docs/KSB_MENTORI_FINAL_605403.pdf Shelf Number: 151098 Keywords: Extremist Groups Terrorism Terrorists Violent Extremism (Kosovo)

Author: Ruteere, Mutuma Title: Confronting Violent Extremism in Kenya: Debates, Ideas and Challenges Summary: This pioneering collection brings together critical analyses on a range of issues touching on violent extremism by a multidisciplinary team of scholars and scholar-practitioners with an intimate and long-standing interest on the subject in Kenya, the region and globally. They cover the breadth as well as depth of the complex problem of violent extremism in a manner and language that speaks to both scholars and policy makers. The contributions are concerned with a number of problems related to terrorism in Kenya: the regional nature and dimensions of the problem; legal and judicial developments to counter the threat of terrorism; patterns and trends in the recruitment into Al- Shabaab and other violent extremist groups; State and society interactions, contestations and confrontations in countering violent extremism; location of women in the terrorism discourse; new technologies and how they shape violent extremism; and the questions of rehabilitation and reintegration of ex-combatants and returnees from Al-Shabaab. The aim of the papers in this collection is to provoke and stimulate the ongoing scholarly and policy conversations on what the spectre of violent extremism means for Kenya's future and fortunes as a fledgling democracy. The studies provide new knowledge, data and perspectives on the nature, magnitude and dimensions of the problem of violent extremism in Kenya. The studies are nuanced but have not shied away from recognising difficulties, highlighting policy and knowledge gaps and making policy recommendations where possible. Details: Nairobi: Centre for Human Rights and Policy Studies, 2018. 184p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 20, 2018 at: https://www.chrips.or.ke/publications/research-reports/confronting-violent-extremism-in-kenya-debates-ideas-and-challenges/ Year: 2018 Country: Kenya URL: https://www.chrips.or.ke/publications/research-reports/confronting-violent-extremism-in-kenya-debates-ideas-and-challenges/ Shelf Number: 151592 Keywords: Extremism Extremist Groups Terrorism Violent Extremism

Author: Busher, Joel Title: The Internal Brakes on Violent Escalation: A Descriptive Typology Summary: Why do some 'extremists' or 'extremist groups' choose not to engage in violence, or only in particular forms of violence? Why is it that even in deeply violent groups there are often thresholds of violence that members rarely if ever cross? The basic premise of this project is to look at the 'internal brakes' on violent escalation: the intra-group mechanisms through which group members themselves contribute to establish and maintain parameters on their own violence. Such internal brakes are often evident in detailed accounts of decision-making within groups that use or flirt with violence, yet they are rarely examined systematically. The aim of this project was to develop a descriptive typology of the internal brakes on violent escalation that could provide a basis for more systematic analysis of such brakes. The authors used three very different case studies to construct, test and refine the typology: the transnational and UK jihadi scene from 2005 to 2016; the British extreme right during the 1990s, and the animal liberation movement in the UK from the mid-1970s until the early 2000s. The typology -- The typology is based around five underlying logics on which the internal brakes identified in this project operate: Brake 1 - strategic logic: Identification of non- or less violent strategies of action as being as or more effective than more violent alternatives. Brake 2 - moral logic: Construction of moral norms and evaluations that inhibit certain forms of violence and the emotional impulses towards violence. Brake 3 - logic of ego maintenance: Self-identification as a group that is either nonviolent or uses only limited forms of violence. Brake 4 - logic of out-group definition: Boundary softening in relation to putative out-groups such as opponents, opponents' perceived supporters, the general public or state actors. Brake 5� - organisational logic: Organisational developments that either (a) alter the moral and strategic equations in favour of non- or limited violence, (b) institutionalise less violent collective identities and/or processes of boundary softening, and/or (c) reduce the likelihood of unplanned violence. A number of issues require careful attention if this typology is to be used, as intended, to support evaluation of the threats from and opportunities to inhibit, escalation towards violence, and it is clear that the typology cannot be use as a straightforward 'checklist'. However, in recent years a growing number of academics have begun to highlight the need for a more detailed understanding of the processes of non- or limited escalation. This typology provides an important step in that direction. Details: Lancaster, UK: Department of Psychology, Lancaster University, Centre for Research and Evidence on Security Threats (CREST), 2019. 108p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed march 12, 2019 at: https://crestresearch.ac.uk/resources/internal-brakes-full-report/ Year: 2019 Country: United Kingdom URL: https://crestresearch.ac.uk/resources/internal-brakes-full-report/ Shelf Number: 154902 Keywords: Extremism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Violent Extremism

Author: Koehler, Daniel Title: Violence and Terrorism from the Far-Right: Policy Options to Counter an Elusive Threat Summary: Extreme right-wing violence and terrorism are a growing threat to Western societies. This form of political violence is also quite elusive and differs from others (e.g. jihadist violence) in some key characteristics. Since the September 11 attacks, policy makers, law enforcement and intelligence agencies as well as researchers have focused most of their attention on Islamic extremist violence and terrorism. This has led to an imbalance in the understanding of other threats, especially from the far-right, and adequate ways to counter it. This paper, using Germany as a main case study, argues that far-right violence has a potential risk of being misunderstood and under-classified, thus creating the perception among victims of that violence that democratic countries "are blind on the right side". This erosion of trust in the rule of law and the monopoly of force is one goal of extreme right-wing terrorists. Specific recommendations to improve countering the threat posed by the far-right are avoiding double standards in dealing with political violence at all costs, swift and efficient appropriate legal actions against extreme right perpetrators of violence, an increase in funding for research about right-wing terrorism, a possible refinement of the legal definition of "terrorism" and a discussion about its relationship with hate crimes, as well as wide scale support for countering violent extremism (CVE) and deradicalisation programs targeting the far-right. Details: The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2019. 21p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 8, 2019 at: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Koehler-Violence-and-Terrorism-from-the-Far-Right-February-2019.pdf Year: 2019 Country: Germany URL: https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Koehler-Violence-and-Terrorism-from-the-Far-Right-February-2019.pdf Shelf Number: 155701 Keywords: Counter-terrorism Extremism Extremist Groups Radical Groups Terrorism Terrorists Violent Extremism

Author: Economist Intelligence Unit Title: The Global Illicit Trade Environment Index: Serbia, Bosnia and Montenegro Summary: Geography, history and political culture (characterised by high levels of corruption) combine in the economies of the former Yugoslavia (and the Balkans in general) to create a range of issues when it comes to combatting illicit trade. Serbia, for one, lies on a major trade corridor known as the Balkan route, which is used by criminal groups for various activities, including human trafficking and the trafficking of drugs coming from Asia and South America. Montenegro's ports are similarly used as transit points for the unloading and reloading of illicit cargo destined for Central and Western Europe. Bosnia's porous borders with the former two economies, as well as with neighbouring Croatia, enable easy transit from Eastern Europe and the Balkans region to economies in Western Europe. This could be made worse by the adoption of a Visa Liberalisation Agreement between the European Union's (EU) Schengen zone and Kosovo (which lies in an area considered by Serbia to be vulnerable to trafficking), expected by the end of the year. Compounding the problem, the disintegration of Yugoslavia in the 1990s, and the accompanying conflicts, is thought to have led to an increased risk of terrorism in the region - with an increase in Islamic radicalisation and in nationals of countries and territories in the region joining the so-called Islamic State (IS) as foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq. Ethnic separatist and religious extremist groups are active in some southern regions of Serbia and Kosovo, whose declaration of independence in 2008 was not recognised by Belgrade. These factors lead to increased terrorist financing and thus money laundering. Bosnia's complex and decentralised government structure has also been an obstacle to reforms, and corruption is prevalent in all three economies. This briefing paper will look at the illicit trade environment in Bosnia, Serbia and Montenegro across the four categories of the index: government policy, supply and demand, transparency and trade, and the customs environment. It will consider how these economies compare at global and regional levels, as well as looking at some of the details particular to each. Details: New York: Transnational Alliance to Combat illicit Trade (TRACIT), 2018. 22p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 21, 2019 at: https://www.tracit.org/uploads/1/0/2/2/102238034/eiu_serbia_bosnia_and_montenegro_illicit_trade_paper_final.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Serbia and Montenegro URL: https://www.tracit.org/uploads/1/0/2/2/102238034/eiu_serbia_bosnia_and_montenegro_illicit_trade_paper_final.pdf Shelf Number: 156582 Keywords: Drug Trafficking Extremist Groups Financing of Terrorism Human Trafficking Illegal Trade Illicit Trade Organized Crime Political Corruption Terrorism